RANDY SEGUIN V BENZIE COUNTY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RANDY SEGUIN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 9, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BENZIE COUNTY, BENZIE COUNTY SHERIFF
PAUL STILES, JOHN BRAZASKI and BETH
BAESCH,
No. 194387
Benzie Circuit Court
LC No. 95-004599-NI
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and Hood and Gribbs, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition, pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (8), to defendants. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
In his first amended complaint, plaintiff, a civilian, alleged that a car/deer accident occurred near
his residence and he went to the scene. After plaintiff arrived at the scene, he claimed that he was
“authorized and/or permitted” to direct traffic by defendants, who are sheriff’s deputies that responded
to the accident. While plaintiff was directing traffic, he was struck by an oncoming vehicle being driven
through the accident scene. Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached their duty to him by “allowing an
inexperienced, poorly equipped pedestrian to assist in the administration of the accident scene . . . .”
Plaintiff further alleged that the responding deputies failed to “properly position” their county-owned
patrol vehicles so as to block traffic headed through the scene, and operated the vehicles’ overhead
flashing lights in a manner that reduced visibility.
Defendants’ motion for summary disposition was granted by the trial court pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7) and (8).1 The trial court ruled that defendants did not owe a duty to plaintiff to protect him
from being struck by the oncoming traffic under the “public-duty” doctrine and therefore defendants
were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) on that claim. The court rationalized that
the deputies’ duty to control the accident scene was owed to the public at large, not to any single
individual. The trial court also ruled that plaintiff’s allegations regarding the improper positioning and
-1
lighting of their patrol cars did not come within the “motor vehicle” exception to governmental immunity
and therefore defendants were entitled to summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on those
claims.
I
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in ruling that he failed to plead sufficient facts to establish
that a “special relationship” existed between him and defendants to overcome the “public-duty”
doctrine. We agree.
This Court reviews the trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(8) de novo. Eason v Coggins Memorial Methodist Episcopal Church, 210 Mich
App 261, 263; 532 NW2d 882 (1995). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8) relies on the pleadings
alone, and all well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint are taken as true, as well as any reasonable
inferences or conclusions that can be drawn from the allegations. Peters v Dep’t of Corrections, 215
Mich App 485, 486; 546 NW2d 668 (1996). A motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) should be granted “only when the claim is so clearly unenforceable as a matter of law that
no factual development could possibly justify a right of recovery.” Id. at 487. Summary disposition
under this rule is appropriate in a negligence action if it is determined that, as a matter of law, the
defendant did not owe a duty to the plaintiff according to the alleged facts. Eason, supra.
An essential element of a negligence claim is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff. Koenig v City of South Haven, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No.
180870, issued 2/21/97), slip op p 9; Chivas v Koehler, 182 Mich App 467, 475; 453 NW2d 264
(1990). Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court. Koenig, supra. A public official is
regarded as owing his duty to the public in general and not to a specific individual. Id.; Harrison v
Director of Dep't of Corrections, 194 Mich App 446, 456-460; 487 NW2d 799 (1992). This rule
applies unless a special relationship exists between the official and the individual such that performance
by the official would affect the individual in a manner different in kind from the way performance would
affect the public. Id.
Applied to police officers, the public-duty doctrine insulates officers from tort liability for the
negligent failure to provide police protection unless an individual plaintiff satisfies the special-relationship
exception. White v Beasley, 453 Mich 308, 316; 552 NW2d 1 (1996). In White, the Supreme
Court adopted a test for examining the relationship between police officers and private individuals. Id.
at 320. The elements of the test are:
(1) an assumption by the municipality, through promises or actions, of an
affirmative duty to act on behalf of the party who was injured;
(2) knowledge on the part of the municipality’s agent that inaction could lead to
harm;
-2
(3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the
injured party; and
(4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality's affirmative undertaking. .
. . [Id. at 320-321 (quoting Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255, 260; 513
NYS 2d 372; 505 NE2d 937 (1987).]
In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants had “authorized and/or
permitted” him to direct traffic at the accident scene. Accepting plaintiff’s allegation and all reasonable
inferences or conclusions therefrom as true, plaintiff sufficiently pleaded that a special relationship
existed between him and defendants to abrogate the public-duty doctrine. White, supra; Peters,
supra. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting defendants summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(8) on this claim.
Defendants allege that discovery, which occurred subsequent to the motion for summary
disposition, revealed that, at the time plaintiff got involved at the accident scene, he was not only
uninvited, but was ordered to “get out of the road” by one of the responding deputies. We decline to
consider this evidence because it was not before the trial court at the time of the motion for summary
disposition. Defendant might well succeed in obtaining a grant of summary disposition when discovery
material is properly presented to the trial court. However, this Court’s review is limited to the record
developed by the trial court. MCR 7.210(A)(1); Harkins v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 206 Mich
App 317, 323; 520 NW2d 653 (1994). Furthermore, such discovery is not properly considered under
a MCR 2.116(C)(8) motion, which tests the legal sufficiency of a claim by the pleadings alone. Peters,
supra.
II
Plaintiff next argues that he pleaded sufficient allegations to establish that the “motor vehicle”
exception to governmental immunity was applicable to this case. We disagree.
Summary disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) for a claim that is barred
because of immunity granted by law. When reviewing a grant of summary disposition on the ground that
the claim is barred by governmental immunity, this Court considers all documentary evidence submitted
by the parties. Codd v Wayne County, 210 Mich App 133, 134; 537 NW2d 453 (1995). All well
pleaded allegations are accepted as true and construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. To survive
a motion for summary disposition, brought under MCR 2.116(C)(7), the plaintiff must allege facts
warranting the application of an exception to governmental immunity. Id. at 134-135.
MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107), addressing governmental immunity from tort liability,
provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, all governmental agencies shall be immune
from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise
or discharge of a governmental function.
-3
MCL 691.1405; MSA 3.996(105), which creates an exception to governmental immunity, provides:
Governmental agencies shall be liable for bodily injury and property damage resulting
from the negligent operation by any officer, agent, or employee of the governmental
agency, of a motor vehicle of which the governmental agency is owner . . .
The motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity must be narrowly construed against the broad
grant of general immunity found in MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). Wade v Dep’t of Corrections,
439 Mich 158, 166; 483 NW2d 26 (1992).
In his first amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that defendants were grossly negligent by failing
to properly position their patrol vehicles “so as to prevent traffic from flowing through [the] accident
scene in a dangerous manner.” Plaintiff further alleged that defendants were negligent in “operating
overhead lights on [the patrol cars] in a manner that . . . caused reduced visibility and an increase in
potential hazards to plaintiff . . . .”
Here, the dispositive question is whether plaintiff’s injury was caused by defendants’ negligent
operation of their patrol cars. See Peterson v Muskegon Co Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 137 Mich App
210, 213-214; 358 NW2d 28 (1984). However, the gravamen of plaintiff’s complaint is not that the
deputies’ patrol cars were negligently operated, but that the control of the traffic flow through the
accident scene was inadequately accomplished. As such, the complaint does not sufficiently allege that
plaintiff’s injury was caused by the negligent operation of the patrol cars. Id. We further note that
plaintiff’s claim that defendants’ operation of the overhead lights on the patrol cars “caused reduced
visibility” at the accident scene is meritless. Police officers’ activation of the overhead flashing lights at
the scene of an automobile accident is one of presumed purposes for equipping patrol vehicles with such
lights. The trial court properly granted defendants summary disposition as to these allegations under
MCR 2.116(C)(7).
We reverse the trial court’s determination with regard to Count I only (plaintiff’s allegation that
is predicated on the existence of a special relationship between plaintiff and defendants) and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Otherwise, we affirm.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. No taxable costs pursuant to MCR 7.219,
neither party having prevailed in full. We do not retain jurisdiction
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Roman S. Gribbs
1
“Defendants” as used infra does not include defendant Paul Stiles, the Benzie County Sheriff. The
trial court dismissed the claims against Stiles upon a finding that he was immune from any tort liability
because his office was an elected position. Plaintiff does not challenge this determination on appeal.
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.