PEOPLE OF MI V CALVIN CORNELL WEBBS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 9, 2004
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 246372
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 02-008977-FC
CALVIN CORNELL WEBBS,
Defendant-Appellee.
Official Reported Version
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
FITZGERALD, J.
Plaintiff appeals as of right the order dismissing the charge against defendant on the basis
of improper venue. We affirm.
Defendant was charged in Grand Traverse County with one count of larceny of $1,000 or
more, but less than $20,000, by false pretenses, MCL 750.218(4)(a).1 According to the felony
complaint, in February 2000 defendant, falsely identifying himself as James Hardy, applied for
and received a loan in the amount of $5,200 from Beneficial Consumer Finance (Household
Bank) in Wayne County. James Hardy is a resident of Grand Traverse County. The complaint
identified Grand Traverse County as the location where the offense occurred.
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that venue was improper in Grand
Traverse County because all the acts in perpetration of the offense occurred in Wayne County.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, finding no evidence that any act done in
perpetration of the offense occurred in Grand Traverse County. The trial court reasoned that
defendant applied for the loan and received the money in Wayne County and that the only
possible connection of the offense to Grand Traverse County was the possibility that defendant
1
"The crime of larceny by false pretenses requires (1) a false representation as to an existing
fact, (2) knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of the representation, (3) use of the false
representation with an intent to deceive, and (4) detrimental reliance by the victim on the false
representation." People v Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113, 119; 418 NW2d 695 (1987).
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received the information to carry out the offense from an application that James Hardy submitted
to a lender in Grand Traverse County. However, it is undisputed that no evidence was presented
to establish the means by which defendant received James Hardy's personal identity information
and the prosecutor conceded that he did not "have proof of the Defendant committing some act
that has some direct nexus to Grand Traverse County."
"A trial court's determination regarding the existence of venue in a criminal prosecution
is reviewed de novo." People v Fisher, 220 Mich App 133, 145; 559 NW2d 318 (1996). Venue
is a part of every criminal prosecution and must be proved by the prosecutor beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. "Due process requires that the trial of criminal prosecutions should be by a jury of the
county or city where the offense was committed, except as otherwise provided by the
Legislature." Id.
"Venue rules traditionally have served to ensure that proceedings are held in the most
convenient forum." Gross v Gen Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147, 155; 528 NW2d 707 (1995).
Convenience is evaluated "primarily in terms of the interests of the parties and any relevant
witnesses. However, the primary goal is to minimize the costs of litigation not only by reducing
the burdens on the parties, but also by considering the strains on the system as a whole." Id. The
determination of venue "should only concern the selection of a fair and convenient location
where the merits of a dispute can be adjudicated." Id. at 156.
Whenever a felony consists or is the culmination of two or more acts done in the
perpetration thereof, the felony may be prosecuted in any county in which any one of the acts
was committed. MCL 762.8. Plaintiff argues that under MCL 762.8, venue is proper in Grand
Traverse County because this statute permits venue in the county where there are "effects" of the
acts committed in perpetration of the felony. Plaintiff contends that James Hardy suffered the
effects of having his personal identity information stolen in Grand Traverse County.
"Where . . . venue is established by statute, this Court's primary objective is to effectuate
legislative intent without harming the plain wording of the act." Keuhn v Michigan State Police,
225 Mich App 152, 153; 570 NW2d 151 (1997). The plain language of MCL 762.8 provides
that venue is proper "in any county in which any one of said acts [done in perpetration of a
felony] was committed." The Legislature did not draft MCL 762.8 to provide for venue in the
county where the "effects" of the acts done in perpetration of a felony were felt. Cf. MCL
762.2(1) ("A person may be prosecuted for a criminal offense he or she commits while he or she
is physically located within this state or without this state if . . . (e) [t]he criminal offense
produces substantial and detrimental effects within this state [emphasis added]"). If the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, this Court must assume that the Legislature intended its
plain meaning and enforce the statute as written. Because the plain language of MCL 762.8
requires an act to be done in the perpetration of the felony without regard to where the effects of
the crime are felt, and because there was no evidence that any act in perpetration of the crime
was done in Grand Traverse County, the trial court properly granted defendant's motion to
dismiss on the basis of improper venue.
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Fisher and People v Flaherty, 165 Mich App 113, 119; 418 NW2d 695 (1987), on which
the prosecution relies, are factually distinguishable. In those cases, the Courts interpreted MCL
762.8 broadly, ruling that venue was proper in a county where the "effects" of the defendant's
essential acts in furtherance of the offense were felt or suffered. In Fisher, the defendant was
charged in Wayne County with inciting perjury and attempted obstruction of justice. The
defendant had previously been convicted of murdering his wife. Pending an appeal of his
murder conviction, the defendant was imprisoned at Jackson Prison. According to the felony
complaint, the defendant, while in Jackson Prison, "knowingly attempted to persuade, incite, and
procure [another inmate] to swear to a false affidavit for use by defendant's appellate attorney in
legal pleadings that would either further defendant's appeal of his murder conviction or be used
to help him obtain a new trial." Fisher, supra at 136. This Court noted that the defendant's acts
"were intended to affect proceedings pending in [Wayne County]" and that "the obstruction
charge required proof that defendant intended to hinder the due course of justice in the case
pending in Wayne County." Id. at 152. This Court concluded, "An act that has effects elsewhere
that are essential to the offense is, in effect, committed in the place where the act has its effects."
Id.
In Flaherty, the defendant was charged with the offense of larceny by false pretenses.
The defendant's insurance agency was located in Macomb County, and he was tried in St. Clair
County. The defendant had allegedly defrauded a general insurance agency, having accepted
money from it for an insurance policy that was never issued. Flaherty, supra at 118-119. This
Court noted that evidence was presented that the larceny was accomplished through mail and
telephone communications that moved across county boundaries, and that some of these acts had
their effects in St. Clair County, including the general agency's authorization of an invoice and
placing of payment to the defendant in the mail. This Court stated, "The effective false
representation occurred in St. Clair County." Id. at 119.
The reasoning in Fisher and Flaherty does not comport with the plain language of MCL
762.8. Nonetheless, those cases are factually distinguishable. In Fisher, the obstruction charge
required proof that defendant intended to hinder the due course of justice in the case pending in
Wayne County, and the defendant's act of inciting perjury was intended to have an effect on the
proceedings in Wayne County. In Flaherty, the larceny offense was accomplished through mail
and telephone communications that moved across county boundaries. Although the defendant
was physically present in Macomb County, the false representation occurred in St. Clair County.
In both cases, the defendants' acts had effects elsewhere that were essential to the offenses
charged. In contrast, defendant's use of Hardy's personal identity information is not an act that
had effects essential to the offense of larceny by false pretenses.2 Even accepting as true
plaintiff's allegation that James Hardy suffered tangential effects in Grand Traverse County as a
2
Importantly, this case does not involve the offense of obtaining another person's identity
information with intent to unlawfully use the information. MCL 750.285. That statute did not
become effective until April 1, 2001.
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result of defendant's use of Hardy's personal identity information,3 those alleged effects are not
essential to the charged offense.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
3
There is no actual evidence that any particular effects of defendant's conduct were felt by Hardy
in Grand Traverse County.
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