GWENDOLYN BAKER V BECKER GROUP INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GWENDOLYN BAKER,
UNPUBLISHED
May 23, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v
No. 195408
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 95-499745-CZ
BECKER GROUP INC.,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Hood and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order of dismissal, granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim barred because of release). Defendant cross appeals from
the trial court’s order of dismissal, denying its motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no
genuine issue regarding any material fact and moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law). We affirm the
order of dismissal, finding that summary disposition should have been granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
I.
Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a quality control inspector. While working on August 8, 1991,
plaintiff dropped a tape gun onto her small toe. As she bent down to remove the tape gun, she injured her back.
Plaintiff consequently took a medical leave of absence as of August 22, 1991, for one year. She attempted to return to
work on August 21, 1992, by giving defendant a note from her physician stating that she was able to return to work.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff’s union and defendant, an employee who was on
medical leave for more than thirty days could not return to work without first being examined by defendant’s staff
physician. Thus, defendant informed plaintiff that she could not return to work without being examined by
defendant’s doctor, which she subsequently did. The doctor indicated that plaintiff could not return to work without
the restrictions of standing and bending, which her job required her to do. Because the collective bargaining
agreement also provided that an employee would be terminated if absent from work for one year, defendant
terminated plaintiff on August 26, 1992.
After she was terminated, plaintiff filed a grievance. A grievance meeting was conducted, during which it
was agreed that plaintiff would undergo an independent medical examination by a third-party physician, whose
conclusion regarding whether plaintiff could return to work would be binding on the parties. Plaintiff was thereafter
examined by Dr. Richard Reilly, who determined that she could return to work without restrictions. However, neither
plaintiff nor her union received the results of the examination and she was not rehired by defendant. Plaintiff
subsequently filed a claim for worker’s compensation benefits, which resulted in a settlement of $5,000. In
consideration for the money, plaintiff signed a release and waiver, in which she agreed not to seek reemployment with
defendant or pursue other worker’s compensation benefits. Plaintiff later filed this suit alleging handicap
discrimination.
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II.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(7) regarding her claim for handicap discrimination because she did not waive her right to bring suit
under the Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act (HCRA) by signing the release and waiver. Rather, plaintiff maintains that
she merely waived her right to seek re-employment with defendant in exchange for the worker’s compensation
settlement of $5,000.
MCR 2.116(C)(7) provides in relevant part that “a party may move for dismissal of or judgment on all or part
of a claim [if] . . . the claim is barred because of release.” This Court reviews a summary disposition determination de
novo as a question of law. Florence v Dep’t of Social Services, 215 Mich App 211, 214; 544 NW2d 723 (1996). A
motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7) may be supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence. Patterson v Kleiman, 447 Mich 429, 432; 526 NW2d 879 (1994). If such documentary
evidence is presented to the court, it must be considered when deciding the motion. MCR 2.116(G)(5).
Plaintiff entered into an agreement to redeem liability and a “release and waiver of seniority” agreement with
defendant on December 22, 1994. The agreement to redeem liability indicated that plaintiff agreed to redeem liability
for all benefits under worker’s compensation in consideration for $5,000. The release and waiver of seniority
provided:
WHEREAS GWEN BAKER has filed a claim under the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act for
injury alleged to have resulted from his/her employment;
And whereas the employer, BECKER MANUFACTURING has denied liability, the
undersigned, in consideration of settlement of the claim through redemption proceedings with the
Worker’s Disability Compensation Department, does hereby voluntarily quit his/her employment
with said employer, waives any and all seniority rights he/she may have, and releases any claim
he/she may have for re-employment based on such seniority rights and further agrees not to seek
re-employment with the above-named employer.
If a contract’s language is clear, its construction is a question of law for the court. G&A Inc v Nahra, 204
Mich App 329, 330; 514 NW2d 255 (1994). When presented with a dispute, a court must determine what the parties’
agreement is and enforce it. Id. Contractual language is given its ordinary and plain meaning, and technical and
constrained constructions are avoided. Id., pp 330-331.
The language of the release and waiver clearly indicates that plaintiff agreed to voluntarily quit her
employment with defendant, waived any seniority rights and any claim for re-employment based on such rights, and
agreed not to seek re-employment, in consideration for $5,000. The agreement to redeem liability also clearly stated
that plaintiff “agree[d] to redeem any and all liability for any and all benefits under the Worker’s Disability
Compensation Act.” Neither the release and waiver, nor the agreement to redeem liability stated that plaintiff waived
any handicap discrimination claim or that she waived any and all claims she had against defendant.
Defendant points out that plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to defendant on November 14, 1994, before
entering into the release and waiver, which indicated that plaintiff believed defendant had violated the HCRA by
refusing to reinstate her from her medical leave after Dr. Reilly determined she was able to work without restrictions.
The letter further stated:
However, before we file suit on [plaintiff’s] behalf it is our practice, w[h]ere practical, to offer the
defendant an opportunity to provide us with any information they might have which would
demonstrate that our client’s claim lacks merit or, in the alternative, to explore settlement of our
client’s claim.
Accordingly, we will postpone filing a complaint on Ms. Baker’s behalf for twenty (20)
days to allow you an opportunity to respond to this letter.
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Defendant contends that this letter demonstrates that plaintiff intended to waive her claims under the HCRA
because she entered into the release after sending the letter, and did not raise the claim when she agreed to the
settlement. We do not agree with defendant’s contention because the letter and the release cannot be read, by their
clear and unambiguous language, as indicating that plaintiff waived her claim of handicap discrimination. Had
plaintiff intended to waive all her claims, then the language of the release would have indicated that.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) because the release and waiver did not bar plaintiff from bringing a claim for handicap discrimination
against defendant.
III.
On cross appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied its motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) because plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of handicap
discrimination. Specifically, defendant argues that plaintiff did not establish that defendant made any adverse
employment decision toward her on the basis of handicap.
In reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding a motion for summary disposition brought pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10), this Court examines all relevant affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other documentary evidence
and construes the evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. Sanchez v Lagoudakis (On Remand), 217 Mich App
535, 539, 522 NW2d 472 (1996). This Court then determines whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on which
reasonable minds could differ. Id. We review de novo a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary
disposition. Id.
Section 202(1)(b) of the HCRA, MCL 37.12012(1)(b); MSA 3.550(202)(1)(b), provides that an employer shall
not “[d]ischarge or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to compensation or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of a handicap that is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform
the duties of a particular job or position.” To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the HCRA, it must
be shown that (1) the plaintiff is “handicapped” as defined in the HCRA, (2) the handicap is unrelated to the
plaintiff’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job, and (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of
the ways set forth in the statute. Sanchez, supra, p 539.
MCL 37.1103(e)(i)(A); MSA 3.550(103)(e)(i)(A) defines handicap, in relevant part, as:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual, which may result
from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of
that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to perform the duties of a particular job or
position or substantially limits one or more of the m
ajor life activities of that individual and is
unrelated to the individual’s qualifications for employment or promotion.
“‘Unrelated to the individual’s ability’ [means that], with or without accommodation, an individual’s handicap does
not prevent the individual from . . . performing the duties of a particular job or position.” MCL 37.1103(l)(i); MSA
3.550(103(l)(i). Moreover, discriminatory actions taken against an employee based on an employer’s belief that the
employee has a handicap unrelated to job performance are prohibited under the HCRA. Sanchez, supra, pp 556-557.
To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff was first required to establish that she was handicapped as defined
by the act and that the handicap was unrelated to her ability to perform the duties of a particular job. Plaintiff took a
medical leave of absence from her job from August 1991 until August 1992. She produced a note from her physician
stating that she could return to work on August 22, 1992. Defendant had the right to terminate plaintiff if she did not
return to work on August 23, 1992, under the collective bargaining agreement because she would have been on
medical leave for one year. Pursuant to defendant’s policy, plaintiff was required to be evaluated by defendant’s
physician before she could return to work after having been absent on medical leave for over thirty days. Plaintiff
was consequently examined by defendant’s physician, who indicated that plaintiff could not return to work without
the restrictions of bending and standing. Plaintiff was required to bend and stand in order to perform her job. She
was terminated by defendant on August 26, 1992 because she had been absent from work for over one year.
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Plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance, and as a result, the parties agreed that plaintiff would undergo an
independent medical examination by a third-party doctor, whose determination of whether plaintiff could return to
work would be binding. Accordingly, plaintiff was examined by Dr. Richard Reilly, who determined that she was able
to return to work without restrictions. Dr. Reilly sent a letter indicating his conclusions to defendant’s staff
physician, Dr. Blau, on December 3, 1992. However, plaintiff was not informed of the results of Dr. Reilly’s
examination and she was not rehired.
Plaintiff testified that she called Donna Obrycki and Anna Showman of human resources, to find out the
results of the examination, but they did not return her calls. Plaintiff then called her union representative, Shirley
Wallace, who told plaintiff that Showman did not give her any information. Wallace eventually stated that she would
follow up with Showman to obtain the results, but Wallace never obtained the information for plaintiff. On the other
hand, Showman testified that she was never contacted by plaintiff or Wallace regarding the results of the
independent medical examination. Showman stated that if plaintiff had requested to return to work, she would have
been allowed to do so. Shirley Wallace testified that plaintiff called her once or twice to inquire about Dr. Reilly’s
conclusion, and she contacted Showman once or twice in response, but Showman told her that she did not have any
information and that she would get back to her. However, Wallace claims she was not contacted by Showman.
Plaintiff claims that defendant discriminated against her by refusing to allow her to return to work. She does
not contest that defendant initially had a right to require her to be examined by defendant’s doctor before allowing
her to return to work after several months medical leave. Rather, plaintiff objects to the fact that defendant did not
provide her with the results of Dr. Reilly’s medical examination and allow her to return to work based on his findings.
Both parties acknowledge that, at that point, plaintiff was able to return to work without restrictions. We believe that
there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not handicapped or perceived to be handicapped within
the meaning of the HCRA because there was no question that defendant knew plaintiff could return to work without
restrictions.
Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(10) because there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not handicapped or perceived to be
handicapped within the meaning of the HCRA.
Therefore, although the trial court improperly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and denied defendant’s motion pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), we affirm the order of dismissal
because the court reached the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. Hawkins v Dep’t of Corrections, 219 Mich
App 523, 528; 557 NW2d 138 (1996).
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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