CITY OF MONROE V HELEN FAITH JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITY OF MONROE,
FOR PUBLICATION
November 18, 2003
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 241486
Monroe Circuit Court
LC No. 01-013988-AV
HELEN FAITH JONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
January 30, 2004
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Murphy and Neff, JJ.
MURPHY, J.
Defendant received approximately 203 parking citations for violating a one-hour
limitation on parking in designated spaces on a street near her place of employment in downtown
Monroe. Judgment was entered against her in the amount of $6,995. Defendant argues that the
municipal parking ordinance that prohibits parking in violation of the posted time limit cannot be
enforced against her because she is a disabled driver entitled to the protection afforded by MCL
257.675(6). She appeals by delayed leave granted. We find that MCL 257.675(6) precludes
liability by defendant for the parking citations because she is a disabled person and was cited, not
for violating the Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., but for violating a local ordinance
not contemplated by MCL 257.675(6) as constituting an exception to the liability exemption for
disabled persons. Therefore, the judgment is reversed.
I. BASIC FACTS and CASE HISTORY
The offense dates for the citations involved in this case range from September 5, 2000, to
August 29, 2001. The citations resulted in numerous district court files, some of which have
been provided to us. The files that have been provided appear to be incomplete. However, the
parties agree that the pertinent facts are undisputed.
Defendant has been diagnosed with multiple sclerosis. At the time of the lower court
proceedings, she lived in Ohio, and her driver's license and license plate were from Ohio.
Defendant had a disability placard from Ohio in her vehicle. She was employed by the Salvation
Army in downtown Monroe. Parking on the street in the downtown area is limited to one hour.
Signs notified drivers of the parking time limit. According to the chairperson of the mayor's
downtown parking committee, the parking spaces on the street are intended for customer parking
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for service-oriented and retail businesses. Defendant normally parked on Front Street, in parking
spaces designated for the disabled, but subject to a one-hour time limit. Defendant testified that
the disabled parking spaces in the area that were not time-limited were not accessible to her
because they were too far from her place of employment. If she had to walk a block to get to
work, she would be too fatigued to work for the rest of the day. From September 2000 to August
2001, defendant was issued approximately 203 parking citations for violating the one-hour time
restriction.
The district court rejected defendant's argument that state law preempted plaintiff from
enforcing against the disabled the time limits on parking, and the court denied defendant's
motion to dismiss. For several months in 2001, the focus shifted to defendant's position that the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., required plaintiff to make
reasonable accommodations for her.1 Subsequently, after rejecting defendant's arguments
attacking the legality of the citations, the district court entered judgment against defendant but
reduced the fines for the second and subsequent offenses. The district court entered judgment
against defendant for $5,075.
Defendant appealed liability and plaintiff cross-appealed the amount of the judgment to
the circuit court. Defendant raised the same issues in the circuit court appeal as she does in the
appeal before us. The circuit court rejected defendant's argument that MCL 257.675(6) shielded
her from plaintiff 's local parking ordinance regarding time restrictions. The circuit court agreed
with plaintiff that the district court abused its discretion in reducing the fines for the second and
subsequent offenses and remanded for entry of an order imposing fines as provided in the
ordinance. Pursuant to the remand order, the district court entered judgment against defendant
for $6,995. This Court subsequently granted defendant's delayed application for leave to appeal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The issues raised by the parties solely concern matters of statutory construction that are
reviewed de novo by this Court. Orion Twp v Munro, 235 Mich App 572, 574; 599 NW2d 496
(1999).
1
An opinion by the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals confirms that defendant filed a
lawsuit in federal court against plaintiff, alleging that the city's refusal to modify its municipal
parking program constituted unlawful and intentional discrimination based on disability and
violated federal law. Jones v City of Monroe, 341 F3d 474, 475 (CA 6, 2003). She had sought a
preliminary injunction in the federal district court ordering the city to reserve a free parking
space for her adjacent to her office, or prohibiting the city from continuing to ticket her for
parking violations. Id. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary
injunction. Id.
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B. General Rules of Statutory Construction
Our Supreme Court, in Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63; 642 NW2d
663 (2002), recently emphasized the following rules concerning statutory construction:
An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule of statutory
construction, is that courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature. People v
Wager, 460 Mich 118, 123, n 7; 594 NW2d 487 (1999). To do so, we begin with
an examination of the language of the statute. Wickens v Oakwood Healthcare
System, 465 Mich 53, 60; 631 NW2d 686 (2001). If the statute's language is clear
and unambiguous, then we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning
and the statute is enforced as written. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 562; 621
NW2d 702 (2001). A necessary corollary of these principles is that a court may
read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of
the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial,
Inc v Shacks, Inc, 460 Mich 305, 311; 596 NW2d 591 (1999).
With these general principles in mind, we now tackle the language contained in MCL
257.675(6).
C. Discussion
This case turns on the interpretation of MCL 257.675(6), which is a provision contained
in the Vehicle Code, and which provides in full:
A disabled person with a certificate of identification, windshield placard,
special registration plates issued under section 803d, a special registration plate
issued under section 803f that has a tab for persons with disabilities attached, a
certificate of identification or windshield placard from another state, or special
registration plates from another state issued for persons with disabilities is entitled
to courtesy in the parking of a vehicle. The courtesy shall relieve the disabled
person or the person transporting the disabled person from liability for a
violation with respect to parking, other than in violation of this act. A local
authority may by ordinance prohibit parking on a street or highway to create a
fire lane or to provide for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning and
afternoon rush hours, and the privileges extending to veterans and physically
disabled persons under this subsection do not supersede that ordinance.
[Emphasis added.]
The language of § 675(6) clearly and unambiguously provides, in an all-encompassing
manner, that a disabled person shall be relieved of liability for a parking violation except as
provided in the statute. There is no dispute that defendant is a disabled person, that her vehicle
properly displayed the requisite identification showing her to be disabled, and that she was cited
for multiple parking violations. The question becomes whether the exceptions under § 675(6)
are applicable. One of those exceptions is where the disabled person violated "this act," or in
other words, where the disabled person violated the Vehicle Code. MCL 257.674 provides in
relevant part:
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(1) A vehicle shall not be parked, except if necessary to avoid conflict
with other traffic or in compliance with the law or the directions of a police
officer or traffic-control device, in any of the following places:
* * *
(w) In violation of an official sign restricting the period of time for or
manner of parking.
* * *
(4) A person who violates this section is responsible for a civil infraction.
Indeed, the record reflects that defendant possibly violated § 674(1)(w) on numerous
occasions. However, defendant was not cited for violating § 674; she was issued parking
citations for violating a local time-restriction parking ordinance. The citations that are contained
in the record do not indicate that they were issued pursuant to the Vehicle Code, nor does
plaintiff argue that the citations were issued pursuant to the Code. Therefore, the exception
under § 675(6), which permits the ticketing of a vehicle operated by a disabled person where the
disabled person is cited and found responsible for a violation of the Vehicle Code, is simply not
applicable here.2
The only other exceptions found in MCL 257.675(6), with respect to the liability
exemption for disabled persons, pertains to local ordinances prohibiting parking on a street to
create a fire lane or providing for the accommodation of heavy traffic during morning and
afternoon rush hours. Defendant's parking citations were not issued pursuant to such ordinances.
In light of our discussion above, we can only conclude that MCL 257.675(6) clearly and
unambiguously precludes plaintiff from citing defendant, a disabled person, for a time-restriction
parking violation under the local ordinance. If we were to allow defendant to be held liable
under the circumstances presented here, we would in fact be reading additional language into §
675(6) that is not present, and thus not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived
from the words of the statute itself. Roberts, supra at 63. Additionally, if we allowed liability
predicated on a time-restriction ordinance, despite the language contained in § 675(6) that does
not reference such an ordinance, we would be violating the maxim of expressio unius exclusio
alterius. In the context of examining a statute, the maxim means "that the express mention in a
statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things[,]" Bradley v Saranac
Community Schools Bd of Ed, 455 Mich 285, 298; 565 NW2d 650 (1997), or "that the express
mention of one thing is to the exclusion of all others," Kater v Brausen, 241 Mich App 606, 609;
617 NW2d 40 (2000).
2
Defendant argues that the city's one-hour parking ordinance does not comply with the "official
sign" requirement as contained in MCL 257.674(1)(w). Because defendant was not cited for
violation of § 674(1)(w), this issue is not properly before us.
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Moreover, if the local time-restriction ordinance is read to be applicable to disabled
persons, it would directly conflict with the clear and unambiguous language of § 675(6). A
municipality's power to adopt an ordinance regarding municipal concerns is "subject to the
constitution and law." Const 1963, art 7, § 22; Rental Prop Owners Ass'n of Kent Co v Grand
Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 256-257; 566 NW2d 514 (1997). A state law preempts a municipal
ordinance if the ordinance directly conflicts with the state statute. Rental Prop, supra at 257.
Plaintiff argues vigorously that it had the constitutional and statutory authority to adopt
local ordinances that restrict the time a vehicle is parked in any particular parking space, citing
Const 1963, art 7, § 22; MCL 257.605; MCL 257.606, the Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et
seq.; and an Attorney General opinion, OAG, 2000, No 7041, p 83 (February 18, 2000). We
agree that plaintiff has the authority to enact time-restriction parking ordinances; but that
authority is not absolute and unfettered and must give way to a specific statutory provision that
places a limit on that authority.
Const 1963, art 7, § 22, which provides a municipality the "power to adopt resolutions
and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns," places a limit on that power by providing that
the power is "subject to the constitution and law." The law limiting that power here is MCL
257.675(6).
MCL 257.605(1) provides that the Vehicle Code is to be applied "uniformly throughout
this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities in the state." There is no argument
presented that § 675(6) is not applied uniformly across the state. Moreover, § 605(1) provides
that "[a] local authority shall not adopt, enact, or enforce a local law that provides lesser
penalties or that is otherwise in conflict with this chapter . . . ." A conflict would be created if
the city's time-restriction parking ordinance was read to permit the ticketing of a disabled
person's vehicle.
MCL 257.606 provides that chapter VI of the Vehicle Code, which regards traffic laws,
including § 675, shall not be considered to prevent local authorities from regulating the standing
or parking of vehicles. This broad statute on the general issue of parking must bow to a specific
statute regarding disabled persons and parking, § 675(6), or else § 675(6) is rendered completely
nugatory. People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 282; 662 NW2d 12 (2003) (specific statute will not be
controlled or nullified by a general one regardless of priority of enactment absent clear intention
otherwise); Pittsfield Charter Twp v Washtenaw Co, 468 Mich 702, 714; 664 NW2d 193 (2003)
(every word of a statute should be given meaning and no word should be treated as surplusage or
rendered nugatory if at all possible).
With respect to home rule cities, our Supreme Court in Detroit v Walker, 445 Mich 682,
690; 520 NW2d 135 (1994), stated that "it is clear that home rule cities enjoy not only those
powers specifically granted, but they may also exercise all powers not expressly denied." MCL
257.675(6) constitutes an express denial of a municipality's power to hold liable a disabled
person for violating a local time-restriction parking ordinance.
Finally, plaintiff 's reliance on the Attorney General opinion is misplaced. The opinion
makes no reference to whether the analysis considers the applicability of a parking ordinance
under § 675(6). OAG, 1999-2000, No 7041, p 83 (February 18, 2000). The opinion states that §
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675(6) "specifically exempts disabled persons from liability for parking violations except for
those offenses which are a violation of the Code itself." Id. The opinion then simply concludes:
Section 674 of the Code lists several specific parking practices that are
prohibited by the Code. Among these prohibited practices is parking a vehicle
"[i]n violation of an official sign restricting the period of time for or manner of
parking." . . . Thus, parking in excess of the time permitted by a posted sign is a
violation of the Code, and is not within the "courtesy" extended to disabled
persons by section 675(6) of the Code. [OAG, No 7041, supra at 84 (alteration in
original).]
The problem that exists in the case at bar, as noted earlier, is that defendant was not cited
for violating § 674. Therefore, the Attorney General's opinion has no bearing on this case.3
It could be argued that the reference in § 675(6) to the Vehicle Code, and here
specifically § 674, simply means that a parking citation predicated on violation of a time
restriction does not exempt a disabled person from liability regardless of the mechanism through
which the municipality seeks enforcement, i.e., an ordinance or state statute. We find that such a
reading is contrary to the plain language of § 675(6). Moreover, under such a construction, it
would be illogical for the Legislature to have included a particular exception to § 675(6) for local
ordinances prohibiting parking on a street to create a fire lane. Section 674(1)(aa) prohibits a
vehicle from being parked "[i]n a place or in a manner that blocks access to a space clearly
designated as a fire lane." The fire-lane exception under § 675(6) would be unnecessary if we
interpreted § 675(6) in the manner argued by plaintiff.
III. CONCLUSION
We find that MCL 257.675(6) precludes liability by defendant because she is a disabled
person and was cited, not for violating the Vehicle Code, but for violating a local time-restriction
parking ordinance not contemplated in MCL 257.675(6) as constituting an exception to the
liability exemption for disabled persons. Therefore, defendant was entitled to dismissal, and we
reverse the judgment entered in plaintiff 's favor.
Reversed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Janet T. Neff
3
We also note that an opinion by the Attorney General is not precedentially binding. Indenbaum
v Michigan Bd of Medicine (After Remand), 213 Mich App 263, 274; 539 NW2d 574 (1995).
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