REGINALD E MOORE V GANDAM JAYAKAR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
REGINALD E. MOORE,
UNPUBLISHED
March 28, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 189379
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 94-411051-NH
GANDAM JAYAKAR, M.D., ERIC GLOSS, D.O.,
and ST. JOHN HOSPITAL & MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Saad and M.D. Schwartz,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). We affirm in part and remand to the trial court for a
determination of reasonable attorney fees.
On September 15, 1993, plaintiff, Reginald Moore, presented to the emergency room at St.
John Hospital with a stab wound in the upper right chest. Plaintiff was admitted to St. John Hospital,
was initially evaluated by Dr. Gloss, an emergency room physician, and was subsequently evaluated by
the trauma team, of which Dr. Jayakar, a thoracic surgeon, was a member. A chest x-ray was taken,
and plaintiff was ordered to be held for 23-hour observation. However, plaintiff was apparently
discharged approximately eleven hours after his admission. In the days after his discharge from St. John
Hospital, plaintiff continued to experience chest pain and was coughing up blood. As a result, on
September 22, 1993, plaintiff visited the Detroit Community Health Connection, which referred him to
Detroit Receiving Hospital. Plaintiff was admitted to Detroit Receiving Hospital, where he was
diagnosed with a hemothorax, a collection of blood in the pleural cavity. Plaintiff remained hospitalized
for sixteen days, during which he underwent the insertion of three chest tubes to treat the hemothorax.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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Plaintiff filed suit in the Wayne Circuit Court on March 31, 1994, against defendants alleging a
violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 USC 1395dd,
which requires treatment of patients in an emergency condition until they are stabilized. Defendants
subsequently moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), and moved for costs and
fees pursuant to MCR 2.403(O) and MCL 600.2591; MSA 27A.2591. The trial court granted the
motion for summary disposition and granted defendants costs and fees under the applicable statute and
court rules.
On appeal, plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by finding no genuine issue of material
fact with regard to whether defendants violated the EMTALA.
The EMTALA imposes the following duties on hospitals:
1. To provide “an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of
the hospital’s emergency department” to “any individual [who] comes to the emergency
department’ and seeks examination or treatment. 42 USC 1395dd(a).
2. If the “hospital determines that the individual has an emergency medical condition,”
to stabilize the medical condition before transferring or discharging the patient. 42 USC
1395dd(b)(1) and (c)(1). [Cleland v Bronson Health Care Group, 917 F2d 266,
268 (CA 6, 1990).]
Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated the EMTALA by discharging him before his condition was
stabilized. According to the EMTALA, a medical condition is “stabilized” when “no material
deterioration of the condition is likely, within reasonable medical probability, to result from or occur
during the transfer (or discharge) of the individual from a facility.” 42 USC 1395dd(c)(3)(B) and (4).
In the instant case, plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Lee, testified that, at the time of plaintiff’s discharge, his
vital signs were stable and he was stable from a hemodynamic standpoint. Dr. Lee also testified that,
based on the facts as they existed at the time of plaintiff’s discharge, it was “possible” that plaintiff’s
condition would deteriorate. However, Dr. Lee did not testify that such a deterioration was “likely” or
that such a deterioration would result from or occur during the discharge of plaintiff. Plaintiff presented
no evidence that his condition was not stabilized, as that term is defined by the EMTALA, at the time of
his discharge. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim
under the EMTALA.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in determining that no genuine issue of material fact
existed with regard to the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
To establish a claim of medical malpractice, a plaintiff is required to prove that the alleged
breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injury. MCL 600.2912a;
MSA 27A.2912(1); Locke v Pachtman, 446 Mich 216, 222; 521 NW2d 786 (1994). Proximate
cause has been defined as “that which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new,
independent cause, produces the injury, without which such injury would not have occurred.”
McMillan v Vliet, 422 Mich 570, 576; 374 NW2d 679 (1985).
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Plaintiff alleged that defendants breached the applicable standard of care by failing to properly
diagnose and treat his condition, and by discharging him before his condition was stabilized. Plaintiff
argues that defendants’ breach of the applicable standard of care was the proximate cause of his
subsequent hospitalization for the insertion of multiple chest tubes to treat the hemothorax. However,
Dr. Lee testified that, even if defendants had taken a CT scan on September 15, 1993, which plaintiff
argues should have been done, plaintiff still may have required chest tubes at a later date. Dr. Lee also
testified that a different course of treatment that the one followed by defendants “may” have eliminated
the need for chest tubes at a later date. However, Dr. Lee gave no definitive testimony indicating that
plaintiff would not have needed chest tubes on September 22, 1993, if he had been treated differently at
St. John Hospital on September 15, 1993. A finding of causation must not be based on mere
conjecture, but rather must be based on reasonable inferences from the evidence. Nicholson v
Children’s Hospital of Michigan, 139 Mich App 434, 438; 363 NW2d 1 (1984). Accordingly, we
find that the trial court properly granted summary disposition with respect to plaintiff’s negligence claim.
Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s finding that plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Gloss was
frivolous was clearly erroneous.
MCL 600.2591(1); MSA 27A.2591(1) provides that costs and fees shall be awarded to a
prevailing party if the court finds that a civil action or defense was frivolous. Under MCL
600.2591(3)(a); MSA 27A.2591(3)(a), an action is frivolous when any one of the following conditions
is met:
(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the defense was to
harass, embarrass, or injure the prevailing party.
(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying the party’s
legal position were in fact true.
(iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.
Pursuant to MCL 600.2912d; MSA 27A.2912(4), as it existed at the time this case was filed, a
plaintiff in a medical malpractice case was required to file an affidavit attesting that he had obtained a
written opinion from a licensed physician that the claim was meritorious. See Historical Note following
MCL 600.2912d; MSA 27A.2912(4).
In the instant case, plaintiff filed an affidavit stating that he had obtained an expert opinion that
the case was meritorious. However, plaintiff had no e
xpert opinion that the case was meritorious
specifically with respect to Dr. Gloss. Dr. Lee, the only expert consulted, testified that his opinions
were limited to the actions of Dr. Jayakar and, furthermore, as a thoracic surgeon, he would not
comment on the actions of Dr. Gloss, an emergency room physician. Plaintiff had no evidence on which
to base its position that Dr. Gloss committed malpractice. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err in
finding plaintiff’s claim against Dr. Gloss to be frivolous.
Finally, plaintiff argues that the court abused its discretion in determining the amount and costs of
fees to be awarded.
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Defendant, Dr. Gloss, was awarded $6,641.52 for the filing of a frivolous action against him
pursuant to MCL 600.2591; MSA 27A.2591 and defendants, Dr. Jayakar and St. John Hospital, were
awarded $7,521.64 as mediation sanctions pursuant to MCR 2.403(O).
Although there is no precise formula to be taken into account when computing the
reasonableness of attorney fees, the factors to be taken into consideration include: 1) the professional
standard and experience of the attorney, 2) the skill, time, and labor involved, 3) the amount in question
and the results achieved, 4) the difficulty of the case, 5) the expenses incurred, and 6) the nature and
length of the professional relationship with the client. Wood v DAIIE, 413 Mich 573, 588; 321 NW2d
653 (1982). A trial court need not detail its findings relative to each specific factor considered. Id.
However, in the instant case, the trial court did not consider any of these factors on the record.
A trial court may not find a bill of costs acceptable on its face without considering the issue of
reasonableness. Petterman v Haverhill Farms, Inc, 125 Mich App 30, 33; 335 NW2d 710 (1983).
Accordingly, we remand for a hearing regarding the reasonableness and appropriateness of the attorney
fees. JC Building Corp II v Parkhurst Homes, Inc, 217 Mich App 421, 430; 552 NW2d 466
(1996).
The trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of defendants is affirmed. We vacate the
award of attorney fees and remand for a hearing on the appropriateness and reasonableness of the
attorney fees to be awarded, if any. No further jurisdiction is retained.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Michael D. Schwartz
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