PEOPLE OF MI V TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
April 8, 2003
9:15 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 244435
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-185279-FC
TARAJEE SHAHEER MAYNOR,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
May 23, 2003
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Griffin and Owens, JJ.
OWENS, J.
Defendant Tarajee S. Maynor appeals by leave granted the circuit court's order granting
the prosecution's motion to reinstate the charges, consisting of two counts of first-degree felony
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), with the underlying felony being first-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(2). We affirm.
On June 28, 2002, defendant left her ten-month-old daughter and three-year-old son alone
in a hot car for approximately 3-1/2 hours. When defendant returned to the car, she found both
children dead in the back seat. The medical examiner determined that the cause of death was
hyperthermia, or heat exposure, from being left in the hot car. The prosecution sought to bind
defendant over on two counts of first-degree felony murder, with first-degree child abuse as the
underlying felony. The district court ruled that first-degree child abuse was a specific-intent
crime, and found that there was not probable cause to believe that defendant acted with the
requisite intent. The district court further concluded that there was only probable cause for
involuntary manslaughter. Accordingly, the district court bound defendant over on two counts of
involuntary manslaughter.
The prosecution moved in the circuit court for reinstatement of the felony-murder
charges. The circuit court granted the prosecutor's motion, holding that first-degree child abuse
is a general-intent crime. The circuit court also found that there was probable cause to believe
defendant had committed this offense, as well as second-degree murder. Thus, the court
reinstated the felony-murder charges.
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On appeal, defendant contends that the circuit court erred in ruling that first-degree child
abuse is a general-intent crime. Ordinarily, the decision of the district court on a motion to bind
over is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Stone, 463 Mich 558, 561; 621 NW2d 702
(2001). However, we review this issue de novo because it involves a question of statutory
interpretation. Id.
The first-degree child abuse statute, MCL 750.136b(2), provides as follows: "A person is
guilty of child abuse in the first degree if the person knowingly or intentionally causes serious
physical or serious mental harm to a child." Generally, a specific-intent crime requires a
criminal intent beyond the act done, whereas a general-intent crime requires only the intent to
perform the proscribed physical act. People v Whitney, 228 Mich App 230, 254; 578 NW2d 329
(1998).
In People v Gould, 225 Mich App 79, 86; 570 NW2d 140 (1997), we opined that firstdegree child abuse was a specific-intent crime. However, in denying leave, our Supreme Court
observed that our ruling "that first-degree child abuse is a specific-intent crime is dictum, in light
of the panel's conclusion that, even under that standard, the circuit court did not err in denying
the defendant's motion for directed verdict." People v Gould, 489 Mich 955 (1999).
Accordingly, the Gould construction of the statute governing first-degree child abuse is not
binding precedent. People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278, 286; 597 NW2d 1 (1999).
Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis in Gould was sound. In fact, we adopt the
following portion of the Gould analysis as our own:
The word "knowingly" is not defined in the statute. Unless defined in the
statute, every word of the statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary
meaning. MCL 8.3a; MSA 2.212(1); People v Gregg, 206 Mich App 208, 211;
520 NW2d 690 (1994). If a statute does not expressly define its terms, a court
may consult dictionary definitions. Id., pp 211-212.
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed) defines "knowingly" as: "With
knowledge; consciously; intelligently; willfully; intentionally" (emphasis
supplied). Given the dictionary definition of the word "knowingly" and applying
the plain and ordinary meaning of the word to the language of the statute, we
conclude that "knowingly" as contained in the statute means the same thing as the
word "intentionally."
According to the dictionary definition, the words
"knowingly" and "intentionally" are synonymous. [Gould, supra, 225 Mich App
84.]
We further note that, although Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed) does not define "knowingly," it
does define "knowing" as "[h]aving or showing awareness or understanding; well-informed . . .
deliberate; conscious." Similarly, Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2001) defines
"knowing" in pertinent part as "conscious," "intentional," and "deliberate."
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In support of its conclusion, the Gould panel also opined "that this Court has repeatedly
concluded that a crime that is required to be committed 'knowingly' is a specific intent crime."
Gould, supra at 85. We recently recognized that "'[w]ords typically found in specific intent
statutes include "knowingly," "willfully," "purposely," and "intentionally."'" People v Disimone,
251 Mich App 605, 611; 650 NW2d 436 (2002), quoting People v Davenport, 230 Mich App
577, 579-580; 583 NW2d 919 (1998).
Moreover, we note that second-degree child abuse occurs if a person "knowingly or
intentionally commits an act likely to cause serious physical or mental harm to a child regardless
of whether harm results." MCL 750.136b(3)(b). Comparing first-degree child abuse with
second-degree child abuse, it appears that our Legislature contemplated the situation where a
person intended an act, but perhaps not the consequences of the act. Thus, second-degree child
abuse is an example of a general-intent crime. Whitney, supra at 254. We must presume that our
Legislature's decision not to include the "commits an act" language in the first-degree child abuse
provision was intentional. People v Rahilly, 247 Mich App 108, 112; 635 NW2d 227 (2001),
quoting Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). Given the
dictionary definitions described above, as well as our Legislature's deliberate use of different
phrases when defining first- and second-degree child abuse, we conclude that first-degree child
abuse is a specific-intent crime. Therefore, the circuit court erred in ruling, as a matter of law,
that first-degree child abuse is a general-intent crime.
However, we need not reverse the circuit court's reinstatement of the original charges if
the circuit court correctly ruled that defendant could be charged with felony murder. Indeed, we
may affirm where the court reaches the right result, albeit for the wrong reason. People v Jory,
443 Mich 403, 425; 505 NW2d 228 (1993).
Generally, a magistrate must bind a defendant over for trial if, at the conclusion of the
preliminary examination, "there is probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed
and that defendant committed it." People v Carter, 250 Mich App 510, 521; 655 NW2d 236
(2002). MCL 766.13. "Probable cause exists when there is a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong to warrant a cautious person to believe that the
accused is guilty of the offense charged." Carter, supra at 521.
As noted above, defendant was charged with felony murder, MCL 750.316. We have
defined felony murder as follows:
(1) the killing of a human being; (2) with the intent to kill, to do great
bodily harm, or to create a high risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge
that death or great bodily harm was the probable result; (3) while committing,
attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies
specifically enumerated in MCL 750.316 . . . . [People v Hutner, 209 Mich App
280, 282-283; 530 NW2d 174 (1995).]
In other words, felony murder is essentially second-degree murder, elevated by one of the
felonies enumerated in MCL 750.316. See People v Magyar, 250 Mich App 408, 412; 648
-3-
NW2d 215 (2002).
750.316(1)(b).
First-degree child abuse is one of the felonies enumerated in MCL
The elements of second-degree murder are: "(1) a death, (2) caused by an act of the
defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse." People v Goecke, 457 Mich
442, 463-464; 579 NW2d 868 (1998). "Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to cause
great bodily harm, or the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood that
the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 464. Here,
there is no dispute that defendant caused the tragic death of her children. Goecke, supra at 463.
In addition, there was no evidence indicating a justification or excuse for the killing. Id. As
noted, malice includes "the intent to do an act in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood
that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm." Id. at 464.
Among the evidence introduced during the preliminary examination was defendant's admission
that she left her children unattended in a hot car for approximately 3-1/2 hours. Her act of
leaving the children unattended was intentional, rather than accidental.1 Accordingly, there was
sufficient evidence that defendant's conduct fell within the definition of malice. Id.
Consequently, we conclude that there was ample evidence to support a finding of probable cause
for second-degree murder.2 Carter, supra at 521.
Next, we must determine whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence during
the preliminary examination to support a finding of probable cause for first-degree child abuse.
Having already concluded that the crime requires specific intent, the primary question is whether
defendant specifically intended to seriously harm her children, MCL 750.136b(2).
"Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from the evidence are sufficient to
support a bindover." People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 451; 569 NW2d 641 (1997).
Moreover, if "there is credible evidence both to support and to negate the existence of an element
of the crime, a factual question exists that should be left to the jury." Id.
Here, although defendant stated that she did not intend for the children to die, her selfserving statement obviously does not end the inquiry. Again, the evidence indicated that
defendant left her children in a hot car for approximately 3-1/2 hours. In fact, regardless of the
weather, leaving the children unattended in a car for such a long time raises considerable doubt
with respect to whether she was merely negligent. Furthermore, defendant did not check on her
children, although the evidence indicated that she left the salon to get herself something to eat
and drink. In addition, although defendant's statement suggested that she might not have known
that the children were at risk, it is worth noting that the evidence also suggested that she rolled
down at least one of the car windows about an inch and a half. These acts belie her claim of
1
Second-degree murder is a general-intent crime. Goecke, supra at 464.
2
Thus, for the same reasons, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in finding
that the evidence only supported involuntary manslaughter. Stone, supra at 561. At the very
least, there was probable cause to support charges of second-degree murder.
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ignorance of the risks.3 Accordingly, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a
jury could infer the requisite intent for first-degree child abuse.4 Carter, supra at 521.
Consequently, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in reinstating the felony-murder
charges. Jory, supra at 425.
Affirmed.
Griffin, J., concurred.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
3
It is questionable whether her claim of ignorance is even sufficient to defeat the rather obvious
fact that hot weather makes cars very hot. The prosecution compellingly argued below that
people know not to leave milk in their cars on hot days. Indeed, every new driver quickly learns
that, on hot days, the temperatures inside a car will exceed the outside temperature in a relatively
short period. In other words, it does not require a scientific background to know that cars get
very hot on summer days. Nor is extensive medical knowledge required to realize that such
temperatures are harmful to people, especially children. Thus, we believe a jury should appraise
the veracity of defendant's statements regarding her knowledge of the risks, or lack thereof.
4
At the very least, the issue of defendant's intent should be left to a jury. Terry, supra at 451.
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