PEOPLE OF MI V SCHERRILL TIM EARNEST
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 2, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 189626
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 94-012545-FH
SCHERRILL TIM EARNEST,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Murphy and Cavanagh, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver 50 to 224
grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). He now appeals as of right.
We affirm.
Defendant contends that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he
was in possession of the cocaine. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for a directed
verdict, this Court must look to the evidence presented up to the time the motion was made. People v
Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW2d 176 (1992). In determining whether the prosecution
has presented sufficient evidence, this Court is required to view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of
the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Jaffray, 445 Mich 287, 296; 519
NW2d 108 (1994).
Possession may be actual or constructive. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 519-520; 489
NW2d 748 (1992). A person’s presence, by itself, at a location where drugs are found is insufficient to
establish constructive possession. Instead, some additional connection between the defendant and the
contraband must be shown. Any one of various factors may be sufficient to establish construction
possession. Id. at 520. Constructive possession exists when the totality of the circumstances indicates a
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband. Id. at 521.
In this case, the police raided a suspected crack house and discovered cocaine and other items
related to the production and dissemination of cocaine. Defendant’s fingerprint was found on a plastic
bag containing 124.6 grams of cocaine. Following the raid, defendant was discovered along with
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another individual crouched down behind a chimney on the roof of the house. Viewed in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, we find that sufficient evidence existed to establish that defendant was in
possession of 50 to 224 grams of cocaine.
Next, defendant contends that he is entitled to be resentenced because the trial judge did not
recognize that she had the discretion to depart down from the mandatory minimum sentence. A
defendant convicted of possession of a controlled substance is subject to a mandatory sentence of ten
to twenty years in prison. MCL 333.7403(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7403)(2)(a)(iii). The trial court may
depart from a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment if it finds on the record that there are
substantial and compelling reasons to do so. MCL 333.7403(3); MSA 14.15(7403)(3); People v
Sanders, 193 Mich App 128, 130; 483 NW2d 439 (1992).
In this case, the trial judge told defendant that she “must impose the mandatory sentence” and
she indicated that she was “sorry to have to do it.” Given the context in which these statements were
made, we do not agree that the trial judge failed to consider the possibility of a departure. At the
beginning of the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor informed the court of its discretion and argued that
defendant’s prior record did not warrant a sentence below the mandatory minimum. Thus, it would
appear that the trial judge’s subsequent remarks did not evince a lack of recognition regarding the
possibility of a downward departure. Rather, it appears that the trial judge simply believed that
substantial and compelling reasons to warrant a deviation from the mandatory minimum did not exist.
Defendant next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to depart
downward. We disagree. A finding of substantial and compelling circumstances should be the
exception and not the rule and a departure from the mandatory minimum sentence is justified only in
exceptional cases. People v Fields, 448 Mich 58, 68, 70, n 5; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). A
determination that a departure is warranted must be based on objective and verifiable factors. Id. at 68.
Sentencing courts are required to consider the following factors in determining whether a case presents
substantial and compelling reasons to deviate from the mandatory minimum sentence: (1) the facts of the
crime that mitigate the defendant’s culpability, (2) the defendant’s prior record, (3) the defendant’s age
and (4) the defendant’s work history. Id. at 76-77.
In this case, defendant argues that a downward departure was warranted based on the fact that
he was “27 years old and steadily, gainfully employed.” Although defendant had a job at the time of his
conviction, the presentence investigation report indicates that he has had no “formal job training” and
possesses no “job skills.” Moreover, defendant’s prior record is poor. The instant offense represents
defendant’s third felony conviction. At the time of sentencing, defendant had three active misdemeanor
warrants and one violation of probation warrant. In addition, he tested positive for “THC” in July of
1995. No mitigating circumstances existed which would have justified a downward departure.
Accordingly, defendant is not entitled to be resentenced.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
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