HARVEY W FAMBROUGH V CARL L RHOADS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HARVEY W. FAMBROUGH and PAMELA CADY,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 1997
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees,
v
No. 185561
Wayne County
LC No. 94-425718-NM
CARL L. RHOADS,
Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Before: Corrigan, P.J., and Jansen and M. Warshawsky,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right from a March 15, 1995, order granting defendant’s motion for
summary disposition on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Defendant cross-appeals as of
right from the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary disposition which was based on a statute of
limitations defense. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
This is a legal malpractice case. On May 21, 1991, defendant Carl L. Rhoads, an attorney,
drafted a will for Harvey G. Fambrough, plaintiffs’ father. Defendant was the personal representative
named in the will. Harvey G. Fambrough died on April 1, 1993, and on April 12, 1993, a petition for
commencement of proceedings was filed in the Wayne County Probate Court. Administration of the
estate was granted to defendant as personal representative. At a June 18, 1993, hearing, the will was
admitted to probate and defendant was appointed personal representative of the estate. During the
hearing, a dispute arose concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of the will. On July 21,
1993, defendant filed a petition for construction of the will. In connection with the petition for
construction, notes of the testator regarding instructions for the will were provided to plaintiffs on
September 14, 1993. From these notes, it was determined that there were omissions from the will
contrary to the testator’s express instructions. During a deposition, defendant admitted that he had
made drafting errors in the writing of the will.
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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On March 4, 1994, the probate court entered an order settling the petition for construction of
the will. In August 1994, a dispute arose regarding defendant’s claims against the estate for services
rendered. The probate court ordered the case to mediation regarding fees, and a hearing was held on
December 19, 1994. Defendant itemized the fees totaling $26,883.40. Plaintiffs argued that the fee
should be reduced by $10,000 because of defendant’s inadvertence in not including two relevant
phrases of instructions from the testator. The mediation panel evaluated the case at $19,000, and, on
January 10, 1995, an order was entered by the probate court awarding defendant $19,000 in full
payment for all services rendered to the estate. The order granting fees also states, “Neither this
settlement nor this Order shall be construed to affect the rights of the parties in Wayne County Circuit
Court civil action no. 94-425718-NM.”
On August 29, 1994, plaintiffs filed an action in the Wayne Circuit Court against defendant
alleging legal malpractice. Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary disposition on the basis that
the statute of limitations had expired. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a second
motion for summary disposition on the basis of collateral estoppel and res judicata. The trial court
granted the motion, ruling that plaintiffs were precluded from bringing this case on the basis that the
parties agreed to settle the will construction claim (the underlying suit). On appeal, defendant argues
that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary disposition on the basis that the claim is time
barred. Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting defendant’s motion on the basis of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.
We first address plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court erred in granting defendant summary
disposition on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Such a motion is properly granted under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) (claim is barred because of prior judgment). In deciding a motion brought under
MCR 2.116(C)(7), affidavits, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence may be
submitted by a party to support or oppose the grounds asserted in the motion. MCR 2.116(G)(2). If
such documentary evidence is filed, the court must consider it when ruling on a motion brought under
subrule (C)(7). MCR 2.116(G)(5). Here, documentary evidence was submitted by the parties; thus,
like the trial court, we consider it when reviewing the motion for summary disposition. Patterson v
Kleiman, 447 Mich 429; 526 NW2d 879 (1994).
First, to the extent that defendant argues that he owed plaintiffs no duty because they were not
his clients, but only named beneficiaries in the will, we disagree on the basis of our Supreme Court’s
recent holding in Mieras v DeBona, 452 Mich 278; 550 NW2d 202 (1996). Our Supreme Court held
that beneficiaries named in a will may bring a tort-based cause of action against the attorney who
drafted the will for negligent breach of the standard of care owed to the beneficiary by nature of third
party status. Id., p 308. Thus, defendant in this case owed a duty to plaintiffs in this negligence cause
of action.
Turning to the issue of whether plaintiffs are barred by the principles of res judicata and
collateral estoppel from bringing the present cause of action, we find that the trial court erred in so
ruling. In Lowman v Karp, 190 Mich App 448, 452-453; 476 NW2d 428 (1991), this Court held
that the plaintiff’s settlement of the underlying action does not act as an absolute bar to a subsequent
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legal malpractice action. Moreover, the parties in this case, in the order granting fees, stipulated that,
“Neither this settlement nor this Order shall be construed to affect the rights of the parties in [this legal
malpractice case].” The trial court ruled that the order itself was silent regarding any foreclosure of
rights in the present legal malpractice case, and that plaintiffs were estopped from pursuing this case
because they could have pursued these claims in the underlying probate court matter. We cannot agree
with the trial court’s conclusion in this regard because the stipulation is included in the order and signed
by both parties. The stipulation, therefore, is binding because it is in writing and subscribed by the party
against whom the agreement is offered. MCR 2.507(H). The trial court erred reversibly in granting
summary disposition to defendant on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel because the parties
stipulated that the settlement of the will construction claim would not affect the rights of the parties in the
legal malpractice case.
Defendant attempts to invalidate the stipulation, stating that he did not knowingly agree to such
language. However, defendant never raised this issue below and he has attempted to expand the record
on appeal by attaching an affidavit to this effect dated September 12, 1995. Because defendant never
raised this issue and because this Court’s review is limited to the record developed in the trial court, we
will not review this issue. MCR 7.210(A)(1); Harkins v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 206 Mich App
317, 323; 520 NW2d 653 (1994).
Last, we address the cross-appeal. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his
motion for summary disposition on the basis that the claim was time barred. In Mieras, supra, p 301,
our Supreme Court stated that “because beneficiaries of a will have no rights under the will before the
testator’s death, a disgruntled beneficiary’s cause of action does not ripen until the death of the
testator.” The testator in this case died on April 1, 1993, and plaintiffs filed their cause of action on
August 29, 1994. Further, in this case, defendant was appointed personal representative of the estate
on June 18, 1993. It was not until March 4, 1994, when the probate court relieved defendant of his
duties as personal representative.
A legal malpractice claim must be brought within two years after the date the attorney
discontinues serving the client, or within six months after the plaintiff discovers or should have
discovered the existence of the claim. Maddox v Burlingame, 205 Mich App 446, 450; 517 NW2d
816 (1994). A lawyer discontinues serving a client when relieved of the obligation by the client or the
court, or upon completion of a specific legal service that the lawyer was retained to perform. Id. In this
case, defendant was the personal representative of the estate, and was not relieved of that duty until
March 4, 1994. Plaintiffs’ claim was filed on August 29, 1994. This is well within the two-year statute
of limitations period for an action of legal malpractice. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4).
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the
basis that the claim was time barred.
We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition on the
basis that the claim is not time barred, and we reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s motion
for summary disposition on the basis of res judicata and collateral estoppel. This case is remanded for
further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not retained.
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/s/ Maura D. Corrigan
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Meyer Warshawsky
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