PEOPLE OF MI V MARCUS ANTHONY ECCLES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
January 20, 2004
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 242357
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-178323-FH
MARCUS ANTHONY ECCLES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
March 26, 2004
Before: Schuette, P.J., and Murphy and Bandstra, JJ.
BANDSTRA, J.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession with intent to deliver more
than 50 but less than 225 grams of a controlled substance, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), for which he
was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, MCL 333.7413(1). Defendant appeals as of right.
We affirm.
This case arises from a traffic stop that resulted in the discovery of more than 134 grams
of cocaine hidden beneath the passenger seat of a vehicle being driven by defendant. Defendant,
who is African-American, was arrested and charged with possessing the cocaine with the intent
to deliver, in violation of MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). On appeal, defendant argues that he was
denied his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury at the trial because only one AfricanAmerican juror was seated on the jury panel. Defendant asserts that this denial was the result of
the trial court having improperly excused several jurors under MCR 2.511(D)(11), and the
prosecutor having excused a number of African-Americans by peremptory challenge. Defendant
contends that "the combined effect" of these actions "constituted an intentional and systematic
exclusion of minority jurors from the jury," which denied him the right to an impartial jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. We disagree.
During jury selection the prosecutor successfully challenged the seating of four members
of the jury array under MCR 2.511(D)(11), which provides that it is grounds for a challenge for
cause that a person "is or has been a party adverse to the challenging party or attorney in a civil
action, or has complained of or has been accused by that party in a criminal prosecution." The
basis for the prosecutor's challenges under this rule was that each of the jurors challenged had
been the subject of misdemeanor criminal proceedings initiated by the Oakland County
Prosecutor's Office. On appeal, defendant first argues that the trial court erred in granting these
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challenges because a county prosecutor is not a "party in a criminal prosecution" within the
meaning of MCR 2.511(D)(11). We disagree.
Initially, we note that defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting to dismissal of
the challenged jurors under MCR 2.511(D)(11).1 Generally, we review unpreserved issues for
plain error affecting the defendant's substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763;
597 NW2d 130 (1999). However, to the extent our analysis involves interpretation of a court
rule, our review is de novo. People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 497; 668 NW2d 602 (2003).
When called on to construe a court rule, this Court applies the legal principles that govern
the construction and application of statutes. People v Holtzman, 234 Mich App 166, 175; 593
NW2d 617 (1999). Accordingly, the rule at issue here must be construed "in accordance with
'the ordinary and approved usage of the language'" employed, and '"in light of its purpose and the
object to be accomplished by its operation.'" Id., quoting People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442,
449; 564 NW2d 158 (1997).
The purpose of permitting a challenge for cause under the grounds listed in MCR
2.511(D) is explained in 3 Dean & Longhofer, Michigan Court Rules Practice, § 2511.5, p 172173:
The . . . grounds listed in MCR 2.511(D) on which a party may challenge
a juror for cause fall into two principal categories. The first is that the person is
not statutorily qualified to act as a juror. The second is that the juror is biased,
i.e., that the juror has preconceived opinions or prejudices, or such other interest
or limitations as would impair his or her capacity to render a fair and impartial
verdict.
Although, as a general matter, the determination whether to excuse a prospective juror for
cause is within the trial court's discretion, once a party shows that a prospective juror falls within
the parameters of one of the grounds enumerated in MCR 2.511(D), the trial court is without
discretion to retain that juror, who must be excused for cause. See People v Lamar, 153 Mich
App 127, 134-135; 395 NW2d 262 (1986) ("Such a showing is equivalent to bias or prejudice at
common law."). A challenge for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(11) falls within the latter of the
categories described by Dean & Longhofer. See Dean & Longhofer, supra at 173. Indeed, that a
prospective juror has been the subject of a criminal prosecution raises a question concerning that
person's "capacity to render a fair and impartial verdict" in a criminal matter. Id.
Defendant nonetheless argues that because the rule at issue here expressly includes, as a
person previously "adverse" to the prospective juror, both the "challenging party or attorney in a
civil action," but includes only the challenging "party" when addressing a criminal prosecution,
the rule does not contemplate a challenge by the prosecuting attorney in a criminal matter. We
1
Although, at the close of jury selection, defense counsel raised a general objection to the
composition of the jury, he did not argue that MCR 2.511(D)(11) had been improperly applied
by the trial court.
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disagree. Unlike cases initiated in the civil arena, where any number of individual attorneys may
be chosen to represent a particular party, it is the prosecuting attorney who represents the people
in each and every criminal prosecution. This "oneness" of party and attorney explains the
different language employed by the rule for criminal, as opposed to civil, actions and, when
viewed in conjunction with the purpose underlying a challenge for cause as discussed above,
militates against the argument advanced by defendant. Consequently, we find no error, plain or
otherwise, in the trial court's grant of the prosecutor's challenges for cause under MCR
2.511(D)(11).2 Carines, supra.
Defendant further argues that the trial court's "hard and fast policy" of granting the
prosecutor's challenges under MCR 2.511(D)(11), despite the potential jurors having indicated
their ability to be fair and impartial, resulted in a "systematic exclusion" of African-Americans
from the jury panel.3 In making this argument, defendant contends that because there is a higher
incidence of arrest among African-Americans than any other group in Oakland County, such
rigid application of the rule at issue makes it statistically more likely that African-Americans will
be excluded from the jury panel.4
2
See Lupro v State, 603 P2d 468, 479-480 (Alas, 1979) (rule of criminal procedure providing a
challenge for cause on the ground that "the person is or has been a party adverse to the
challenging party or attorney in a civil action, or has complained of or been accused by him in a
criminal prosecution," did not preclude the state prosecuting attorney from challenging three
potential jurors who had previously been charged with crimes; "the state was a party to the
criminal proceedings").
3
We recognize that the authorities on which defendant relied in assigning error to this result
concern the "systematic exclusion" of minorities from selection into the broader jury array, rather
than the panel itself. See, e.g., Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357; 99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579
(1979); see also People v Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 472-473; 552 NW2d 493
(1996). However, assuming without deciding that the law pertaining to selection of the jury
array is equally applicable to selection of the jury panel, for the reasons stated below we find no
basis to conclude that application of MCR 2.511(D)(11) resulted in such an exclusion here.
4
In support of this argument, defendant has presented this Court with documentation regarding
the incidence of arrest in Oakland County. However, these documents are not properly before
this Court as they were not presented to the trial court and are, therefore, not part of the record on
appeal. MCR 7.210(A)(1); see also People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519, 524 n 1; 616 NW2d
710 (2000) (a party may not enlarge the record on appeal). In any event, arrest statistics are
somewhat irrelevant; the challenges at issue here, consistent with MCR 2.511(D)(11), pertained
to prospective jurors who had been not only arrested but also charged, i.e., "accused by the
[state] in a criminal prosecution." Moreover, even assuming that a disproportionate number of
African-Americans are the subject of criminal prosecutions in Oakland County, we question
whether, given the purpose discussed above for excluding a prospective juror under MCR
2.511(D)(11), a prohibited "systematic exclusion" can be shown. See People v Smith, 463 Mich
199, 203-205; 615 NW2d 1 (2000) (determination whether a systematic exclusion of a distinctive
(continued…)
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The right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment of the federal constitution requires
that juries be drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. Duren v Missouri, 439 US 357;
99 S Ct 664; 58 L Ed 2d 579 (1979). For this reason, distinct groups represented in the
community may not be systematically excluded from the jury selection process. People v
Hubbard (After Remand), 217 Mich App 459, 472-473; 552 NW2d 493 (1996). Generally, this
Court reviews a claim of systematic exclusion de novo. People v Williams, 241 Mich App 519,
525; 616 NW2d 710 (2000). However, because the argument advanced here was not raised
before the trial court, it is again not preserved for our review. See People v Connor, 209 Mich
App 419, 422; 531 NW2d 734 (1995) (issues not raised before and decided by the trial court are
not preserved for appeal). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to relief only upon a showing of
plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra. Again, we find no such error here.
Initially, we note that it is not disputed that the prospective jurors at issue here had each
been the subject of misdemeanor criminal prosecutions, a fact that, as discussed above,
constitutes a proper ground for a prosecutorial challenge for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(11). A
proper ground for a challenge for cause having been shown, the trial court was without discretion
to retain these individuals regardless of whether they asserted an ability to be fair and impartial.
Lamar, supra. Thus, the trial court's excusing them in compliance with the rule, having not been
presented with the Sixth Amendment argument defendant now raises on appeal, was not plain
error.
Moreover, the record in this case is devoid of any evidence from which it can be
concluded that the prospective jurors excused under MCR 2.511(D)(11) were in fact AfricanAmerican. The record assuredly indicates only that three African-Americans were excused from
the panel by the prosecutor. The first was excused for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(4) after she
candidly expressed an inability to impartially decide the case "given the way African-American
men may be depicted." The second was excused for cause under MCR 2.511(D)(2) after
acknowledging a prior felony conviction.5 The third was peremptorily excused and the trial
court immediately inquired into the basis. The prosecutor explained that a son of that proposed
juror had previously been prosecuted and convicted by his office. Consequently, there being no
evidence from which to conclude that application of MCR 2.511(D)(11) resulted in the exclusion
of any African-Americans from the jury that decided his case, defendant has failed to establish
plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra.6
(…continued)
group has been shown depends, in part, on whether the representation of that group in the jury
pool is "fair and reasonable").
5
MCR 2.511(D)(2) and (4) respectively provide that it is grounds for a challenge for cause that a
person "has been convicted of a felony," or "shows a state of mind that will prevent the person
from rendering a just verdict."
6
For the reasons stated, this case does not present a good record on which to consider
defendant's Sixth Amendment argument regarding MCR 2.511(D)(11). That argument might
have merit in a different case.
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We similarly find no basis on the record before us to conclude that the prosecutor
improperly used his peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury panel.
See Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 84-88; 106 S Ct 1712; 90 L Ed 2d 69 (1986) (the use of a
peremptory challenge to strike a potential juror solely because of the potential juror's race
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). As noted above, the record
discloses only one sure instance of a prospective African-American juror being peremptorily
excused by the prosecutor. With respect to this challenge the trial court stated that, although no
objection to this challenge was raised by the defense:
I did summon the prosecutor at sidebar with defense counsel to find out
why [the prosecutor] challenged [the prospective juror]. The prosecutor indicated
to me that [the juror] had a son that was convicted in Oakland County and
prosecuted by the Oakland County Prosecutor's office. That is a nondiscriminatory reason, and it is one that the Court would honor.
This Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court's ruling regarding discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 184; 585 NW2d 357 (1998). In
doing so, we must give great deference to the trial court's findings because they turn in large part
on a determination of credibility. Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App 302,
319-320; 553 NW2d 377 (1996). Here, the prosecutor provided a race-neutral basis for excusing
the subject juror. See Purkett v Elem, 514 US 765, 767; 115 S Ct 1769; 131 L Ed 2d 834 (1995).
Moreover, the prosecutor failed to exercise all his peremptory challenges despite the fact that one
African-American juror remained on the panel. As noted by this Court in People v Williams, 174
Mich App 132, 137; 435 NW2d 469 (1989), "[t]hat the prosecutor did not try to remove all
blacks from the jury is strong evidence against a showing of discrimination." Accordingly,
giving deference to the trial court's ability to judge the credibility of the prosecutor's proffered
basis for peremptorily excusing the subject juror, and considering that the record discloses no
other use of peremptory challenges of African-American jurors, we do not conclude that the trial
court abused its discretion in rejecting defendant's claim of racial discrimination in the selection
of his jury.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in ruling that the police and the
prosecution used due diligence in attempting to locate and produce Chris Turner as a witness
and, accordingly, in denying defendant's request for an instruction that the jury should infer that
testimony from Turner, who was also arrested for possession of the cocaine found in the vehicle,
would have been adverse to the prosecution. We disagree.
A prosecutor who endorses a witness under MCL 767.40a(3) is obliged to exercise due
diligence to produce that witness at trial. People v Cummings, 171 Mich App 577, 583-585; 430
NW2d 790 (1988). A prosecutor who fails to produce an endorsed witness may show that the
witness could not be produced despite the exercise of due diligence. People v Canales, 243
Mich App 571, 577; 624 NW2d 439 (2000). If the trial court finds a lack of due diligence, the
jury should be instructed that it may infer that the missing witness's testimony would have been
unfavorable to the prosecution's case. CJI2d 5.12; see also People v Snider, 239 Mich App 393,
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422; 608 NW2d 502 (2000).7 We review a trial court's determination of due diligence and the
appropriateness of a "missing witness" instruction for an abuse of discretion. See People v Bean,
457 Mich 677, 684; 580 NW2d 390 (1998); Snider, supra.
In this case, the evidence demonstrated that substantial efforts were made to locate
Turner. The officer in charge, Sergeant Sean Hoydic, testified at the due diligence hearing that
he had at "numerous times" attempted to serve Turner with a subpoena to appear as a witness in
this case, but was unsuccessful. Hoydic explained that after retrieving the address listed on
Turner's arrest card, which was the home of Turner's mother, he traveled to that address where he
interviewed a number of subjects. These subjects, however, informed Hoydic that Turner had
not been seen by them in some time. Hoydic then checked Turner's jail records for an alternative
address, but found that the address listed there was again that of Turner's mother's home. A
check with the county jails in the surrounding area similarly proved to be fruitless. Hoydic also
spoke with the mother of Turner's child, who indicated that she too had not seen Turner "for
quite some time." However, one week before trial was scheduled to begin, Hoydic received a
telephone call from Turner, who informed Hoydic that he was in Shreveport, Louisiana. When
informed of the trial dates and times, Turner, who had called Hoydic from a pay telephone,
indicated that he "planned on being [t]here because he didn't want to get blamed for any of the
drugs that were in the car. . . . [H]e wanted to show up and tell his side of the story." Hoydic
testified that he attempted to obtain a telephone number and address for Turner in Louisiana, but
was told by Turner that "he either didn't know where he was staying or didn't know the address
of where he was staying," and had no phone number. When Turner failed to appear on the first
day of trial, Hoydic called Turner's mother, who informed Hoydic that Turner had not "yet"
arrived. Hoydic then called the Wayne, Oakland, Macomb, Washtenaw, and Monroe county
jails, as well as a number of area hospitals and morgues, to inquire whether any of those facilities
had had any contact with Turner. When those efforts proved fruitless, Hoydic called the police
department and jail in Shreveport, Louisiana, but was again unsuccessful in locating Turner.
On cross-examination, Hoydic acknowledged that he had not checked with the United
States Postal Service to inquire whether Turner had filed a change of address card, or had made
arrangements to have his mail forwarded to an address other than his mother's. Hoydic testified,
however, that during the three days before trial began he had personally conducted surveillance
of Turner's mother's house on a number of occasions, hoping to catch Turner coming in or going
out. Hoydic also "sat on" a party store near that house, which Turner was known to frequent.
Hoydic further testified that he was aware that Turner was an informant for a "drug agent in
Detroit," and that this agent was contacted as well, but indicated that he had not seen Turner.
Hoydic acknowledged, however, that he did not check to determine whether Turner was
registered as an informant with any federal agencies, nor did he check the federal prisons.
Hoydic did, however, check Turner's name on the Law Enforcement Information Network,
without any success.
7
Contrary to the argument advanced by the prosecution on appeal, such instruction remains a
viable option in cases where, as here, the prosecution fails to produce a witness endorsed and not
otherwise properly excused. See People v Perez, 469 Mich 415, 418-421; 670 NW2d 655
(2003).
-6-
In light of this testimony, which was not contested, we do not conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in determining that due diligence was shown and that, therefore, a missing
witness instruction was not warranted. Cummings, supra at 585 (due diligence is the attempt to
do everything reasonable, not everything possible, to obtain the presence of a witness); Snider,
supra.
We affirm.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Bill Schuette
/s/ William B. Murphy
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