DETROIT FREE PRESS V DEPT OF STATE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DETROIT FREE PRESS,
UNPUBLISHED
May 16, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 188313
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 92432519 CZ
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Marilyn Kelly and J.B. Sullivan,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this action brought under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), MCL 15.231 et seq.;
MSA 4.1801(1) et seq., defendant appeals as of right from a grant of summary disposition for plaintiff
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (C)(10). The trial court held that defendant violated the FOIA by
charging plaintiff approximately $50 million for its request of motorists’ records.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in substituting its determination of the fee to be
charged for public records for the fee determination made by the Secretary of State pursuant to
Legislative enactment. It asserts that its policies and actions were not arbitrary or capricious. It argues
that the trial court erred when it awarded attorney fees to plaintiff after determining that defendant’s fee
requirement constituted a constructive denial of plaintiff’s FOIA request. Finally, defendant argues that
the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff’s status as a member of the press entitled it to treatment
different from that afforded to other members of the public. We affirm in part, reverse in part and
remand.
I
Pursuant to the FOIA, Detroit Free Press staff writer Dan Gillmor requested from defendant a
copy of the computer tape containing the records of all Michigan motorists. The Free Press wanted to
examine the relationship between accidents, motorists with bad driving records and the manner in which
drivers were treated by the judicial system.
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Defendant informed Gillmor that the entire file was available for duplication. However, the Free
Press would be responsible for the commercial look-up fee of $6.55 for each motorist’s record as
prescribed by the Legislature. 1990 PA 208, § 904. Because there are approximately 7.6 million
records on computer tape, the total charge for the file was $49,770,000.
After plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to persuade defendant to lower its fees, it filed a
complaint alleging that defendant violated the FOIA by arbitrarily and capriciously determining that the
fee for plaintiff’s information request would be nearly $50 million.
Following cross-motions for summary disposition, the trial court found that the $50 million fee
was clearly prohibitive and constituted a constructive denial of the request. The court also found that
the information request was for the benefit of the public. It determined that the Legislature’s reason for
setting the fee for a request at $6.55 a record was unclear and held that the $6.55 charge was not
binding on defendant in this case, because the request was for the public’s benefit. The court stated that
it was attempting to interpret the FOIA in the best interest of the public given the conflict between
defendant’s authority to charge a look-up fee and the intent of the FOIA to provide the public with
government records. However, the court noted that the duplication of the data file would require the
creation of a new computer program that could delete confidential information not disclosable under the
FOIA. The court directed the parties to arrive at a reasonable fee that would cover defendant’s actual
costs in meeting the information request.
Plaintiff filed a motion for entry of judgment, alleging that an independent computer consultant
determined that it would cost defendant only $135 to comply with the request. Defendant objected to
entry of the order, because it determined the cost for compliance to be $81,600. According to
defendant, each record would have to be individually edited in order to delete information that is
classified as confidential under the FOIA.
The trial court appointed its own expert, Barry Brickner, to assist in understanding the
practicality of creating a computer program that would redact exempt information from disclosure.
Brickner estimated that the cost of reprogramming would be $6,080, but recommended that plaintiff not
be charged for reprogramming, because defendant had not charged others for it in the past.
Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for entry of judgment. Defendant responded by requesting that
plaintiff be charged a reasonable fee of $6,080 for reprogramming, $6,300 for computer time spent
running the program and $120 to cover the costs of copying the information.
Based upon the recommendations of Brickner, the court did not charge plaintiff for
reprogramming costs. The court found that defendant’s reasonable costs for supplying the requested
information were $6,420. It also ordered defendant to pay plaintiff’s reasonable attorney fees and costs
associated with the FOIA request pursuant to MCL 15.240(4); MSA 4.1801(10)(4), as plaintiff was
the prevailing party.
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II
First, defendant argues that the trial court improperly substituted its determination of the fee to
be charged for that of the Secretary of State. We disagree.
The fee that may be charged by a public body for a request of information under the FOIA is
set forth in MCL 15.234; MSA 4.1801(4), which provides in relevant part, as follows:
(1) A public body may charge a fee for providing a copy of a public record.
Subject to subsection (3), the fee shall be limited to actual mailing costs, and to the
actual incremental cost of duplication or publication including labor, the cost of search,
examination, review, and the deletion and separation of exempt from nonexempt
information as provided in section 14. Copies of public records may be furnished
without charge or at a reduced charge if the public body determines that a waiver or
reduction of the fee is in the public interest because furnishing copies of the public
record can be considered as primarily benefiting the general public.
***
(3) In calculating the costs under subsection (1), a public body may not attribute
more than the hourly wage of the lowest paid, full-time, permanent clerical employee of
the employing public body to the cost of labor incurred in duplication and mailing and to
the cost of examination, review, separation, and deletion. A public body shall utilize the
most economical means available for providing copies of public records. A fee shall not
be charged for the cost of search, examination, review, and the deletion and separation
of exempt from nonexempt information as provided in section 14 unless failure to charge
a fee would result in unreasonably high costs to the public body because of the nature of
the request in the particular instance, and the public body specifically identifies the
nature of these unreasonably high costs. A public body shall establish and publish
procedures and guidelines to implement this subsection.
(4) This section does not apply to public records prepared under an act or
statute specifically authorizing the sale of those public records to the public, or where
the amount of the fee for providing a copy of the public record as otherwise specifically
provided by an act or statute.
Defendant argues that the fee limitation of the FOIA is inapplicable, because two congressional
acts specifically authorize the sale of the registration lists and provide that a fee of $6.55 can be charged
for each transaction. First, § 232 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides in pertinent part:
The secretary of state is hereby authorized to sell, or contract for the sale of,
any motor vehicle registration lists in addition to those distributed at no cost under this
section and to sell or furnish any other information from the records of the department
pertaining to the sale, ownership, and operation of motor vehicles. The secretary of
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state shall fix a reasonable price or charge for the sale of such lists or other information
and the proceeds therefrom shall be added to the state highway fund provided for
herein. [MCL 257.232; MSA 9.1932.]
Moreover, 1990 PA 208, the appropriations bill in effect at the time of the initiation of this suit,
provides:
[T]he department of state may provide a commercial look-up service of motor
vehicles, including off-road vehicles and snowmobiles, watercraft, personal
identification, and driver records on a fee basis of $6.55 per transaction and use the fee
revenue received from the service for necessary expenses as appropriated in section
101. [1990 PA 208, § 904.]
In effect, defendant argues that these two provisions specifically authorize the sale of public
records to the public. Therefore, the fee provisions of the FOIA do not apply.
Recently, this Court addressed what constitutes specific authorization under the FOIA.
Grebner v Clinton Charter Twp, 216 Mich App 736; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). In Grebner, we held
that a primary definition of the word “specific” is “explicit.” Id. at 743, citing Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary, p 1285, def 1. Because the Michigan Election Law, § 522, provided
only for the payment of costs of preparing copies of voter registration records as opposed to their sale,
the exception to the FOIA fee restrictions did not apply. Grebner, supra at 743.
Here, we agree with defendant that the Motor Vehicle Code explicitly authorizes the sale of
motor vehicle registration lists and other information from the motor vehicle records. MCL 257.232;
MSA 9.1932. However, we find that the appropriations bill does not explicitly authorize the sale of lists
or information. Rather, it states that defendant may provide a look up service and charge a transaction
fee of $6.55. This is not the explicit authorization contemplated by the FOIA in order to render
inapplicable its cost provisions. Grebner, supra. Therefore, we conclude that defendant was not
authorized to charge $6.55 per transaction for plaintiff’s request. Defendant was permitted, however,
to charge a reasonable fee as provided by the Motor Vehicle Code. MCL 257.232; MSA 9.1932.
We agree with the trial court that a $50 million fee is unreasonable.
III
Next, defendant argues that, in determining the reasonableness of the fee, the trial court
improperly accepted the opinion of the court appointed expert, Brickner, when it failed to charge
plaintiff a fee for reprogramming defendant’s computers to comply with the request. Defendant argues
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a fee had been routinely charged for this
service in the past.
Plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition was granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and
(C)(10). It appears, however, that this precise issue was decided under MCR 2.116(C)(10) as the trial
court found no genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant had routinely charged others for
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reprogramming the computer. A motion under this section is not proper where there is a genuine issue
of material fact. Johnson v Wayne Co, 213 Mich App 143, 149; 540 NW2d 66 (1995). We
consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and any other documentary evidence in favor
of the opposing party. Id.
We find that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff should have been
charged the cost for reprogramming defendant’s computer to accommodate plaintiff’s FOIA request.
Brickner opined that plaintiff should not be charged for reprogramming, because defendant had not
charged others for it in the past. Brickner based this conclusion on the deposition of Michael Miner,
Director Systems Programming Division, Bureau of Information Systems for the state. Miner testified
that defendant had not charged its customers for the cost of reprogramming computers.
However, in opposition to Brickner’s findings, defendant submitted the affidavit of Robert
Walker, the director of the Michigan Bureau of Information Systems. He stated that defendant had
previously charged, and still charges, for unique computer programming in o
rder to comply with a
request under the FOIA. Walker stated that previously the charge had been paid by the requesting
party directly to Unisys, the company that performed the computer programming for the state. Walker
related that plaintiff’s request could not be completed using existing programs and that new
programming would be required.
The testimony of Walker and Miner creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
defendant’s past and present policy was to charge a requesting party for unique computer programming
needed to complete an information request. Therefore, summary disposition was improperly granted to
plaintiff with respect to the issue of programming costs. On remand, the issue should be resolved by the
trier of fact.
IV
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in finding that it constructively denied plaintiff’s
request. The finding resulted in an improper award of attorney fees to plaintiff. We disagree.
This Court will not set aside findings of fact by the trial court unless they are clearly erroneous.
MCL 2.613(C), Tallman v Cheboygan Area Schools, 183 Mich App 123, 126; 454 NW2d 171
(1990). A finding of fact is not clearly erroneous unless there is no evidence to support it or the review
court on the entire record is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Tallman, supra.
Here, the trial court found that, while defendant offered to copy the information for plaintiff, it
constructively denied the request because of the exorbitant fee it charged. Applying our standard of
review, we find that the court’s findings were not clearly erroneous. Defendant could not reasonably
expect plaintiff to pay such a high fee in order to receive a copy of the records.
Moreover we find that the trial court properly awarded attorney fees to plaintiff. A trial court
must award attorney fees when a party prevails in an action brought under the FOIA. Yarbrough v
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Dep’t of Corrections, 199 Mich App 180, 186; 501 NW2d 207 (1993). A plaintiff prevails when the
action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and the action had a
substantial causative effect on the delivery of the information. Id.
Here, plaintiff would not have obtained the records without commencing its cause of action,
because it was not prepared to pay $50 million for the FOIA request. Plaintiff prevailed in its cause of
action and was properly awarded reasonable attorney fees. Tallman, supra.
V
Finally, we find no support in the record for defendant’s argument that plaintiff received special
treatment by the trial court because it is a member of the press. See In re Midland Publishing, Inc,
420 Mich 148, 155 n 7; 362 NW2d 580 (1984). The trial court gave significant weight to its finding
that plaintiff’s information request was in the public interest and was under the jurisdiction of the FOIA.
Based upon the public interest of the request, the trial court determined that the FOIA would be
“emasculated” if the normal commercial look-up fee were charged for each driver’s record. Because
plaintiff was not given inappropriate treatment, defendant’s argument is without merit. Furthermore, the
weight the trial court gave the request was suitable given the legislative intent of the FOIA. See
Clerical-Technical Union of Michigan State University v Bd of Trustees of Michigan State
University, 190 Mich App 300, 303; 475 NW2d 373 (1991).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Marilyn Kelly
/s/ Joseph B. Sullivan
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