PEOPLE OF MI V KEITH ERIC THOMPSON
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
February 18, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 191136
LC No. 93-010492
KEITH ERIC THOMPSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Gage and D.A. Burress,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial conviction of voluntary manslaughter, MCL
750.321; MSA 28.553. Defendant was sentenced to ten to fifteen years’ imprisonment. We affirm.
First, defendant argues that because he was arrested without an arrest warrant or probable
cause, that his statements and the clothing seized from his person should have been suppressed. We
disagree. The facts and circumstances were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe that a felony had been committed; thus, there was probable cause to arrest defendant without a
warrant. MCL 764.15; MSA 28.874; People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115; 549 NW2d 849
(1996), cert den ___ US ___; 65 USLW 3488 (1997). Moreover, given the nature of the victim’s
injuries, defendant’s bloody clothing was seizable under the plain view doctrine because the clothing’s
“incriminating character” was immediately apparent and the officer was lawfully present in a public place
when she observed defendant’s clothing. See id. at 101.
Next, defendant maintains that his statements to the police were not voluntary. Defendant
claims that his arraignment was unnecessarily delayed, he was deprived of food and clothing, and he
was induced to make his second statement by the officer’s indication that he would not be charged with
first-degree murder if he gave the second statement. When reviewing a trial court’s determination of
voluntariness following a Walker1 hearing, this Court will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless they
are clearly erroneous. People v Johnson, 202 Mich App 281, 288; 508 NW2d 509 (1993).
Whether a defendant’s statement was knowing, intelligent and voluntary is a question of law which the
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
court must determine under the totality of the circumstances including the education, experience and
conduct of the defendant, and the credibility of the police. People v Garwood, 205 Mich App 553,
557-558; 517 NW2d 843 (1994).
Following the Walker hearing, the trial court noted the inconsistencies in defendant’s testimony
and concluded that it did not believe defendant’s testimony. Credibility is crucial in determining a
defendant’s level of comprehension and the trial judge is in the best position to make this assessment.
People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996) (Boyle, J.). After a thorough review of
the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently waived his rights. See Johnson, supra.
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser
offenses of involuntary manslaughter, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder,
aggravated assault, and assault and battery. We disagree. An instruction on the lesser included offense
of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder was unwarranted because defendant
failed to present evidence that his admitted acts were not a legally recognizable cause of the victim’s
death. Cf. People v Bailey, 451 Mich 657, 679-680; 549 NW2d 325 (1996). Similarly, since there
was uncontested evidence that defendant’s acts resulted in the victim’s death, there was no justification
for instructions on aggravated assault or assault and battery. See id. at 671-672. Finally, the evidence
presented could not have supported a conviction of involuntary manslaughter; thus, the court did not err
in refusing to give the requested instruction to the jury. See People v Pouncey, 437 Mich 382, 387;
471 NW2d 346 (1991).
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal on the second-degree murder charge. We disagree. The elements of second
degree murder are: (1) that a death occurred, (2) that it was caused by the defendant, (3) that the
killing was done with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v Lewis, 168 Mich App
255, 268; 423 NW2d 637 (1988). Malice, the requisite mental state for murder, consists of the intent
to kill, to cause great bodily harm, or to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that
the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. Id. at 270.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational
trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of second-degree murder were established
beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 665; 482 NW2d 176
(1991). Defendant admitted to the police that he brutally beat the victim about her head with his fists
approximately five or six times, and in addition grabbed her by the throat, on the night of the incident.
The victim’s head injuries caused severe swelling in the brain, and the medical examiner concluded that
the victim died as a result of the head injuries and the stab injuries. Even if the trier of fact were to
conclude that defendant did not stab the victim, there was sufficient evidence for the trier of fact to
conclude that defendant intended to inflict great bodily harm when he beat the victim’s head five or six
times, that there was no justification or excuse for defendant’s actions, and that the victim died as a
result of her head injuries. Thus, the court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for a directed
verdict.
-2
Next, defendant maintains that the court’s denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial was an
abuse of discretion. We disagree. Although the prosecutor improperly threatened to charge
defendant’s alibi witness with perjury just prior to his testimony, see People v Canter, 197 Mich App
550, 569; 496 NW2d 336 (1992), the error was not of such magnitude that the granting of a mistrial
was a manifest necessity, see People v Robbins, 132 Mich App 616, 619-620; 347 NW2d 765
(1984).
Defendant further contends that the prosecutor’s comments during his opening statement and
closing argument denied him a fair trial. Defendant raises seven separate claims of error. However,
defendant failed to object to the alleged misconduct or to request a curative instruction. Therefore, our
review of the issue is precluded, unless the conduct was so egregious that no curative instruction could
have removed any prejudice to defendant or if manifest injustice would result from our failure to review
the alleged misconduct. People v Paquette, 214 Mich App 336, 341-342; 543 NW2d 342 (1995).
Generally, prosecutors are accorded great latitude regarding their argument and conduct. They
are free to argue the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence as it relates to their theory
of the case. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 282; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). The prosecutor may
comment upon his own witness’ credibility to the jury where there is conflicting evidence and the
question of defendant’s guilt or innocence depends on which witness is believed. People v Stacy, 193
Mich App 19, 29-30; 484 NW2d 675 (1992). Considering the prosecutor’s opening statement and
closing argument in their entirety, we find no error requiring reversal and conclude that no manifest
injustice would result from our failure to further review these issues. See Paquette, supra at 341-342;
People v Hedelsky, 162 Mich App 382, 386; 412 NW2d 746 (1987).
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel when trial counsel
failed to raise the issue of the illegality of defendant’s arrest in his motion to suppress defendant’s
statements and his clothing, and when counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s alleged improper
comments. After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated
that defense counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, or that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. See People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687-688; 521 NW2d 557 (1994), cert den sub
nom Michigan v Caruso, 513 US ___; 115 S Ct 923; 140 L Ed 2d 802 (1995).
Affirmed.
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Daniel A. Burress
1
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
-3
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
