PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFREY ALAN WILLIAMS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
May 22, 2003
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 240751
Ottawa Circuit Court
LC No. 02-025572-AR
JEFFREY ALAN WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
June 20, 2003
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Jeffrey A. Williams appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order affirming
the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the charge of indecent exposure.1 We reverse.
I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
According to the parties' stipulated statement of facts relating to the motion to dismiss, in
January 2001, Williams' eight-year-old niece was taking a bath in a private residence in Holland.
While she was bathing, Williams entered the bathroom. The niece asked Williams to leave, but
he refused. Williams then drew a picture of her, including a depiction of her vagina and breasts.2
Williams originally pleaded guilty of accosting a child for immoral purposes,3 but the
district court refused to accept the plea. The prosecutor then filed an amended complaint
1
MCL 750.335a.
2
In his appellate brief, Williams indicates that this incident actually occurred in the fall of 2000,
and that his niece mistakenly reported that he had drawn her nude in the bathtub on two separate
occasions. Williams denies that the second bathtub incident occurred, but suggests that his niece
may have confused it with an occasion on which he asked her to lie naked on a couch so that he
could draw her. For purposes of this appeal, we will consider only the stipulated facts as
previously described.
3
MCL 750.145a.
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charging defendant with indecent exposure. The indecent exposure statute4 provides that "[a]ny
person who shall knowingly make any open or indecent exposure of his or her person or of the
person of another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ." Williams' counsel stipulated the
addition of the new charge, after which the original charge was dismissed.
Williams then moved to dismiss the indecent-exposure charge, arguing that the exposure
of his niece was not "open" because it occurred in their home rather than a public place. He also
argued that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied. The district court
held that the crime of indecent exposure need not be open to public view and that Williams' act
of causing the girl to expose herself to him long enough for him to draw her "anatomically
correct features" fell within the statute. The district court also concluded that the statute was not
unconstitutionally vague as applied, citing People v Vronko.5
Williams appealed this decision to the circuit court, arguing that all the cases interpreting
MCL 750.335a indicated that there must be an open exposure, and noting that in no case has a
person been found guilty of indecent exposure in his or her own home. However, the circuit
court affirmed the district court. The circuit court noted that
[p]ursuant to Vronko, the exposure need not necessarily have taken place in what
is commonly thought of as a public place. The exposure may occur in a private
place, such as the bathroom of a private residence, so long as it occurs under
circumstances in which another person might reasonably have been expected to
observe it.
Citing Justice Boyle's concurrence in In re Certified Question (Jewell Theatre Corp v Oakland
Co Prosecutor),6 the circuit court held that indecent exposure can occur in a private place as long
as (1) it occurs under circumstances in which another person might reasonably be expected to
observe it, and (2) the person might reasonably be expected to be offended by it.
The circuit court then concluded that the other person witnessing the exposure could be
Williams, reasoning that "there is simply no requirement in the language of MCL 750.335a that
when a person knowingly makes an open or indecent exposure of the person of another, that
exposure must be witnessed by someone other than the person causing the exposure." The
circuit court continued:
[W]hen someone causes an open or indecent exposure of the person of
another, it is more than just 'reasonably likely' that someone will observe it: it is a
fait accompli, because the person causing the exposure himself observes what he
has exposed, and the person who is offended is not some innocent bystander, but
4
MCL 750.335a.
5
People v Vronko, 228 Mich App 649; 579 NW2d 138 (1998).
6
In re Certified Question (Jewell Theatre Corp v Oakland Co Prosecutor), 420 Mich 51, 63; 359
NW2d 513 (1984).
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the very person whose private anatomy has been exposed to the eyes of the person
causing the exposure.
The circuit court concluded that "[b]y refusing to leave the bathroom where [the niece]
was bathing when she requested that he do so, defendant knowingly and intentionally made an
open or indecent exposure of the person of another, i.e., the person of [his niece], to another
person, i.e., to the defendant himself." With regard to defendant's argument that the indecentexposure statute is void for vagueness, the circuit court agreed with the district court that the
statute is not vague as applied to the conduct charged. Williams applied for leave to appeal to
this Court, which we granted.
II. The Indecent-Exposure Statute
A. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews de novo the interpretation and the application of statutes.7
B. Analysis
1. Open Exposure
MCL 750.335a provides, in relevant part: "Any person who shall knowingly make any
open or indecent exposure of his or her person or of the person of another shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor . . . ." Williams argues that MCL 750.335a is inapplicable because his conduct
was not "open" as defined by the courts of this state. On the basis of the stipulated facts, it is
clear that the only person to whom the niece was exposed was Williams himself, and that she
was not openly exposed to the public. Whether an "open exposure" is effected if only the
defendant witnesses the exposure is a question of first impression, requiring us to interpret the
language of MCL 750.335a.
In construing a statute, our purpose is to discern and give effect to the Legislature's
intent. The first step in this process is to review the language of the statute itself.9 If the
language is unambiguous, we presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it clearly
expressed, and judicial construction is neither required nor permitted.10 If judicial construction is
necessary, we must "discern the Legislature's intent by examining 'the object of the statute, the
harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable construction which best
8
7
People v Webb, 458 Mich 265, 274; 580 NW2d 884 (1998).
8
People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 329-330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999), citing Murphy v Michigan
Bell Tel Co, 447 Mich 93, 98; 523 NW2d 310 (1994).
9
People v Vasquez, 465 Mich 83, 87; 631 NW2d 711 (2001), citing In re MCI Telecom
Complaint, 460 Mich 396, 411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
10
People v Herron, 464 Mich 593, 611; 628 NW2d 528 (2001).
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accomplishes the statute's purpose.'"11 While words should generally be given their "common,
generally accepted meaning" when construing a statute with undefined terms, this should be
done in a manner "consistent with the legislative aim in enacting the statute."12
Neither the term "open" nor the word "exposure" is defined in the statute. However, this
Court had the opportunity to define the phrase "open exposure" in Vronko when determining
whether an exposure must be witnessed by another person to constitute a violation of MCL
750.335a. As this Court noted in Vronko, nothing in the language of the statute explicitly
required the existence of a witness. Accordingly, if this element existed, "it must be contained
within the words 'open or indecent exposure.'"13 Looking to the common-law definition for
guidance, this Court concluded that an indecent exposure need not be observed to constitute a
punishable offense, provided the exposure occurred in a public place.14
In support of this interpretation, the Vronko panel observed that Justice Boyle, concurring
in In re Certified Question, "defined 'open exposure' under the indecent exposure statute as being
'any conduct consisting of a display of any part of the human anatomy under circumstances
which create a substantial risk that someone might be offended.'"15 According to Justice Boyle,
"[t]his standard would require evaluation of the setting in which the exposure took
place in order to determine whether anyone might reasonably have been expected
to observe it and, if so, whether the person might reasonably have been expected
to have been offended by what was seen."[16]
This Court noted that although Justice Boyle's definition was not binding on the Court, it was
consistent with the common-law interpretation of the offense.17 This Court further stated that
nothing in the language of the statute suggested that the Legislature intended to modify the
common-law interpretation.18 For these reasons, this Court held that there was no requirement
that the defendant's exposure actually be witnessed by another person in order to constitute "open
11
People v Lino, 447 Mich 567, 618-619; 527 NW2d 434 (1994) (Riley, J.), quoting In re
Forfeiture of $5,264, 432 Mich 242, 248; 439 NW2d 246 (1989).
12
People v Spann, 250 Mich App 527, 530; 655 NW2d 251, lv pending, ___ Mich ___ (2002),
citing People v Morris, 450 Mich 316, 326, 537 NW2d 842 (1995), and People v Denio, 454
Mich 691, 699; 564 NW2d 13 (1997).
13
Vronko, supra at 655.
14
Id. at 655-656.
15
Id. at 656, quoting In re Certified Question, supra at 63.
16
Id. at 656-657, quoting In re Certified Question, supra at 63.
17
Id. at 657.
18
Id.
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or indecent exposure," "as long as the exposure occurred in a public place under circumstances in
which another person might reasonably have been expected to observe it."19
Of course, this case differs from Vronko in the sense that another person did, in fact,
witness the exposure. Nonetheless, we believe the reasoning in that case is instructive with
respect to the scope and application of the phrase "open exposure," and provides some insight
into the legislative purpose behind the statute itself. In Vronko, this Court cited approvingly, as
consistent with the common-law interpretation of the offense, Justice Boyle's test for "open
exposure" as "'whether anyone might reasonably have been expected to observe it and, if so,
whether the person might reasonably have been expected to have been offended by what was
seen.'"20
Implicit in this formulation, from a purely grammatical standpoint, is the notion that the
underlying concern of the statute is whether the viewer might have been offended upon viewing
the exposure. We can find no justification, either in the language of the statute or the cases
interpreting it, that the test for whether a punishable open exposure occurred is whether the
person being viewed might have been offended by his own exposure. In our view, the definition
of "open exposure" suggested by Justice Boyle and adopted in Vronko supports the conclusion
that the Legislature's aim was to punish exposures that would be offensive to viewers, actual or
potential, and not to the person exposed. Although the overwhelming majority of persons in our
society would be deeply offended by the conduct in this case, we simply cannot conclude that it
is punishable under MCL 750.335a. To do so would require us to endorse a tortured reading of
the statute and its interpreting cases that would abdicate our responsibility to examine "'the
object of the statute, the harm which it is designed to remedy, and apply a reasonable
construction which best accomplishes the statute's purpose.'"21 For this reason, we conclude that
the charge of indecent exposure should have been dismissed.
2. Indecent Exposure
Having concluded that Williams' conduct did not constitute open exposure under the
statute, we are left with the question whether it nonetheless might have qualified as indecent
exposure. We note that Williams did not make this argument to either the district or the circuit
court; however, because it presents a legal question for which the necessary facts are before us,
we may nonetheless address it.22
As Justice Boyle observed, the Legislature's use of the disjunctive "or" "suggests strongly
that open exposure and indecent exposure are distinctly different kinds of behavior and that the
Michigan Legislature understood each to define different conduct."23 Under this reasoning,
19
Id.
20
Id. at 656-657, quoting In re Certified Question, supra at 63.
21
Lino, supra at 618-619, quoting In re Forfeiture of $5,264, supra at 248.
22
People v Davis, 250 Mich App 357, 364; 649 NW2d 94 (2002).
23
In re Certified Question, supra at 63.
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"exposure that was not 'open,' because it did not take place under circumstances that created a
substantial risk that someone might be offended, could still be proscribed under the statute as
'indecent' if it violated the minimum standards of Miller v California . . . ."24
Because the Miller standards include "lewd exhibition of the genitals,"25 under Justice
Boyle's reasoning, it is conceivable that the factual scenario at issue could have constituted the
discrete crime of "indecent exposure." However, this possibility is foreclosed by the Vronko
Court's interpretation of the statute. As that panel noted, the phrase "indecent exposure," which
the statute does not define, is defined in Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977) as being
"an 'intentional exposure of part of one's body (as the genitals) in a place where such exposure is
likely to be an offense against the generally accepted standards of decency in a community.'"26
Accordingly, the Vronko panel held that an exposure need not "actually be witnessed by another
person in order to constitute 'open or indecent exposure,' as long as the exposure occurred in a
public place under circumstances in which another person might reasonably have been expected
to observe it."27 As discussed, we conclude that Williams' conduct did not occur under such
circumstances; the exposure was quite clearly not in a public place. Therefore, his conduct
cannot be considered "indecent exposure" under MCL 750.335a.
III. Williams' Motion to Dismiss
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's ruling regarding a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion.28
B. Analysis
Williams argues on appeal that, because the indecent-exposure statute did not apply to his
conduct, the circuit court erred in failing to dismiss the charge against him. Judge Robert Bork
once commented, disapprovingly, on the "heart's desire" school of jurisprudence.29 Were we to
be guided only by our hearts' desire, we might rule otherwise on this point. However, we
choose—as we must—to be guided by the plain language of the law as our Courts have
interpreted it. Because we simply cannot conclude that MCL 750.335a applies here, we hold that
24
Id. at 64, citing Miller v California, 413 US 15; 93 S Ct 2607; 37 L Ed 2d 419 (1973).
25
Id. at 63.
26
Vronko, supra at 654.
27
Id. at 657.
28
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 389; 633 NW2d 376 (2001).
29
See Robert H. Bork & Nathan Schleuter, Constitutional Persons: An Exchange on Abortion,
available at http://www.aei.org/news/newsID.15107/news_detail.asp, visited April 11, 2003.
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the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Williams' motion to dismiss.30 In light of our
conclusion, we need not reach Williams' contention that the statute is void for vagueness.
Reversed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
30
See People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
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