PEOPLE OF MI V LAMONT BASS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
January 24, 1997
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 190130
Detroit Recorder’s Court
LC No. 95-002308
LAMONT BASS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Saad and H.A. Beach,* JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a bench trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of third-degree criminal sexual
conduct involving forced or coerced sexual penetration, MCL 750.520d(1)(b); MSA 28.788(4)(1)(b).
Defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of five to fifteen years’ imprisonment. He now appeals as
of right. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in allowing statements made by the victim’s
sister, Tamika Fogle, to be admitted into evidence under the coconspirator’s exception to the hearsay
rule, MRE 801(d)(2)(E). Because there was scant independent evidence of a conspiracy, we find that
the trial court abused it’s discretion in admitting Tamika’s statements under MRE 801(d)(2)(E). People
v Crump, 216 Mich App 210, 211; 549 NW2d 36 (1996). However, we also find that the error was
harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt. People v Cadle, 204 Mich App
646, 653; 516 NW2d 520 (1994). See also MCR 2.613(A). The victim testified that defendant
forced her to engage in sexual intercourse, the medical records confirmed that the victim had been
forced to engage in sexual intercourse, and defendant admitted that he had engaged in sexual intercourse
with the victim. Under these circumstances, the erroneous admission of Tamika’s statements was
harmless error.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution exercised due
diligence in its attempt to produce the victim’s brother, Laron Fogle, as an endorsed witness. We
* Circuit judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
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disagree. The record reveals that the prosecutor made a reasonable, good faith effort to procure
Laron’s presence at trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that the prosecutor had
exercised due diligence to produce Laron. People v Wolford, 189 Mich App 478, 484; 473 NW2d
767 (1991); People v Phillips, 61 Mich App 138, 147; 232 NW2d 333 (1975).
Lastly, defendant claims that his waiver of the right to a jury trial was not made orally on the
record. We disagree. Contrary to defendant’s claim, a review of the record reveals that defendant
made an oral waiver of jury trial before Judge Thomas E. Jackson on August 8, 1995. Further, it
appears that defendant’s wavier of his right to a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily made. The
definition of a jury trial was given to defendant, the court ascertained that defendant understood that he
had a right to a jury trial, and defendant affirmatively indicated that he wished to waive this right.
Consequently, we conclude that defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial was knowingly and
voluntarily made. People v Reddick, 187 Mich App 547, 550; 468 NW2d 278 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Harry A. Beach
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