THOMAS F MEEKER V COMERICA INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
THOMAS F. MEEKER,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 187120
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94400168 CK
COMERICA, INC,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Marilyn Kelly and D.A. Burress,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this breach of contract and misrepresentation case, plaintiff appeals as of right from a grant of
summary disposition for defendant pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). On appeal, he argues that there
were genuine issues of fact precluding summary disposition. We affirm.
I
On December 8, 1989, following defendant’s acquisition of the Alliance Financial Corporation,
plaintiff terminated his employment with Alliance and signed a consulting agreement with defendant. The
agreement contained the following provision regarding retirement welfare benefits:
The Consulting Employee will accumulate Comerica pension service credits until
June 18, 1993 and will be subject to the provisions of the Comerica Incorporated
Retirement Plan and any retirement policies or procedures in effect at that time. Upon
the termination date of this Agreement, the Consulting Employee will be considered
eligible to participate in any applicable health and life insurance programs offered to
employees who retire from Comerica and which are in effect at the date on which the
Consulting Employee retires.
The agreement also contained the following provision regarding the duration of the contract:
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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This Agreement and all relationships between [plaintiff] and [defendant] shall
terminate on June 18, 1993, provided, however, that in the event that the Consulting
Employee dies or becomes permanently disabled . . . prior to June 18, 1993, this
Agreement and all relationships between the parties shall be terminated upon the date of
the Consulting Employee’s death or the expiration of the six month period of continuous
disability, whichever is appropriate. (emphasis in original).
In December, 1992, defendant decided to reduce its retiree insurance benefits effective January
1, 1993. Employees who had ten years of service and were eligible for retiree benefits were notified of
the change and given the opportunity to retire before the reduction of benefits. Because plaintiff did not
have ten years of service, he was not notified or given the opportunity to retire.
Plaintiff brought this action claiming that defendant breached the contract by failing to provide
him with the opportunity to retire before the reduction of benefits. Plaintiff also alleged that defendant
was liable for fraud and misrepresentation, as it had falsely led plaintiff to believe that he would not be
subject to defendant’s standard vesting requirements in order to be eligible for retirement benefits.
Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that there
was no question of fact that the consulting agreement unambiguously gave it the authority to modify
retirement benefits. Defendant asserted that plaintiff was entitled to receive only those benefits available
at the time of his retirement. Finally, it argued that plaintiff could not prove damages from the
misrepresentation because he had had no retiree insurance benefits while employed with Alliance.
Consequently, he could not have lost benefits by signing the consulting agreement.
Plaintiff argued that there was evidentiary support for his claims, precluding summary disposition
for defendant. According to plaintiff, in August, 1989, Robert Eppler, defendant’s director of human
resources, contacted plaintiff regarding renegotiation of plaintiff’s contract. In the course of
negotiations, Eppler confirmed the content of their discussions in a written memorandum entitled
"Contract Discussions." Plaintiff claimed that these documents showed that it was understood between
Eppler and plaintiff that defendant would provide plaintiff with retiree health and life insurance benefits as
part of his new contract, without regard to defendant’s ten-year eligibility requirement. Plaintiff cited the
following paragraph from the Contract Discussion memorandum:
You may continue in a Basic Heath Care Plan (hospitalization only) on the same
basis as prior to retirement if you retire after age 55 and are receiving a monthly benefit
check from the Comerica Retirement Plan.
At plaintiff’s request, John Cerretani, defendant’s in-house counsel, agreed to add this provision
to the consulting agreement. Cerretani never informed plaintiff that eligibility would be contingent upon a
minimum number of years of credited service. Plaintiff claimed that, before signing the agreement on
January 5, 1990, he asked Cerretani whether he would be eligible for retiree benefits if he retired that
day. Cerretani replied affirmatively. Plaintiff claimed that defendant enticed him into signing the
agreement by fraudulently inducing him to believe that he would qualify for the benefits without ten years
of service.
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At the motion hearing, defendant’s counsel stated that, although plaintiff did not need ten years
of service in order to qualify for retirement benefits, plaintiff would not become eligible for the benefits
until June 18, 1993, when the consulting agreement expired. In an effort to clarify its position, defendant
stated that plaintiff would be eligible at the time of his retirement to receive whatever benefits were
offered to retirees at the date of his retirement. Defendant denied that it had ever taken the position that
plaintiff would not be eligible for benefits until he met the retirement plan’s ten-year vesting provision.
The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the breach of contract
claim, finding that the contract unequivocally stated that plaintiff could not retire before June 18, 1993,
unless due to death or disability. It concluded that Cerratani’s statement was a misstatement of present
fact and, therefore, not a fraudulent misrepresentation. The trial court also granted summary disposition
as to the misrepresentation claim because plaintiff had not given the trial court more than "bare
conclusory statements concerning damages."
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition where plaintiff raised a
material question of fact regarding defendant’s obligation to offer plaintiff the opportunity to retire early
and avoid the reduced retirement benefits.
II
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether plaintiff’s claim was preempted by the
federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 29 USC 1001 et seq. Under
ERISA, state laws that "relate to" an employee benefit plan are expressly preempted. 29 USC 1144a;
Hill v Ford Motor Co, 183 Mich App 208, 213; 454 NW2d 125 (1989). A state law is preempted if
it "relates to" an employee benefit plan by
1) altering the level of benefits which would be paid out under a given plan from
state to state, 2) altering the terms of the plan such as requirements for eligibility, or 3)
subjecting the fiduciaries of a plan to claims other than those provided in the ERISA
itself. [
Teper v Park West Galleries, Inc, 431 Mich 202; 221; 427 NW2d 535
(1988).]
Moreover, preemption exists only where there is a real, if only indirect, relationship between the
challenged state law and an employee benefit plan. Id. at 220.
As in Hill, we find that plaintiff’s claim of misrepresentation does not “relate to” the plan. The
claim is premised upon a representation made by defendant’s employee regarding the time plaintiff
became eligible for participation in the plan. Plaintiff is seeking damages for alleged misrepresentation
not from the plan itself, but from defendant. Hill, supra. Therefore, as the claim will not alter the
benefits paid out of the plan from state to state, and will not alter the plan’s terms, it is not preempted by
ERISA. Teper, supra, Hill, supra.
However, as in Hill, we find that plaintiff’s breach of contract claim “relates to” the plan and is
preempted by ERISA. Hill, supra at 214-215. If plaintiff’s claim is successful, he would recover more
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benefits than he would otherwise be entitled to under the plan. Therefore, plaintiff’s claim “relates to”
defendant’s employee benefit plan and is preempted. Id. at 215.1
III
With respect to the merits of defendant’s misrepresentation claim, plaintiff argues that the trial
court improperly granted summary disposition where there were issues of material fact to be decided by
the jury. To constitute actionable fraud, a plaintiff must establish that:
(1) defendant made a material misrepresentation; (2) it was false; (3) when it
was made defendant knew that it was false or made it recklessly, without knowledge of
its truth and as a positive assertion; (4) defendant made it with the intent that it should be
acted upon by plaintiff; (5) plaintiff did act in reliance upon it; and (6) plaintiff thereby
suffered injury. [Webb v First of Michigan Corporation, 195 Mich App 470, 473;
491 NW2d 851 (1992).]
Plaintiff alleged that he asked Cerretani before signing the agreement whether he would be
eligible for retirement benefits if he retired that day, and Cerretani responded affirmatively. Plaintiff
claims that Cerretani’s statement satisfied the first four elements of misrepresentation: (1) he made the
statement, (2) it was false, (3) he knew it was false, (4) he made it to induce plaintiff to sign the contract.
However, this Court has held that there can be no fraud where the means of acquiring knowledge of the
truthfulness of the representation are available to the plaintiff. Webb, supra at 474.
Here, the contract clearly stated that plaintiff would be eligible for retirement benefits at the
expiration of the contract, June 18, 1993. Therefore, the means of acquiring knowledge regarding the
truthfulness of the representation was available to plaintiff. Plaintiff has not alleged that defendant
prevented him from examining the contract or from seeking the advice of counsel regarding the provision
in the contract. The trial court could have granted summary disposition on this basis.
However, it granted summary disposition on the ground the plaintiff failed to establish damages.
Michigan law has recognized that actionable fraud does not require monetary loss to the plaintiff. The
injury may be considered the plaintiff’s unfulfilled expectations. Mayhall v A H Pond Co, Inc, 129
Mich App 178, 183; 341 NW2d 268 (1983). We believe that a factual question was presented on this
issue. However, because the trial court could have properly granted summary disposition on the ground
that there is no basis for fraud when the truth of the statement is readily ascertainable by plaintiff,
summary disposition is still proper. We will not reverse a trial court when it reaches the correct result
for the wrong reason. People v Beckley, 161 Mich App 120, 131; 409 NW2d 759 (1987), aff’d,
434 Mich 691 (1990).
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Affirmed. Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Marilyn Kelly
/s/ Daniel A. Burress
1
It has come to our attention that federal courts have interpreted the issue of preemption in a different
manner than Teper or Hill. See Cefalu v BF Goodrich Company, 871 F2d 1290 (CA 5, 1989);
Degan v Ford Motor Company, 869 F2d 889 (CA 5, 1989); Fisher v Combustion Engineering,
Inc, 976 F2d 293 (CA 6, 1992). We urge the Michigan Supreme Court to take another look at this
issue.
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