KATHRYN HADDEN V MCDERMITT APARTMENTS LLC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHRYN HADDEN,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 12, 2010
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 286474
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 07-087100-NO
McDERMITT APARTMENTS, LLC,
Defendant-Appellant.
Advance Sheets Version
Before: MURPHY, P.J., and METER and BECKERING, JJ.
BECKERING, J.
Defendant appeals by leave granted the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition with regard to plaintiff’s claim that defendant breached its statutory duty
under MCL 554.139(1)(a). We affirm. This appeal has been decided without oral argument
pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Plaintiff was a tenant in an upstairs apartment of defendant’s building. After twice
calling defendant to complain about the presence of snow and ice on an outdoor stairway
attached to the building, plaintiff slipped and fell on black ice when using the stairway. She
fractured her left hip.
Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of common-law general liability for owners of
premises and breach of defendant’s statutory duty as a landlord to keep the premises and
common areas fit for the use intended and the premises in reasonable repair under MCL
554.139(1)(a) and (b). Defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
arguing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the hazard was open and obvious, so
it could not be held liable under a common-law premises liability theory. Defendant also argued
that it was not liable under MCL 554.139(1) because its statutory duty did not extend to snow
and ice removal.
Initially, the trial court completely denied defendant’s motion, but on the same day the
trial court entered its order, our Supreme Court issued its decision in Allison v AEW Capital Mgt,
LLP, 481 Mich 419; 751 NW2d 8 (2008). Defendant moved for reconsideration, arguing that
applying Allison would change the outcome of the trial court’s decision.
The trial court granted in part defendant’s motion for reconsideration. It found, pursuant
to the Court’s holding in Allison, that defendant had no statutory duty to keep the stairway in
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reasonable repair under MCL 554.139(1)(b). However, under MCL 554.139(1)(a), defendant
had a duty to keep the stairway fit for its intended use. The trial court found the conclusion
reached in Allison—that one to two inches of snow did not render a parking lot unfit for its
intended use—distinguishable. The facts here included black ice, not just snow, and the intended
use of easy ingress to and egress from the upstairs apartments was different from that of the
parking lot in Allison. The trial court noted that, by its own terms, the statute is to be “liberally
construed,” quoting MCL 554.139(3). Finally, the trial court found that plaintiff waived her
arguments against defendant’s “open and obvious” danger defense because she cited no caselaw
supporting her position.
In this Court, the only issue properly presented is whether the trial court’s decision
regarding MCL 554.139(1)(a) was erroneous given its finding that there is a material distinction
between the facts here and those in Allison.
We review de novo a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion for summary
disposition. Spiek v Dep’t of Transp, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). Although we
view substantively admissible evidence submitted at the time of the motion in the light most
favorable to the party opposing the motion, the nonmoving party must come forward with at least
some evidentiary proof, some statement of specific fact upon which to base his or her case.
Maiden v Rozwood, 461 Mich 109, 119-121; 597 NW2d 817 (1999); Skinner v Square D Co, 445
Mich 153, 161-162; 516 NW2d 475 (1994).
“MCL 554.139 provides a specific protection to lessees and licensees of residential
property in addition to any protection provided by the common law.” Allison, 481 Mich at 425
(emphasis in original). MCL 554.139 provides, in relevant part:
(1) In every lease or license of residential premises, the lessor or licensor
covenants:
(a) That the premises and all common areas are fit for the use intended by
the parties.
* * *
(3) The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed . . . .
For common areas, “the lessor effectively has a contractual duty to keep the [area] ‘fit for the use
intended by the parties.’” Allison, 481 Mich at 429, quoting MCL 554.139(1)(a).
Our Supreme Court in Allison made it clear that an accumulation of snow and ice could
implicate a landlord’s duty to keep the premises and all common areas fit for the use intended.
Allison, 481 Mich at 438.1 In Allison, at issue was whether “one to two inches of accumulated
1
Allison also clarified that the “open and obvious” danger doctrine does not obviate a landlord’s
statutory duty under MCL 554.139. Allison, 481 Mich at 425.
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snow” in an apartment complex parking lot made the parking lot unfit for its intended use. Id. at
423. While the majority of justices agreed that the presence of snow and ice could make a
parking lot unfit for its intended use, the Supreme Court held that the facts in Allison did not
establish that tenants were unable to use the parking lot for its intended purpose:
A parking lot is constructed for the primary purpose of storing vehicles on
the lot. “Fit” is defined as “adapted or suited; appropriate[.]” Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (1997). Therefore, a lessor has a duty to keep a
parking lot adapted or suited for the parking of vehicles. A parking lot is generally
considered suitable for the parking of vehicles as long as the tenants are able to
park their vehicles in the lot and have reasonable access to their vehicles. A
lessor’s obligation under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard to the accumulation of
snow and ice concomitantly would commonly be to ensure that the entrance to,
and the exit from, the lot is clear, that vehicles can access parking spaces, and that
tenants have reasonable access to their parked vehicles. Fulfilling this obligation
would allow the lot to be used as the parties intended it to be used.
In this case, in construing the meaning of these terms in the contract,
neither of the parties has indicated that the intended use of the parking lot was
anything other than basic parking and reasonable access to such parking.
Plaintiff's allegation of unfitness was supported only by two facts: that the lot was
covered with one to two inches of snow and that plaintiff fell. Under the facts
presented in this record, we believe that there could not be reasonable differences
of opinion regarding the fact that tenants were able to enter and exit the parking
lot, to park their vehicles therein, and to access those vehicles. Accordingly,
plaintiff has not established that tenants were unable to use the parking lot for its
intended purpose, and his claim fails as a matter of law.
While a lessor may have some duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) with regard
to the accumulation of snow and ice in a parking lot, it would be triggered only
under much more exigent circumstances than those obtaining in this case. The
statute does not require a lessor to maintain a lot in an ideal condition or in the
most accessible condition possible, but merely requires the lessor to maintain it in
a condition that renders it fit for use as a parking lot. Mere inconvenience of
access, or the need to remove snow and ice from parked cars, will not defeat the
characterization of a lot as being fit for its intended purposes. [Id. at 429-430.]
While the Allison Court specifically referenced parking lots, the principles set forth apply
to all common areas, including stairways. The primary purpose or intended use of a stairway is
to provide pedestrian access to different levels of a building or structure. As with a parking lot,
MCL 554.139(1)(a) does not require perfect maintenance of a stairway. The stairway need not
be in an ideal condition, nor in the most accessible condition possible, but, rather, must provide
tenants “reasonable access” to different building levels. See Allison, 481 Mich at 430. We must
ascertain whether there could be reasonable differences of opinion regarding whether the
stairway was fit for its intended use of providing tenants with reasonable access under the
circumstances presented at the time of plaintiff’s fall.
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Plaintiff testified that she lived on the second floor of defendant’s apartment building. In
order to access her mailbox on the first floor, plaintiff used the stairway in question, which
consisted of approximately 12 open steps located outside the building but covered by a roof.
Plaintiff testified that the day before the fall, she left her apartment to check her mail and noted
the presence of snow on all the stairs of the stairway. Although she was able to use the stairway
without incident, plaintiff called defendant and complained to “Lori” about the presence of snow
and ice on the stairway.2 She was told that “Scott” would take care of it when he had the time.
Plaintiff testified that on the day of the fall, before she had left her apartment, she again
called and notified defendant about the presence of snow and ice on the stairway. Plaintiff
produced weather data indicating that preceding her fall, temperatures were at or below freezing,
and the area experienced episodes of light freezing rain and at one point “ice pellets.” At
approximately 1:00 p.m. on December 1, 2006, plaintiff left her apartment to check her mail.
She noticed “lots of snow,” that was “fresh,” and that there was “more than a couple of inches”
on the second floor as she walked toward the stairway. Plaintiff descended the stairway and
checked her mailbox. Plaintiff’s testimony was conflicting on the issue whether she noticed
snow or ice on the stairway before her fall. On her way back up the stairway, plaintiff used the
right side of the stairway so that she could use the handrail. As she reached the second step,
plaintiff slipped and fell on ice, fracturing her left hip. She testified that she did not see the ice
before her fall because it was black ice and the stairway was too dark. As she fell, however,
plaintiff noticed that the gutters overhead were overflowing with water and icicles had formed.
Plaintiff testified that there was no salt on the stairway at the time of her fall.
Defendant concedes that for purposes of this appeal, plaintiff’s testimony must be
accepted as true and the evidence presented must be viewed in the light most favorable to
plaintiff. We agree with the trial court that plaintiff has produced enough evidence to create a
material question of fact whether the stairway was fit for its intended use at the time of plaintiff’s
fall. As stated earlier, the primary purpose of a stairway is to provide pedestrians reasonable
access to different levels of a building or structure. Reasonable minds could conclude that the
presence of black ice on a darkly lit, unsalted stairway—possibly caused or aggravated by
overflowing ice water from overhead gutters in the presence of freezing rain—posed a hidden
danger that denied tenants reasonable access to different levels of the apartment building and
rendered the stairway unfit for its intended use.
This case is factually distinguishable from Allison because black ice on a stairway
presents more than the “[m]ere inconvenience” posed by “one to two inches of snow” in a
parking lot. See Allison, 481 Mich at 423, 430. Furthermore, as the Court stated in Allison, the
primary use of a parking lot is to park cars. Id. at 429. Although the Court recognized that
tenants must have reasonable access to their vehicles in a parking lot, i.e., they must be able to
walk to the vehicles, id., tenants do not use a parking lot for its intended use by merely walking
2
While it appears plaintiff contradicted herself at times throughout her deposition, neither party
produced the entirety of plaintiff’s deposition; therefore, the facts cited are gleaned from the
available testimony presented to this Court.
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in the lot. Walking in a parking lot is secondary to the parking lot’s primary use. In contrast, a
tenant uses a stairway for its intended use solely by walking up and down it. Thus, the primary
purpose of a stairway is for walking. Indeed, the primary purposes and, therefore, intended uses
of a parking lot and a stairway are two different things.
Therefore, under all the circumstances presented here, the snow- and ice-covered
stairway may not have been fit for its intended use at the time of plaintiff’s fall. We agree with
the trial court that this issue presents a material question of fact for the jury.
Affirmed.
MURPHY, P.J., concurred.
/s/ Jane M. Beckering
/s/ William B. Murphy
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