SANDRA L HOUGHTALING V BAY MEDICAL CENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
SANDRA L. HOUGHTALING and TROY
HOUGHTALING,
UNPUBLISHED
March 14, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 187838
BAY MEDICAL CENTER,
Bay Circuit Court
LC No. 94-003423-CZ
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Taylor, P.J., and McDonald and C. J. Sindt,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from an order granting defendant summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10) on the basis of a finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding
whether defendant took effective steps to prevent plaintiff, Sandra L. Houghtaling, from being sexually
harassed in the work place. We affirm.
Houghtaling, a phlebotomist, alleged that on November 19, 1993, while she was working in
defendant’s emergency room (ER), a doctor escorted her to an unoccupied utility room where he
kissed her once. She became extremely distraught about the incident and informed her supervisors.
Defendant responded to this incident by agreeing to not schedule her for ER coverage and by telling the
doctor to cease and desist from such conduct. Despite defendant’s assurance regarding ER coverage,
defendant still scheduled plaintiff for ER duty. However, when she confronted her supervisor with a
scheduling conflict issue, her schedule was changed. In addition to her scheduling problems, plaintiff
claims to have encountered some difficulties with her co-workers, including: (1) complaints and ridicule
for not going into the ER; (2) jokes made over the public address system about her inability to provide
ER coverage; (3) a male nurse pulling at her hair when she was in the ER; and (4) someone placing pins
in her family portrait. She experienced no further harassment from the doctor.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erroneously limited its inquiry to whether plaintiff suffered
a second assault and battery, and that the correct inquiry should have been “whether a reasonable
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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person, in the totality of the circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as substantially
interfering with employment or having the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment.” See Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich 368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155
(1993). Plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that a reasonable
person, after being assaulted in the isolated area of the ER by a physician who had the authority to issue
orders to the person, would feel that being required to go back to the ER and being subjected to the
control of that physician, would constitute an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment. “[W]hether
a hostile work environment exists should be determined by an objective reasonableness standard, not
by the subjective perceptions of a plaintiff.” Radtke, supra at 388. “The alternative would be to
accept all plaintiffs’ subjective evaluations of conduct, thereby imposing upon employers liability for
behavior that, for idiosyncratic reasons, is offensive to an employee.” Id. at 387.
We conclude on the basis of an objective standard that defendant’s scheduling of plaintiff for
ER coverage did not create a hostile environment. Each time that plaintiff brought the fact that she had
been scheduled for ER to the attention of her supervisor, her schedule was changed. The mere fact that
she was erroneously scheduled for ER coverage did not create a hostile environment because defendant
responded when notified of the problem. Plaintiff’s “coverage” consisted of only one hour per eight
hour shift, and the possibility that she would encounter the doctor on the intermittent occasions when she
was scheduled for the ER appears remote. It only occurred once over a three month time period.
Moreover, defendant was not required to exempt Houghtaling from ER coverage. The law states that
an employer may avoid liability if it investigates the misconduct and takes prompt appropriate remedial
measures. Radtke, supra at 396; see also Saxton v American Tel & Tel Co, 10 F3d 526, 535-536
(CA 7, 1993) (holding that the employer was not liable even though it failed to follow through on its
promise that the offending supervisor would take a refresher course on the sexual harassment policy
because the employer’s actions effectively ended the complained of conduct). Defendant’s actions
were effective in that the doctor was thwarted from future misconduct, as evidenced by the fact that he
did not harass plaintiff again after the initial incident.
We also conclude on the basis of an objective standard that the alleged teasing incurred at the
hands of co-workers was insufficient to support a claim for hostile environment. Regarding jokes over
the public address system, objectively speaking, we do not conclude that a single incident where a co
worker asked plaintiff to go to the emergency room and then said, “Oops. Forgot you can’t go down
there,” constitutes harassment. Plaintiff conceded that the incident with the male nurse pulling her hair
happened because he thought that she had removed a blood pressure cuff from a patient he had been
attending. It was not because of her sex. Finally, the alleged damage to her family portrait was neither
sexual in nature nor directed at her because of her sex. As noted by the trial court: “the teasing was not
sexual harassment. . . . [T]he teasing had to do with [her] refusal to go to ER or perhaps that she was
being favored by [defendant] in not being required to go to ER . . . .”
Plaintiff also argues that the doctor’s conduct alone was sufficient to constitute a hostile work
environment. In Radtke, supra, the Court held that “[a] single incident unless extreme, will not create
an offensive, hostile, or intimidating environment” but that a single incident may be sufficient” if severe
harassment is perpetrated by an employer in a closely knit working environment.” Id. at 398. In
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Radtke, the plaintiff was a veterinary technician who worked for the defendant who was part owner and
the operator of Clark Everett Dog and Cat Hospital. Id. at 374. The defendant held the plaintiff down
and tried to kiss her while they were taking a break from their work. Id. at 375. The Court found that
the defendant could be liable because, although the conduct itself did not create a hostile environment,
“the alleged conduct combined with the reality that the employer was the perpetrator, permits this single
incident to be sufficient to reach the jury.” Id. at 395 (emphasis in original). The Court specifically
noted that, “because the perpetrator of the alleged conduct was the employer, recourse to the employer
was fruitless.” Id.
In this case, the doctor was not plaintiff’s employer. Rather, he was a subcontractor who
worked in the ER and who had power to give plaintiff orders with respect to patient care. Unlike the
plaintiff in Radtke, plaintiff’s recourse was not “fruitless.” Defendant had a sexual harassment policy in
place and remedied her situation. Furthermore, unlike the Radtke case, defendant’s hospital is not a
“closely knit” working environment. Rather, it is an operation of considerable size, employing almost
two thousand people. This is evidenced by plaintiff’s concession that in the approximately three months
she worked for defendant following the occurrence, she only worked in the same room with the doctor
once.
Finally, plaintiff argues that defendant did not adequately remedy the alleged hostile work
environment. However, the law does not require a defendant to do everything a plaintiff requests. The
law only requires “prompt and appropriate remedial action upon notice of the alleged hostile work
environment.” Radtke, supra at 395; Downer v Detroit, 191 Mich App 232, 234; 477 NW2d 146
(1991). Here, plaintiff’s supervisor prepared a report about the incident on the evening that it occurred,
two administrators spoke with her within hours of the alleged incident, the incident was investigated the
following day, and it was agreed that she would not be assigned to the ER until further notice. One
week later, the doctor was warned that defendant would not tolerate incidents of this nature and was
advised that if he did not “cease and desist” immediately, he would lose his right to practice medicine or
work at defendant’s hospital. These actions were both prompt and appropriate. Courts that have
decided the issue whether an employer has taken prompt and appropriate action have “placed great
weight on whether the harassment ended after remedial steps were taken.” Foster v Twp of Hillside,
780 F Supp 1026, 1039 (D NJ, 1992). Here, the doctor never engaged in the alleged misconduct
again. We conclude that the remedy was therefore adequate.
Next, plaintiff argues that she should have been allowed to amend her complaint to add the
doctor as a defendant. Plaintiff concedes that she failed to serve the doctor within the ninety-one day
period as provided under MCR 2.102(D). However, plaintiff contends, the dismissal was without
prejudice and did not affect her right to amend her complaint under MCR 2.118(A). In the alternative,
plaintiff argues that leave to amend is typically freely given and that failure to allow amendment in this
case was grossly unfair and potentially prejudicial to her in that the doctor’s deposition would have been
helpful to this case. We find plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive. “This Court will not reverse the trial
court’s decision on a motion to amend absent an abuse of discretion that results in injustice.” Taylor v
Detroit, 182 Mich App 583, 586; 452 NW2d 826 (1989). MCR 2.118(A)(1) provides that “[a]
party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 14 days after being served with a
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responsive pleading by an adverse party.” However, “[a] summons expires 91 days after the date the
complaint is filed.” MCR 2.102(D). As the trial court correctly noted:
The plaintiffs’ have attempted to do an end run around the rules which provide
for dismissal for non-service by the expedient filing of an amended complaint. By the
reasoning of plaintiffs’ counsel plaintiffs could extend this matter indefinitely contravening
the rules regarding the prompt service of process. The Court is convinced that the
plaintiffs cannot avoid the consequences of the rules by this expedient.
Plaintiffs could have extended the summons with a showing of good cause within the ninety-one day
period. MCR 2.102(D). However, plaintiff failed to seek such an extension. Furthermore, the trial
court’s ruling did not prejudice plaintiff. Plaintiff could still have taken the doctor’s deposition in this
case, and there is no indication that she could not file a separate action against him.
Affirmed.
/s/ Clifford W. Taylor
/s/ Gary R. McDonald
/s/ Conrad J. Sindt
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