PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID O MOSS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 2, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
DAVID O. MOSS, a/k/a DAVID OZEAR MOSS,
No. 190968
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-009053
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Saad and T.S. Eveland,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of attempted breaking and entering,
MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287; MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305, and malicious destruction of a building
under $100, MCL 750.380; MSA 28.612. Defendant was sentenced to serve ninety days in prison for
the malicious destruction of a building conviction, to be served concurrently to a sentence for six to
twenty years in prison for the attempted breaking and entering conviction, as enhanced by the habitual
fourth offender statute, MCL 769.12; MSA 28.1084. We affirm in part and vacate in part.
I
Defendant challenges three separate instructions given by the trial court. Instructions to the jury
should be considered as a whole rather than extracted piecemeal to establish error. People v Bell, 209
Mich App 273, 276; 530 NW2d 167 (1995). Even if somewhat imperfect, there is no error if the
instructions fairly presented the issues and sufficiently protected the defendant’s rights. Id.
Defendant first contends that the trial court’s instructions on the elements of attempted breaking
and entering usurped the fact-finding function of the jury. We disagree. A trial court is required to
instruct the jury as to the law applicable to the case and, in doing so, it may comment on the evidence.
MCL 768.29; MSA 28.1052. However, a trial court may not state as a fact that which the undisputed
evidence tends to prove. People v Brian Harris, 37 Mich App 409, 410; 195 NW2d 29 (1971).
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
Here, the trial court did not announce to the jury that one of the essential elements had been
established. Rather, the trial court simply explained that the evidence tended to show an attempt, by
whomever, to commit some kind of breaking and entering, but that it was for the jury to decide whether
to believe the evidence. Because this instruction made it plain to the jury that the ultimate determination
was theirs alone, see People v Lintz, 244 Mich 603, 617-618; 222 NW 201 (1928), it did not remove
from the jury consideration of an essential element of the offense. Cf. Brian Harris, 37 Mich App at
410.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding a previous
ruling on the constitutionality of the on-the-scene identification procedure. We disagree. Defendant’s
argument that the instruction was analogous to instructing the jury on the outcome of a Walker1 hearing
is unconvincing. While it makes no sense to ask a jury whether a statement has been made after
informing the jury that the statement was voluntary, People v Mathis (On Remand), 75 Mich App 320,
324; 255 NW2d 214 (1977), the same is not true of asking a jury whether an identification was reliable
after informing the jury that no constitutional rights were violated in the process of conducting an
identification.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury regarding the
process by which criminal charges are brought. We disagree. Defendant’s argument relies exclusively
on People v Hudson, 123 Mich App 624, 625; 333 NW2d 12 (1982). In Hudson, this Court held
that the burden of proof shifted to the defendant when the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that
a preliminary examination had been conducted to establish that a crime had been committed, and that
there was probable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the crime. Id. Here, unlike
Hudson, the trial court did not state that there was probable cause to believe defendant had committed
the crime charged. Because the trial court: (1) did not allow the witness to answer the prosecutor’s
question about probable cause, (2) did not instruct the jury that probable cause was the “constitutional
and legal” standard which had to be met at a preliminary examination in order for charges to be brought,
and (3) never referred to the state of the pre-trial evidence against defendant in particular, the instruction
was not erroneous. Moreover, the trial court gave explicit instructions on the presumption of innocence
and reasonable doubt. Therefore, considered as a whole, the instructions fairly presented the issues and
sufficiently protected defendant’s rights.
II
Defendant next contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain his
misdemeanor conviction of malicious destruction of a building under $100. We agree. Therefore,
defendant’s conviction for malicious destruction of a building is vacated.
Because there is no indication on the record that defendant’s conviction of malicious destruction
of a building under $100 was a factor at sentencing for the attempted breaking and entering conviction
(which was vacated below) or at sentencing on the habitual fourth offender,2 we decline defendant’s
request for resentencing.
-2
Given our resolution of defendant’s sufficiency claim, we need not address defendant’s double
jeopardy argument.
Defendant's conviction for breaking and entering, and the sentence of six to twenty years, as an
habitual fourth offender, is affirmed. Conviction and sentence for m
alicious destruction of building is
vacated. No resentencing is necessary due to concurrent original sentences.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part.
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Thomas S. Eveland
1
See People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331, 338; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
2
Defendant has ten prior misdemeanor convictions and seven prior felony convictions.
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