PEOPLE V JOHN ALLEN ELLINGER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 29, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 167366
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 92-114514-FH;
92-114514-FH
JOHN ALLEN ELLINGER,
Defendant-Appellee.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 169536
Oakland Circuit Court
LC Nos. 92-111956-FH;
92-114513-FH;
92-114514-FH
JOHN ALLEN ELLINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 170148
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 92-117634-FH
JOHN ALLEN ELLINGER,
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Defendant-Appellant.
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Before: Jansen, P.J., and McDonald and D.C. Kolenda*, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial in the Oakland Circuit Court, defendant was convicted of two counts of
delivery of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA
14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii), one count of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), one count of conspiracy to deliver less than fifty
grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a; MSA 28.354(1), and one count of conspiracy to possess with
intent to deliver marijuana, MCL 333.7401(2)(c); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(c); MCL 750.157a; MSA
28.354(1). The trial court sentenced defendant to five to twenty years’ imprisonment for the
convictions of delivery of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine, two to twenty years for the
conviction of delivery of less than fifty grams of cocaine, two to twenty years for the conviction of
conspiracy to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, and two to four years for the conviction of
conspiracy to possess with intent to deliver marijuana. The sentences are to run consecutively;
therefore, defendant’s minimum sentence, when added together, totals sixteen years. Defendant
appeals as of right from his convictions in Docket Nos. 169536 and 170148. The prosecutor appeals
as of right from the trial court’s decision to depart below the mandatory minimum sentence in Docket
No. 167366. We affirm in all respects.
This case concerns several drug buys made by an undercover police officer. Ferndale police
officer Kenneth Denmark was assigned to the Oakland County Narcotics Enforcement Team.
Denmark was introduced to defendant by a confidential informant. The first drug buy occurred on
August 7, 1991, in which Denmark bought a quarter ounce of cocaine from defendant. No arrest was
made at that time. On August 21, 1991, Denmark contacted defendant and asked to purchase one
ounce of cocaine. The deal was ultimately made, and Denmark purchased one ounce of cocaine from
defendant for $1,200. On September 3, 1991, Denmark called defendant and asked to purchase two
ounces of cocaine. The following day, Denmark went to defendant’s residence and paid him $2,300
for the cocaine. Defendant gave Denmark two ounces of cocaine. On September 26, 1991, Denmark
again contacted defendant and arranged to buy two ounces of cocaine for $2,400. Denmark met
defendant, gave him the money, and defendant gave Denmark two ounces of cocaine.
During the September 26, 1991 transaction, Denmark told defendant that he would transport
marijuana from Florida to Michigan. On October 3, 1991, Denmark began receiving pages from
defendant. Defendant inquired if Denmark had retrieved the marijuana. Denmark replied that he had
and said that the price was $1,700 per pound. Defendant indicated that he was interested in buying five
pounds and that the purchase would involve his neighbor, William Lemiere. Denmark later contacted
defendant on October 7, 1991, and arranged to go to defendant’s residence to sell the marijuana.
Defendant was initially alone at his house, and he called Lemiere to see the marijuana. Defendant had
previously indicated to Denmark that he would sell the marijuana to Lemiere at a cost of $2,300 per
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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pound. Lemiere returned to defendant’s house and gave Denmark the money for the marijuana.
According to Denmark, defendant was arrested following the marijuana deal because the marijuana was
police property that could not be lost.
At defendant’s request, the charges were consolidated for trial. Defendant was convicted as
charged by the jury. On appeal, defendant raises four issues relating to his convictions. He claims that
he was denied the effective assistance of counsel, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss on the basis of entrapment, that prosecutorial misconduct denied him a fair trial, and that there
was insufficient evidence to sustain his two conspiracy convictions. The prosecutor appeals from the
trial court’s decision to depart below the mandatory minimum sentences for the convictions of delivery
of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine. We do not find any issue to require reversal.
Docket Nos. 169536; 170148
I
Defendant first contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Defendant did
not move for an evidentiary hearing or new trial on this basis in the lower court, and his motion to
remand for an evidentiary hearing filed in this Court was denied in an unpublished order dated March 1,
1994. Accordingly, our review of this issue is limited to the record. People v Barclay, 208 Mich App
670, 672; 528 NW2d 842 (1995).
In order to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel mandating reversal of a conviction,
counsel’s performance must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness, and the representation
must prejudice the defendant so as to deprive him of a fair trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298,
309; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). In order to prove prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome. Id., p 314.
A
Defendant first contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain certain information
regarding the confidential informant. It is defendant’s contention that this failure prevented counsel from
being able to effectively cross-examine Denmark about the confidential informant.
Defendant acknowledges that the prosecution stated that everything in its file had been given to
defense counsel. Further, it is unclear what history on the confidential informant existed, since there is
no evidentiary record on this point. Denmark indicated that he kept certain notes, but that his reports
contained the same information and the reports were given to defense counsel. Under these
circumstances, defendant has not made a showing of prejudice; that is, there is no showing that the
result of the trial would have been different had counsel obtained any additional information regarding
the confidential informant.
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B
Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to give an opening statement.
However, this is considered to be trial strategy, and this Court will not second-guess counsel on matters
of trial strategy. People v Barnett, 163 Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987); People v
Calhoun, 178 Mich App 517, 524; 444 NW2d 232 (1989). Further, there is no prejudice to
defendant because counsel gave a closing statement and cross-examined the witnesses. Therefore, the
prosecution’s theory did not go unrebutted.
C
Defendant next contends that counsel was ineffective for failing to move in limine to exclude
evidence of an uncharged sale on August 7, 1991. In this case, evidence of this first buy (not charged
by the prosecutor) was introduced to demonstrate the workings of an undercover operation. Thus,
evidence of this sale was offered for a proper purpose and was relevant. Further, we do not find the
evidence to be more prejudicial than probative because there was ample evidence admitted regarding
the subsequent offenses for which defendant was charged. People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 74;
508 NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994). Defendant has not shown that the result of
the proceeding would have been any different had the first sale not been admitted as evidence.
D
Defendant next argues that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel because a second
attorney took over the case in mid-trial. However, a careful review of the record indicates that it does
not support defendant’s argument in this regard.
Before the jury was chosen, defendant’s original counsel, Richard Wayne, introduced attorney
Charles Novelli to the trial court as co-counsel on the case. On the second day of trial, Novelli
proceeded with the case because Wayne explained that he was not feeling well. Defendant did not
object to this, and Novelli had been present during all of the trial. This substitution, or change of
counsel, does not, in and of itself, constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel. Contrary to
defendant’s claim, there was no last minute substitution of counsel. Moreover, a review of the trial
indicates that Novelli vigorously and effectively cross-examined the witnesses and presented
defendant’s defense. Therefore, defendant is unable to show any actual prejudice on the record before
us.
E
Defendant next argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to move for an entrapment hearing
before trial. Although it would have been preferable for counsel to have raised such a motion either
before or during trial, we find no prejudice because a review of the testimony indicates that an
entrapment claim would not have been availing (see Issue II, infra). Further, counsel did move to
dismiss the case on the basis of entrapment at the conclusion of the testimony. The trial court
understood defendant’s motion, and the facts for the motion were developed at trial. Therefore,
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counsel’s failure to move for an evidentiary hearing regarding the defense of entrapment either before or
during trial was not ineffective because defendant is unable to show that the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.
F
Lastly, defendant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Denmark’s comment
about the “war on drugs.” We find that this is sound trial strategy, because counsel may not have
wanted to object and thereby emphasize the remark. People v Barker, 161 Mich App 296, 304; 409
NW2d 813 (1987). Further, the trial court instructed the jury that it was not to be concerned about the
war on drugs when defense counsel objected to a similar comment made by the prosecutor during
rebuttal argument. Therefore, we do not find that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object on
this basis below.
II
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the basis of
entrapment. A trial court’s finding concerning entrapment is reviewed under the clearly erroneous
standard of review. People v Williams, 196 Mich App 656, 661; 493 NW2d 507 (1992).
Entrapment exists when one of two prongs is met: (1) if the police conduct would induce a
person similarly situated as the defendant not ready and willing to commit an offense to commit the
offense; or (2) if the police engaged in conduct so reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated, regardless of
whether the conduct caused the defendant to commit the crime. People v Fabiano, 192 Mich App
523, 531-532; 482 NW2d 467 (1992). The following factors are to be considered to determine
whether the government activity would induce criminal conduct: (1) whether there existed any appeals
to the defendant’s sympathy as a friend; (2) whether the defendant had been known to commit the
crime with which he was charged; (3) whether there were any long time lapses between the investigation
and the arrest; (4) whether there existed any inducements that would make the commission of a crime
unusually attractive to a hypothetical law-abiding citizen; (5) whether there were offers of excessive
consideration or other enticement; (6) whether there was a guarantee that the acts alleged as crimes
were not illegal; (7) whether, and to what extent, any governmental pressure existed; (8) whether there
existed sexual favors; (9) whether there were any threats of arrest; (10) whether there existed any
governmental procedures that tended to escalate the criminal culpability of the defendant; (11) whether
there was police control over the informant; and (12) whether the investigation was targeted. Williams,
supra, pp 661-662.
Defendant contends that the following factors preponderate in his favor for a finding of
entrapment: the threat of arrest, governmental pressure, the escalation of criminal culpability, the
informant was unsupervised and not under the control of the police, and defendant had never committed
the offense with which he was charged. Here, defendant and the informant were acquainted because
they had worked together and they became friends. There is no claim that appeals were made to the
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defendant’s sympathy as a friend. Further, defendant concedes that he was using narcotics in 1991,
and that he had purchased narcotics from the informant on a number of occasions.
Although defendant claims that he had never committed the offense with which he was charged,
he was previously buying illegal drugs, and the informant stated that defendant did sell drugs. With
respect to the claim of governmental pressure, the police officer, Denmark, did contact defendant on
several occasions and asked if defendant could supply him with cocaine. On each occasion, defendant
stated that he could do so. This does not constitute governmental pressure because merely supplying a
person with an opportunity to commit a crime does not constitute entrapment. See, e.g., Williams,
supra, p 663. Also, with respect to the claim that the informant was not supervised or under the control
of the police, the evidence was that, at least initially, Denmark controlled the informant’s activities.
Denmark then “cut out” the informant from further drug transactions, but, the informant continued to call
defendant to pressure him to sell drugs to Denmark. Even if the informant involved himself in the drug
transactions, the police had cut him out of further dealings. We cannot place fault with the police for the
independent decision of an informant to continue contacting defendant. Moreover, we note that the
informant told defendant that he (the informant) was working for the police. Therefore, we do not
believe that these factors favor a finding of entrapment.
The factors of threat of arrest and escalation of criminal culpability are somewhat more
problematic. Defendant claims that the informant threatened to turn him in to the police. However,
there is no evidence that the police authorized or encouraged the informant to threaten defendant with
arrest. Further, Denmark’s actions of asking defendant for increasing amounts of cocaine did escalate
defendant’s culpability. However, the evidence showed that defendant was willing to sell larger
amounts of cocaine. The evidence also showed that defendant had been involved in using and buying
drugs before he began selling drugs to Denmark. Accordingly, we do not agree with defendant’s
contention that the police manufactured the offenses. We do not find the police conduct to be so
reprehensible that it cannot be tolerated, nor did the police engage in impermissible conduct that would
induce a law abiding person to commit a crime under similar circumstances.
The trial court did not clearly err in denying defendant’s motion to dismiss at the close of the
proofs on the basis of entrapment.
III
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct which denied him a fair trial.
Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor failed to comply with a court order to provide counsel
with several reports and Denmark’s notes, and that the prosecutor made inflammatory comments during
closing argument.
With respect to the notes and reports, the record indicates that when defense counsel
questioned the absence of the reports and notes, the prosecutor copied them and provided them to
counsel. Also, Denmark indicated that his notes had been incorporated into his reports, and counsel
had been provided with the reports. Therefore, even though the reports were not timely given to
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defense counsel, counsel was provided with the reports. Counsel stated on the record that he did not
need to see the notes, and defendant has not shown that the lack of timely access to the reports or notes
had any effect on the verdict. In fact, counsel never requested a continuance or any other type of
remedy. Therefore, we cannot conclude that defendant was deprived of a fair trial in this regard.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when he made inflammatory
remarks during closing argument. Specifically, defendant refers to the prosecutor’s comments that
defendant could gain access to large amounts of cocaine, and that defendant did not care where the
drugs went that he sold. Defense counsel asked to approach the bench, and, after a conference, the
trial court immediately instructed the jury that it was not to concern itself with the war on drugs, but only
with the charges against defendant. During the jury instructions, the trial court instructed the jury that the
attorneys’ statements, arguments, and questions were not evidence. Under these circumstances, we
find that the trial court’s instructions to the jury sufficiently cured any prejudice. People v Bahoda, 448
Mich 261, 281; 531 NW2d 659 (1995).
Accordingly, defendant was not denied a fair trial due to any alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
IV
Lastly, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his two conspiracy
convictions. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could
have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v
Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992), amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
A conspiracy is a mutual agreement or understanding between two or more persons to commit
a criminal act or to accomplish a legal act by unlawful means. The agreement or understanding may be
express or implied. Proof of a formal agreement is not required. Conspiracy is a specific intent crime
which requires both the intent to combine with others and the intent to accomplish the illegal objective.
Direct proof of an agreement is not required. The circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties can
establish the existence of an agreement. A conspiracy may be based on inference or proven by
circumstantial evidence. No overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy is necessary. The formation of
the agreement completes the crime of conspiracy. People v Cotton, 191 Mich App 377, 392-393;
478 NW2d 681 (1991).
The evidence in this case indicated that on August 21, 1991, Denmark went to defendant’s
residence to purchase cocaine. Shortly thereafter, Thomas Reed arrived at defendant’s house with the
cocaine. The evidence conflicted regarding whether Reed handed the bag of cocaine to defendant or
directly to Denmark. However, there was evidence that Reed handed the bag to defendant who then
gave it to Denmark. Denmark handed defendant the money and left with the cocaine.
The second conspiracy offense arose on October 7, 1991 when Denmark went to defendant’s
house with five pounds of marijuana. Before Denmark arrived, defendant contacted William Lemiere.
Lemiere arrived at defendant’s residence and inspected the marijuana. Lemiere left, and later returned
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with the money to purchase the marijuana. Lemiere gave Denmark the money and Denmark signaled
the surveillance officers.
This evidence, when taken in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and in drawing
reasonable inferences from it, is sufficient to sustain defendant’s two conspiracy convictions.
Docket No. 167366
In this appeal, the prosecutor appeals from the trial court’s decision to d
epart below the
mandatory minimum sentences with respect to the two convictions of delivery of more than 50 but less
then 225 grams of cocaine. Defendant received prison terms of five to twenty years’ imprisonment for
both of those convictions, although the statutory minimum terms are ten years. The prosecutor argues
that the trial court improperly considered the consecutive nature of the sentences, that there were no
substantial and compelling reasons to depart below the mandatory minimum, and that the extent of the
departure resulted in disproportionately lenient sentences.
At sentencing, the trial court stated the following:
The Court believes a just sentence here would be in the vicinity of sixteen years
and for substantial and compelling reasons on the record including the government’s
involvement in this offense and the fact that there are—they are consecutive sentences,
sentence you, Mr. Ellinger, to the delivery of a controlled substance of 50 to 224 grams
of five to twenty years with credit for seventy-five days.
We find no error with respect to the trial court’s decision to account for the fact that the sentences in
this case must run consecutively to each other in attempting to fashion proportionate sentences. People
v Davis, 196 Mich App 597, 601-602; 493 NW2d 467 (1992).
We also find no error with respect to the trial court’s decision to depart below the mandatory
minimum term in sentencing defendant. MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii)
provides that an offender shall be imprisoned for not less than ten nor more than twenty years.
However, trial courts are permitted to depart from the minimum term if the court finds that there are
substantial and compelling reasons to do so on the record. MCL 333.7401(4); MSA 14.15(7401)(4).
Only those factors that are objective and verifiable may be used to judge whether substantial
and compelling reasons exist to depart from the mandatory minimum term. People v Fields, 448 Mich
58, 62; 528 NW2d 176 (1995). In determining whether substantial and compelling reasons to depart
exist, courts first are to place particular emphasis on mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense.
Id., p 76. Other factors to evaluate include: (1) the defendant’s prior record, (2) the defendant’s age,
(3) the defendant’s work history, (4) the defendant’s cooperation with law enforcement officials, and
(5) factors arising after the defendant’s arrest. Id., p 77.
The existence or nonexistence of a particular factor is a factual determination for the sentencing
court that is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard of review. Id. The determination that a
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particular factor is objective and verifiable is to be reviewed as a matter of law. Id. A trial court’s
determination that the objective and verifiable factors present in the case constitute substantial and
compelling reasons to depart below the statutory minimum sentence is to be reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. Id., p 78.
The trial court relied on factors such as no evidence of prior drug dealing by defendant,
defendant’s age (twenty-seven years old when he committed the offenses), defendant’s steady
employment history, defendant’s strong family support, defendant’s lack of a prior criminal record,
defendant’s strong potential for rehabilitation, and the government’s escalation of the offenses. These
factors are all objective and verifiable and are supported by record evidence. The trial court’s finding
that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart below the mandatory minimum sentence of
ten years is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a
sentence of five to twenty years for the delivery of more than 50 but less than 225 grams of cocaine
convictions.
Finally, the sentences in this case do not violate the principle of proportionality in considering the
background of the offender and the circumstances surrounding the offenses. People v Milbourn, 435
Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Dennis C. Kolenda
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