PEOPLE OF MI V WDUAN DAVID HICKMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 18, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 187453
Washtenaw Circuit
LC No. 94-003035
WDUAN DAVID HICKMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wahls, P.J., and Gage and W.J. Nykamp,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of one count of second-degree criminal sexual
conduct, MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA 28.788(3)(1)(a), and was sentenced to time served and five
years’ probation. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence, this Court “must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements
of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489
NW2d 748 (1992). Second-degree criminal sexual conduct is defined by statute as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the second degree if the
person engages in sexual contact with another person and if any of the following
circumstances exists:
(a) That other person is under 13 years of age. [MCL 750.520c(1)(a); MSA
28.788(3)(1)(a).]
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to show that he had any sexual contact
with the five-year-old victim. We disagree. The victim testified that on three separate occasions
________________________
*Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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defendant removed her clothing and touched her “vagina” and her “butt.” This testimony is sufficient to
support defendant’s conviction of second-degree criminal sexual conduct.
Defendant alternatively argues that the evidence did not establish that he had the requisite intent
to commit the offense. Criminal sexual conduct, second degree, is a general intent offense. People v
Brewer, 101 Mich App 194, 196; 300 NW2d 491 (1980). General intent crimes involve merely the
intent to do the physical act that forms the offense and do not require a particular criminal intent beyond
the act done. People v Beaudin, 417 Mich 570, 574; 339 NW2d 461 (1983). The jury may draw
the inference as to the intent with which a particular act was done as they draw all other inferences, from
any fact in evidence which to their minds fully proves its existence. People v Strong, 143 Mich App
442, 452; 372 NW2d 335 (1985).
The victim’s testimony established that defendant’s conduct was not accidental. Defendant
pulled off her shirt and underwear before touching her. On one occasion, defendant told the victim that
“this is our secret.” This testimony was sufficient to allow the jury to infer that defendant intentionally
touched the victim.
Affirmed.
/s/ Myron H. Wahls
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Wesley J. Nykamp
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