PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES CLARK MONAGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 25, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 187613
Calhoun Circuit court
LC No. 95-000320
CHARLES CLARK MONAGAN, a/k/a
CHARLIE CLARK MONAGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Hoekstra and J.M. Batzer,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury of possession with intent to deliver
less than fifty grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); MSA 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv). Defendant
received a sentence of two to twenty years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
I
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence presented to sustain his conviction,
specifically maintaining that the prosecution failed to prove that the cocaine belonged to defendant, and
that it had not been planted on him (as the defense contended at trial). We disagree.
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence question, this Court reviews the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could conclude that the
elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515;
489 NW2d 748, modified 441 Mich 1201 (1992). “Inherent in the task of considering the proofs in
the light most favorable to the prosecution is the necessity to avoid a weighing of the proofs or a
determination whether testimony favorable to the prosecution is to be believed. All such concerns are
to be resolved in favor of the prosecution.” People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 474; 511 NW2d 654
(1993). Essentially, defendant’s claim here, is that the credible evidence in this case does not support
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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his conviction. Reviewing issues of credibility that were decided by the jury is not the role of this Court.
Wolfe, supra at 514. The evidence, when examined in a light most favorable to the prosecution, is
more than sufficient to support defendant’s conviction.
II
Defendant next argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial because the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the prosecutor to introduce irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence
regarding police witnesses’ experiences in unrelated drug investigations. Defendant specifically
challenges the testimony of officers indicating that it was not uncommon for drugs to be packaged in
clear plastic baggies secured with a knot, nor was it unusual to find drugs hidden between the mattresses
of a bed. We find no abuse of discretion.
When considering that the defense advanced the theory that the police had planted the sock
containing cocaine in the room defendant occupied, stressing that the sock found during the search of
another dealer’s motel room was packaged identically to the one supposedly found in defendant’s
room, we find that evidence establishing that method of packaging as one commonly used by drug
traffickers, and not one peculiar to the two instances here in question, is relevant. We conclude that the
officers gave proper lay witness testimony that was rationally based on their personal knowledge and
experience, and that their opinions and explanations were helpful to the jury. MRE 701; People v
Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 57; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
In addition to finding the evidence to be relevant, we also find that its probative value was not
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537
NW2d 909 (1995), modified 450 Mich 1212. We note that just because the evidence sought by the
prosecution undercut defendant’s defense theory, it cannot be automatically deemed unfairly prejudicial.
All relevant evidence is inherently prejudicial. Id.
III
Finally, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct which
involved the prosecutor eliciting testimony confirming that the searching officer had direct contact with
the prosecutor’s office with respect to what he should do with the discovered cocaine, and then during
closing arguments, questioning what that officer would have to gain by orchestrating the event as the
defense suggested. Defendant maintains that in both instances, the prosecutor improperly vouched for
the credibility of the police witnesses. We disagree.
Prosecutorial misconduct issues are decided on a case-by-case basis, and this Court must
examine the relevant portion of the record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks or conduct in context.
People v Legrone, 205 Mich App 77, 82; 517 NW2d 270 (1994). In the first instance, with respect
to the testimony that someone from the prosecutor’s office recommended that the police remove the
sock containing cocaine rather than take a chance and leave it for defendant to retrieve, we conclude
that the testimony was elicited in direct response to the defense’s attack on the officer for having initially
removed the cocaine. Therefore, rather than trying to enforce the officer’s credibility by suggesting that
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he worked side-by-side with the prosecutor’s office, the prosecutor merely elicited testimony to explain
why the officer removed the sock containing cocaine and replaced it with a sock containing soap.
Furthermore, our review of the record reveals that not only did the defense, too, mention a
connection between the investigating officer and the prosecutor’s office, such statements were at times
offered by the witnesses without specific request and with no objection from the defense. Therefore,
when reviewing the prosecutor’s conduct in context, it is apparent that she did not elicit the officer’s
testimony in an attempt to bolster his credibility, nor were his statements concerning the prosecutor’s
office of any prejudice, given the fact that the jury was already aware that a connection existed.
Second, defendant assigns as error comments made by the prosecutor during closing
arguments. Based on our review of those comments, we again conclude that the prosecutor merely
addressed the challenges raised by defendant during trial, and simply asked the jury to consider what, if
anything, the officer involved would have to gain by orchestrating the raid. We find that rather than
vouching for the officer’s credibility, the prosecutor left the question for the jury to answer. We find no
misconduct, nor prejudice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ James M. Batzer
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