PEOPLE OF MI V RAUL RODRIGUEZ
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 28, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 163842
Recorder’s Court
LC No. 92-007287
RAUL RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Neff and M.E. Dodge,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of armed robbery, MCL 750.529; MSA
28.797. He was sentenced to 180 months to 600 months in prison. Defendant now appeals as of right,
and we affirm.
First, defendant contends that the prosecutor improperly bolstered the credibility of witness
Gilbert Gutierrez by eliciting testimony regarding his promise to testify truthfully as part of a plea
agreement and by referring to that testimony during closing argument. Defendant did not object at trial.
Appellate review of allegedly improper remarks is generally precluded absent a timely objection by
counsel unless a curative instruction could not have eliminated the prejudicial effect or where failure to
consider the issue would result in a miscarriage of justice. People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687;
521 NW2d 557 (1994). After reviewing the record, we find no miscarriage of justice.
Had defendant objected to testimony regarding the plea agreement or to the prosecutor’s initial
reference to Gutierrez’ promise to testify truthfully, any prejudice could have been cured by a cautionary
instruction. Moreover, the challenged remarks, read in their entirety, were directed at defendant’s
theory of the case and the evidence submitted at trial. Neither the questioning nor the commentary
conveyed a message that the prosecutor had some special knowledge of facts indicating that the witness
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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was testifying truthfully. See, e.g., People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276-282; 531 NW2d 659
(1995); People v Williams, 123 Mich App 752, 756; 333 NW2d 577 (1983).
Defendant also argues that the prosecutor bolstered Gutierrez’ credibility by eliciting evidence
that he agreed to take a polygraph test and by suggesting during closing argument that the test was not
administered because the police were able to verify his testimony by other means. This issue is not
preserved for appeal because it was not raised in defendant’s statement of questions presented.
Lansing v Hartsuff, 213 Mich App 338, 351; 539 NW2d 781 (1995); People v Yarbrough, 183
Mich App 163, 165; 454 NW2d 419 (1990). Further, although defendant objected when the
prosecutor referred to the polygraph test during closing argument, he did not specify the same ground
for objection that he now asserts on appeal. Even if we concluded that the issue was preserved for
appeal, reversal would not be warranted. It was defense counsel who first elicited testimony regarding
the polygraph examination. Moreover, this was a bench trial. A judge is presumed to possess an
understanding of the law which allows him to understand the difference between admissible or
inadmissible evidence or statements of counsel. People v Wofford, 196 Mich App 275, 282; 492
NW2d 747 (1992).
Defendant next contends that the trial court failed to secure a proper waiver of his right to a jury
trial. We disagree. If anything, the colloquy conducted in the instant case was more thorough than the
waiver procedure approved of by this Court in People v Shields, 200 Mich App 554, 560-561; 504
NW2d 2d 711 (1993).
Defendant argues that he was coerced into waiving his right to a trial by jury because he was
brought to court in jail clothing. We disagree. At the hearing on defendant’s motion for a new trial,
defendant testified that he would not have waived his right to a jury trial had he been dressed in civilian
clothes. Defendant’s attorney testified that he discussed the waiver issue with defendant before trial was
scheduled to commence and admitted that he told his client to waive his right to a jury. However, he
denied that his recommendation was the result of the clothing issue. In denying defendant’s motion for a
new trial, the trial court determined that defendant’s testimony was not credible. A trial court may
evaluate the credibility of a witness in deciding a motion for new trial. People v Mechura, 205 Mich
App 481, 484; 517 NW2d 797 (1994).
Next, defendant contends that the waiver was invalid because the trial court failed to inform him
of the nature of the right to a jury trial. According to defendant, the trial court should have explained
that the verdict of the jury must be unanimous and that defendant had the right to participate in jury
selection. We disagree. Although knowledge of the basic attributes of a jury trial is sufficient to satisfy
the “knowing and intelligent” requirement, US v Martin, 704 F2d 267, 273 (CA 6, 1983), it is not
constitutionally mandated, US v Sammons, 918 F2d 592, 597 (CA 6, 1990). The type of colloquy
suggested by defendant is not required in Michigan. See, e.g., People v James (After Remand), 192
Mich App 568, 570-571; 481 NW2d 715 (1992).
Although defendant testified that he was never informed of the basic elements of a jury trial, he
has never contended that he would have made a different decision had the judge conducted the
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suggested colloquy. See United States ex rel Williams v DeRobertis, 715 F2d 1174, 1181 (CA 7,
1983). In fact, defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing that his decision to waive a jury trial was
based primarily on the fact that prison officials had lost his clothes. Under these circumstances,
defendant’s challenge to the waiver procedure is without merit.
Next, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor elicited evidence
regarding an unnamed prior conviction. We disagree. Defendant did not object to the challenged
exchange, thus precluding appellate review absent a miscarriage of justice. Stanaway, supra. After
reviewing the record, we conclude that there was no miscarriage of justice.
It does not appear that Gutierrez was referring to a prior unnamed conviction. Rather, it is more
likely that the witness was attempting to explain that he had contact with defendant until he was jailed for
the murder and robbery of Charles King in May of 1992. In fact, when the prosecutor asked Gutierrez
how long he had known Kenneth Matsey, the other alleged participant, the following exchange
occurred:
Q (by the prosecutor): And had you also known Kenneth Matsey for some time
before that May 5th -A (by Gutierrez): I’ve known him for about, like, for three months.
Q: And once again, we’re talking about three months before all of this happened; is
that correct?
A: Yes. [Emphasis added.]
Based on this exchange, we conclude that the witness was not referring to any unnamed prior conviction
when he indicated that defendant was “locked up.”
Even if the witness’ reference to the fact that defendant was “locked up” was improper, any
error was harmless in light of the fact that this was a bench trial. Unlike a jury, a judge is presumed to
possess an understanding of the law which allows him to understand the difference between admissible
and inadmissible evidence. Wofford, supra. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted on this basis.
Defendant next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor referred to the
fact that defendant was in a gang. This issue is not properly before this Court because defendant failed
to raise it in his statement of questions presented. Hartsuff, supra; Yarbrough, supra. Further,
defendant did not object to testimony elicited by the prosecutor from a witness regarding defendant’s
gang activity.
Next, defendant contends that the sentencing information report upon which the trial court relied
was improperly scored. According to defendant, the trial court erred in scoring one hundred points
under offense variable two (“OV 2”). We disagree. A sentencing judge has discretion in determining
the number of points to be scored as long as evidence exists to support a particular score. People v
Derbeck, 202 Mich App 443, 449; 509 NW2d 534 (1993). Once a defendant has challenged a
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factual assertion contained in the PSIR or any other controverted issues of fact relevant to the
sentencing decision, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the facts are
as asserted. People v Walker, 428 Mich 261, 267-268; 407 NW2d 367 (1987). Because the
standard of proof differs from that necessary for a criminal conviction, a fact can be proven for the
purpose of sentencing even though it was not established for the purpose of conviction. People v
Harris, 190 Mich App 652, 663; 476 NW2d 767 (1991). Thus, a sentencing court may consider
criminal activity for which the defendant was acquitted. People v Coulter (After Remand), 205 Mich
App 453, 456; 517 NW2d 827 (1994).
When scoring OV 2 for a robbery conviction, one hundred points are to be assessed when
“death results from the commission of a crime and homicide is not the conviction offense.” In the instant
case, Michael Hodgson testified that he was in a gang with defendant, Gutierrez, and Kenneth Matsey.
Gutierrez testified that he played pool with King, Matsey, and defendant on the night the murder was
committed. According to Gutierrez, defendant suggested that the three men rob King of his money and
then kill him. Later, the four men drove to Clark Park. Matsey got out of the car and demanded that
King give him his money. Matsey hit King in the head with a hammer. As Matsey tried to pull King out
of the car, defendant began going through King’s pockets. Defendant ran off just as Matsey was about
to strike King a second time. When Matsey hit King, the hammer stuck inside his skull. Later, Matsey
told Gutierrez that he would kill defendant if Matsey did not get any money from King. King’s body
was found the next morning. Several days after the incident, defendant told Gutierrez that he got rid of
King’s wallet.
Based on the testimony of Gutierrez and Hodgson, we conclude that sufficient evidence existed
for the trial court to conclude that King’s death resulted from the commission of the robbery for
purposes of scoring OV 2. We find defendant’s reliance on People v LeMarbe (After Remand), 201
Mich App 45, 48-49; 505 NW2d 879 (1993), and People v Payton, 186 Mich App 387, 388; 464
NW2d 907 (1990), to be inapposite as both decisions involved OV 3 which contains specific
instructions not applicable to OV 2.
We also reject defendant’s contention that his sentence is disproportionate. Defendant’s 180 to
600 month sentence was within the guidelines range and is presumed to be proportionate. People v
Piotrowski, 211 Mich App 527, 532; 536 NW2d 293 (1995). In order to overcome the presumption
of proportionality, the defendant must present unusual circumstances to the court. Id.; People v Sharp,
192 Mich App 501, 505; 481 NW2d 773 (1992). A defendant’s lack of criminal history and minimum
culpability are not mitigating factors that would overcome the presumption of proportionality. People v
Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 54; 523 NW2d 830 (1994). Accordingly, we conclude the sentence is
proportionate to the offense and the offender.
Next, defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial
counsel failed to object when Gutierrez testified that he had known defendant since “before he got
locked up.” Although defendant filed a motion for a new trial and a Ginther1 hearing, this issue was not
raised below. Therefore, this Court’s review is limited to errors apparent on the record. People v
Oswald (After Remand), 188 Mich App 1, 13; 469 NW2d 306 (1991).
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As noted, there is no indication in the record that Gutierrez was referring to a prior unnamed
conviction. It is likely that defense counsel did not object to Gutierrez’ testimony because, like this
Court, he believed that the witness was referring to when defendant was jailed in the instant case, not
for any unnamed prior conviction. It is also possible that defense counsel did not object because he did
not want to call attention to the allegedly improper remark. Accordingly, defendant has failed to
establish that his trial counsel was ineffective on this basis.
Defendant also contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to “other
prosecutorial misconduct.” This issue is not preserved for appeal because it was not set forth in
defendant’s statement of the questions presented. Hartsuff, supra; Yarbrough, supra. Moreover,
defendant does not identify the precise instances of conduct to which he is referring, nor does he make
any meaningful argument with regard to this allegation. Therefore, this issue has been abandoned. See
Froling v Carpenter, 203 Mich App 368, 373; 512 NW2d 6 (1994).
Next, defendant contends that his counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of the
possibility of moving for a continuance so that he could obtain civilian clothes. Effective assistance of
counsel is presumed, and defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. Stanaway, supra. To
establish prejudice, defendant must show that there was a reasonable probability of a different outcome.
Id. at 687-688. In the instant case, defendant must prove that he would not have waived his right to a
jury trial had his attorney informed him of the possibility of a continuance or adjournment for purposes
of obtaining civilian clothes. This requires a showing that the waiver decision was, in fact, the result of
defendant’s inability to obtain the proper attire. As noted, the trial court found that defendant was not
coerced into waiving his right to a jury trial because he was dressed in jail garb. Accordingly, defendant
has failed to establish that he would not have waived his right to a jury trial had his attorney informed
him of the possibility of a continuance for purposes of obtaining civilian clothes.
In denying defendant’s motion for a new trial, the trial court found that the waiver was voluntary
and that defendant was lying with regard to the circumstances surrounding the waiver decision. As
noted, a trial court may evaluate the credibility of a witness in deciding a motion for new trial. Mechura,
supra. Because defendant has failed to establish that his decision to waive a jury trial was influenced by
the fact that he was dressed in jail garb, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.
Finally, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to explain to him the
nature of the right to a jury trial. Defendant alleges that his attorney failed to inform him that the verdict
of the jury must be unanimous and that he had the right to participate in jury selection. At the
evidentiary hearing, defendant testified that his decision to waive a jury trial was based primarily on the
fact that prison officials had lost his clothes. Thus, it does not appear that counsel’s alleged failure to
inform defendant of the basic elements of a jury trial substantially contributed to the waiver decision.
Moreover, defendant has cited no authority establishing that an attorney’s failure to advise a client of the
nature of a jury trial constitutes ineffective assistance. As noted, knowledge of the basic attributes of a
jury trial is not constitutionally required to effectuate a proper waiver. Sammons, supra.
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We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael E. Dodge
I concur in the result only.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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