PEOPLE OF MI V RONNIE L WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 23, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 188273
LC No. 93-130196-FH
RONNIE L. WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Smolenski and T.G. Power*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver more than
225 grams but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1) and MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii), possession with intent to deliver more than 225 grams
but less than 650 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(ii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(ii), and fleeing
and eluding a police officer, MCL 750.479a(1); MSA 28.747(1)(1). Defendant was sentenced to
consecutive terms of twenty to sixty years’ imprisonment for the conspiracy and possession convictions.
Defendant was also sentenced to one year imprisonment for the fleeing and eluding conviction, such
sentence to run concurrently with the conspiracy sentence. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy conviction.
Specifically, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence of an agreement between himself,
Gover and Powell.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could have found that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Medlyn, 215 Mich
App 338, 340; 544 NW2d 759 (1996). The gist of the offense of conspiracy is the unlawful agreement
between two or more persons. People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 481; 505 NW2d 843 (1993). There
must be evidence of specific intent to combine with others to accomplish an illegal objective. Id. For
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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intent to exist, the defendant must know of the conspiracy, must know of the objective of the
conspiracy, and must intend to participate cooperatively to further that objective. Id. at 485. However,
direct proof of agreement is not required, nor is proof of a formal agreement necessary. It is sufficient
that the circumstances, acts and conduct of the parties establish an agreement. People v Cotton, 191
Mich App 377, 393; 478 NW2d 681 (1991).
In this case, evidence was presented that defendant and Powell were business associates in the
drug trade. Approximately two weeks before the instant offenses, Powell took Gover from Detroit to
Flint where Gover stayed for approximately one week for the purpose of selling drugs supplied to him
by Powell. Powell also gave Gover money. At the end of the week, Powell picked up Gover and took
him back to Detroit.
On the day of the instant offenses, Powell again contacted Gover by telephone. Although
Powell did not expressly refer to drug dealing on the telephone, Gover “had an idea of what he was
talking about” because Powell “said a few words in somewhat of a code.” Powell subsequently picked
up Gover and drove Gover to defendant. The three men were going to drive from the Detroit area to
Flint. After getting into defendant’s vehicle, Powell showed Gover a bag outside the presence of
defendant and told Gover that the bag contained narcotics. Defendant then entered the driver’s
compartment of the vehicle. The bag was sitting in the front seat area. At some point, defendant asked
Gover whether Gover was “ready to make some money,” which Gover understood to refer to his going
to Flint to sell drugs. On the way to Flint, Powell and Gover engaged in a discussion concerning the
nature of Gover’s duties with respect to selling drugs in Flint. Defendant drove and listened to this
conversation.
When a police car activated its lights for the purpose of stopping defendant’s vehicle, Powell
started to throw the bag of cocaine out of the window but was stopped by defendant. After the police
officer placed Powell in the police car, defendant and Gover engaged in a discussion concerning a plan
whereby Gover would jump out of the vehicle, dispose of or hide the drugs and meet later with
defendant. Defendant drove away from the scene of the stop and Gover grabbed the bag of cocaine,
which was now underneath the passenger seat. Defendant drove on the road’s shoulder and told Gover
to jump. Gover jumped out of the moving vehicle with the bag of cocaine and was apprehended by the
police. Defendant was not apprehended by the police at this point.
Defendant had previously utilized a man named Boatwright to sell cocaine for defendant in Flint.
Boatwright testified that in September, 1993, he had a discussion with defendant and Powell about the
instant offenses, and that defendant admitted that the cocaine in the bag was his cocaine.
Viewing the evidence of defendant’s association with Powell, their recruitment of people to sell
drugs for them in Flint, defendant’s admitted knowledge of the cocaine in the bag and conduct of
defendant, Powell and Gover on the day in question in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the element of agreement, i.e., a specific intent
to combine with others to accomplish an illegal objective, was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See
Meredith, supra at 411.
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Next, defendant argues that insufficient evidence was presented that he possessed the cocaine.
We disagree. The element of possession may be either actual or constructive. People v Catanzarite,
211 Mich App 573, 577; 536 NW2d 570 (1995). Constructive possession is established where the
accused had the right to exercise control of the cocaine and knew that it was present. Id. In this case,
evidence was presented that defendant prevented Powell from throwing the bag out the window and
that he subsequently acknowledged that the cocaine was his. Viewing this evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the element
of possession was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to
amend the conspiracy count to include Powell as a member of the conspiracy after the proofs were
concluded. This Court will not reverse a trial court’s decision to amend an information unless it finds
that the defendant was prejudiced in his defense or that a miscarriage of justice resulted. MCR
6.112(G); MCL 767.76; MSA 28.1016; People v Weathersby, 204 Mich App 98, 103; 514 NW2d
493 (1994). The key question is whether the amendment prejudiced the defendant. People v
Covington, 132 Mich App 79, 86; 346 NW2d 903 (1984).
Here, the original information only listed Gover as a coconspirator with respect to the
conspiracy charge. At trial, the court granted the prosecutor’s motion to amend the information to also
include “Kevonta Johnson, also known as KP or Kenneth Powell” as a coconspirator. A review of the
record reveals that the amendment merely reiterated information that had been presented at trial. All
relevant evidence regarding Powell’s role in the drug deal was readily available to defendant before the
amendment occurred. Moreover, defendant was able to cross-examine Gover as to Powell’s role in
the conspiracy. Defendant has failed to establish prejudice so as to merit relief.
Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that defendant engaged
in six cocaine deals after the instant offenses. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision regarding the
admission or exclusion of bad acts and similar acts evidence for an abuse of discretion. Catanzarite,
supra at 579. In People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445
Mich 1205 (1994), our Supreme Court outlined the standard to be utilized when determining whether
evidence of other acts is admissible under MRE 404(b):
First, that the evidence be offered for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b);
second, that it be relevant under Rule 402 as enforced through Rule 104(b); third, that
the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice;
fourth, that the trial court may, upon request, provide a limiting instruction to the jury.
This Court has held that evidence of prior drug dealing is relevant to the issue of a defendant’s intent to
deliver. People v Mouat, 194 Mich App 482, 484-485; 487 NW2d 494 (1992).
In this case, defendant’s theory of defense was that he was simply giving his companions a ride
and that he had no knowledge of the cocaine in his vehicle. Before trial, the prosecutor gave notice that
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it would seek to introduce evidence of defendant’s subsequent drug deals as proof of defendant’s
knowledge of and intent to distribute cocaine. At trial, the court ruled that the evidence was admissible.
The court conducted the analysis required by VanderVliet and concluded that the evidence of
defendant’s subsequent drug deals was relevant with respect to the issues of intent, motive, plan and
scheme, and that the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. During final jury instructions, the court extensively cautioned the jury that it could not
consider the evidence of defendant’s subsequent drug deals as evidence that defendant was a bad man
and therefore that he probably committed the crimes with which he was charged, but rather that it could
only consider the evidence of defendant’s subsequent drug deals with respect to the issues of
defendant’s motive, intent and knowledge. We agree with the court’s analysis and find no abuse of
discretion. Catanzarite, supra.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Thomas G. Power
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