JOSEPH A DITZHAZY JR V OAKLAND CO CONCEALED WEAPONAnnotate this Case
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JOSEPH A. DITZHAZY, JR.,
April 4, 1997
OAKLAND COUNTY CONCEALED WEAPON
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-475069-AS
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Hood and Jansen, JJ.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the trial court’s order dismissing his complaint for
superintending control. We affirm.
Plaintiff applied for a concealed gun permit because he sold alarms in Metropolitan Detroit
areas for an alarm company. The Board denied his application based upon inconsistencies with the
resume he provided, his interview at the hearing, and the information obtained during its investigation.
Plaintiff filed a complaint for superintending control, claiming that the Board’s decision exceeded its
jurisdiction because the statutory criteria for granting a permit was not met. The trial court dismissed
plaintiff’s complaint for superintending control when it was brought to the court’s attention that plaintiff
was no longer employed with the alarm company. The court determined that plaintiff’s claim was moot.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in holding that the issue was moot because
justiciable issues still existed. We disagree.
For superintending control to lie, a plaintiff must establish the absence of an adequate legal
remedy and that a defendant failed to perform a clear legal duty. The nature and extent of the legal duty
is reviewed de novo. Lockhart v Thirty-Sixth Dist Court Judge, 204 Mich App 684, 688; 516
NW2d 76 (1994). In reviewing a case for superintending control, review is limited only to questions of
law. Czuprynski v Bay Circuit Judge, 166 Mich App 118, 121; 420 NW2d 141 (1988).
MCL 28.426; MSA 28.93 requires an applicant for a concealed weapons license to have a
good reason to fear injury to his or her person or property, or have other proper reasons, and is a
suitable person to be licensed. On his application plaintiff indicated that his reason for wanting the
license was “Frmr Police Ofcr, Chief, MI Agent and related business.” Since plaintiff was no longer
employed by the alarm company, the trial court correctly determined that the issue was moot. Further,
plaintiff’s contention that the issue w not moot because he could be denied a permit at a later time
based on this denial is without merit. Nothing in the statute indicates that a prior denial of an application
precludes an applicant from obtaining a permit in the future. Thus, whether plaintiff will be denied in a
future attempt to obtain a concealed weapon permit is an abstract question of law that we will not
decide. East Grand Rapids School Dist v Kent Co Tax Allocation Bd, 415 Mich 381, 390; 330
NW2d 7 (1982).
Moreover, we reject plaintiff’s argument that defendant violated his due process rights. Plaintiff
does not possess a property interest in obtaining a concealed weapon permit because he does not have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. Williams v Hofley Mfg Co, 430 Mich 603, 610; 424 NW2d
278 (1988). Moreover, defendant conducted a hearing before denying plaintiff’s request. Therefore,
plaintiff was not denied due process. Bundo v City of Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 696; 238 NW2d
154 (1976) (citing Sponick v Detroit Police Dep’t, 49 Mich App 162, 189; 211 NW2d 674 (1973)).
Finally, plaintiff contends that the concealed weapons statute is unconstitutional because it is
over broad and vague. We disagree. First, there is no reason apparent in the record why plaintiff must
protect himself by obtaining a concealed gun permit. Plaintiff may not be heard to assert that the statute
is over broad because it precludes self-defense when he gives no indication as to why he needs such
self-protection. People v Lynch, 410 Mich 343, 352; 301 NW2d 796 (1981). In regard to plaintiff’s
void for vagueness argument, this Court has held that the statute is constitutional and not void for
vagueness. People v McFadden, 31 Mich App 512, 515-516; 188 NW2d 141(1971).
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen