WILLIAM R BEHR V ROSS ROY INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
UNPUBLISHED
March 21, 1997
WILLIAM R. BEHR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 185685
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 94-477913
ROSS ROY, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Hood and Jansen, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting summary disposition to defendant on
plaintiff’s age discrimination claim. We affirm.
Plaintiff was hired by defendant agency in October 1978 at the age of 49. He was hired as a
senior copywriter in the Dodge Truck Group. Plaintiff was hired by Al Hibbert, who informed him that
the agency did not hire people over the age of 50. About the same time, Hibbert informed plaintiff that
the company was going to be eliminating a lot of “dead wood.” Plaintiff assumed that the comment was
age related, but conceded that Hibbert could have been referring to eliminating “unproductive people.”
Plaintiff testified that numerous other people also stated that defendant did not want to hire persons over
the age of 50.
In April 1989, plaintiff was promoted by Joe McNeil to the position of Group Creative Director
in charge of the copywriters. He also became a vice-president of the agency, but the title did not alter
his status as the creative director. In May 1990, McNeil completed plaintiff’s first performance
evaluation as a Group Creative Director. The evaluation was above average in most categories, but
McNeil noted some problems with plaintiff, including punctuality, originality and leadership. In April
1991, plaintiff’s employment evaluation again contained evidence of his problem with leadership and
stated that “he is functioning more as a Copy Supervisor that as Group Creative Director.”
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In 1992, Jack Frakes replaced McNeil as the director of the agency. Frakes made numerous
organizational changes, including demoting plaintiff to senior copywriter. As a result, plaintiff reported to
Cliff Sevakis, and his immediate supervisor was Susan McKay. Plaintiff’s work was assigned by
McKay and critiqued by Sevakis. Plaintiff admitted that he felt superior to Sevakis in every way even
though Sevakis was the boss.
Approximately four months into the new arrangement, Sevakis wrote a memo to plaintiff
regarding his performance. The memo outlined several problems with plaintiff, including failure to
smoothly integrate client revisions into copy, confusion on issues, failure to take notes regarding
projects, plagiarism, lack of initiative and socializing. Plaintiff denied the allegations in a memo. McKay
claimed that she had no knowledge of the memo. McKay testified that, although she did not have first
hand knowledge regarding some of the allegations, such as the plagiarism, the rest of the memo was
invalid. She also testified that plaintiff was well thought of by his coworkers and that everyone who
worked for Sevakis believed him to be incompetent.
Frakes intervened and stopped any further exchange of memos. The memos were removed
from plaintiff’s employment file, and Frakes instructed plaintiff to deal only with McKay in employment
matters. McKay evaluated plaintiff at the end of 1992. Plaintiff scored average in most categories, with
a noted problem with punctuality.
In November 1993, when Frakes retired, Gary Wolfson became the Executive Vice President
and Chief Creative Officer for the agency. Wolfson claimed that he was instructed to implement a
reduction of the workforce and to restructure communications in order to improve the overall creative
production of the agency. Wolfson averred that the executive committee wanted to eliminate non
productive people when reducing the work force. Plaintiff testified that Wolfson met with him in 1993
and conducted a half hour interview to obtain plaintiff’s ideas about how to improve the agency.
Plaintiff indicated that his next meeting with Wolfson was on February 8, 1994, when he was
terminated. Plaintiff was 65 years old.
In his deposition, Wolfson testified that he gathered information about the people working for
the agency and reviewed everyone in the communications group. He reviewed the most recent
performance reviews and consulted with senior management and Frakes. According to Wolfson,
Sevakis suggested termination of plaintiff’s employment and, after conducting his own evaluation, he
agreed. Wolfson testified that he terminated plaintiff because, based on the employment evaluations,
plaintiff was not producing work commensurate with his salary and his performance was the lowest
among his copy writing peers in the group. Immediately after plaintiff’s termination, defendant did not
hire anyone into plaintiff’s department. Instead, plaintiff’s duties were redistributed to four other
persons in the department.
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging that he was fired because of age discrimination.
Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of
age discrimination. Defendant further argued that the agency underwent a work force reduction, and
plaintiff was terminated because of his relatively poor performance. The trial court granted summary
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disposition in favor of defendant, finding that plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination. The trial court also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration.
Plaintiff claims that defendant was not entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff’s age
discrimination claim. We disagree.
We review an order granting summary disposition de novo.
Plieth v St Raymond Church, 210 Mich App 568, 571; 534 NW2d 164 (1995). A motion for
summary disposition may be granted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) when, except with regard to the
amount of damages, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Id. Giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the nonmovant, the trial
court must determine whether a record might be developed that would leave open an issue upon which
reasonable minds might differ. Id.
Plaintiff’s claim of age discrimination is based upon the Civil Rights Act, which provides in
relevant part, that an employer shall not:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against
an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or
privilege of employment, because of . . . age. [MCL 37.2202; MSA 3.548 (202).]
The burden of proof in an age discrimination case is allocated as follows: (1) the plaintiff has the
burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) if the
plaintiff is successful in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions; and (3) the plaintiff then has the burden of proving
by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reason offered by the defendant was merely a
pretext. Plieth, supra at 571-572; Barnell v Taubman Co, Inc, 203 Mich App 110, 120; 512
NW2d 13 (1993).
An age discrimination claim can be based on two theories: (1) disparate treatment, which
requires a showing of either a pattern of intentional discrimination against protected employees, e.g.,
employees aged forty to seventy years, or against an individual plaintiff; or (2) disparate impact, which
requires a showing that an otherwise facially neutral employment policy has a discriminatory effect on
members of a protected class. Farmington Ed Ass'n v Farmington School Dist, 133 Mich App 566;
351 NW2d 242 (1984). In this case, plaintiff relies on the disparate treatment theory.
Plaintiff claims that he established his prima facie case under the four-part test set forth in
McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973), which
requires a plaintiff to show that (1) he was a member of a protected class, (2) he was discharged, (3) he
was qualified for the position, and (4) he was replaced by a younger person. See also Barnell, supra.
Where, however, as here, a plaintiff is discharged as a result of an employer’s economically motivated
reduction in force, a prima facie case of disparate treatment requires a showing, by plaintiff, that age
was a determining or a significant factor in the employer’s decision to discharge or demote the
plaintiff. Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683; 385 NW2d 586 (1986); Plieth, supra. Age
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need not be the only reason or the main reason for the discharge, but it must be one of the reasons that
made a difference in determining whether to discharge a person. Plieth, supra at 121.
We are not convinced that plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of age discrimination. Plaintiff
was sixty-five years old when he was discharged, and considering plaintiff's employment and
experience, we will accept that he had skills and training to perform certain tasks at the agency.
However, plaintiff’s allegation that he was replaced by a younger employee was unsupported in his brief
to the trial court and in his brief on appeal. Unsupported allegations need not be considered by this
Court. Porter v Royal Oak, 214 Mich App 478; 542 NW2d 905 (1995). A party may not merely
announce his or her position and leave it to us to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.
Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 655, n 1; 358 NW2d 856 (1984); In re Toler, 193 Mich App
474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992).
More importantly, we are not persuaded that plaintiff’s age was a significant reason in
determining whether to discharge him. Plaintiff presented evidence that two of the senior managers,
who were consulted about plaintiff prior to his discharge, had made age-related remarks to him or in his
presence. One of these managers recommended plaintiff and one other 64-year-old employee for
termination during defendant’s 1994 reorganization. However, there was undisputed evidence that the
person who terminated plaintiff reviewed the performance evaluations of the copywriters in plaintiff’s
group before making a decision. He testified that, based on those evaluations, plaintiff’s performance
was the lowest in the group. At best, plaintiff has offered evidence that his age may have played some
meager part in defendant’s decision to terminate him. Plaintiff has made no showing that his age was
the motivating factor in that decision.
We further note that plaintiff also has failed to establish a prima facie case that defendant
engaged in a pattern of discharging older employees. Plaintiff was required to present evidence that he
was qualified for the position and that there was a pattern of discharges of older employees, whose
positions were then filled by younger employees. See Foehr v Republic Automotive Parts, Inc, 212
Mich App 663, 671; 538 NW2d 420 (1995). In this case, plaintiff provided no evidence that there
was a pattern of discharges based on age. In fact, the evidence on which plaintiff relies tends to indicate
a discriminatory hiring policy, which did not affect plaintiff. The only evidence offered by plaintiff was
the testimony of a co-employee who stated that many other employees felt they were separated from
their employment, either by termination or early retirement, because of age. This testimony alone does
not establish a pattern of age-related discharges. See Bouwman v Chrysler Corp, 114 Mich App
670, 682; 319 NW2d 621 1982). Plaintiff also failed to provide any supporting evidence, by way of
testimony or affidavits, from the individuals who believed there was discrimination by the agency even
though he was provided with a list of names. Plaintiff’s allegations, without supporting authority, are
insufficient to survive summary disposition. See Johnson v Wayne Co, 213 Mich App 143, 149; 540
NW2d 66 (1995).
Even if we conclude that plaintiff met his burden and proved a prima facie case of age
discrimination, the burden of production would shift to defendant to rebut the presumption of disparate
treatment by articulating, not proving, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
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employment decision against plaintiff. In rebuttal, defendant states that it underwent a reduction in force
and plaintiff was terminated because his performance was the lowest among his peers and because he
was not producing work commensurate with his salary.
Defendant having carried its burden of production, plaintiff was required to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s proffered reasons are a mere pretext. Plaintiff failed
to offer any evidence, beyond mere speculation and unsupported allegations, that defendant did not
undergo a reduction in force. Furthermore, although plaintiff offered the testimony of his immediate
supervisor that his performance was always of good quality, he did not offer the performance
evaluations of the retained employees to demonstrate that, based on written evaluations, he was not the
lowest performer in the group. Plaintiff also completely failed to rebut that he was chosen for
termination because his productivity level was not commensurate with his salary. A party has to rebut
the legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons with supporting evidence to survive summary disposition.
Singal v General Motors Corp, 179 Mich App 497, 500; 447 NW2d 152 (1989). Because plaintiff
has not rebutted defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for his discharge, the trial court
properly dismissed his claim of age discrimination.
Affirmed. Defendant being the prevailing party, it may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
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