PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY WILLIAM WRIGHT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 1, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 185863
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-135697
GREGORY WILLIAM WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Hood and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83;
MSA 28.278, two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA 28.797, kidnapping, MCL
750.349; MSA 28.581, unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA), MCL 750.413; MSA
28.645, carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), MCL 750.227; MSA 28.424, being a felon in
possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), and five counts of possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). He was then found by the court
to be an habitual offender, third offense, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083. He was sentenced to terms of
sixty to ninety years for the assault conviction, two life sentences for the armed robbery convictions, life
for the kidnapping conviction, three to five years for the UDAA conviction, three to five years for the
felon in possession conviction, and three to five years for the CCW conviction. Each of these sentences
was vacated, and defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of sixty to ninety years’ imprisonment
and five to ten years’ imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a two-year sentence on each of the
felony-firearm convictions. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Gregory Gryczon testified that on June 28, 1995, at approximately 8:35 p.m., he was exiting
Sam’s Club store in Madison Heights. As he approached his vehicle, he saw defendant sitting in the
passenger seat of an adjacent vehicle. According to Gryczon, as he opened his d
oor, defendant
approached him, pointed a gun at his chest and demanded his vehicle and his wallet. Defendant did not
take his wallet because Gryczon said that there was no money in it. Defendant then drove off in the
vehicle, and Gryczon returned to the store to call the police.
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Royal Oak Police Officer Dana Welch testified that at approximately 8:45 p.m., he was
dispatched to investigate a carjacking at Sam’s Club. As he proceeded to an entrance ramp to
southbound I-75, he saw a vehicle matching the description of the stolen vehicle moving at a high rate of
speed. According to Welch, he was in radio contact with Police Officer Christopher Jahnke. Welch
pursued the car and determined from the license plate that it was the stolen vehicle. Jahnke joined the
pursuit and they attempted, unsuccessfully, to box in the vehicle. The stolen vehicle then rammed
Jahnke’s vehicle. Jahnke testified that when the stolen vehicle became adjacent to his car, the driver
pulled out a gun and fired two shots. After being shot, Jahnke pulled over while Welch continued the
pursuit. Welch testified that the stolen vehicle exited at Eight Mile Road and turned into a subdivision.
Welch lost the vehicle at that point.
Jeanette Godfrey1 testified that, at approximately 9:00 p.m., she pulled into her driveway in
Palmer Woods in Detroit and saw defendant standing outside her vehicle holding a gun. Defendant
entered the driver’s door, crawled over Godfrey, sat in the passenger seat, and ordered her to drive him
to I-75 and Davison. Godfrey testified that defendant told her that he “had just shot some cops near
Oakland Mall.” After Godfrey drove defendant around Detroit for twenty to twenty-five minutes,
defendant allowed her to leave the car.
Claude Huffman, the boyfriend of defendant’s cousin, testified that, sometime in the late evening,
defendant unexpectedly appeared at his house beating on the door and demanding to be let in because
he “had just shot the police.” Hoffman refused and defendant left.
Detroit Police Officer Thomas C. Berry testified that, on June 29, 1994, he and his partner
observed defendant and attempted to arrest him. Berry indicated that, as he reached for defendant’s
left hand to cuff him, defendant began to turn around and he noticed that defendant had a .45 caliber
gun in the waistband of his shorts. Defendant attempted to pull his gun on the officers. They struggled
and Berry hit defendant on the head with his gun. Ultimately, defendant was arrested after two
additional officers arrived.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to sua sponte order a
hearing to evaluate his competence to stand trial after observing his demeanor at trial. We disagree.
We review a trial court’s decision on the question of a defendant’s competency to stand trial for an
abuse of discretion. People v Harris, 185 Mich App 100, 102; 460 NW2d 239 (1990).
A criminal defendant is presumed competent to stand trial absent a showing that “he is
incapable because of his mental condition of understanding the nature and object of he proceedings
against him or of assisting in his defense in a rational manner.” MCL 330.2020(1); MSA
14.800(1020)(1). Although the determination of a defendant’s competence is within the trial court’s
discretion, a trial court has the duty of raising the issue of incompetence where facts are brought to its
attention which raise a “bona fide doubt” as to the defendant’s competence. Harris, supra.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that it supports the trial court’s conclusion that
defendant was competent to stand trial. Prior to trial, the court held a hearing on defendant’s
competence to stand trial. During the hearing, an expert witness testified that defendant feigned his
symptoms, and provided a detailed explanation for this conclusion. Defendant failed to offer any
plausible argument as to why or how the expert’s opinions were flawed.
Furthermore, defendant’s reliance on Harris, supra, is misplaced as that case is distinguishable
from the instant case. Most obviously, the instant case involved extensive expert testimony that
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defendant faked his symptoms. Defendant has failed to offer any argument that the trial court’s
acceptance of the expert’s testimony was an abuse of discretion MRE 702. The trial court had
discretion to conclude that defendant’s symptoms were fake, and was not obligated to order another
competency hearing.
Moreover, defendant’s conduct while acting as his own attorney demonstrates that defendant
was competent to stand trial. Defendant asserted at least five successful objections at trial, citing
appropriate grounds for each. Defendant was also able to cross-examine prosecution witnesses with
prior inconsistent statements and, on at least three occasions, was able to modify his questions in
response to the prosecutor’s objections. Finally, at the close of the evidence, defendant brought a
motion for directed verdict, articulating specific arguments with respect to each charge. We find that
this conduct demonstrates that defendant was capable of “understanding the nature and object of the
proceedings against him.” The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to order a competency
hearing sua sponte.
Defendant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting his motion to proceed
pro se and by failing to reverse that decision after seeing his behavior at trial. Again, we disagree. We
review a trial court’s decision on the question of a defendant’s competency to proceed pro se for an
abuse of discretion. People v Holcomb, 47 Mich App 573, 581; 209 NW 2d 701 (1973), rev’d on
other grounds 395 Mich 326; 235 NW2d 343 (1975).
A criminal defendant’s right to proceed in propria persona is guaranteed by the Michigan
Const 1963, art 1, § 13 and by MCL 763.1; MSA 28.854, and implicitly by the Sixth Amendment, US
Const, Am VI. This right, however, is not absolute. Three requirements must be satisfied before a
defendant’s request to dismiss his counsel and proceed pro se is granted. People v Anderson, 398
Mich 361 367; 247 NW2d 857 (1976). First, the defendant's request must be unequivocal. Id. at
367. Second, the defendant must assert his right to self-representation knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. In assuring a knowing and voluntary waiver, the trial court must make the defendant aware
of "the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows
what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open." Id. at 367-368. Third, the court must
establish that the defendant will not unduly disrupt the court while acting as his own counsel. Id. at 368.
In addition to the aforementioned substantive requirements, a trial court must also comply with
MCR 6.005(D) with respect to a defendant considering self-representation. People v Adkins, 452
Mich 702, 722; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). Accordingly, pursuant to MCR 6.005, the court is required
to inform the defendant of the risks of self-representation, offer the assistance of an attorney and advise
the defendant about the possible punishment for the charged offenses. Id.
In this case, defendant’s waiver of right to counsel was valid. Defendant unequivocally
indicated, no less than five times, his desire to represent himself. Defendant indicated that he had “[n]o
doubt in [his] mind” that he was “sure” that he wanted to represent himself. The court explained the
hazards of self-representation. In fact, the court instructed defendant to think about his request over the
lunch hour. The court explained that, in representing himself, he would be unable to match the education
and experience of the prosecutor. The court even stated that, “[i]t is very dangerous for people to
represent themselves. Even lawyers are warned, “Don’t try to represent yourself.” Defendant
acknowledged that he knew what his waiver signified. The court allowed defense counsel to serve as
standby counsel, instructed defense counsel to sit at the table with defendant, and told defendant that he
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was free to consult with defense counsel at any time. The court also explained the charges against
defendant and the possible minimum and mandatory sentences. Finally, the court determined that that
defendant would abide by rules of courtroom.
Furthermore, as previously discussed, defendant’s conduct while acting as his own attorney
demonstrates that he knew what “he was doing.” Again, defendant asserted at least five successful
objections at trial, effectively cross-examined prosecution witnesses with prior inconsistent statements
and, at the close of the evidence, brought a motion for directed verdict, articulating specific arguments
with respect to each charge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendant’s motion
to proceed pro se and by failing to reverse that decision after observing his behavior at trial
Defendant next argues that his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f; MSA 28.421(6), violates the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the Michigan and United States
Constitutions. Specifically, defendant claims that, because the statute was not in effect when he was
convicted of the crimes which gave him “felon” status, his conviction is ex post facto. We disagree.
Whether a statute’s application is ex post facto is a question of law reviewed de novo. See Riley v
Michigan Parole Bd, 216 Mich App 242; 548 NW2d 686 (1996).
A statute which affects the prosecution or disposition of criminal cases involving crimes
committed prior to the effective date of the statute v
iolates the Ex Post Facto Clauses if it 1) makes
punishable that which was not, 2) makes an act a more serious criminal offense, 3) increases the
punishment for the crime, or 4) allows the prosecution to convict on less evidence. Id. at 244.
This Court explicitly addressed the exact argument asserted by defendant in People v Tice, 220
Mich App 47; ___ NW2d ___ (1996). The Tice Court ruled that, because the protection of public
safety is a valid exercise of the police power, application of MCL 750.224f; MSA 28.421(6) to
convicted felons, based on a felony committed prior to the effective date of the statute, does not violate
the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. Id. at 52. This issue is,
therefore, without merit.
Defendant finally argues that his habitual offender sentences are disproportionate to the offense
and the offender. We disagree. This Court’s review of an habitual offender sentence is limited to
considering whether the sentence violates the principle of proportionality. People v Gatewood (On
Rem), 216 Mich App 559, 560; 550 NW2d 265 (1996). The principle of proportionality requires that
the sentence imposed be proportionate to the seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense
and the offender. People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 636; 461 NW2d 1 (1990).2
The circumstances surrounding this offense were serious. Defendant essentially orchestrated a
crime spree, during which he shot a police officer, abducted a woman from her driveway and robbed
her of her vehicle at gunpoint, and robbed another person of his vehicle at gunpoint in a store parking
lot. Although defendant argues that his sentences were too “extensive,” in his appellate brief, defense
counsel even acknowledges that:
There is no doubt that if one narrowly focuses on just the circumstances of the
offense, some incarceration would be required. After all, an officer was shot, and two
citizens were assaulted with a handgun and robbed.
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Moreover, the sentences fit the offender. We first note that defendant was convicted of four
offenses (assault with intent to murder, two counts of armed robbery and kidnapping) which impose a
maximum penalty of life imprisonment. Defendant’s record includes a conviction for receiving and
concealing property over $100, and two convictions for felony escape, in addition to a juvenile
adjudication. In fact, at the time defendant committed the instant offenses, he had been released from
prison less than two months. Furthermore, as the trial court noted, at the time of the instant case,
defendant had additional charges for carjacking and firing upon a police officer pending in the US
Federal District Court. The trial court further noted that, while in prison on previous convictions,
defendant “had difficulty adjusting” resulting in his serving a maximum sentence. The court concluded,
and we agree, that defendant “is a threat to the general public” who has “no remorse for his conduct.”
This finding by the trial court refutes defendant’s contention that the trial court “never addressed
defendant’s rehabilitative potential” or “gave little weight to [defendant’s] relatively minimal prior
record.” We conclude that defendant’s sentences are proportional to the offender and the
circumstances surrounding the offense. The trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
1
Jeanette Godfrey is a clinical psychologist. At defendant’s competency hearing, following defense
counsel’s voir dire of Godfrey on her training and experience, the trial court ruled that she could testify
as to her observations of defendant, although she could not offer an opinion as to whether he was
competent to stand trial. Godfrey testified that during the twenty-five minutes that she was with
defendant, he appeared to be lucid, coherent and goal oriented. She further indicated that he did not
report any visual or auditory hallucinations, nor did he demonstrate any symptoms of any kind of
psychosis, such as twitching or inappropriate speech.
2
We initially note that defendant’s citation in his appellate brief of the sentences he received is incorrect.
The sentences imposed for his convictions for assault with intent to murder, armed robbery, kidnapping,
UDAA, CCW, and being a felon in possession of a firearm were vacated in lieu of defendant being
sentenced as a habitual offender, third offense.
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