PATRICK J MCDONALD V GRAND TRAVERSE CO ELECTION COMM
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK J. MCDONALD,
FOR PUBLICATION
March 18, 2003
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
GRAND TRAVERSE COUNTY ELECTION
COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE JOHN D.
FORESMAN, WILLIAM ROKOS, LINDA
COBURN, STATE OF MICHIGAN, and
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 237984
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 00-020835-AW
Updated Copy
May 9, 2003
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Cavanagh and Bandstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff Patrick J. McDonald appeals as of right the trial court's order granting summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) to defendants Grand Traverse County Election
Commission, the Honorable John D. Foresman, William Rokos, Linda Coburn, the state of
Michigan, and the Secretary of State, and denying McDonald's motion for summary disposition.
We affirm.
I. Basic Facts And Procedural History
In August of 2000, McDonald filed a complaint against defendants. The complaint
challenged the constitutionality of MCL 168.737, which provides for straight-ticket voting on
voting ballots in the state of Michigan.1 The complaint alleged that McDonald was an
1
In McDonald's first amended complaint, he alleged that MCL 168.684, MCL 168.685, MCL
168.696, MCL 168.703, MCL 168.706, and MCL 168.737, "and perhaps other statutes, rules,
regulations, and instructions provide for straight party ticket voting on the ballots of the State of
Michigan." On appeal, McDonald challenges the constitutionality of the straight-ticket ballot
option, but does not cite the specific statute or statutes that he alleges are unconstitutional.
-1-
independent candidate for Green Lake Township Trustee in Grand Traverse County. McDonald
alleged that the straight-ticket ballot option gave candidates affiliated with a political party an
advantage over candidates who were not affiliated with a political party; that the straight-ticket
ballot option violated his constitutional right to equal protection under the Michigan and United
States Constitutions; that the straight-ticket ballot option unduly burdened his federal
constitutional right of free association; and that the straight-ticket ballot option violated the
Michigan Constitution's guarantee of pure elections.
Accordingly, McDonald sought a declaratory judgment that Michigan's straight-ticket
ballot option is unconstitutional, an injunction preventing the Grand Traverse County Board of
Elections from putting the straight-ticket ballot option on the ballots for Green Lake Township,
and a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of State to promulgate new rules to eliminate
the straight-ticket ballot option on any ballot on which there are candidates who are not affiliated
with a political party and directing the Grand Traverse County Election Commission not to
include the straight-ticket ballot option on the ballots for Green Lake Township. Shortly
thereafter, McDonald sought a preliminary injunction that the trial court denied.
In June of 2001, the trial court ordered the parties to submit a joint stipulation of facts
(JSOF) and to file cross-motions for summary disposition. The parties' JSOF asserted that
McDonald was an independent candidate for trustee in Green Lake Township on November 7,
2000. According to the JSOF, there were two Green Lake Township trustee positions to be filled
for which there were two Republican candidates, no Democratic candidates, and one independent
candidate, McDonald. The two Republican candidates were elected as Green Lake Township
trustees. One Republican candidate received 1,185 votes and the other received 1,175 votes.
McDonald received 966 votes and therefore received 209 less votes than the second Republican
who was elected.
According to the JSOF, 487 people voted the Republican straight-party ticket and 255
voted the Democratic straight-party ticket in the Green Lake Township elections on November 7,
2000. The JSOF further asserted that 106 voters voted the "No Party Affiliation" option in the
straight-party-ticket section of the ballot. The JSOF also stated that candidates affiliated with a
political party could receive votes either by a straight-party-ticket vote or by an individual vote,
while candidates who were not affiliated with a political party listed on the ballot could not
receive votes by a straight-party-ticket vote. Individuals who voted straight-party could split
their ticket, however, and vote for candidates of another political party or independent candidates
for any individual office. The JSOF further asserted that straight-party-ticket voting takes less
time than voting for each office separately.
In accordance with the trial court's order, McDonald moved for summary disposition
pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(9) and (10), and defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). After a hearing, the trial court denied McDonald's motion for
summary disposition and granted defendants' motion for summary disposition based on MCR
2.116(C)(10). In granting defendants' motion, the trial court observed that there is no
-2-
fundamental right to run for office or to be elected to office. The trial court further asserted that
statutes that are nondiscriminatory and content-neutral are reviewed under a lenient standard,
whereby the state only has to show some rational justification for the statute. The trial court
noted that the state articulated several justifications for straight-ticket voting, including
improving the speed and efficiency of elections, reducing the number of precinct personnel
necessary, increasing voter turnout, and reducing voter apathy resulting from waiting in long
lines to vote. Finally, the trial court concluded that the straight-ticket ballot option is
constitutional. Although the trial court did not specifically address each of McDonald's
constitutional arguments, McDonald asked the trial court if its ruling applied to all the grounds
raised in the briefs, and the trial court responded that it did. McDonald now appeals.
II. Summary Disposition; The Constitutionality Of The Statute
A. Standard Of Review
This Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition.2 This
Court must review the record in the same manner as the trial court to determine whether the
movant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.3 This Court reviews constitutional questions
de novo on appeal.4 Statutes are presumed to be constitutional, and "[e]very reasonable
presumption must be made in favor of constitutionality."5 The party asserting the constitutional
challenge has the burden of proof.6
B. The History Of The Straight-Ticket Ballot Option
Michigan has traditionally permitted a straight-ticket ballot option, also known as a
straight-party option, which permits voters to pull a single lever, punch a single chad, or make a
single mark in the partisan section of a ballot to vote for all candidates of a particular party.7
However, in 2001, the Michigan Legislature enacted Public Act 269, which eliminated the
straight-ticket ballot option. The Michigan Constitution gives the people "the power to approve
or reject laws enacted by the legislature, called the referendum."8 Pursuant to this referendum
power, the Democratic Party circulated petitions and obtained enough signatures to invoke a
referendum on 2001 PA 269. As a result of the referendum, Proposal 1 appeared on the general
2
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998).
3
Morales v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 458 Mich 288, 294; 582 NW2d 776 (1998).
4
Tolksdorf v Griffith, 464 Mich 1, 5; 626 NW2d 163 (2001).
5
Mahaffey v Attorney Gen, 222 Mich App 325, 344; 564 NW2d 104 (1997).
6
Stevenson v Reese, 239 Mich App 513, 517; 609 NW2d 195 (2000).
7
See MCL 168.737.
8
Const 1963, art 2, § 9.
-3-
election ballot on November 5, 2002, and the people of the State of Michigan were permitted to
vote on whether 2001 PA 269, which would, among other things, eliminate the straight-ticket
ballot option, should go into effect. 1,775,043 voters voted not to approve 2001 PA 269, and
1,199,236 voters voted to approve 2001 PA 269. Because 2001 PA 269 was not approved by a
majority of the voters on November 5, 2002, it did not go into effect. The law in effect before
2001 PA 269 was enacted, MCL 168.737, is thus still in effect today. Therefore, the straightticket ballot option is the law in Michigan. The question that McDonald poses is whether that
law is constitutional.
C. Freedom Of Association
1. Overview
McDonald asserts that MCL 168.737 violates his First Amendment rights of freedom of
association. Although freedom of association is not explicitly enumerated in the First
Amendment, the United States Supreme Court has found it to be a right included within the
"penumbra" of the First Amendment.9 First Amendment guarantees are applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 A corollary of the right to
associate is the right not to associate.11 The freedom of association is not absolute, and the
nature and degree of constitutional protection granted to the freedom of association may vary,
depending on the extent to which constitutionally protected liberty is at stake in a given case.12
McDonald contends that because the straight-ticket ballot option implicates his
fundamental right of freedom of association, the state must have a compelling interest to justify
the constitutional intrusion. Generally, state action that infringes on First Amendment rights will
only be tolerated when such infringement is unavoidably required to further a compelling,
paramount, or vital state interest.13 However, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
that "to subject every voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest . . . would tie the hands of States seeking
to assure that elections are operated equitably and efficiently."14 Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court has held that a less stringent level of review applies to state election laws that
9
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479, 482-484; 85 S Ct 1678; 14 L Ed 2d 510 (1965).
10
Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich 63, 111; 305 NW2d 201 (1981).
11
California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 US 567, 574; 120 S Ct 2402; 147 L Ed 2d 502
(2000).
12
Boy Scouts of America v Dale, 530 US 640, 678; 120 S Ct 2446; 147 L Ed 2d 554 (2000).
13
Falk, supra, 411 Mich at 111-112.
14
Burdick v Takushi, 504 US 428, 433; 112 S Ct 2059; 119 L Ed 2d 245 (1992).
-4-
exact a "lesser burden" on an individual's right to freedom of association.15 The United States
Supreme Court explained the less stringent level of review, as well as the analytical process that
a court should utilize in considering a First Amendment challenge to a state election law, in
Timmons:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational rights, we weigh the "'character and magnitude'" of the
burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State
contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns
make the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs'
rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser
burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's "'important
regulatory interests'" will usually be enough to justify "'reasonable,
nondiscriminatory restrictions.'"[16]
2. McDonald's Assertions
Under the framework first established by the United States Supreme Court in Anderson,
the initial step in assessing whether the straight-ticket ballot option unconstitutionally burdens
McDonald's fundamental right to association is to assess the character and magnitude of the
injury to his First Amendment rights. McDonald asserts that the straight-ticket ballot option
impermissibly burdens his right to associate because candidates affiliated with a political party
obtain benefits from the straight-ticket ballot option that he, as an independent candidate, does
not. According to McDonald, his freedom of association is implicated because the freedom of
association includes the freedom not to associate, and he could only obtain the benefits of the
straight-ticket ballot option if he associated with and became the nominee of one of the political
parties listed on the ballot in the straight-party-ticket-voting section.
McDonald specifically contends that, as an independent candidate, he did not receive five
benefits of the straight-ticket ballot option. First, McDonald argues that the straight-ticket ballot
option was unavailable for independent candidates and that, as an independent candidate, he was
deprived of straight-ticket votes from voters who would have voted straight-ticket independent if
they had the opportunity to so vote. Second, McDonald argues that party candidates could
receive votes in two locations on the ballot (at the top of the ballot via the straight-ticket ballot
option and at the bottom of the partisan ballot, where the individual office of township trustee
was located), while he could only receive votes in one location on the ballot (at the bottom of the
15
Timmons v Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 US 351, 358; 117 S Ct 1364; 137 L Ed 2d 589
(1997); Anderson v Celebrezze, 460 US 780, 789; 103 S Ct 1564; 75 L Ed 2d 547 (1983);
Burdick, supra.
16
Timmons, supra at 358, quoting Burdick, supra at 434, quoting Anderson, supra at 788-789
(internal citations omitted).
-5-
partisan ballot where the individual office of township trustee was located). Third, McDonald
contends that he was disadvantaged because party candidates could receive a vote at the top of
the ballot, while he could only receive a vote in the township trustee section of the ballot, which
was located below the top of the ballot (actually, the township trustee office which McDonald
was seeking was the last office on the partisan section of the ballot). Fourth, McDonald contends
that because "a significant portion" of straight-ticket voters would proceed directly to the
nonpartisan section of the ballot, he was deprived of "potential name recognition" and the
opportunity to receive votes from "voters opposed to the party of the Plaintiff 's rival candidates."
Fifth, McDonald contends that the straight-ticket ballot option immunizes candidates associated
with the major political parties from "roll-off," which occurs when voters cast votes for high
profile offices but fail to vote for the "lesser" offices further down on the ballot.
3. The Burden On McDonald's Associational Rights
We conclude that the straight-ticket ballot option places only a "lesser burden" as
opposed to a "severe burden" on McDonald's associational rights.17 The essence of each of the
benefits of the straight-ticket ballot option that McDonald claims he was denied as a result of his
independent status concerns the ease with which voters could cast their vote for him. As a result
of McDonald's decision not to associate with a political party, voters who wanted to vote for him
for township trustee were required to spend more time and make a greater effort to vote for him
than voters who simply voted straight-ticket. However, even straight-ticket voters were not
prohibited from splitting their ticket and voting for a candidate of another party or an
independent candidate for any of the partisan offices. Because the straight-party ballot option did
not prevent or prohibit straight-ticket voters from splitting their tickets and voting for McDonald
and because any voter who desired to vote for McDonald could do so if the voter took the time
and made the effort, we conclude that the nature of the burden on McDonald's associational
rights was not severe enough to warrant strict-scrutiny review.18
4. The State's Interests
The second step of the Anderson test requires this Court to identify and evaluate
Michigan's interests that would justify imposing this lesser, but nonetheless identifiable, burden
on McDonald's First Amendment associational rights. Because the straight-ticket ballot option
did not impose a severe burden on McDonald's associational rights, it passes constitutional
muster if the state has "important regulatory interests" to justify it.19 In its brief on appeal, the
state identifies many interests that it seeks to further by permitting the straight-ticket ballot
option. One of the interests identified by the state in support of the straight-ticket ballot option
17
For a discussion on assessing the severity of the burden, see Citizens for Legislative Choice v
Miller, 144 F3d 916 (CA 6, 1998).
18
See Timmons, supra at 363.
19
Anderson, supra at 788.
-6-
includes the state's power to regulate elections in order to maintain and protect the integrity of the
democratic system. According to the state, "the option of voting a straight ticket speeds the
voting process and reduces the amount of voting machines, polling places, and personnel
necessary to facilitate elections." The state further asserts that if the voting process is easy and
expedient, people will be more likely to exercise their right to vote. In addition, the state asserts
that "the ability to vote a straight ticket provides a clear and simple option for voters who may
otherwise be confused by the array of offices and candidates." Finally, the state asserts that it has
a strong interest in protecting the stability of its political system.
The interests that the state articulates are "important regulatory interests."20 In Timmons,
the United States Supreme Court recognized that a state "certainly ha[s] an interest in protecting
the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of [its] ballots and election processes as means for electing
public officials."21 The United States Supreme Court also recognized in Timmons that a state
also has a "strong interest" in the stability of its political systems.22 In addition, the Michigan
Supreme Court has classified as "compelling" the state's interest in the protection of the integrity
of its election process.23
5. Balancing The Interests
The final step of the Anderson test requires this Court to balance the character and
magnitude of the constitutional injury to McDonald against the state's interests. We conclude
that the state's compelling interest in the integrity of the election process and strong interest in the
stability of its political systems outweigh the burden on McDonald's First Amendment right to
freedom of association. The imposition of even substantial restrictions on the right to associate
does not automatically invalidate a statute that has that effect.24 States must be permitted to
enact reasonable regulations of parties, elections, and ballots to reduce election- and campaignrelated disorder.25 "'[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the
democratic process.'"26 Moreover, the state's interest in the stability of its political systems
permits it "to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice, favor the traditional
two-party system."27 "[W]hile an interest in securing the perceived benefits of a stable two-party
20
Id.
21
Timmons, supra at 364.
22
Id. at 366.
23
Socialist Workers Party v Secretary of State, 412 Mich 571, 589; 317 NW2d 1 (1982).
24
Storer v Brown, 415 US 724, 729; 94 S Ct 1274; 39 L Ed 2d 714 (1974).
25
Timmons, supra at 358.
26
Burdick, supra at 433, quoting Storer, supra at 730.
27
Timmons, supra at 367.
-7-
system will not justify unreasonably exclusionary restrictions, . . . [s]tates need not remove all of
the many hurdles third parties face in the American political arena today."28
In conclusion, the straight-ticket ballot option, which does not impose a severe burden on
McDonald's constitutional rights to freedom of association, is justified by the state's compelling
interest in the integrity of the election process and its strong interest in the stability of its political
systems. The straight-ticket ballot option therefore did not deprive McDonald of his First
Amendment right to freedom of association.
D. Equal Protection
1. Overview
McDonald asserts that MCL 168.737 violates his right to equal protection of the law.
The Equal Protection Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions provide that no
person shall be denied the equal protection of the law.29 The Michigan Supreme Court has held
that Michigan's equal-protection provision is coextensive with the Equal Protection Clause of the
United States Constitution.30
McDonald argues that the straight-ticket ballot option denied him equal protection under
the United States and Michigan Constitutions, and that because the straight-ticket ballot option
also burdens his First Amendment right of freedom of association, this Court must analyze its
constitutionality using strict scrutiny. According to McDonald, the straight-ticket ballot option is
unconstitutional because the state does not have a compelling state interest to justify it, and the
state has not used means that are narrowly tailored to advance any state interests.
2. "Invidious Discrimination"
Initially, we must address whether the alleged discrimination in this case is the type of
discrimination proscribed by the United States and Michigan Constitutions. As the United States
Supreme Court observed in American Party of Texas v White,31 "'[s]tatutes create many
classifications which do not deny equal protection; it is only 'invidious discrimination' which
offends the Constitution.'"32 This Court has also recognized that "'United States Supreme Court
precedents consistently indicate that the United States Constitution's Equal Protection Clause
28
Id. (citation omitted).
29
US Const, Am XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 2.
30
Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 258; 615 NW2d 218 (2000), cert den 531 US 1074 (2001).
31
American Party of Texas v White, 415 US 767, 781; 94 S Ct 1296; 39 L Ed 2d 744 (1974).
32
Id., quoting Ferguson v Skrupa, 372 US 726, 732; 83 S Ct 1028; 10 L Ed 2d 93 (1963).
-8-
reaches only intentional or purposeful discrimination.'"33 A plaintiff alleging an equal-protection
violation has the "burden . . . to demonstrate in the first instance a discrimination against them of
some substance."34
We conclude that the discrimination that McDonald alleges in this case is not the sort of
invidious, intentional, or purposeful discrimination that is proscribed by the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution and the equal-protection provision in the Michigan
Constitution. The distinction that the statutes providing for straight-ticket voting make is
between candidates for public office who are running as candidates for a particular party and
candidates for public office who are running as independents with no party affiliation. Voters
cannot vote for independent candidates using the straight-ticket vote. The nature of the
discrimination against McDonald, then, is that voters desiring to vote for him must spend more
time and make a greater effort to vote for him, while candidates affiliated with a party can
receive a vote more quickly and easily from voters who vote straight-ticket.
However, the straight-ticket ballot option did not prevent straight-ticket voters from
splitting their ticket and also voting for McDonald. Accordingly, any voter desiring to vote for
him could have done so. This distinction is not the type of invidious discrimination proscribed
by the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, we see no evidence that the Legislature, in enacting
the election laws in Michigan, intentionally or purposefully discriminated against independent
candidates, nor does McDonald provide anything to indicate that the Legislature had such an
intent.
3. Rational Basis Versus Strict Scrutiny
We note, further, that the constitutional validity of the straight-ticket ballot system must
be analyzed using the rational-basis analysis, not the more stringent strict-scrutiny analysis.
McDonald contends that because the alleged equal-protection violation also affects a
fundamental right, the freedom of association, this should elevate the level of scrutiny to strict
scrutiny requiring a compelling state interest with means narrowly tailored to advance that
interest.
McDonald is correct that the general rule is that the strict-scrutiny test must be used to
analyze an equal-protection claim where the legislation at issue also affects a fundamental
interest.35 However, in Socialist Workers Party,36 where the challenged statute also burdened the
33
Vorva v Plymouth-Canton Community School Dist, 230 Mich App 651, 659; 584 NW2d 743
(1998), quoting Harville v State Plumbing & Heating, Inc, 218 Mich App 302, 306; 553 NW2d
377 (1996).
34
American Party of Texas, supra at 781.
35
Vargo v Sauer, 457 Mich 49, 60; 576 NW2d 656 (1998).
36
Socialist Workers Party, supra at 589.
-9-
plaintiffs' fundamental right of association, the Michigan Supreme Court held that "[i]n an equal
protection challenge to a ballot-restricting statute, plaintiffs have the burden of demonstrating a
discrimination 'of some substance' before the compelling state interest test is triggered." In
addition, although Anderson involved a constitutional challenge based solely on the First
Amendment, other courts have held that the Anderson test also applies to equal-protection
challenges.37
We conclude that McDonald has not met his burden of demonstrating discrimination "of
some substance" to trigger strict scrutiny and require the state to articulate a compelling state
interest.38 As noted previously, it was more difficult and time consuming for voters to vote for
McDonald because he was an independent candidate. However, we observed that the increased
difficulty for voters desiring to vote for McDonald was minimal. Moreover, Michigan election
law did not prohibit straight-ticket voters from splitting their ticket and voting for McDonald in
the township trustee portion of the ballot. Thus, the ballot did not prevent McDonald from
receiving votes from any voter who wanted to vote for him. Accordingly, any discrimination
against McDonald was not of sufficient substance to trigger strict-scrutiny review.
Moreover, the standard articulated in Anderson applies to McDonald's equal-protection
claim, notwithstanding the fact that the straight-ticket ballot option also implicates his First
Amendment right of freedom of association. For the same reasons as those we outlined above,
the straight-ticket ballot option did not deprive McDonald of equal protection under the United
States and Michigan Constitutions.
E. Purity Of Elections
1. Overview
McDonald argues that the straight-ticket ballot option violates the "purity of elections"
clause of the Michigan Constitution.39 The Michigan Constitution provides that "[t]he legislature
shall enact laws to . . . preserve the purity of elections."40 The Michigan Supreme Court has
interpreted the "purity of elections" clause to embody two concepts: "first, that the constitutional
authority to enact laws to preserve the purity of elections resides in the Legislature; and second,
'that any law enacted by the Legislature which adversely affects the purity of elections is
37
See Green v Mortham, 155 F3d 1332, 1337 n 10 (CA 11, 1998); Rosen v Brown, 970 F2d 169,
177-178 (CA 6, 1992).
38
Even if we were to conclude that strict scrutiny applies to the straight-ticket ballot option, the
Supreme Court has stated that the state has a "compelling interest . . . in the protection of the
integrity of its election process." Socialist Workers Party, supra at 589.
39
Const 1963, art 2, § 4.
40
Id.
-10-
constitutionally infirm.'"41 The phrase "purity of elections" does not have a single precise
meaning.42 However, "it unmistakably requires . . . fairness and evenhandedness in the election
laws of this state."43
According to McDonald, the straight-ticket ballot option violates the "purity of elections"
clause because his opponents, who were affiliated with the Republican Party, had the opportunity
to receive votes at the top of the voting ballot if voters exercised their straight-ticket voting
option, while he could only receive a vote at the bottom of the partisan voting ballot. McDonald
argues that this was unfair because candidates affiliated with a political party were "immunized"
from voter roll-off, while he was not.
2. Elliott
In support of his argument, McDonald cites Elliott v Secretary of State.44 In Elliott, the
Michigan Supreme Court held that election officials had a duty to rotate the names of candidates
for Supreme Court Justice because candidates "whose names appear at the head of the list have a
distinct advantage."45 The Supreme Court further stated, "[i]t is not consistent with fairness or
purity of elections or the avoidance of misuse of elective franchise for election officials to
prepare ballots in such a condition as will afford one candidate or nominee an unfair advantage
over rival candidates or nominees."46 The Supreme Court again emphasized the importance of
candidates being treated equally in Wells,47 where it stated that "one of the primary goals of
election procedures is to achieve equality of treatment for all candidates whose names appear
upon the ballot."
We conclude, however, that McDonald's reliance on Elliott is misplaced because that case
is factually distinguishable from this case, and the holding is not as broad as McDonald suggests.
In Elliott, the plaintiff was a candidate for the office of Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court.
The plaintiff argued that the "purity of elections"48 clause required elections officials to rotate the
41
Socialist Workers Party, supra at 596, quoting Wells v Kent Co Bd of Election Comm'rs, 382
Mich 112, 123; 168 NW2d 222 (1969).
42
Wells, supra at 123.
43
Socialist Workers Party, supra at 598.
44
Elliott v Secretary of State, 295 Mich 245; 294 NW 171 (1940).
45
Id. at 249.
46
Id. at 249-250.
47
Wells, supra at 123.
48
In Elliott, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted the "purity of elections" clause in the 1908
Michigan Constitution, which provided: "Laws shall be passed to preserve the purity of elections
and guard against abuses of the elective franchise." Const 1908, art 3, § 8.
-11-
plaintiff 's name with the names of the other nominees on the ballot. The Supreme Court held
that the "purity of elections" clause required election officials to "rotate on the nonpartisan ballots
the names of candidates for the office of Justice of the Supreme Court . . . ."49
The holding in Elliott that it was unfair to have one candidate's name appear at the head
of the list is limited to candidates for the "same office" and does not stand for the proposition, as
McDonald suggests, that a ballot is unfair in general if it permits one candidate for an office to
receive votes at the top and bottom of the ballot, while other candidates can only receive votes at
the bottom of the ballot. We therefore reject McDonald's attempt to extend or expand the
holding in Elliott to the facts of this case.
3. The "Purity Of Elections" Clause
Further, we conclude that the straight-ticket ballot option does not violate the "purity of
elections" clause in the Michigan Constitution. In Jacobs v Headlee,50 this Court held that the
Michigan campaign financing and practices act did not violate the "purity of elections" clause
because it was "based on legitimate governmental objectives" and did not provide "any unfair
advantage to major party candidates."51 Similarly, the straight-ticket ballot option in this case
does not create an unfair advantage to candidates affiliated with a political party. The benefit of
the straight-ticket ballot option is that it makes it easier and faster for some voters to vote.
Although the straight-ticket ballot option benefits candidates affiliated with a political party by
making it easier for voters to vote for those candidates, such a benefit does not afford an unfair
advantage to the candidates affiliated with a political party. The advantage here is only minimal;
the straight-ticket ballot option does not prevent or prohibit any voter from voting for the
candidate of the voter's choice. We observe that voters not voting a straight ticket could have
voted for McDonald by selecting his name in the township-trustee section of the partisan ballot
while straight-ticket voters who desired to vote for McDonald could have split their ticket and
voted for him for township trustee.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a state's interest in the stability of its
political system "permits them to enact reasonable election regulations that may, in practice,
favor the traditional two-party system."52 The straight-ticket ballot option minimally favors
candidates who are affiliated with a political party, but it does not give them an unfair advantage;
again, any voter who wanted to vote for McDonald for township trustee could have done so.
Moreover, the straight-ticket ballot option is "based on legitimate governmental objectives"
because the state has a "compelling" interest in the protection of the integrity of its election
49
Elliott, supra at 250.
50
Jacobs v Headlee, 135 Mich App 167, 177; 352 NW2d 721 (1984).
51
Id. (emphasis in original).
52
Timmons, supra at 367.
-12-
process,53 and a strong interest in the stability of its political systems.54 Therefore, we conclude
that the straight-ticket ballot option did not provide an unfair advantage to major-party candidates
and did not violate the "purity of elections" clause of the Michigan Constitution.
F. Conclusion
We conclude that the straight-ticket ballot option was constitutional and did not deprive
McDonald of his First Amendment associational rights or his equal protection rights under the
United States and Michigan Constitutions. Further, the straight-ticket ballot option did not
violate the Michigan Constitution's "purity of elections" requirement. Accordingly, defendants
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in granting their
motion for summary disposition.
III. Discovery Sanctions; Costs And Attorney Fees
A. Standard Of Review
McDonald argues that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to impose
discovery sanctions on defendant Secretary of State based on the Secretary of State's failure to
answer plaintiff 's interrogatories 29 and 33 as required by the trial court's order. McDonald also
argues that the trial court clearly erred in awarding the Secretary of State attorney fees, and
abused its discretion in awarding the Secretary of State costs. This Court reviews a trial court's
imposition of discovery sanctions for an abuse of discretion.55 This Court reviews a trial court's
decision to award attorney fees for clear error and reviews the award itself for an abuse of
discretion.56 This Court reviews an award of costs for an abuse of discretion.57
B. McDonald's Interrogatories And The Secretary Of State's Response
The language of McDonald's interrogatories 29 and 33 is as follows:
29. Does the straight party ticket option provide any advantage
whatsoever in elections to party affiliated candidates whose parties are listed in
the straight party ticket section of the ballot over rival candidates who cannot be
voted for by means of the straight party ticket option? If yes, please describe the
nature of each and every advantage?
53
Socialist Workers Party, supra at 589.
54
Timmons, supra at 366.
55
Bass v Combs, 238 Mich App 16, 26; 604 NW2d 727 (1999).
56
Michigan Ed Employees Mut Ins Co v Turow, 242 Mich App 112, 118; 617 NW2d 725 (2000).
57
Kernan v Homestead Dev Co, 252 Mich App 689, 691; 653 NW2d 634 (2002).
-13-
* * *
33. Are you aware of any data and/or information that in any way tends to
indicate that the straight party ticket voting option is unfair, and/or in any way
works to the advantage of the larger political parties? If so please fully identify
the source of the data and/or information, including the name and address of the
source, and provide copies of the data and information.
On May 2, 2001, McDonald filed a motion to compel defendants to answer his
interrogatories. On May 6, 2001,58 the Secretary of State responded to McDonald's
interrogatories. In response to interrogatory 29, the Secretary of State replied, "[t]he Secretary of
State does not answer this question, because it calls for a legal conclusion and thus no answer is
required, and because there is no data to support the underlying assumptions contained in the
question." The Secretary of State responded to interrogatory 33 as follows: "The Secretary of
State is unable to answer this question because it is unduly burdensome, as the requested data is
not available and could not be obtained with reasonable effort."
C. The Trial Court's Ruling
At the hearing on McDonald's motion to compel discovery, McDonald asked the trial
court to compel the Secretary of State to answer interrogatories 29 and 33, as well as other
interrogatories. At the hearing, the trial court stated:
It would seem to the Court either the information exists and statistical
compilations that [sic] are readily available to you or any other citizen in or out of
the lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act; or, you are asking a party to do
expert witness work for you, which they have no obligation to do.
If the data isn't compiled in the fashion you want, if there aren't statistics
on the things which you are interested, it's not your opponent[']s obligation to do
statistical studies, but you to retain an expert and do the discovery yourself.
The trial court then specifically refused to order the Secretary of State to respond to discovery
requests that required it to do research or perform statistical studies, but did order the Secretary
or State to answer interrogatories that could be answered "yes," "no," or "I don't know."
Thereafter, the trial court entered an order requiring the Secretary of State to respond to
McDonald's interrogatories 21, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 32, and 33, by May 14, 2001, if those
interrogatories could be answered with a yes or no answer. According to the Secretary of State,
58
The court clerk mistakenly stamped May 6, 2002, on the Secretary of State's responses to
McDonald's interrogatories. The year the Secretary of State's responses to McDonald's
interrogatories were filed was 2001.
-14-
she complied with the trial court's discovery order by including responses to McDonald's
interrogatories in the parties' joint stipulation of facts, and she was therefore not required to serve
McDonald with answers to interrogatories if the interrogatories could not be answered with a yes
or no.
McDonald then moved for discovery sanctions, arguing that the Secretary of State failed
to comply with the trial court's discovery order. After a hearing, the trial court denied
McDonald's motion for discovery sanctions and granted the Secretary of State's motion for costs
and attorney fees, stating:
Whether or not there was room for additional discovery within that set of
parameters is neither here nor there because specific issues raised here were the
subject of an earlier motion where the Court did in fact rule, correctly or
incorrectly, that these interrogatories did seek to have statistical work and research
done by the Secretary of State. This is the type of work that if someone wishes to
pursue these points in litigation it's typically their responsibility to hire their own
expert, whether he or she be political scientists or a statistician.
* * *
I'm not sure what the purpose is here, Mr. McDonald, I won't ascribe it to
bad faith but it is a redundant motion. These interrogatories were answered, this
is not a motion to—this is not a motion that legitimately tested the nature of those
answers.
In view of the prior Court ruling and specific direction to the Secretary of
State as to how to answer these, the motion is denied.
And, I am going to have the Attorney General, taxpayers of Michigan,
compensated for his mileage up here and six hours of time; I drive to Lansing
often enough to know that you can't do that in less than that, or you shouldn't.
D. Discovery Sanctions
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McDonald's
motion for discovery sanctions. Interrogatories 29 and 33 clearly could not be answered with a
simple yes or no response. Accordingly, the Secretary of State did not violate the trial court's
order requiring her answer those interrogatories that could be answered with a yes or no
response, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McDonald's motion for
discovery sanctions.
E. Fees And Costs
-15-
In addition, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in awarding attorney fees to
the Secretary of State, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding costs to defendant Secretary of
State. The trial court awarded the Secretary of State $99.18 in costs to cover mileage and $900 in
attorney fees. Generally, attorney fees are not recoverable unless expressly authorized by statute,
court rule, or common-law exception.59 Here, the trial court did not articulate a statutory basis or
court rule to justify awarding attorney fees on the record at the hearing or in its order awarding
costs and attorney fees. However, at the hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary
disposition, McDonald asked the trial court on what basis it had awarded costs, and the trial court
stated that it awarded costs to the Secretary of State pursuant to MCR 2.114.
The trial court's award of attorney fees and costs to defendant based on MCR 2.114 was
appropriate. MCR 2.114(D) and (E) provide:
(D) Effect of Signature. The signature of an attorney or party, whether or
not the party is represented by an attorney, constitutes a certification by the signer
that
(1) he or she has read the document;
(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed
after reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law; and
(3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(E) Sanctions for Violation. If a document is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, on the motion of a party or on its own initiative, shall impose upon
the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction,
which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the document, including
reasonable attorney fees. The court may not assess punitive damages.
Here, the discovery order did not require the Secretary of State to answer interrogatories
29 and 33 because they clearly could not be answered with a yes or no answer. McDonald's
motion for discovery sanctions based on the Secretary of State's alleged failure to comply with
the trial court's discovery order therefore was not well grounded in fact or warranted by existing
law. Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err in awarding attorney fees to the Secretary of
59
MCL 600.2405(6); Terra Energy, Ltd v Michigan, 241 Mich App 393, 397; 616 NW2d 691
(2000).
-16-
State under MCR 2.114(E), and did not abuse its discretion in awarding the Secretary of State
costs under MCR 2.114(E).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
-17-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.