PEOPLE OF MI V JUNIOR FRED BLACKSTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 2, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 193142
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 95-009511-FH
JUNIOR FRED BLACKSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Griffin, P.J., and Doctoroff and Markman, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting in the commission of
forgery, MCL 750.248; MSA 28.445, and aiding and abetting in the commission of uttering and
publishing, MCL 750.249; MSA 28.446. Pursuant to MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, the trial court
sentenced defendant as an habitual offender to serve two concurrent terms of eight to 28 years’
imprisonment. Defendant appeals as of right from his convictions and sentence. We affirm defendant’s
convictions and remand for resentencing.
Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to convict him
because it failed to establish that defendant had the requisite intent to commit either crime. We disagree.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich
508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
MCL 767.39; MSA 28.979 provides:
Every person concerned in the commission of an offense, whether he directly
commits the act constituting the offense or procures, counsels, aids, or abets in its
commission may hereafter be prosecuted, indicted, tried and on conviction shall be
punished as if he had directly committed such offense.
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The crime of forgery requires proof that (1) defendant committed an act which results in the
false making or alteration of an instrument and that (2) defendant had a concurrent intent to defraud or
injure. People v Grable, 95 Mich App 20, 24; 289 NW2d 871 (1980). The crime of uttering and
publishing is established by proof that (1) defendant knew that the instrument was false, (2) defendant
had an intent to defraud, and (3) defendant presented the instrument for payment. People v Dukes,
189 Mich App 262, 265; 471 NW2d 651 (1991). Therefore, the crimes of forgery and uttering and
publishing are specific intent crimes.
In order to be convicted for aiding and abetting in the commission of a specific intent crime, the
aider and abettor must have had either the specific intent required of a principal of the crime or the
knowledge that a principal has such intent. People v King, 210 Mich App 425, 431; 534 NW2d
534 (1995). However, because of the difficulty in proving a defendant’s state of mind, minimal
circumstantial evidence is sufficient, People v Palmer, 42 Mich App 549, 552; 202 NW2d 536
(1972), and an aider and abettor’s state of mind may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances,
People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558, 568; 540 NW2d 728 (1995).
With respect to the forgery conviction, the prosecution’s chief witness testified that defendant
was in the vicinity when defendant’s wife, the principal, forged the check and that, immediately following
the forgery, she handed the check to defendant. Although mere presence at the scene of a crime is not
sufficient for the imposition of liability as an aider and abettor, People v Youngblood, 165 Mich App
381, 386; 418 NW2d 472 (1988), a jury can reasonably infer the requisite intent from a defendant’s
close association with the principal and a defendant’s participation in the planning or execution of the
crime, People v Spearman, 195 Mich App 434, 441; 491 NW2d 606 (1992). Therefore, because of
the husband-wife relationship between defendant and the principal, coupled with the witness’ testimony
regarding defendant’s actions surrounding the forgery, we conclude that a jury could reasonably infer
that defendant possessed, at the time of the forgery, the specific intent to defraud or injure or, at the
very least, possessed the knowledge that his wife, the principal, possessed such an intent.
With respect to the uttering and publishing conviction, another principal testified that defendant
accompanied him to Hardings Market for the purpose of presenting the forged check for payment.
Further, the witness testified that defendant carried the check to the store and handed it to him before he
entered the store. The witness also stated that after presenting the forged check to the store cashier, he
met defendant outside the store and gave him $100 of the proceeds from the fraudulently cashed check.
This testimony created a reasonable inference that defendant possessed both the knowledge that the
check was forged and an intent to defraud.
Accordingly, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude
that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the requisite
intent for aiding and abetting in the forgery and the uttering and publishing of the stolen check.
Defendant next argues several instances of prosecutorial misconduct, none of which were
preserved at trial by a timely objection. This Court reviews an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct
for whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial. People v Kulick, 209 Mich App 258,
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259-260; 530 NW2d 163, remanded 449 Mich 851; 535 NW2d 788 (1995). However, appellate
review of allegedly improper prosecutorial remarks is precluded if the defendant fails to timely and
specifically object unless an objection could not have cured the error or a failure to review would result
in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994).
Nonetheless, we find that each of defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct is without merit.
Defendant’s first contention of prosecutorial misconduct involves the prosecutor’s method of
impeaching defendant and his wife, a defense witness, with evidence of prior convictions. After eliciting
testimony from defendant and his wife that each had been convicted in previous proceedings of offenses
involving theft or dishonesty, the prosecutor proceeded to inquire whether either had committed perjury
in those previous proceedings. While defendant responded that he had not, defendant’s wife responded
that she had.
MRE 608(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness’ credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided in Rule
609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of
the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross
examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’ character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness . . . .
Whether a witness committed perjury in a previous proceeding is probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness; thus, pursuant to MRE 608(b), no error occurred with respect to this line of questioning.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor impermissibly questioned his chief alibi witness,
defendant’s wife, regarding her failure to disclose her involvement in the crimes for which defendant was
presently on trial until her recent guilty pleas. During defendant’s trial, she testified that she was solely
responsible for the instant offenses and that defendant played no part in assisting her to commit the
crimes. Defendant contends that the prosecutor’s line of questioning was impermissible because his
wife had the right to defend herself against the charges that had been filed against her.
The constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the right of due process restrict the use
of a defendant’s silence in a criminal trial, People v Sutton (After Remand), 436 Mich 575, 592; 464
NW2d 276, amended 437 Mich 1208 (1990); however, these considerations do not extend to an
ordinary witness such as defendant’s wife. A prosecutor is permitted to question an alibi witness
regarding why she did not come forward with exculpatory information before trial. People v Phillips,
217 Mich App 489, 494; 552 NW2d 487 (1996). Defendant’s contention that his wife had legitimate
reasons for not coming forward with the information earlier could have been brought out and explained
through defense counsel’s direct or redirect examination of defendant’s wife. See id. Thus, no error
occurred with respect to this line of questioning.
Defendant next argues that the prosecution impermissibly questioned a witness regarding illegal
drug use by defendant and others at the time of the instant offenses. First, we note that the information
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with respect to defendant’s drug use came from the witness in the form of an unresponsive answer.
When a witness gives an unresponsive answer containing inadmissible evidence, the case must be very
peculiar and strong to justify reversal, People v Lumsden, 168 Mich App 286, 299; 423 NW2d 645
(1988).
Further, in People v Scholl, 453 Mich 730, 741; 556 NW2d 851 (1996), our Supreme Court
stated, “it is essential that prosecutors and defendants be able to give the jury an intelligible presentation
of the full context in which disputed events took place.” Thus, the presence of drugs during the
commission of the crimes could have affected the memory or behavior of anyone who used the drugs,
including defendant and others involved in the offenses. In addition, “[t]he more the jurors knew about
the full transaction, the better equipped they were to perform their sworn duty.” Id. at 742. For these
reasons, we hold that no error requiring reversal occurred in the admission of the testimony regarding
drug use at the time of the offenses.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in eliciting from his chief
witness that the witness had entered into a plea bargain that included a requirement that he testify
truthfully, thereby placing the prestige of the prosecutor’s office behind the witness’ testimony. We
disagree.
Although a prosecutor may not vouch for the credibility of a witness or suggest that the
government has some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully, People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995), this Court has held that a plea agreement containing a promise
of truthfulness is inadmissible only if the prosecutor suggests that “the government had some special
knowledge, not known to the jury, that the witness was testifying truthfully,” People v Buschard, 109
Mich App 306, 316; 311 NW2d 759 (1981), vacated and remanded 417 Mich 996; 334 NW2d 376
(1983), aff'd on remand, 129 Mich App 160, 165; 341 NW2d 260 (1983). Because in the present
case the prosecutor never suggested that he had some special knowledge that the witness was testifying
truthfully, no error requiring reversal occurred in the disclosure of the plea agreement.
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to preserve the above-discussed
allegations of error amounted to ineffective assistance of trial counsel. However, inasmuch as
defendant’s contentions of error are without merit, his trial counsel could not have been ineffective for
failing to preserve the alleged errors for review because counsel is not required to argue a frivolous or
meritless claim. People v Gist, 188 Mich App 610, 613; 470 NW2d 475 (1991).
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court failed to give defendant an opportunity to allocute at
sentencing. We agree.
MCR 6.425(D) provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) Sentencing Procedure. . . . At sentencing the court, complying on the
record, must:
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(b) give each party an opportunity to explain, or challenge the accuracy or
relevancy of, any information in the presentence report, and resolve any challenges in
accordance with the procedure set forth in subrule (D)(3),
(c) give the defendant, the defendant’s lawyer, the prosecutor, and the victim
an opportunity to advise the court of any circumstances they believe the court should
consider in imposing sentence.
Our Supreme Court has stated that strict compliance with the rule providing for allocution is
required and thus the sentencing court must ask the defendant separately whether the defendant wishes
to address the court before sentencing. People v Berry, 409 Mich 774, 781; 298 NW2d 434 (1980).
Further, resentencing is mandated where the court fails to strictly comply with the provisions of the rule.
People v Lowe, 172 Mich App 347, 351; 431 NW2d 257 (1988).
In the instant case, our review of the record reveals that the sentencing court complied with
MCR 6.425(D)(2)(b) when it asked defendant before sentencing whether he had any “comments,
objections, or corrections” with respect to the presentence report. However, this inquiry was not broad
enough to encompass defendant’s allocution rights pursuant to MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c). The language of
MCR 6.425(D)(2)(b) reveals that its purpose is to give each party an opportunity to challenge the
accuracy of the presentence report so as to ensure that any challenges are properly resolved pursuant to
MCR 6.425(D)(3). However, allocution with respect to MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) serves an entirely
different purpose. The policy behind MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c) is to ensure that a sentencing court avoids
“forming sentencing decisions until after the defendant has been allowed the opportunity to make
whatever statements he wishes to make in mitigation, extenuation, or justification of the crime for which
sentence is being imposed.” People v Parks, 183 Mich App 647, 653-654; 455 NW2d 368 (1990).
Therefore, because strict compliance with the court rule is required, defendant’s sentence must be
vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Before resentencing, the trial court
must provide defendant an opportunity to allocute pursuant to MCR 6.425(D)(2)(c).
Because resentencing is warranted, defendant’s further contentions regarding his sentence need
not be addressed.
We affirm defendant’s convictions and remand for resentencing. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Martin M. Doctoroff
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
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