PEOPLE OF MI V ROBERTO ANTONIO CASANOVA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 183532
Muskegon Circuit Court
LC No. 94037204
ROBERTO ANTONIO CASANOVA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Hood and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was charged and convicted, following a jury trial, of two counts of first-degree
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a); MSA 28.548(1)(a), two counts of felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a);
MSA 28.548(1)(a), and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for each of
the first-degree murder convictions and the felony murder convictions and to a term of two years’
imprisonment for each of the felony-firearm convictions. We vacate defendant’s felony murder
convictions and sentences, but affirm defendant’s remaining convictions and sentences.
This case arises out of the May 26, 1993, slayings of James and Linda Crews. Linda Crews
was the parent of Cheryl Sladovnik, defendant’s girlfriend and mother of his child. There was evidence
that defendant killed the Crews because he was angry that they would not tell him the location of
Sladovnik.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony of an
investigating police officer who investigated the alibis of the people whom defendant contended had
committed the murders of the victims in this case. We agree, but find the error harmless. The decision
whether to admit evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be set aside on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion trial. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538, 546; 543 NW2d 49
(1995). Error requiring reversal may not be predicated upon a ruling that admits evidence unless a
substantial right was affected and resulted in a miscarriage of justice. MRE 103(a); MCL. 769.26;
MSA 28.1096.
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In this case, an officer testified that he had conducted an investigation and had drawn a
conclusion from his investigation that four particular people were not suspects. During voir dire, outside
the presence of the jury, it was revealed that the officer based his conclusion on his interviews with the
four people and the bus tickets that all of them showed him, even though these bus tickets did not state
the passengers’ names and the officer conducted no further investigation. The trial court ruled that the
bus tickets and the statements of the four people were inadmissible hearsay, but allowed the officer’s
testimony under MRE 701.
We agree with defendant’s assertion that admission of the officer’s testimony was an abuse of
discretion. See People v Lucas, 138 Mich App 212; 360 NW2d 162 (1984). We, however, find
this error harmless. An error in the admission of evidence may require reversal of a conviction where,
after considering the nature of the error and assessing its effect in light of the weight and strength of the
properly admitted evidence, refusal to vacate the judgment would be inconsistent with substantial
justice. People v Huyser, ___ Mich App ___; ____ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 184611, issued
1/28/97) slip op p 3.
Here, the case does not entirely depend on whether the jury believed the officer’s conclusion
because there was sufficient corroborating evidence of defendant’s culpability. The physical evidence in
this case that pointed to defendant’s guilt included footwear impressions, handwriting samples and
personal items of the victims in his possession. Furthermore, the trial testimony consistently established
defendant’s motive and opportunity to murder the victims. In addition, defendant’s own testimony was
problematic because he gave the investigating officers no aid in locating his own alibi witness. Given the
overwhelming evidence against defendant, raising doubts about another person’s alibi would not have
exculpated defendant. Therefore, any error is deemed harmless. Compare Huyser, supra and Lucas,
supra (erroneous admission of evidence not harmless where there was little or no corroborating
evidence).
Defendant next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting testimony regarding
evidence that was missing because of the police officers’ gross negligence. We disagree. Again, we
review this issue for an abuse of discretion. Price, supra.
The missing evidence included the shotgun wadding and pellets that were removed from the
victims’ bodies during their autopsies and from the victims’ home. Absent the intentional suppression of
evidence or a showing of bad faith, the loss of evidence which occurs before a defense request for its
production does not require reversal. People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365; 494 NW2d 873
(1992). Defendant has the burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police
acted in bad faith. Id.
Having reviewed the pertinent testimony, we find that there is no support for defendant’s
assertion that the police deliberately destroyed the evidence. There was no testimony at trial or the
evidentiary hearing indicating that the suppression was deliberate or in bad faith. Indeed, the testimony
of the officers who searched the police department’s evidence room several times indicated the
opposite. In addition, both the coroner and the firearms expert testified from a report or notes made
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during their examinations. Moreover, based on the evidence in this case, there is no indication that the
shotgun wadding or pellets would have provided defendant with exculpatory evidence. We therefore
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Defendant also argues that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor improperly injected
testimony that there were outstanding warrants against him and the trial court’s cautionary instruction did
not cure the error. We disagree. We initially note that defendant failed to challenge the sufficiency of
the trial court’s instruction below. In fact, defense counsel approved the curative instruction before it
was given to the jury. We therefore review this issue only for manifest injustice. People v Maleski,
220 Mich App 518, 521; ___ NW2d ___ (1996).
Defendant concedes that the testimony complained of was unresponsive to the prosecutor’s
question. Generally, unresponsive testimony by a prosecution witness does not justify a mistrial unless
the prosecutor knew in advance that the witness would give the unresponsive testimony or the
prosecutor conspired with or encouraged the witness to give that testimony. People v Hackney, 183
Mich App 516, 531; 455 NW2d 358 (1990).
In any event, defendant’s claim is without merit. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel
requested a curative instruction following the unresponsive testimony. Defense counsel failed to object
to the trial court’s instruction. In fact, defense counsel indicated to the court that the instruction was
“excellent” before it was given to the jury. A defendant may not choose a course of action and then “sit
back and harbor error to be used as an appellate parachute.” People v Pollick, 448 Mich 376, 387;
531 NW2d 159 (1995). Furthermore, the court properly and clearly instructed the jury that
outstanding warrants are “totally irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt or innocence” and it “must disregard
the statement by the witness regarding the alleged warrants.” Jurors are presumed to have followed a
court’s instructions until the contrary is clearly shown. People v McAlister, 203 Mich App 495, 504;
513 NW2d 431 (1994). We therefore find no manifest injustice.
Defendant also argues this Court’s holding in People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91; 489
NW2d 152 (1992), mandates that his felony murder convictions be vacated. We agree, and note that
in its late filed brief, the prosecution also agrees that defendant's felony murder convictions must be
vacated. This Court reviews double jeopardy issues de novo. Price, supra at 542; People v White,
212 Mich App 298, 304-305; 536 NW2d 876 (1995).
The United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for
a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Torres, 452 Mich 43, 63; 549
NW2d 540 (1996), cert den ___ US ___; ___ S Ct ___; 136 L Ed 2d 867 (1997). Multiple
convictions and sentences for counts of both first-degree murder and felony murder arising from the
death of a single individual violate the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy. Passeno,
supra at 95. Where a defendant is convicted of both first-degree and felony murder for the murder of a
single individual, the conviction of first-degree murder must be affirmed, and the conviction for felony
murder vacated. Id. We therefore affirm defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder and vacate his
convictions for felony murder. The mandatory life sentences for those affirmed convictions are affirmed.
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Defendant’s felony murder convictions and sentences are vacated. Defendant’s convictions and
sentences for first-degree murder and felony-firearm are affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
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