IN RE CASSELL L PURSELL TRUST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re CASSELL L. PURSELL TRUST.
CASSELL C. PURSELL, JR., KRISTINE D.
SHIRK, CHRISTOPHER PURSELL, KATHRYN
ENZWEILER, BEATRICE COOK, VIRGINIA
EICHER, and GLENADINE PURSELL,
UNPUBLISHED
May 2, 1997
Petitioners-Appellants,
v
No. 195602
Jackson Probate Court
LC No. 95-000002
CAROL PURSELL,
Respondent-Appellee,
and
CITY BANK AND TRUST,
Respondent.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Doctoroff and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Petitioners appeal as of right the probate court's May 29, 1996, order interpreting the trust
agreement of Cassell L. Pursell [hereinafter L. Pursell]. We affirm.
This action was initiated on January 2, 1996, by L. Pursell's daughter, who filed a petition
requesting the probate court to interpret the following language in the Cassell L. Pursell Trust:
(c) Upon the death of the Grantor's wife, GLENADINE M. PURSELL, or
upon the death of the Grantor if the said GLENADI[N]E M. PURSELL shall have
predeceased him, then this Trust shall immediately terminate and the Trustee shall
distribute the remaining corpus and undistributed income of the Trust Estate to the
Grantor's children in the following proportions:
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(1) To my son, CASSELL C. PURSELL, thirty (30%) per cent
thereof;
(2) To my daughter, BEATRICE P. TRAPNELL, thirty (30%) per cent
thereof;
(3) To my daughter, VIRGINIA P. EICHER, forty (40%) per cent
thereof;
[P]rovided, however, that if any of my said children shall predecease me leaving issue
me surviving the issue shall take, in equal parts per stirpes, the share which such child
who predeceased me would have taken if such child had survived me; if there be no
such issue then living to my issue living at the death of such child, in equal parts per
stirpes, and if there be no such issue of mine then living to the persons who would be
entitled to inherit the same in accordance with the laws of the State of Michigan then in
force as if I had died immediately after the death of such child, intestate, and a resident
of the State of Michigan and owning the said property. [Article II, paragraph C,
subparagraph (c), (1), (2) and (3) of the Cassell L. Pursell Trust.]1
Following a hearing on March 26, 1996, the probate court concluded that the above language
in the trust was not ambiguous and clearly stated that the rights of L. Pursell's children "vest if they live
long enough to outlive himself, which all of them did" and therefore Cassell Pursell's [hereinafter C.
Pursell] interest vested at the time of L. Pursell's death.2 The probate court held that because there was
no ambiguity in the trust, there was nothing for the court to construe and no reason to allow testimony
regarding the grantor's testamentary intent.
Petitioners first contend that the probate court erred in ruling that the trust contains no
ambiguities requiring interpretation by the court. They argue that consideration of the entire trust
document reveals that the grantor intended to assure that the trust corpus and any undistributed income
would pass to the grantor's lineal descendants, including C. Pursell’s children. Petitioners further argue
that because the trust language, as interpreted by the probate court, allows the trust to be inherited by
individuals, such as respondent Carol Pursell-- C. Pursell’s wife at the time of his death-- who are
unrelated to L. Pursell, such language must be the result of a drafting error and is therefore ambiguous.
The role of the probate court is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the testator as
derived from the language of the testamentary instrument. In re Woodworth Trust, 196 Mich App
326, 327; 492 NW2d 818 (1992). Where there is no ambiguity, that intention is to be gleaned from
the four corners of the instrument. Id. A patent ambiguity exists if an uncertainty concerning the
meaning appears on the face of the instrument and arises from the use of defective, obscure, or
insensible language. Id. at 327-328. A latent ambiguity exists where the language and its meaning is
clear, but some extrinsic fact creates the possibility of more than one meaning. Id. at 328.
The language used in L. Pursell's trust agreement is unambiguous. Petitioners do not argue that
there is uncertainty concerning the meaning of the language used or that there is some extrinsic fact
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creating the possibility of more than one meaning for the language used. They only argue that evaluating
the trust in a fuller context would reveal an ambiguity. Therefore, neither a patent nor a latent ambiguity
exists in the language at issue and L. Pursell's intent must be gleaned from the four corners of the trust
agreement which he established. Id. at 327.
This Court has held that where there is no patent or latent ambiguity, the intention to be ascribed
to the grantor is the intention demonstrated in the will's plain language. In re Willey's Estate, 9 Mich
App 245, 249; 156 NW2d 631 (1967). Where an instrument is unambiguous, the court has merely to
interpret and enforce the language employed. In re Norwood Estate, 178 Mich App 345, 347; 443
NW2d 798 (1989). The Supreme Court has held that, in the absence of ambiguity or mistake
appearing on the face of the document, even the testimony of the scrivener regarding a mistake or an
intention of the testator different from that expressed in the will is not admissible and the court may not
reform the document. Burke v Central Trust Co, 258 Mich 588, 592; 242 NW 760 (1932).
While L. Pursell's trust agreement demands one result if he predeceases his wife and another if
she predeceases him, such results seem clearly and unambiguously to be called for by the language of
the trust. The former has occurred and we must read the agreement accordingly. There is no indication
revealed within the four corners of the trust document that such a result was not intended by L. Pursell
nor do we find it to be without conceivable rationality. Therefore, the probate court's ruling that there is
no ambiguity or mistake on the face of the document and the court's refusal to further interpret the
document was not clearly erroneous.
Petitioners also argue that because the trust document was ambiguous, testimony should be
allowed to establish the grantor's true intent. Again, however, the trust agreement created by L. Pursell
was unambiguous, requiring no reformation or construction by the probate court. Petitioners seek
specifically to admit the testimony of L. Pursell's daughters to establish his testamentary intent.
However, this Court has held that, absent ambiguity, the testator's intent is to be gleaned wholly from
within the four corners of the testamentary instrument. In re McPeak Estate, 210 Mich App 410, 412;
534 NW2d 140 (1995). Additionally, testimony of a mistake in drafting, or of an intention of the
testator different from that expressed in the document, is not admissible in the absence of ambiguity or
mistake appearing on the face of the document. Burke, supra at 592. Therefore, the probate court's
ruling that testimony would not be allowed regarding L. Pursell's testamentary intent was not clearly
erroneous.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
1
The December 6, 1975, amendment to the trust changed the proportions in subparagraphs (c) (1),
(2), and (3) to one-third (1/3) each. All other language remained the same.
2
C. Pursell passed away shortly after his father L. Pursell.
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