PEOPLE OF MI V MAURICE TIDWELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 6, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 190005
Van Buren Circuit
LC No. 95-009437 FH
MAURICE TIDWELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Saad and Gage, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his conviction of possessing less than twenty-five grams of
cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(v); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(v), resisting and obstructing an officer,
MCL 750.479; MSA 28.747, furnishing false information to a peace officer, MCL 257.324; MSA
9.2024, and operating a motor vehicle without a license, MCL 257.904(1); MSA 9.2604(904)(1).
We affirm.
Defendant was stopped by two Covert Township police officers after the officers witnessed
defendant fail to make a complete stop at an intersection and then cross into oncoming lanes of traffic.
Defendant was arrested after he acknowledged that he did not have a driver's license, and he struggled
with the officers as he was being handcuffed. After defendant was subdued, a package of cigarettes
and a folded piece of paper containing .210 grams of cocaine were found on the ground near defendant.
A search of defendant revealed two plastic bags containing cocaine residue, a plastic bag containing .96
grams of cocaine, and a bundle of cash estimated at $700. Another plastic bag containing crack
cocaine was found near the driver's door of defendant's car. An orange pill, a razor blade, and a crack
pipe were also found on the front seat of the car.
Defendant’s motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence were denied.
I
Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney
failed to timely challenge the trial court's continuance of the preliminary examination. The trial court
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granted the prosecutor's request for a one-week continuance of the preliminary examination in order to
secure the laboratory analysis of the substance alleged to be cocaine. The preliminary examination
therefore occurred fifteen days after defendant’s arraignment, one day beyond the time period
established by MCL 766.4; MSA 28.992. On the day of trial, defendant's attorney filed a motion to
dismiss, stating that the lab report was actually completed seven days before the first scheduled
preliminary examination.
MCL 766.4; MSA 28.992 requires that a preliminary examination be scheduled for a date “not
exceeding 14 days after the arraignment.” Adjournment or continuance “shall not be granted by a
magistrate except for good cause shown.” MCL 766.7; MSA 28.925. Where the fourteen-day rule is
violated, the appropriate remedy is dismissal without prejudice. People v Weston, 413 Mich 371, 376;
319 NW2d 537 (1982); People v Fuqua, 146 Mich App 250, 253; 379 NW2d 442 (1985). “Even
if a particular trial might be barred by the failure to hold the preliminary examination in a timely fashion,
the state is still fully authorized to bring defendant to trial again.” People v Dunson, 139 Mich App
511, 513; 363 NW2d 16 (1984). We have expressly declined to impose the extraordinary remedy of
dismissal with prejudice for a trivial delay not affecting the integrity of the fact-finding process. Fuqua,
supra at 253.
In order to obtain a reversal of a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of
the proceeding would have been different. People v Launsburry, 217 Mich App 358, 362; 551
NW2d 460 (1996). Even if defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective by failing to timely challenge the
holding of defendant’s preliminary examination fifteen days after his arraignment, the mistake is not one
but for which defendant would have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal. People v Cavitt, 189
Mich App 31, 32; 471 NW2d 630 (1991). If defendant’s counsel had timely challenged defendant’s
preliminary examination and the trial judge had dismissed the charges against defendant, the dismissal
would have been without prejudice and the prosecutor could simply reinstate the charges against
defendant. Fuqua, supra at 253.
Because defendant was not prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to timely object to defendant’s
preliminary examination being held fifteen days after his arraignment, defendant was not denied effective
assistance of counsel.
II
Next, defendant contends that the traffic stop was pretextual, the subsequent arrest and search
of defendant was illegal, and therefore the evidence seized should be suppressed. Defendant maintains
that he did not fail to stop at a stop sign as stated by the officers, and he questions the officers' ability to
observe the alleged traffic violation. The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to quash, stating
that defendant's explanation was "just slightly incredulous and less believable than the officers." A trial
court's decision following a suppression hearing will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous.
People v Peebles, 216 Mich App 661, 664; 550 NW2d 589 (1996).
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An arrest or stop may not be used as "pretext" or "subterfuge" to search for evidence of crime.
People v Haney, 192 Mich App 207, 209; 480 NW2d 322 (1991). However, if the arresting officer
had probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed or was about to commit an offense,
and the officer was authorized by state or municipal law to effect a custodial arrest for the particular
offense, a stop or arrest is necessarily reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 210.
The officer here testified that he had probable cause to believe defendant committed an offense,
because he saw defendant fail to stop at a stop sign. There is no dispute that the officer was authorized
by law to make the traffic stop based on that offense. The officer's testimony supports the trial court's
determination that defendant drove through the intersection without stopping. We defer to the trial
court's determination that the officer was more credible than defendant. See People v Bender, 452
Mich 594, 599; 551 NW2d 71 (1996). Therefore, the trial court's determination is not clearly
erroneous, and the evidence seized was properly admitted. People v Chambers, 195 Mich App 118,
121; 489 NW2d 168 (1992).
III
Defendant argues next that the cumulative effect of errors at his trial denied him due process and
a fair trial. Although due process does not require that a trial be perfect and without irregularities, the
total weight of errors at trial may constitute imperfection to the point of violating due process. People v
Rosales, 160 Mich App 304, 312-313; 408 NW2d 140 (1987). Here, defendant alleges the
following errors: (1) the delay of the preliminary examination and accompanying ineffectiveness of
counsel; (2) the pretextual traffic stop and failure to suppress evidence issues; (3) the defense attorney's
failure to make an opening statement; and (4) ineffective assistance of counsel. We find no merit to this
argument.
As discussed in Issue I, defendant was neither prejudiced nor denied effective assistance of
counsel due to the delay of defendant's preliminary examination. As discussed in Issue II, the traffic
stop of defendant was not pretextual and the evidence seized from defendant was properly admitted.
With regard to defense counsel’s failure to make an opening statement, we will not substitute
our judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will we assess counsel's
competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d
378 (1987). In the absence of a record made in connection with a motion for new trial, defense
counsel's failure to make an opening statement is presumed to be a decision made pursuant to defense
counsel's permissible trial strategy. People v Harlan, 129 Mich App 769, 779; 344 NW2d 300
(1983). Therefore, defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel and counsel's decision to
waive his opening statement was not in error.
Because no errors have been found at defendant's trial, defendant's claim that the cumulative
effect of such errors denied him a fair trial is without merit. Likewise, his claim that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel due to such alleged errors must fail.
IV
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In light of the January 19, 1996 amendment to the judgment of sentence, defendant’s argument
that the habitual offender charge should be deleted is moot.
V
Finally, defendant argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding money
confiscated from him at the time of his arrest. Because the trial court did not address the issue of
forfeiture proceedings, and the record is silent about the facts necessary to determine the issue, we lack
jurisdiction to review this matter. See In re Forfeiture of $28,088, 172 Mich App 200, 204; 431
NW2d 437 (1988).
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
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