JAMES D PRESLER V CITY OF WHITE CLOUD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JAMES D. PRESLER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 27, 1997
Plaintiff/Appellant/
Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 189878
Newaygo Circuit Court
LC No. 94-014884-NI
THE CITY OF WHITE CLOUD, TOWNSHIP OF
EVERETT and THE COUNTY OF NEWAYGO,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
THE BOARD OF COUNTY ROAD
COMMISSIONERS OF THE COUNTY OF
NEWAYGO,1
Defendant/Appellee/
Cross-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Markey and J.C. Kingsley*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to White
Cloud.2 Plaintiff also appeals an earlier order of the trial court granting summary disposition in favor of
the Road Commission on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the statutory notice period. The
Road Commission cross-appeals as of right from the trial court’s denial of its initial motion for summary
disposition involving the statute of limitations. We affirm the granting of summary disposition in favor of
White Cloud and the Road Commission for the reasons stated in this opinion.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting White Cloud’s motions to dismiss under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) because White Cloud’s repair and maintenance of the
accident site gave it jurisdiction over the area of roadway at issue and subjected White Cloud to liability
under the highway exception to governmental immunity. MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). We
disagree. This Court has held that “jurisdiction” as used in the highway exception to governmental
immunity is synonymous with “control,” so as to limit liability for defective highways to the entity with the
authority to construct, repair and maintain them. Markillie v Bd of Co Rd Commissioners of Co of
Livingston, 210 Mich App 16, 21-22; 532 NW2d 878 (1995). This Court has also refused to extend
jurisdiction over county roads to municipalities simply because the municipalities assume maintenance
over them, Kuhn v Associated Truck Lines, Inc, 173 Mich App 295, 300; 433 NW2d 424 (1988),
and has stated that there can be no concurrent jurisdiction over highways. Berry v City of Belleville,
178 Mich App 541, 547; 444 NW2d 222 (1989).
Here, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting White Cloud’s motion for summary
disposition because White Cloud established as a matter of law that it did not have jurisdiction over the
roadway at issue. Plaintiff’s assertions that White Cloud repaired and maintained the road and fixtures
around the accident scene are not enough to confer jurisdiction over the accident scene on White
Cloud. Markillie, supra at 21-22; Kuhn, supra at 300. Because it did not have jurisdiction over the
roadway at issue, White Cloud is not liable for the alleged defects of which plaintiff complains and is
entitled to claim governmental immunity. Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 374; 501 NW2d 155
(1993); Berry, supra at 547.
On cross-appeal, the Road Commission claims that the trial court erred in not granting its initial
motion for summary disposition because plaintiff did not file his amended complaint or serve notice upon
the Road Commission until the limitations period had expired. We agree. The period of limitations for
claims against a governmental agency arising out of the negligent maintenance of a highway is two years
under MCL 691.1411; MSA 3.996(111). West v Livingston Co Rd Commission, 131 Mich App
63, 65; 345 NW2d 608 (1983).
Where a defendant is brought into an action for the first time through the filing of an amended or
supplemental complaint, the filing of the amendment constitutes the commencement of the action against
that defendant. The statutory period continues to run until the time of the filing of the amendment. If at
that time the action is barred, a party subsequently brought in may claim that he is not liable because the
statute of limitations has expired. Forest v Parmalee (On Reh), 60 Mich App 401, 406; 231 NW2d
378 (1975), aff’d on other grds, 402 Mich 348; 262 NW2d 653 (1978). An exception to this rule is
that an additional defendant may be brought in after the statute of limitations has expired where the
amendment corrects a defect in the original proceeding, Id., such as when the right party is served under
a wrong name or in an incorrect capacity. Ray v Taft, 125 Mich App 314, 320; 336 NW2d 469
(1983). In those situations, courts have deemed the applicable statute of limitations tolled because the
true defendant had notice of the litigation and was not prejudiced by the amendment. Id.
Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff did not serve the chairperson or the clerk of the Road
Commission with his original complaint until after the limitations period had expired, and that the
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amended complaint was not even filed until after the limitations period had expired. Plaintiff attempts to
avoid the statute of limitations in this case by arguing that the Road Commission was aware of the suit,
should have realized that they were the proper party to the suit, and that substituting the Road
Commission for the County of Newaygo only corrected the name of a proper party. Contrary to
plaintiff’s position, plaintiff’s filing of an amended complaint naming the Road Commission in place of the
County of Newaygo did not merely correct a misnomer. Ray, supra at 320. Counties and county road
commissions are recognized as separate “political subdivisions” and “governmental agencies” by MCL
691.1401(b) and (d); MSA 3.996(101)(b) and (d). County road commissions are also recognized as
bodies corporate under MCL 224.9(1); MSA 9.109(1), and MCL 224.21; MSA 9.122 provides that
actions for failure to maintain safe highways “shall be brought against the board of county road
commissioners . . . and service shall be made upon the clerk and upon the chairperson of the board.”
Accordingly, we believe that under these facts, no exception to the rule regarding the amendment of
complaints to add additional parties applied and that the Road Commission was entitled to summary
disposition because the statute of limitations had expired.
Because we agree with the Road Commission that they were entitled to summary disposition on
the basis of the statute of limitations, we need not address plaintiff’s issue that summary disposition was
improperly granted in the Road Commission’s favor on the basis of plaintiff’s failure to comply with the
statutory notice provisions contained in MCL 224.21; MSA 9.121 and MCL 691.1404; MSA
3.996(104). Even assuming arguendo that we agreed with plaintiff that summary disposition on this
basis was improperly granted, summary disposition in the Road Commission’s favor would still have
been proper on the basis of the statute of limitations, and plaintiff would be entitled to no relief because
this Court will not reverse the trial court where the right result is reached for the wrong reason. Welch v
District Court, 215 Mich App 253, 256; 545 NW2d 15 (1996).
We affirm the granting of summary disposition in favor of White Cloud and the Road
Commission for the reasons stated in this opinion. Both defendants having prevailed, they may tax costs
pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ James C. Kingsley
1
For ease of reference, defendant City of White Cloud will be referred to as “White Cloud” and the
Board of County Road Commissioners for the County of Newaygo will be referred to as “the Road
Commission.”
2
This was the final order in plaintiff’s case because White Cloud was then the only defendant remaining
in the suit. The County of Newaygo was dismissed on its motion for summary disposition on
September 28, 1994, Township of Everett by stipulation on May 15, 1995, and the Road Commission
on its motion for summary disposition on June 12, 1995.
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