MARIANNE GRISTY V MAY DEPT STORES CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARIANNE GRISTY,
UNPUBLISHED
February 11, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 185734
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 93-005025-NZ
MAY DEPARTMENT STORES COMPANY d/b/a
LORD & TAYLOR, and LYNDA CAMPBELL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Reilly and E. Sosnick,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a May 5, 1995, order of the Macomb Circuit Court granting
defendants summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue regarding any
material fact and moving party entitled to judgment as a matter of law). We affirm the grant of summary
disposition with regard to the claim of retaliatory discharge, reverse the grant of summary disposition
with regard to the claim of age discrimination, and remand for further proceedings.
I
Plaintiff worked for defendant Lord & Taylor from September 28, 1991 to October 8, 1992,
when she was terminated. She was born on December 31, 1934, and received a bachelor of arts
degree in public relations and marketing in 1980. Plaintiff interviewed with Lynda Campbell, then
general manager of the Lord & Taylor store located at the Twelve Oaks Mall in Novi. During her
second interview with Campbell, plaintiff was offered an executive position as the area sales manager in
shoes, handbags, accessories, and jewelry. Plaintiff testified at her deposition that Campbell expressed
concerns about plaintiff’s age at the second interview and informed plaintiff that “if it was up to her
[Campbell], she wouldn’t hire” plaintiff. However, plaintiff began working on September 28, 1991.
Campbell testified that plaintiff was the only manager over the age of fifty at the Novi store, and that
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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during Campbell’s ten-year career at Lord & Taylor, plaintiff was the only person over the age of fifty
that she hired into a salaried position.
Plaintiff stated that she began to experience problems from the beginning of her employment.
Plaintiff stated that she was told to “write up” two older workers, Helen Bowen (late sixties) and Ann
Collins (late fifties). Plaintiff testified that she was instructed to give Bowen more work to do in an effort
to force her to retire. Plaintiff also testified that Campbell told plaintiff that she wanted to discharge
Bowen because of her age on more than one occasion. Plaintiff further testified that she was told that
Collins may have Alzheimer’s disease and that Campbell wanted Collins to retire as well. Campbell
admitted to calling Collins a member of the “Alzheimer’s club.” Three other managers also told plaintiff
to give Bowen more stock work to do in the hope that she would retire or quit. One manager told
plaintiff that they were trying to get rid of Bowen because she was “too old.”
Defendants also presented evidence that there were problems with plaintiff’s employment
relationship. Plaintiff’s supervisor expressed concern that plaintiff was struggling with her job. When
the 1991 holiday season was finished, the store conducted an inventory, and the inventory in plaintiff’s
department went well. However, in February 1992, the store conducted reviews of its managers and
plaintiff was on the bottom of the list with respect to numerical ranking. Plaintiff was put on probation
for thirty days, and the probationary period was later extended to sixty days.
During the probationary period, plaintiff sent a letter to Virginia Demchak, the regional human
resources manager, complaining that she was being discriminated against because of her age and religion
(citing a Jewish “joke” told by Campbell). A meeting took place between Demchak, Campbell, and
plaintiff, but Campbell denied making any statements about plaintiff’s age.
Plaintiff completed her probation in May 1992 and received an effective (good) review. Plaintiff
was also given a pay raise of $1,000. By the middle of June 1992, however, plaintiff’s new supervisor,
Marla Wald, began complaining about plaintiff’s performance. Wald told Campbell that plaintiff was
not getting merchandise onto the floor on time and plaintiff was not maintaining merchandise presentation
or housekeeping presentation. Shortly thereafter, it was discovered that some merchandise had not
been included in the most recent inventory, but was behind a backdrop in plaintiff’s department. On
July 8, 1992, plaintiff was given a final warning because of her decision to not inform management about
the merchandise. On July 9, 1992, plaintiff’s operational audit resulted in a 41.4% rating, which
defendants claimed was unsatisfactory. Another audit done on August 9, 1992, was again unacceptable
to defendants. Defendants contend that plaintiff’s performance continued to be deficient and on
September 23, 1992, a memorandum setting forth plaintiff’s deficiencies was sent to an executive in
New York. On September 25, 1992, plaintiff’s termination was approved by the senior vice-president
of human resources. Campbell told plaintiff that her termination was due to her failure to keep her
performance at an effective or better level. Plaintiff’s former stock clerk, Theresa Smith, then twenty
eight years old, replaced her.
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II
A motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on appeal. Plieth v St. Raymond
Church, 210 Mich App 568, 571; 534 NW2d 164 (1995). The factual support of a plaintiff’s claim is
tested on a motion for summary disposition filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Skinner v Square D Co,
445 Mich 153, 161; 516 NW2d 475 (1994). The court must consider the affidavits, pleadings,
depositions, admissions, and any other documentary evidence presented to it. MCR 2.116(G)(5). The
court is not permitted to assess credibility or to determine facts on a motion for summary disposition.
Skinner, supra, p 161. Rather, the court’s task is to review the record evidence, and all reasonable
inferences drawn from it, and determine whether a genuine issue of any material fact exists to warrant a
trial. Id.
III
A
Plaintiff alleges that she was discharged on the basis on her age in violation of the Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a). Plaintiff’s claim is premised on a disparate
treatment theory which requires a showing of either a pattern of intentional discrimination against
protected employees, or against an individual plaintiff. Lytle v Malady, 209 Mich App 179, 184-185;
530 NW2d 135 (1995), lv gtd 451 M 920 (1996). A plaintiff can establish a claim of age
ich
discrimination under ordinary principles of proof by any direct or indirect evidence relevant to and
probative of the issue without resort to any judicially created presumptions or inferences related to the
evidence. Matras v Amoco Oil Co, 424 Mich 675, 683; 385 NW2d 586 (1986). However, “an
employer is rarely so blatant as to announce its illegal motives.” Lytle, supra, p 185. Rather, the usual
case must be proved by indirect evidence and special rules of proof have been created in employment
discrimination cases1. Id.
A prima facie case of age discrimination in a non-reduction-in-workforce claim, such as this,
requires the plaintiff to show (1) she was a member of a protected class; (2) she was discharged; (3)
she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a younger person. Matras, supra, p
683; see also McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green, 411 US 792, 802; 93 S Ct 1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668
(1973)2. Once established, a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of disparate treatment.
Lytle, supra, p 186. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by
articulating some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision against the
plaintiff. Id., pp 186-187. If the defendant carries its burden of production, the presumption of
discrimination is dispelled, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity. In order for a
plaintiff to survive a motion for summary disposition, she must next tender specific factual evidence that
could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant’s proffered reasons are a pretext for age
discrimination. Id., p 188. Therefore, plaintiff must establish, directly or indirectly, the existence of a
genuine issue of material fact that the defendant’s proffered reasons are unworthy of credence, and that
illegal age discrimination was more likely the defendant’s true motivation in discharging her. Id.
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B
We find that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of age discrimination under a disparate
treatment theory. Plaintiff was a member of a protected class (age forty to seventy) because she was
fifty-seven when she was discharged. Second, there is no question in this case that plaintiff was
discharged by defendant; that is, plaintiff did not voluntarily resign. Further, plaintiff was qualified for the
position because she had a bachelor of arts degree in public relations and marketing and eight years of
experience in retail management positions. Moreover, Demchak testified that plaintiff was qualified for
the position when she interviewed plaintiff. The trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not qualified for
the position because she did not perform her job competently is erroneous because an employee’s
qualification for a job is much different than competency while on the job and a trial court is not
permitted to make such a factual determination when deciding a motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(10). Further, a prima facie case here does not require plaintiff to prove that she was
performing the job at a level which met her employer’s expectations. Plaintiff has shown that she was
qualified for the position. Finally, plaintiff has also shown that she was replaced by a younger employee,
as Smith was twenty-eight years old.
Next, because plaintiff established her prima facie case of age discrimination, the burden of
production shifted to defendants to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the
discharge. Defendants have met this burden by stating that plaintiff was discharged because of poor job
performance. Thus, in order to survive the motion for summary disposition, plaintiff must show specific
factual evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that defendants’ proffered reason for
discharge are a mere pretext for age discrimination. We believe that plaintiff has alleged such factual
evidence.
Plaintiff testified that Campbell told her at her second interview that if it was up to her, she
would not hire plaintiff and that she had concerns about plaintiff’s age. Campbell admitted that in her
ten years at Lord & Taylor, plaintiff was the only person over forty hired into a salaried position.
Campbell also admitted that she referred to Collins as part of an “Alzheimer’s club.” Plaintiff further
testified that Campbell wanted to discharge Bowen because of her age. Plaintiff has also rebutted
defendants’ proffered reason for discharge because she demonstrated through documents that her sales
figures for the first two quarters of 1992 were better than the company had planned. Further, plaintiff
successfully completed her probationary period and received a good review. Plaintiff also received a
pay increase two months before her discharge. Plaintiff also set forth documentary evidence that her
replacement received a performance appraisal approximately equal to plaintiff, but Smith was never
placed on probation or discharged.
Accordingly, the evidence, taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff, is sufficient to establish the
existence of a material factual dispute that defendants’ proffered reason is unworthy of credence, and
that illegal age discrimination was more likely defendants’ true motivation in discharging plaintiff. The
trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendants regarding the age discrimination claim.
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IV
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing her claim of retaliatory discharge.
Plaintiff contends that she was discharged as well because she complained about age discrimination as it
related to Bowen, Collins, and herself. Under the Civil Rights Act, an employer cannot retaliate against
an employee for opposing a violation of the act or making a charge or complaint of discrimination.
MCL 37.2701; MSA 3.548(701).
In order to establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under the “opposition clause” of
the Civil Rights Act, plaintiff must set forth facts showing (1) that she has opposed violations of the act,
and (2) that the opposition was a significant factor in an adverse employment decision. Johnson v
Honeywell Information Systems, Inc, 955 F2d 409, 415 (CA 6, 1992); see also Goins v Ford
Motor Co, 131 Mich App 185, 198; 347 NW2d 184 (1983) (where the plaintiff claimed that he was
unlawfully discharged for filing a worker’s compensation claim, the trial court correctly instructed the
jury that the plaintiff had the burden of proving that the filing of the worker’s compensation claim was a
significant factor in the defendant’s decision to discharge the plaintiff).
A review of the record indicates that plaintiff never informed any of her supervisors about the
discrimination against Bowen or Collins, nor did she inform anyone that she was unwilling to engage in
discrimination against them. Although plaintiff argues that she refused to unfairly document any
performance deficiencies, this was never relayed to defendant. Because there is no evidence that
defendants were aware that plaintiff believed that Bowen and Collins were being discriminated against,
she cannot establish that her opposition to the discrimination was a significant factor in the decision to
discharge her. Therefore, plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge with
respect to her alleged opposition to the treatment of Bowen and Collins at work.
Plaintiff, however, also alleges that she informed management that she believed that she was
being discriminated against and that she was discharged as a result of this complaint. During the period
while plaintiff was on probation, she sent a letter to Demchak complaining that she was being
discriminated against because of her age, citing the comments made to her at her second interview, and
because of her religion, citing a Jewish “joke” told by Campbell. Although we agree that plaintiff has
met the first element of the prima facie case of retaliation, we are unable to conclude that plaintiff has set
forth any evidence demonstrating that her complaint was a significant factor in her discharge.
In this case, the letter was sent while plaintiff was on probation. Further, a meeting was held
with Demchak and Campbell regarding plaintiff’s concerns. Plaintiff was taken off probation after the
meeting, having completed it successfully, and she received a pay increase. Also, at the time that
plaintiff completed probation, she received a good review. When plaintiff was discharged,
approximately six months after she wrote the letter, there is no indication that she was discharged
because of her complaint of discrimination. Plaintiff must prove that the complaint of discrimination was
a significant factor in the decision to discharge her, however, plaintiff has not set forth any circumstantial
or direct evidence tending to show this.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to
defendants with respect to the retaliation claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not
retained.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Maureen Pulte Reilly
/s/ Edward Sosnick
1
Plaintiff argues that resort to the special burden-shifting rules of proof in employment discrimination
cases need not be done because there is direct evidence of discrimination. We do not agree with
plaintiff’s contention in this regard because, although plaintiff testified that Campbell made direct
remarks of discrimination, Campbell denied making the remarks. Therefore, this presents a credibility
issue that a trier of fact will have to resolve.
2
The United States Supreme Court has recently held that the fact that a plaintiff bringing a claim under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act was replaced by a person outside the protected class is not
a proper element of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case. O’Connor v Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp, ___ US ___; ___ S Ct ___; ___ L Ed 2d ___; 64 USLW 4243 (April 1, 1996). In
this case, because plaintiff was replaced by a person who is not a member of the protected class, we
note, like the Supreme Court, that the fact that the replacement was substantially younger than plaintiff is
a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the plaintiff was replaced by
someone outside the protected class.
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