PEOPLE OF MI V JOHN FREDERICK WATKINS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 28, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 180973
Hillsdale Circuit Court
LC No. 187030
JOHN FREDERICK WATKINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Markman and H.A. Koselka,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted of one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL
750.520b; MSA 28.788(2). He was subsequently sentenced by the trial court to imprisonment of eight
to twenty years. Defendant appeals his conviction and sentence as of right. We reverse the judgment
of the trial court and remand this case for a new trial.
On appeal, defendant alleges three separate instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. As
there was no Ginther1 hearing in this case, review by this Court is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record. People v Price, 214 Mich App 538, 547; 543 NW2d 49 (1995). To establish that the
defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel was so undermined that it justifies reversal of an
otherwise valid conviction, this Court must find that counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the representation so prejudiced the defendant as to deny him a fair
trial. People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 302-303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994).
We first consider defendant’s allegations that he was denied effective assistance of counsel
when defense counsel failed to object to the injection of highly prejudicial testimony that defendant had
sexually assaulted an adult woman. Reference to the alleged assault was first made by Troy Dwyer, Sr.,
the victim’s father. During the prosecutor’s direct examination, Dwyer testified without objection, that a
friend, Keith Wasnich, told him that defendant had sexually abused the victim in this case and that
defendant had also raped Wasnich’s girl friend (apparently she related the incident to Wasnich
sometime after it allegedly occurred). On direct examination, defense counsel elicited defendant’s
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1
admission to the girl friend’s allegations and the fact that there had been a police investigation of her
claim. The prosecutor subsequently engaged in pointed cross-examination of defendant, without
objection from defense counsel, insinuating that defendant was charged with raping the woman, and
eliciting testimony from defendant that he had sex with her, but she was “willing.”
First, we conclude that Dwyer’s testimony regarding the alleged rape of Wasnich’s girl friend
was hearsay. MRE 801. Dwyer’s testimony was further implicated by MRE 404(b)(1) which provides
that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show action in conformity therewith.” However, evidence of another crime or bad act may be
admitted if: (1) it is relevant to an issue other than character or propensity, (2) it is relevant to an issue or
fact of consequence at trial, and (3) its probative value is not outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. People v Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 578-579; 536 NW2d 570 (1995). In
addition, there must be substantial proof that the defendant committed the other act sought to be
admitted. People v Engelman, 434 Mich 204, 213; 453 NW2d 656 (1990).
In this case, there was no apparent justification for admission of testimony relating to the girl
friend’s unproved allegations of rape against defendant, other than to show the jury defendant’s
propensity for sexual abuse. Unrelated incidents of past sexual misconduct are not admissible to show a
general propensity to commit sex offenses. See, e.g., Engelman, supra at 225; People v Major, 407
Mich 394, 400-401; 285 NW2d 660 (1979); People v Devine, 168 Mich App 56, 57-58; 423
NW2d 594 (1988). Furthermore, the girl friend’s allegations were unsubstantiated and did not result in
prosecution or conviction. The evidence was particularly insidious when it was raised three times during
defendant’s one-day trial. Under such circumstances it would be difficult for the jurors to avoid
considering the unrelated rape allegations as evidence of defendant’s propensity for sexual abuse, and
perhaps convict him in part for that offense. Devine, supra at 59.
Although counsel’s trial strategy is entitled to a great deal of deference, People v Emerson
(After Remand), 203 Mich App 345, 349; 512 NW2d 3 (1994), the admission of testimony regarding
a prior alleged rape was so blatantly inadmissible and prejudicial that defense counsel’s failure to object
to its admission on two occasions was unreasonable under an objective standard. Defense counsel’s
error was compounded by his own direct examination which resulted in defendant’s admission to the
existence of the allegations and the fact that there was a police investigation. Taking the inflammatory
nature of the evidence and the circumstances of the trial into consideration, this Court believes that the
representation so prejudiced defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial. Therefore, defendant is entitled
to a new trial.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in finding that the rape shield law, MCL
750.520j; MSA 28.788(10), prohibited the testimony of Doris Purcell regarding an incident in which
she caught the victim and two other children “playing doctor.” The decision whether to admit evidence
is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion. People v Lugo, 214 Mich App 699, 709; 542 NW2d 921 (1995). The rape shield law
provides that evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct is inadmissible unless: (1) it
-2
concerns the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor, or sexual activity showing the source or origin
of semen, pregnancy, or disease; and (2) the trial court finds that the proposed evidence is not
inflammatory or unduly prejudicial. MCL 750.520j; MSA 28.788(10). Defendant offered the
evidence of the victim’s sexual touching with other children for purposes of demonstrating the “origin” of
her knowledge of sexual matters, and claims it was necessary to his constitutional right to present a
defense.
Even when a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense is at issue, it must be weighed
against other legitimate interests such as those protected by the rape shield law. Michigan v Lucas,
500 US 145; 11 S Ct 1743; 114 L Ed 2d 205, 212 (1991). The trial court’s decision to bar Purcell’s
testimony is supported by People v Arenda, 416 Mich 1; 330 NW2d 814 (1982), and People v
Byrne, 199 Mich App 674, 676; 502 NW2d 386 (1993), which concerned similar constitutional
challenges. The rape shield law prohibits testimony of a specific instance of a child victim’s unrelated
sexual conduct when offered to explain the victim’s familiarity with sexual matters. Arenda, supra at
12-14. Given the lack of similarity between the acts observed by Purcell and those for which defendant
was accused, any probative value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and misleading the
jury. Byrne, supra at 679. Moreover, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to present a
defense. Defendant had ample opportunity to examine whether the victim could have learned about
sexual matters from a source other than the alleged abuse by defendant. Nor was defendant prevented
from asserting the defense that the victim invented the story because she wanted her parents to be
reunited. It was also proper for the trial court to take into account defendant’s failure to comply with
the rape shield law’s ten-day notice requirement in barring the evidence. People v Lucas (On
Remand), 193 Mich App 298, 302; 484 NW2d 685 (1992), cert den ___ US ___; 115 S Ct 593;
130 L Ed 2d 505 (1995).2
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to an additional fifteen days time served for the fifteen
days he served in Florida before his extradition to Michigan. Defendant did not raise this issue before
the trial court; therefore, review is limited to preventing manifest injustice. People v Connor, 209 Mich
App 419, 431; 531 NW2d 734 (1995); People v Grant, 445 Mich 535, 547; 520 NW2d 123
(1994). Whether a defendant is entitled to credit for time served is a question law which is reviewed de
novo on appeal. Connor, supra at 423. Defendant was arrested in Florida on March 18, 1994, on
the basis of a fugitive warrant issued by the State of Michigan, and was subsequently returned to
Hillsdale County. However, defendant’s official date of arrest is listed as April 2, 1994, the day he was
returned to Hillsdale County. At the time of sentencing on August 17, 1994, defendant was only given
credit for 138 days time served (April 2, 1994 through August 17, 1994), rather than 153 days (March
18, 1994 through August 17, 1994).
By statute, a criminal defendant must receive credit for time served prior to sentencing. MCL
769.11b; MSA 28.1083(2). This Court has held that a defendant is entitled to credit for time spent in a
foreign state awaiting extradition to Michigan. People v Becker, 114 Mich App 145, 146; 318 NW2d
506 (1982); People v Gibson, 101 Mich App 205, 206; 300 NW2d 500 (1980). It appears that the
trial court erred by using April 2, 1994, defendant’s official date of arrest, rather than March 18, 1994,
-3
the date defendant’s incarceration commenced in Florida. It would be manifestly unjust for defendant to
be denied credit for time served as the result of an oversight. However, the issue is moot in light of this
Court’s finding of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the admission of testimony concerning
unrelated rape allegations against defendant.
Reversed and remanded.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Stephen J. Markman
/s/ Harvey A. Koselka
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
2
However, to the extent that the rape shield law precludes the introduction of evidence by defendant
relating to the complainant’s past conduct, the prosecutor cannot be permitted to argue in summation
that negative inferences should be drawn from defendant’s failure to offer such evidence. We believe
that several of the prosecutor’s statements concerning the lack of complainant’s basis for describing
cunnilingus arguably violated this stricture. The prosecutor cannot use the rape shield law both as a
shield and a sword.
-4
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.