PEOPLE OF MI V HOOMAN HOOSHYAR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 25, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 175976
Midland Circuit Court
LC No. 93-007099
HOOMAN HOOSHYAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Reilly, P.J. and MacKenzie, and B.K. Zahra,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct with a person under the age of thirteen, MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(a), and two
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a person under the age of thirteen, MCL
750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a). He was sentenced to concurrent terms of thirty to sixty years’
imprisonment for the first-degree criminal sexual conduct conviction, and ten to fifteen years’
imprisonment for each of the second-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions. Defendant appeals as
of right, and we affirm.
I.
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial when an expert testified that the complainant fit
the profile of a typical sexual abuse victim. We agree that admission of portions of the testimony was
improper, but conclude that the error was harmless.
Bonnie J. Larson, a clinical social worker, testified that she conducted therapy with the
complainant twenty-eight times, from August 31, 1992 to October, 1993. During direct examination,
the prosecutor asked if there is “what’s called a profile or a behavior pattern of sexually abused
children.” She responded affirmatively and stated that in Roland Summit’s research, five “factors” were
identified:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Number one is secrecy where the child is reminded not to tell.
Number two is a sense of helplessness where they are feeling like they don’t
have any power.
Number three, factor number three, is entrapment where they feel like they are
trapped and they have to accommodate their abuser.
Factor four he identified as delayed disclosure where, um, the telling comes
quite awhile after the abuse.
And number five is recanting or retracting, taking back, the story that they told.
Larson stated that these factors are “typical” in sexually abused children. The prosecutor asked
whether Larson detected secrecy in her counseling with the complainant.
Um, yeah. Initially, he was really reluctant to talk about it. Um, and he
continued to be pretty reluctant over time to talk about it, and so I would get bits and
pieces. Um, but as he seemed to feel safer and as I had given him a feeling vocabulary
with which to describe it -- because some of these things happened without his having
language or a particular word, so I would give him a feeling vocabulary of mad, sad,
glad, and scared; and with that, he would begin to elaborate the details.
The prosecutor asked how helplessness was manifested. Larson responded:
Feeling like no one’s going to believe him or, or um, if his abuser would tell him that it
was his fault or that -- that [the complainant] somehow lied, that [the complainant]
would not be believed; and at one point he told me that he had told his grandma that
terrible things were happening -Defense counsel asked that the jury be excused, and out of the presence of the jury, objected to the line
of questioning. The prosecutor argued that the information “goes to the profile.” The court explained
that “the profile” could not be used in this case and that it was not evidence. After a brief discussion,
the court sustained defendant’s objection.
The direct examination continued with the expert indicating that delayed disclosure and “telling
the story differently, or maybe not disclosing all in one setting” was typical. The prosecutor then asked,
“[I]n your opinion, [the complainant] fits that profile?” Larson responded, “In my opinion, he fits at
least four factors.”
After defense counsel’s cross-examination, the court questioned Larson as follows:
THE COURT: . . . Does your experience - - you’ve testified that - - you probably talk
to about 50 - - have given therapy to roughly 50 children who would fall into the
category of sexually abused children; is that right?
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THE WITNESS: That’s right.
THE COURT: All right. In your experience with those 50 children, is there a pattern of
how they behave that falls out of that? Forgetting about the literature for a moment, in
your experience is there a pattern?
THE WITNESS: There’s, um, a pattern of anger, um, and denial, um, and some
suicidal and homicidal kinds of ideation, and concern about them hurting themselves or
others.
THE COURT: And do you see these children acting in ways that convince you that
there really are signs that you can look to when you are dealing with sexually abused
children?
THE WITNESS: Each, each child is quite unique.
THE COURT: Yes. The bottom line here that I want to ask you is, did this child, [the
complainant] act consistently with children who you have given therapy to who you
believed to be sexually abused or who you were treating for sexual abuse?
THE WITNESS: Yes. In terms of the pattern of needing to feel safe and then - - and
then [sic] disclosing what occurred. What - - what struck - - strikes me as different
about [the complainant] is that he did not act out sexually what went on. I mean, he did
not masturbate or, um, act towards others in a sexual manner. I am concerned that if he
doesn’t address the feelings that he may act that out in some way in the future, because
he has denied feelings.
Defense counsel then attempted to explore this apparent discrepancy between the
complainant’s behavior and other sexually abused children. Counsel asked Larson to explain what she
meant by acting out.
[THE WITNESS]: Some children masturbate frequently, some children use objects to
penetrate themselves, some children might act out towards a sibling.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: This is a pattern that you have seen as a result of your -
[THE WITNESS]: It can be a pattern. [The complainant], it appears to me has
internalized that.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Let me ask you another possibility.
internalized it, but is it possible he is making this up?
Maybe he has
[THE WITNESS]: It’s not possible in my opinion.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In your opinion, it’s not possible; is that correct?
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[THE WITNESS]: That’s correct.
Again, trying to establish the possibility that the complainant might be lying, defense counsel asked
Larson whether, in the course of the children that she’s examined, she ever found any child who was not
telling the truth. Larson testified that that had never happened to her.
The issue in this case is whether portions of Larson’s testimony were inadmissible under People
v Peterson, 450 Mich 349; 537 NW2d 857 (1995) and People v Beckley, 434 Mich 691; 456
NW2d 391 (1990).
Beckley is a plurality opinion in which the justices could not agree on the limitations that should
be imposed on the admissibility of expert testimony regarding the child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome (CSAAS). In People v Christel, 449 Mich 578, 589-590; 537 NW2d 194 (1995), the
Court discussed Beckley, its holding, and the disagreement among the justices.
In Beckley, this Court addressed whether expert testimony regarding the rape
trauma syndrome is admissible in child sexual abuse cases in order to rebut the inference
that the victim's behavior was inconsistent with that of an actual sexual abuse victim. In
a plurality opinion, we held that this expert testimony is generally admissible when the
scientific or technical evidence is from a recognized discipline, the testimony is helpful to
the trier of fact in understanding relevant evidence, and the expert is qualified. Id. at
711, (opinion of Brickley, J.); id. at 736-737 (opinion of Boyle, J.). Assuming these
tests are satisfied, the expert may testify regarding the characteristics of the syndrome
and whether the complainant's behavior is consistent with those traits.
However, seven justices agreed that syndrome evidence is not admissible to
demonstrate that abuse occurred. Id. at 724 (opinion of Brickley, J.); id. at 734
(opinion of Boyle, J.); id. at 744 (opinion of Archer, J.). The Court also agreed that the
expert may not give an opinion about whether the complainant is being truthful or the
defendant is guilty. Moreover, five justices agreed that where syndrome evidence is
merely offered to explain certain behavior, the Davis/Frye test for recognizing an
admissible science is inapplicable. Beckley, supra at 721, 734.
The basis for the three separate opinions in Beckley stemmed from
disagreement regarding the necessary foundation for and the parameters of this expert
testimony. Justice Brickley would limit its admission " 'for the narrow purpose of
rebutting an inference that a complainant's postincident behavior was inconsistent with
that of an actual victim of sexual abuse, incest or rape.' " Id. at 710 (citation omitted).
Justice Archer concurred in part, but would hold that an expert only can testify in
generalities and cannot discuss whether the victim's behavior is consistent with that of
other abuse victims. Id. at 744. On the other hand, Justice Boyle would allow the
expert to testify about these similarities to assist the jury in deciding a fact at issue. Id.
at 736.
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In Peterson, the Court revisited its decision in Beckley and determined the proper scope of
expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. Peterson, supra at 352. The Court summarized its
decision as follows:
As a threshold matter, we reaffirm our holding in Beckley that (1) an expert may
not testify that the sexual abuse occurred, (2) an expert may not vouch for the veracity
of a victim, and (3) an expert may not testify whether the defendant is guilty. However,
we clarify our decision in Beckley and now hold that (1) an expert may testify in the
prosecution's case in chief regarding typical and relevant symptoms of child sexual
abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim's specific behavior that might be
incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an actual abuse victim, and
(2) an expert may testify with regard to the consistencies between the behavior of
the particular victim and other victims of child sexual abuse to rebut an attack on
the victim's credibility. [Emphasis added.]
Although Peterson appears to limit the admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse
cases, the opinion also contains language indicating that the syndrome evidence would almost always be
admissible. The Court in Peterson recognized that child sexual abuse cases raised particular concerns
because of the suggestibility of children and the prejudicial effect expert testimony regarding child sexual
abuse “syndrome” may have on the jury. Id. at 371. The Court adopted “the position that the
admission of expert testimony regarding evidence of behaviors common in other abuse complainants
should be limited in these cases. . . .” Id. Nevertheless, the phrase emphasized in the quotation above
indicates that consistencies between the complainant’s behavior and that of victims of sexual abuse are
admissible whenever the complainant’s credibility is attacked. This suggests that syndrome evidence
will almost always be admissible because typically, a defendant’s trial strategy depends upon attacking
the complainant’s credibility.1 Thus, at first blush, Peterson seems to create limitations on the
admissibility of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases that are of no practical significance because
the limitations do not apply when the complainant’s credibility is attacked in any way, which happens in
nearly every case.
However, in a footnote, the Supreme Court indicated that a general attack on the complainant’s
credibility would not open the door for the admission of all evidence relating to the consistencies
between the complainant’s behavior and that of victims of sexual abuse. Id. at 373-374, and n 13. The
Court explained:
Unless a defendant raises the issue of the particular child victim’s postincident behavior
or attacks the child’s credibility,[n 13] an expert may not testify that the particular child
victim’s behavior is consistent with that of a sexually abused child. Such testimony
would be improper because it comes too close to testifying that the particular child is a
victim of sexual abuse.
[n13] The credibility of the victim is attacked when the defendant highlights
behaviors exhibited by the victim that are also behaviors within CSAAS and alludes that
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the victim is incredible because of these behaviors. The scope of the testimony,
however, is again limited to the behaviors at issue, and the expert may not testify about
behavior manifestations that are not at issue. In other words, it does not matter how the
behavior trait came into evidence. The expert may not proffer testimony of other
behaviors unless the facts as they develop make the specific behavior relevant or if the
defendant attacks the victim’s credibility based on the behavior. [Emphasis added.]
Thus, not every attack on the complainant’s credibility will result in the admission of evidence
concerning CSAAS. Rather, if the defendant attacks the complainant’s credibility based on a behavior
that is explained by CSAAS, for example a delay in disclosure, the expert would be allowed to explain
to the jury that the behavior at issue is consistent with that of a sexually abused child, but would not be
allowed to testify about other behaviors that were not at issue.
This interpretation of Peterson is supported by the discussion applying the standard to the facts
in that case and People v Smith, the companion case. The Court stated that the conduct of the trial in
Smith “presents an almost perfect model for the limitations that must be set in allowing expert testimony
into evidence in child sexual abuse cases.” Id. at 381. In Smith, the complainant did not report sexual
abuse for several years after it occurred. The court allowed expert testimony during the prosecution’s
case in chief on the significance of the complainant’s delay in reporting. Although Smith did not directly
attack the credibility of the victim, id. at 379, the Court held that the expert testimony was admissible.
“[W]here there are common misperceptions regarding the behavior of the victim on which a jury may
draw an incorrect inference, such as delayed reporting, the prosecutor may present limited expert
testimony dealing solely with the misperception.” Id. Smith illustrates the first holding stated by the
Court in its summary, “an expert may testify in the prosecution’s case in chief regarding typical and
relevant symptoms of child abuse for the sole purpose of explaining a victim’s specific behavior that
might be incorrectly construed by the jury as inconsistent with that of an actual abuse victim . . . .” Id. at
352.
In contrast, Peterson illustrates what expert testimony is not allowed when the defendant does
not argue that the complainant’s behavior is inconsistent with that of a victim of child sexual abuse. The
experts in Peterson “were allowed to make numerous references to the consistencies between the
victim’s behavior and the behavior of typical victims of child abuse.” Id. at 376. One expert testified
that the complainant’s symptoms were consistent with those of a victim of child sexual abuse. Another
testified that the behavior manifestations of the complainant were symptomatic of sexual abuse. A third
testified that the complainant had posttraumatic stress syndrome. The Court concluded that this
testimony was inadmissible “[b]ecause the defendant never argued that the victim’s behavior was
inconsistent with that of a typical victim of child sexual abuse . . . .” Id. at 376-377.
In the present case, expert testimony would have been admissible to explain certain behaviors of
the complainant within CSAAS upon which defendant attacked the complainant’s credibility. Id. at
374, n 13. For example, during cross-examination of the complainant, the defendant asked if the
complainant ever told defendant to stop and if the complainant ever yelled or cried out. The
complainant responded negatively to both questions. Expert testimony would have been admissible
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regarding whether the failure to take action to stop the abuse was consistent with that of child sexual
abuse victims.
However, Larson’s testimony exceeded the permissible limits of expert testimony under
Peterson. Larson described five “factors” and offered an opinion that the complainant “fits at least four
factors.” This suggested that the complainant was a likely victim of sexual abuse because he closely
matched “the profile.” However, CSAAS “is not intended as a diagnostic tool for detection of sexual
abuse.” Beckley, supra at 722. Larson should not have testified regarding CSAAS characteristics that
were not at issue. Peterson, supra at 373, n 12. In response to the court’s question, “did this child,
[the complainant] act consistently with children who you have given therapy to who you believed to be
sexually abused or who you were treating for sexual abuse?”, Larson stated:
Yes. In terms of the pattern of needing to feel safe and then - - and then [sic] disclosing
what occurred. What - - what struck - - strikes me as different about [the complainant]
is that he did not act out sexually what went on. I mean, he did not masturbate or, um,
act towards others in a sexual manner. I am concerned that if he doesn’t address the
feelings that he may act that out in some way in the future, because he has denied
feelings.
This testimony was not helpful to the jury to understand specific behaviors of the complainant that the
jury might infer were inconsistent with sexual abuse. Rather, Larson’s concern about the complainant’s
denial of his feelings clearly implies that she believed the complainant had in fact been sexually abused.
Larson essentially vouched for the complainant’s veracity. Peterson, supra at 352, 375-376. Defense
counsel’s attempt to suggest that the absence of acting out could indicate that the complainant was lying
only provided a further opportunity for Larson to indicate her belief in the complainant’s veracity.2
Although we conclude that Larson’s testimony was improper in many respects, we deem the
error harmless. The extent of the impermissible testimony in this case was no worse than that in
Peterson, in which the majority of justices concluded the error was harmless. Although there is no
physical evidence to lend support to the complainant’s allegations, one doctor’s testimony in Peterson
that she found no physical evidence of abuse3, id. at 377, was not an impediment to finding the error
harmless. Larson’s testimony that the complainant was not “acting out” as other victims of sexual abuse
have may be seen as serving to question the complainant’s credibility. The prosecution did not
emphasize the improper aspects of Larson’s testimony in his closing argument.4 Although the court’s
instructions regarding the proper use of Larson’s testimony did not fully convey how the consistencies
between the complainant’s behavior and that of the victims of sexual abuse were relevant, the court
properly instructed the jury that the evidence could “not be used to show that the crime was committed
or that the defendant committed it[, n]or can it be considered an opinion by Bonnie Larson that [the
complainant] is telling the truth.”5 In light of the Supreme Court’s willingness to deem the error in
Peterson harmless, we conclude the error in this case was also harmless.
II.
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Defendant argues that the fifteen-month delay between the time the victim first complained of
sexual abuse and the time defendant was arrested denied defendant his right to a fair trial. Specifically,
defendant alleges that he was denied an opportunity to present an alibi defense and to have the victim
examined by a psychologist. We disagree. The threshold test of whether a delay between the offense
and the arrest denied defendant due process is whether the defendant was prejudiced. People v
Reddish, 181 Mich App 625, 627; 450 NW2d 16 (1989).
In this case, defendant presents no evidentiary or legal support for his claim that he was denied
the opportunity to present an alibi. Defendant did not raise this issue before the trial court by moving to
dismiss the charges on this basis. People v Hernandez, 84 Mich App 1, 19; 269 NW2d 322 (1978).
On appeal, defendant merely relies on an affidavit of a witness, which supposedly was attached to his
brief on appeal. 6 According to defendant, the affidavit states that defendant was in Chicago attending a
car auction on one of the alleged dates the complainant was abused. Assuming that the affidavit exists
and its contents are accurately described by defendant in his brief, we are not persuaded that defendant
has demonstrated prejudice. Defendant had the opportunity to present his potential alibi theory to the
jury. Notably, one witness for the defense testified that defendant often went to Chicago on business.
In sum, the prearrest delay did not prevent defendant from presenting an alibi defense.
Additionally, we are not persuaded that the prearrest delay prejudiced defendant by denying
him an opportunity to have a psychological examination of the complainant performed. In fact,
defendant provides no reason why a psychological examination was necessary at the time the victim first
came forward with his allegations of abuse. The complainant’s credibility and veracity were attacked by
defense counsel at trial without the need for a psychological examination, which is only ordered if there
is a compelling reason to do so. See People v Graham, 173 Mich App 473, 478; 434 NW2d 165
(1988). Accordingly, having considered defendant’s arguments, we conclude that defendant has failed
to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the fifteen-month delay in arrest.
III.
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor’s improper questioning of his expert witness deprived
defendant of his right to a fair trial. However, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor’s alleged
misconduct. Therefore, we find that this issue is not preserved for appellate review. People v
Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 686; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). Indeed, we believe that any prejudice
resultant from the prosecutor’s behavior could have been cured by the trial court’s issuance of
cautionary instructions. See People v Leighty, 161 Mich App 565, 575-577; 411 NW2d 778
(1987). We find that no manifest injustice will result from our failure to review defendant’s claims of
prosecutorial misconduct.
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor deliberately delayed arresting defendant, after the
complainant initially filed his complaint. As a result of this prearrest delay, defendant argues that he was
prejudiced by not having an adequate opportunity to defend himself. However, as stated above,
defendant was not prejudiced by the prearrest delay. Defendant presents no evidence, either at trial or
on appeal, that the prosecution deliberately delayed arresting defendant in order to strengthen its case
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against defendant. As defendant’s argument stands, it is pure conjecture. See People v Hoffman, 205
Mich App 1, 17; 518 NW2d 817 (1994). Thus, we find that no reversal is necessary as to this
allegation of error.
IV.
Defendant next argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel for the various
reasons set forth below. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
show that counsel’s performance was deficient and that, under an objective standard of reasonableness,
counsel was not functioning as the attorney whose assistance is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Further, defendant must show that any deficiency was prejudicial to his
case, e.g. that counsel’s error may have affected the outcome at trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich
298, 302-303, 312, 314; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
Defendant first argues that trial counsel was ineffective for having failed to raise a motion to
dismiss based upon the fifteen-month prearrest delay. However, as stated above, defendant has not
established that he was prejudiced by the prearrest delay. Thus, even if counsel should have filed a
motion to dismiss, defendant has not established that the failure to do so was prejudicial, e.g. that the
motion would have been granted had it been made. Accordingly, defendant has not established
ineffective assistance of counsel on this basis.
Defendant next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s
expert’s testimony that the complainant fit the profile of a typical sexual abuse victim. However, in light
of our holding that the error in the admission of the expert’s testimony was harmless, we conclude that
defendant has not established that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel’s question to the prosecution’s expert about
whether the complainant was “making up” allegations of abuse constituted ineffective assistance of
counsel. We disagree. Defense counsel’s questioning of the expert is a matter of trial strategy. It is
well established that this Court will not second-guess trial counsel’s strategy. The fact that the strategy
may not have worked does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. People v Barnett, 163
Mich App 331, 338; 414 NW2d 378 (1987). In this case, defense counsel took a calculated risk by
asking the expert what her personal opinion was as to whether the complainant could be “making up”
the allegations of abuse. Had the expert testified that the complainant might have made up his
allegations of abuse, defense counsel would be labeled skilled rather than ineffective. Therefore,
because defendant’s questioning of the expert was trial strategy, defense counsel was not ineffective.
Defendant next argues that defense counsel’s failure to have a psychologist who actually
examined defendant testify constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Similarly, defendant argues that
defense counsel’s failure to call a potential alibi witness constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. We
disagree. Defense counsel’s decision to call witnesses to testify is also a matter of trial strategy. See
People v Fisher, 87 Mich App 350, 358-359; 274 NW2d 788 (1978). We note that defense counsel
had a medical expert testify on defendant’s behalf. Thus, defense counsel’s strategy to have only one
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medical expert testify does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Additionally, there is no
evidence from the record that defense counsel failed to explore a potential alibi witness. In fact, defense
counsel called a witness to testify as to defendant’s alibi, e.g., defendant often went to Chicago on
business. Consequently, we find that defense counsel was not ineffective as to this issue.
Lastly, defendant argues that during the impeachment of the complainant, defense counsel
opened the door to allow defendant’s assaultive conduct be introduced as evidence. However, the
impeachment of the complainant was done as trial strategy. Although the impeachment resulted in
unfavorable testimony being admitted regarding defendant, this Court should avoid second-guessing trial
counsel’s decisions. Barnett, supra, at 338. On the whole, we find that defense counsel’s calculated
decision to impeach the complainant was not objectively unreasonable conduct. In conclusion,
counsel’s assistance at trial was not ineffective.
V.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to resentencing because offense variable (OV) 2 was
misscored at twenty-five points, as opposed to zero points. Our review of scoring decisions is very
limited, and they will be upheld if any evidence exists to support them. People v Derbeck, 202 Mich
App 443, 449; 509 NW2d 534 (1993); People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 288; 508 NW2d
509 (1993). The evidence in this case supports the trial court’s score of twenty-five points. The
complainant testified that defendant laughed quietly during the incidents of abuse. In addition, the
complainant stated that defendant threatened him on many occasions. Thus, the record evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that defendant caused the complainant to suffer increased fear and
anxiety during the offense. Notably, the complainant need not have testified that he was anxious or
afraid in order for the trial judge to have found that terrorism existed. People v Kreger, 214 Mich App
549, 552; 543 NW2d 55 (1995). Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s scoring of OV 2. In any
event, the merit of defendant’s argument is moot in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
People v Mitchell, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket Nos 118832; 121158, issued 3/25/97).
According to Mitchell, the challenge does not state a cognizable claim for relief.
VI.
Lastly, defendant argues that the sentence of thirty to sixty years’ imprisonment for the first
degree criminal sexual conduct conviction was disproportionate to the offense and the offender. We
disagree. The recommended guidelines range for defendant’s conviction was ten to twenty-five years’
imprisonment. However, a sentencing court is allowed to depart from the guidelines range when the
recommended range does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense or the characteristics of
the offender. People v Houston, 448 Mich 312, 320; 532 NW2d 508 (1995). On the departure
evaluation form, the trial court explained that the departure was warranted because (1) defendant
“carried on a reign of terror” in the home for over three years and the number of encounters far
exceeded the three charged incidents; (2) the nature of the attacks and the frequency “in conjunction
with [defendant’s] psychological profile show him to be a danger to his former family and to society in
general with little hope of rehabilitation.” Defendant does not contend that consideration of these
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factors was inappropriate. Defendant does challenge the court’s consideration of his “total lack of
remorse,” inasmuch as he has maintained his innocence. The court’s comments regarding lack of
remorse in this case are not different in substance from those in People v Houston, 448 Mich 312,
336-337; 532 NW2d 508 (1995), which the majority held were proper. Id. at 323. We believe that
the deviation from the guidelines range was not an abuse of discretion. On the whole, defendant’s
sentence is proportionate to both the offense and the offender, and resentencing is not required.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Barbara B. MacKenzie
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
1
See also, id. at 373, 374, 375.
2
Larson’s testimony brings to mind the warning in the lead opinion of Beckley:
Given the abhorrence of the crime, it is inevitable that those who treat a child victim will
have an emotional inclination toward protecting the child victim. The expert who treats
a child victim may lose some objectivity concerning a particular case. Therefore to
avoid the pitfall of the treating professional being inclined to give an opinion regarding
whether the complaining witness had been sexually abused, we caution the trial court to
carefully scrutinize the treating professional's ability to aid the trier of fact when
exercising discretion in qualifying such an expert witness. [Id. at 729.]
3
We note that another doctor testified that the complainant had a large vaginal opening for her age, her
hymen was obliterated, and there was some irregularity of the fold surrounding her anal opening.
4
The prosecutor stated:
Bonnie Larson told you those things, too. That the way [the complainant] acted, the
things that were going on in [the complainant’s] head, are typical of sexually abused
children. Sometimes they tell different stories. She even told you that sometimes they
will recant it, they will take it right away, they will say it didn’t happen. It doesn’t mean
it didn’t happen. It just means that that child is going through what is a typical pattern
for sexually abused children. It doesn’t mean that they are unbelievable or that they
shouldn’t be believed.
5
The court’s instruction was as follows:
You have heard Bonnie Larson’s opinion about the behavior of sexually abused
children.
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You should consider that evidence only for the limited purpose of deciding
whether [the complainant’s] acts and words after the alleged crime were consistent with
those of sexually abused children.
That evidence cannot be used to show that the crime charged here was
committed or that the defendant committed it. Nor can it be considered an opinion by
Bonnie Larson that [the complainant] is telling the truth.
6
However, no affidavits were actually attached to defendant’s brief on appeal.
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