BANKERS TRUST CO V ALAN M KIRILUK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KIRCO REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, LIMITED
and ALAN M. KIRILUK,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 156384
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 91 407347 CK
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY and
FIRST OF AMERICA, S.E.,
Defendants-Appellees.
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 180031
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 91 412669 CK
ALAN M. KIRILUK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Reilly, P.J., and White, and P.D. Schaefer,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, Kirco and Kiriluk appeal as of right from the orders dismissing
their suit for injunctive relief and entering judgment in favor of Bankers Trust. We affirm.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Docket No. 156384 involves the interpretation and enforceability of a $1.7 million guaranty
given by Kiriluk to Bankers Trust to secure a $4.2 million loan to Kiriluk’s company, Kirco. After
Kirco’s default, Kirco and Kiriluk sought to enjoin Bankers Trust from enforcing the guaranty and a
$750,000 letter of credit issued by defendant First of America before foreclosing on real estate also
securing the loan. The trial court ultimately denied a preliminary injunction and dissolved a temporary
restraining order it previously entered. Bankers Trust then filed suit (Docket No. 180031) to enforce
the guaranty, and the trial court entered judgment in its favor and dismissed Kirco and Kiriluk’s suit.
Docket No. 156384
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the trial court erred in giving effect to the
parties’ choice of law. The guaranty expressly provided that New York law would govern this case.
Kirco and Kiriluk (hereinafter collectively referred to as Kiriluk) contend that the trial court erred in
applying New York law. We disagree. Bankers Trust is a New York bank, and New York law would
not be contrary to a fundamental policy of the state of Michigan. In the absence of compelling evidence
that Michigan has a materially greater interest than New York, we decline to void the parties’ express
preference for New York law to apply. Chrysler Corp v Skyline Industrial Services, Inc, 448 Mich
113, 133; 528 NW2d 698 (1995).
Next, we reject Kiriluk’s assertion that the trial court erred when it refused to grant injunctive
relief on equitable grounds based on Restatement Security, §131. Plaintiffs have failed to establish that
Bankers Trust would not suffer prejudice if it was required to sell the property at a foreclosure sale
before collecting on the guaranty. As stated by Bankers Trust, “the property is simply not the
equivalent of cash in hand . . . .” Also, we disagree that Michigan’s statutory provisions governing
foreclosure evince a public policy of preventing a lender from collecting on a guaranty before foreclosing
on primary collateral, particularly in a case such as this where the guarantor agrees in writing that the
lender may do so.
We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the guaranty was voidable because of fraud in the
inducement or that the guaranty should be reformed. Under New York law, “[w]here, as here, there is
a ‘meaningful’ conflict between an express provision in a written contract and an earlier alleged oral
representation, the conflict negates a claim of reasonable reliance upon the oral representation.” Stone
v Schulz, ___ AD2d ___; 647 NYS2d 822 (1996). See also AFG Industries v Empire Glass Co,
Inc, 226 AD2d 487; 641 NYS2d 106 (1996). Parol evidence “is not admissible to establish the
existence of fraud as an inducement to execution of a contract in situations where the challenged
agreement contains a specific disclaimer clause which disclaims the making of any representation as to
the particular matter concerning which the fraud is now being asserted.” State University
Construction Fund v Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 189 AD2d 929, 932; 592 NYS2d 490 (1993).
Kiriluk is thus precluded from claiming fraudulent inducement because the guaranty contains numerous
provisions contradicting the alleged representations and a disclaimer clause refers to the “matter
concerning which the fraud is now being asserted.” Id. Kiriluk’s claim that the guaranty should be
reformed also did not preclude summary disposition because there was “no unequivocal evidence of
mutual mistake or fraud.” Chimart Associates v Paul, 66 NY2d 570, 574; 489 NE2d 231 (1986).
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Docket No. 180031
Kiriluk argues that the trial court erred in entering judgment without reducing Kirkiluk’s liability
by $750,000 attributable to Bankers Trust’s recovery under a letter of credit issued by Kirco. We
disagree. Under New York law, courts will not look to the underlying intent of the parties in executing a
contract unless it is ambiguous. Chimart, supra at 572-573. In this case, we agree with the trial court
and the special master that the guaranty is unambiguous with respect to partial payments from any
source: “[S]hould said sums be insufficient to fully pay the Borrower’s Obligations, the Guarantor
hereby covenants and agrees to remain liable for any deficiency to the extent herein provided.”
Accordingly, Kiriluk’s obligation under the guaranty ($1.7 million) should not have been reduced by the
$750,000 that Bankers Trust was able to collect on the letter of credit issued by Kirco. Because the
guaranty was not ambiguous, the trial court did not err in refusing to consider extrinsic evidence of
intent. Furthermore, Kiriluk’s suggestion that the trial court abdicated its responsibilities in failing to
decide the issue of ambiguity is without merit. The court’s opinion, order and judgment clearly indicates
that the court found that the guaranty was not ambiguous and that it was adopting the reasons in the
special master’s opinion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Philip D. Schaefer
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