PEOPLE OF MI V GERONIMO SANCHEZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 16, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 179825
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 92-117468-FC
GERONIMO SANCHEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Griffin and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to deliver 650 grams or more of cocaine,
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(i), and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arose out of a sting operation conducted by the Pontiac Police. Officers arranged for
an informant to buy cocaine in escalating amounts from Sandra Osorio, a known drug dealer. The
police informant learned that Osorio’s boyfriend, Julio Rodriguez, was Osorio’s supplier. At the
direction of police, the informant conducted negotiations with Osorio to purchase one kilogram of
cocaine in mid-August 1991. Osorio presented Rodriguez with the deal, who told her he could obtain
one kilogram of cocaine if she could find a buyer. On September 4, 1991, police raided Rodriguez’s
home and found two kilograms of cocaine hidden in a barbecue grill located in Rodriguez’s garage. The
cocaine was placed in a shoe box which had been sealed with duct tape. Investigators found
defendant’s fingerprint on the duct tape.
Osorio testified at trial to Rodriguez’s various statements concerning defendant’s role in his drug
smuggling activities. Osorio testified that, after she agreed to obtain customers for Rodriguez, he told
her defendant was his partner in the cocaine trade. Rodriguez told Osorio of two occasions on which
he and defendant transported kilogram quantities of cocaine from Miami to Detroit. On one such
occasion in late August of 1991, Rodriguez called Osorio from Florida and told her that he and
defendant had obtained three kilograms of cocaine. Rodriguez stated that they sold one kilogram in
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Florida and would transport the remaining two kilograms to Michigan in a car that defendant and his
wife were renting. Police spotted the rental car parked outside Rodriguez’s house before they raided
his residence.
I
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Osorio’s hearsay
testimony concerning Rodriguez’s statements about defendant. Specifically, defendant contends that the
trial court improperly admitted Rodriguez’s statements pursuant to MRE 801(d)(2)(E), which excludes
from the definition of hearsay statements of coconspirators made during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) provides that “a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course
and in furtherance of the conspiracy on independent proof of the conspiracy” is not hearsay when
offered against a party. People v Vega, 413 Mich 773, 778 n 3; 321 NW2d 675 (1982). Before a
court may admit a coconspirator’s statements against a defendant, the prosecutor must establish the
existence of a conspiracy or concert of action by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the
coconspirator’s statements. Vega, supra at 780-782. Additionally, the coconspirator’s statements
must be made “during the course” and “in furtherance” of the conspiracy. People v Bushard, 444
Mich 384, 394; 508 NW2d 745 (1993) (Boyle, J.). To satisfy the “during the course” aspect of MRE
801(d)(2)(E), the conspiracy must be extant at the time the statement is made. Id. The “in furtherance”
requirement has been defined broadly. Id. at 395. For example, statements made by one
coconspirator to keep other conspirators informed about the progress of the scheme satisfy the “in
furtherance” requirement. Id.
Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of a conspiracy by a
preponderance of independent evidence. We disagree. The evidence clearly showed that Rodriguez,
Osorio’s supplier, was aware of her apparent need for at least one kilogram of cocaine in late August
1991. Defendant then met Rodriguez in Miami, where he and his wife rented a car for Rodriguez to
drive from Miami to Detroit. When Rodriguez returned from Miami, police found two kilograms of
cocaine in his possession, the packaging of which contained defendant’s fingerprints. Thus, defendant
had most likely come in contact with the cocaine, probably sometime before Rodriguez brought the
drugs from Miami. This evidence established by a preponderance that defendant was aware of
Rodriguez’s plan to get cocaine from Miami to Osorio and her buyer in Michigan and further supports
the conclusion that defendant rented Rodriguez a car so that he could accomplish his plan to deliver
cocaine. Hence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that a preponderance of
independent evidence established the existence of a conspiracy between defendant and Rodriguez to
deliver cocaine. People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489, 497; 552 NW2d 487 (1996).
Additionally, defendant argues that Rodriguez did not make his statements in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It is true that Rodriguez did not make his statements to Osorio in order to obtain her
assistance in the plan to smuggle cocaine from Miami to Detroit. However, evidence established that
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Rodriguez supplied Osorio with cocaine to sell to her various customers. All of Rodriguez’s statements
to Osorio can be characterized as statements made to apprise Osorio of the progress and status of the
conspiracy to deliver cocaine, or statements made to foster trust and cohesiveness, so that Osorio
would continue to procure customers with the knowledge that her supplier would have cocaine available
to her for sale. See Bushard, supra at 395-396. In light of these considerations, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by admitting Rodriguez’s statements through Osorio’s testimony. Phillips, supra.1
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have declared a mistrial in response to Osorio’s
two volunteered statements that she had taken a polygraph test. Defendant did not raise this issue in the
trial court and thus failed to preserve it for review. People v Hamacher, 432 Mich 157, 168; 438
NW2d 43 (1989). Nevertheless, we may grant review of an unpreserved issue where failure to do so
would result in manifest injustice. People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547; 520 NW2d 123 (1994).
Upon reviewing the lower court record, we conclude that our refusal to review this unpreserved
issue will not result in manifest injustice. Osorio’s statements about taking a polygraph test were brief,
relatively innocuous, and totally unresponsive to defense counsel’s questions. Generally, an
unresponsive, volunteered answer to a proper question is not grounds for the granting of a mistrial.
People v Haywood, 209 Mich App 217, 228; 530 NW2d 497 (1995). Likewise, the mere mention
of a polygraph test by a witness is not grounds for mistrial. People v Kosters, 175 Mich App 748,
754; 438 NW2d 651 (1989). After Osorio’s second reference to taking a polygraph test, the trial
court instructed the jury that “[l]ie detector tests and their results are not admissible in any court in the
State of Michigan” and that it was to disregard Osorio’s statements. We presume that the jury did just
that. People v Torres (On Remand), ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 197735,
rel’d 3/25/97) slip opinion p 6. Osorio’s statements were not grounds for a mistrial, and any prejudice
was cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury.
III
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in various forms of misconduct that denied
him a fair and impartial trial. Defendant failed to object to the instances of alleged misconduct, thus
foreclosing our review unless the prejudicial effect of the prosecutor’s remarks was so great that it could
not have been cured by appropriate instructions to the jury. People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558,
575; 540 NW2d 728 (!995). We have carefully reviewed each unpreserved instance of alleged
misconduct, and determine that the prosecutor’s remarks were either permissible, and thus did not
adversely affect defendant’s right to a fair trial, or of such a minimally prejudicial nature that timely
requested curative instructions could have eliminated any resulting harm. Therefore, we decline to
address defendant’s unpreserved allegations of misconduct.
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IV
Defendant next argues that his conviction should be reversed because he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at trial. We disagree.
Defendant first argues that his trial attorney’s failure to motion the trial court for a mistrial in
response to Osorio’s references to taking a polygraph test amounted to ineffective assistance of
counsel. As we previously determined, Osorio’s unresponsive, volunteered testimony about her
polygraph test was not grounds for a mistrial. See Haywood, supra; Kosters, supra. A defense
attorney cannot be faulted for his failure to pursue a motion that is destined for failure. People v Gist,
188 Mich App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991). Moreover, any prejudice that may have arisen from
defense counsel’s failure to move for a mistrial was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury to
ignore Osorio’s testimony. See Torres, supra. Accordingly, defendant may not predicate his
ineffective assistance of counsel argument on his attorney’s failure to move the trial court for a mistrial.
Next, defendant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because his
attorney failed to put his wife, Sandra Sanchez, on the witness stand to testify that she saw defendant
help Rodriguez pack the trunk of the rental car before Rodriguez drove their children from Miami to
Michigan in August 1991. Defendant contends that her testimony could have explained how his thumb
print was placed on the package of cocaine found in Rodriguez’s garage.
Generally, the decision whether to call a witness is a matter of sound trial strategy which can
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel only when the failure to do so deprives the defendant of a
substantial defense that could have affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Daniel, 207
Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). There is no support in the lower court record for
defendant’s assertion that his wife, or anyone, saw him assist Rodriguez in packing the trunk of the
rental car. In fact, one witness testified that Rodriguez’s passengers “got their own luggage and carried
it.” Moreover, while testimony that could support the theory that defendant’s fingerprint was placed on
the package of cocaine by innocent means could have benefited the defense, it would have done little to
diminish the impact of the most compelling evidence of defendant’s guilt, Osorio’s testimony.
Therefore, we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that his attorney’s failure to call Sandra
Sanchez as a witness deprived him of a substantial defense and, accordingly, may not predicate his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his attorney’s trial strategy.
Lastly, defendant argues that his attorney’s failure to object to the many instances of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct that defendant raises on appeal amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.
We previously concluded that most of the prosecutor’s closing comments were entirely permissible and,
therefore, unobjectionable. A defense attorney is not obligated to advance meritless objections at trial.
See Gist, supra. Furthermore, any prejudice stemming from the prosecutor’s comments during his
closing and rebuttal was cured by the trial court’s instructions to the jury. Defendant makes no further
effort to establish that his attorney’s failure to advance a barrage of objectionable objections during the
prosecutor’s closing argument and rebuttal fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and
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further fails to show that he was prejudiced by his attorney’s representation. People v Reed, 453 Mich
685, 694-695; 556 NW2d 858 (1996). Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant’s contention that
he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
Defendant also argues that, had the trial court refused to admit Osorio’s testimony regarding
Rodriguez’s statements, there would have been insufficient evidence upon which the jury could find
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiracy to deliver cocaine. Because we have
determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Osorio’s testimony, we need not
address this issue.
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