PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 25, 2003
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 223984
Grand Traverse Circuit Court
LC No. 98-007603-FC
KEVIN CARTER HOLTZER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
April 25, 2003
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Sawyer and R. J. Danhof*, JJ.
SAWYER, J.
Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316, and was sentenced to the mandatory term of life in prison without the possibility of
parole. He now appeals and we affirm.
Defendant was convicted of brutally murdering eighteen-year-old Kaylee Bruce at the
Beach Condominiums in Traverse City, where she worked as a desk clerk and defendant was a
renter. Her body was found by the maintenance supervisor on the morning of February 17, 1998.
She had suffered nineteen lacerations that extended to the bone, multiple skull fractures, severe
neck injuries consistent with strangulation, severe blunt-force injuries to the torso, chest,
abdomen, and pelvis, and extensive internal bleeding. Additionally, a metal rod had been forced
into the decedent's vagina with such force that it lacerated her vagina and penetrated two inches
into her pelvic bone. It was opined that it had been necessary to drive the rod with a mallet or
kick it multiple times with a sturdy shoe to drive it into the bone. The decedent was still alive
when this injury was inflicted. Furthermore, the blood on her breasts had been smeared as if
someone had stroked her breasts. Additionally, money was missing from the office where the
decedent worked.
There was a series of bloody footprints at the scene, all made from the same type of
footwear, a pair of size 12 or 12-1/2 Caterpillar work boots. These boots were similar in style to
a pair that defendant had recently owned; defendant's boots were never found, however, and no
comparison could be made. Defendant was seen wearing the boots before February 14, but wore
________________________________
* Former Court of Appeals judge, sitting on the Court of Appeals by assignment.
-1-
different, new boots to work on February 17. Additionally, a tire valve core was found near the
decedent's body; defendant worked at a Tire Factory store owned by his father. There was
evidence that it was common for tire valve cores to become caught in the tread of Caterpillar
boots worn by store employees.
Defendant moved out of the Beach Condominiums about a week after the murder, and
did not report to work as scheduled on February 26. He did return to work about two weeks
later. However, in March 1998, defendant, using a false name, purchased an Amtrak ticket in
Toledo for passage to Carbondale, Indiana, with a changeover in Chicago. Defendant was taken
into custody by the FBI in Chicago.
Defendant's felony-murder conviction was based on the predicate felonies of third-degree
criminal sexual conduct and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A third theory of felony
murder based on a predicate felony of larceny was rejected by the jury.
In addition to the evidence set out above, the prosecutor introduced evidence of
mitochondrial DNA (mtDNA) from hairs found at the crime scene and in defendant's bedroom.
The admissibility of this evidence underlies the majority of defendant's arguments on appeal. At
issue is mtDNA testing on three hairs. Two hairs subsequently determined to belong to
defendant were found at the crime scene, and are referred to as the "pubic hair" and the "torso
hair." Additionally, a hair identified as belonging to the victim was found in defendant's
bedroom, and is referred to as the "bedroom hair."
Defendant first argues that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of showing that
mtDNA evidence is generally accepted in the scientific community. We disagree.
There are two types of DNA, nuclear DNA (nDNA) and mitochondrial DNA. Every cell
of the body, except for red blood cells, contains both types of DNA. Nuclear DNA is the more
commonly known variety, and is found in the nucleus of the cell. One-half of an individual's
nuclear DNA comes from each parent. Each nDNA molecule consists of approximately three
billion base pairs of nucleotides. Although over ninety-nine percent of nuclear DNA is the same
for all people,1 every person, except for identical twins, has unique differences in his nuclear
DNA. It is this uniqueness that gives rise to its usefulness in forensic work.
Mitochondrial DNA, on the other hand, is found in small organelles called mitochondria,
which are found in every cell floating in the protoplasm. An mtDNA molecule is significantly
smaller than an nDNA molecule, containing only about sixteen thousand base pairs. It also
differs from nDNA in that mtDNA is inherited solely from the mother. Accordingly, it can be
used to establish a maternal lineage. Another difference between nDNA and mtDNA is that
nDNA is arranged in a long, double helix "twisted ladder" formation while mtDNA has a circular
formation, like a twisted rubber band. Furthermore, while each cell has only one nucleus, it may
1
Indeed, there is a greater than ninety-nine percent similarity between human and chimpanzee
nuclear DNA.
-2-
have thousands of copies of mitochondria, and each mitochondria has between two and ten
copies of mtDNA. Thus, while nDNA is significantly larger in size, mtDNA is present in
significantly greater numbers. Additionally, mtDNA is more likely than nDNA to survive in a
dead cell. Thus, it is easier to recover useable mtDNA than usable nDNA.
The use of mtDNA in criminal forensic work is relatively new, although it has been used
in a variety of situations, such as matching body parts in the Oklahoma City bombing, identifying
victims in Bosnia, and identifying the remains of an American citizen killed in Haiti. It has also
been used in historical research. For example, it has been used to identify the remains of one of
the "unknown soldiers," as well as the remains of Jesse James. It was used to examine the bones
of Czar and Czarina Romanov to dispute the claim of a woman that she was the Grand Duchess
Anastasia. At the time of the hearing in this matter, approximately one thousand papers had been
published on the subject, although less than one hundred of those involved criminal forensic
issues.
It is unnecessary to delve into the minute details of DNA analysis. At the risk of
oversimplifying the process, two DNA samples are sequenced; that is, the base pair pattern is
determined. One sample is the "known" and the other is the "unknown."2 The DNA sequences
of the two samples are compared to determine if they are a match. If there is a difference in so
much as one base pair, then the contributor of the known sample is excluded as the source of the
unknown sample. Thus, DNA testing is really a test for exclusion.
The mtDNA samples in the case at bar were tested by two separate laboratories. Dr.
Marcia Eisenberg from LabCorp reported a match between the decedent's mtDNA and the
"bedroom hair." The LabCorp testing also reported matches between defendant's mtDNA and
the pubic hair and torso hair.3 A second series of tests were done by Mitotyping Technologics,
which reported the same results.
The admission of evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 240
Mich App 704, 706; 613 NW2d 411 (2000). Fortunately, we are not called upon to make a
scientific judgment of the merits of the evidence. Rather, as explained in People v Adams, 195
Mich App 267, 269; 489 NW2d 192 (1992), mod on other grounds 441 Mich 916 (1993), the
question for the trial court was whether the scientific evidence is generally accepted in the
scientific community:
2
The "unknown" would be the sample recovered from the crime scene and the "known" would
be a sample from a known donor, such as the suspect or victim. Thus, in the case at bar, the
three hairs recovered from the crime scene and defendant's apartment would be the "unknown"
samples and the "known" samples would be those known to come from defendant and the victim,
such as a blood sample drawn from defendant or the victim.
3
An attempt was made at nDNA testing, but there was insufficient nuclear DNA present to get a
conclusive result, although it did not eliminate defendant as the contributor.
-3-
The Davis-Frye rule, adopted from People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72
NW2d 269 (1955), and Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46, 47; 293 F 1013
(1923), allows the admission of expert testimony regarding novel scientific
evidence only if that evidence has gained general acceptance among scientific
experts in the field. The party offering the evidence carries the burden of
demonstrating its acceptance in the scientific community. People v Young, 418
Mich 1, 21, n 7; 340 NW2d 805 (1983); People v Gistover, 189 Mich App 44, 46;
472 NW2d 27 (1991). The trial court's findings of fact regarding this issue will
not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. MCR 2.613(C);
Gistover, p 46.
Thus, our inquiry is limited to determining whether the trial court clearly erred in finding that
mtDNA testing has achieved general acceptance among experts in the field.
The trial court in this case clearly devoted a great deal of time to this issue, and delivered
an opinion that went into great detail reviewing the evidence and the issues involved. Despite
the complexities involved, the trial court did an admirable job mastering the issue. Ultimately,
the trial court placed a great deal of emphasis on the opinions of three experts, Drs. Jeffrey Boore
and William Shields, who primarily work in the field of nonhuman evolution, and Dr. Mark
Stoneking, who works in the field of human evolution. The trial court placed greater emphasis
on the testimony of Dr. Stoneking, and less emphasis on the other experts because they
possessed, to one degree or another, a financial interest in this area.4 For example, Dr. Eisenberg
from LabCorp and Dr. Terry Melton from Mitotyping, have a financial interest in the acceptance
of mtDNA testing because testing in future cases will provide a source of revenue for the
companies. Similarly, Dr. Theodore Kessis, defendant's expert, has been compensated for
testifying against the acceptance of mtDNA testing in a number of cases.
On the issue of the acceptance of mtDNA evidence in the scientific community, the trial
court opined as follows:
[Dr. Stoneking's] testimony was pretty clearly that this is a reliable
technique that can be used and is accepted for—as reliable for purposes of
identification—again identification—understanding that these are not like
fingerprints or nuclear DNA where the identification is virtually certain, but,
rather, like identification in the sense of being evidence that would lead to that
conclusion. It really is a process of exclusion more than inclusion. If there's
differences between the two mitochondrial DNA sequences, then you know they
don't come from the same people, whereas if they are the same, they may come
from the same people, but that is not always the case, as we've discussed.
4
The lesser reliance on Drs. Shields and Boore was due to their more limited experience and
published activity in the area. Thus, ultimately the trial court placed the greatest reliance on Dr.
Stoneking, noting that he was one of the world leaders in the use of mtDNA, and that his interest
was strongly academic rather than pecuniary.
-4-
There was—he was really the only expert who was not—who was truly
disinterested, as defined in People versus Young, who testified on the subject. He
said it was accepted. On the other hand, we had experts, a couple from the
Defense, who I guess would meet the standards of Young that their livelihood is
not intimately connected with the new technique, but I think that—Doctor
Shields, I know, testifies here hither and yon against this technique and has some
investment against it. I guess I have concluded that the fact that this technique—
that is mitochondrial DNA sequencing—is used for so many other valid and
accepted ways and is relied upon, coupled with Doctor Stoneking's testimony,
which I found most persuasive of all the witnesses on this question, leads me to
believe that this is a technique that is accepted in the scientific community and can
be used and relied upon to be used, if it's done right, for identification work in
criminal investigations.
We are not persuaded that the trial court clearly erred in reaching this conclusion. The
trial court clearly placed a great deal of reliance on Dr. Stoneking's testimony, and with good
reason. Furthermore, the case for mtDNA is strengthening with time, not weakening. In Holland
& Parsons, Mitochondrial DNA Sequence Analysis—Validation and Use for Forensic Casework,
Forensic Science Review, Vol 11, No. 1, June 1999, pp 40-41, Drs. Mitchell Holland and
Thomas Parsons concluded as follows:
The use of mtDNA sequence analysis to identify human remains has led
the way for the application of mtDNA analysis in forensic criminalistic casework.
The first case where mtDNA results were introduced into a court of law in the
U.S. was the State of Tennessee vs Paul William Ware in August of 1996. This
case involved the association of a pubic hair, found in the throat of a four year old
female child, to the suspect, Mr. Ware, who was subsequently convicted of rape
and murder. Since then, mtDNA has been used in more than four hundred
forensic cases, however, very few that have been published [2]. Based on the long
list of citations for cases involving identification of human remains (see above), it
is not surprising that publishers have little interest in continuing to publish
material on this subject. Only those most notable and interesting cases, or cases
with historical significance tend to make their way into scientific periodicals.
In the past three years, mtDNA results have been admitted into evidence in
at least ten states (Tennessee, South Carolina, Michigan, North Carolina,
Maryland, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Indiana, Washington, and Texas), and has
been found inadmissible in the State of Florida on a perceived lack of clarity when
reporting mtDNA statistics (see Section II). Of the ten cases which have gone to
court through the FBI laboratory, eight cases have resulted in convictions, in one
case the suspect pled guilty after the mtDNA results were admitted, and the final
case was awaiting a decision at the time this manuscript was in preparation. In
addition, two of these cases involved admissibility hearings. Finally, the
specimens analyzed in these ten cases were primarily hairs and skeletal remains,
-5-
the types of biological material typically encountered in other scientific
laboratories studying mtDNA.
Outside the U.S., mtDNA analysis has been applied to forensic casework
for a number of years. The FSS laboratory in the U.K. took the lead and
introduced mtDNA in case work in 1992. To date, they have completed more
than 140 cases involving mtDNA analysis, the vast majority of which are
criminalistic cases. In addition, at least 40 other laboratories in ten other countries
across Europe are performing mtDNA analysis, and there are laboratories in Asia,
Australia, the Middle East, and South America that are developing or have
developed mtDNA capabilities. Thus, mtDNA analysis has been well established
in Europe, and is a generally accepted forensic DNA profiling method worldwide.
* * *
While sometimes perceived as a "new" application, mtDNA identity
testing has been performed routinely for at least seven years, with a proven track
record of utility and reliability. As documented in this review, the forensic
scientific community has amassed a vast base of experience in mtDNA identity
testing, in many laboratories worldwide. As a result, mtDNA sequence analysis
for forensic identity testing is robust and "validated."
For the above reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the
mtDNA evidence.
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor did not establish that generally accepted
laboratory procedures were followed in this case and, therefore, even if mtDNA evidence is
generally admissible, it should not have been admitted in this case. We disagree.
As this Court explained in People v Lee, 212 Mich App 228, 281; 537 NW2d 233 (1995):
Whether the proper procedures and safeguards are followed in a particular
case is a matter for the jury to consider in determining how much weight it should
give the results. However, where there are serious errors in a particular
laboratory's work, a court may rule the test results themselves to be inadmissible.
[Citing State v Russell, 125 Wash 2d 24, 54; 882 P2d 747 (1994).]
The trial court found that the procedures followed by Mitotyping involved only minor
problems, and that those problems went to weight, not admissibility. Defendant's primary
complaint against Mitotyping's protocols is that they did not follow FBI protocols. The trial
court, however, found those differences to be minor and, again, going to weight, not
admissibility.
-6-
The trial court had far greater concerns with the procedures of LabCorp, noting those
problems to be "extensive and widespread," and that the court "spent a lot of time anguishing
about whether to let them in."5 Ultimately, however, the trial court concluded that the likelihood
of the necessary events occurring from LabCorp's relaxed procedures to create multiple
contaminations resulting in false positives in all the tests was "very, very unlikely" and, therefore,
"with some reluctance," the trial court concluded than any faulty procedures by LabCorp went to
weight, not admissibility.
Once again, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred in its assessment of this issue.
As the trial court noted, the effect of contamination of a sample is most likely to produce a false
negative rather than a false positive.6 To have created a false positive, mtDNA from the "known"
blood samples of defendant and the victim would have to have found their way into the
respective "unknown" hair samples so that the testing of the unknown samples would yield the
same mtDNA sequences as the known samples.7 As the trial court noted, in the case at bar this
would have had to happen in multiple tests from samples that arrived in the lab at different times,
and all yielding false positives.8 Furthermore, the LabCorp results were confirmed by the
Mitotyping results. Thus, there would have to have been similar contamination events at the
second laboratory, reducing still further the likelihood of multiple false positives at LabCorp.
In sum, we agree with the trial court that the likelihood of such false positives was
remote. In fact, the likelihood was so remote that we cannot say that the errors committed by
LabCorp in its procedures were so serious that they affected the admissibility of the evidence.
Rather, we agree with the trial court that the issue whether laboratory procedures were followed
presented an issue of weight for the jury to resolve. Lee, supra.
Next, defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing use of the "counting method"
in describing the mtDNA results. Specifically, defendant argues that the method of reporting the
results should be subject to the Davis-Frye test, that the mtDNA database is too small to be
reliable, and the fact that defendant's DNA sequence had not been previously seen in the database
was highly prejudicial. We disagree.
5
The trial court did note that this case appears to be the first mtDNA case LabCorp did for
criminal-investigation purposes.
6
For example, if both the "known" and "unknown" samples come from the same person, they
would match. However, if foreign DNA is introduced through contamination, then the testing
would produce a nonmatch and the defendant would be incorrectly excluded.
7
We would also note that even in such a case, if the "unknown" sample was, in fact, from a
source other than the person who contributed the "known" sample, the contamination would have
to be sufficiently great for it to overwhelm the mtDNA from the "unknown" sample so that the
differing mtDNA from the unknown sample would not be present in a sufficient amount to create
a nonmatch.
8
In the case of the so-called torso hair, that hair arrived in the lab 2-1/2 months after the "known"
blood sample had last been tested, thus making any potential cross-contamination very remote in
time.
-7-
We note that defendant misstates the evidence when he claims that his mtDNA sequence
had not been previously seen in the database. In fact, defendant's mtDNA sequence had been
reported twice in a database of 1,657 people, and the decedent's sequence was seen six times in
the same database. Moreover, defendant's argument overlooks the fact that there was expert
testimony that the counting method, which merely reports how many times a particular sequence
has been seen before in the FBI database, is "excessively conservative" and favors the suspect.
In any event, this Court has held that the statistical analysis of DNA testing is relevant to
the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Adams, supra at 279; People v Chandler, 211
Mich App 604, 611; 536 NW2d 799 (1995). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting
this evidence.
Defendant's next issue, whether the improper admission of mtDNA evidence was
harmless, is moot inasmuch as we have concluded that the evidence was properly admitted.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied his right to a speedy trial. We disagree.
Nineteen days before the March 29, 1999, trial date, the prosecution informed the trial
court that it intended to seek a second test of the subject hairs in this case. Defendant objected,
asserting his right to a speedy trial. The delay was granted, and trial in this case was not
conducted until October 1999, nearly eighteen months after the preliminary examination in this
case, and over nineteen months after his arrest.
This Court set forth the factors to be considered in analyzing a claim of a denial of a
speedy trial in People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 602; 617 NW2d 339 (2000):
A criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to a speedy
trial. US Const, Ams VI and XIV; Const 1963, art 1, § 20; MCL 768.1; MSA
28.1024. See also MCR 6.004(A). "In determining whether a defendant has been
denied a speedy trial, four factors must be balanced: (1) the length of the delay,
(2) the reasons for the delay, (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a
speedy trial, and (4) prejudice to the defendant from the delay." People v
Levandoski, 237 Mich App 612, 620, n 4; 603 NW2d 831 (1999), citing Barker v
Wingo, 407 US 514, 530; 92 S Ct 2182; 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972). Speedy trial
claims raise constitutional issues that we review de novo. People v Cain, 238
Mich App 95, 108; 605 NW2d 28 (1999).
With respect to the issues of the length of delay and prejudice to defendant, defendant asserts
without analysis or support that the delay not attributable to defendant exceeded eighteen months
and, therefore, contrary to the trial court's holding, prejudice is presumed.
Defendant is correct that if the delay not attributable to defendant exceeds eighteen
months, prejudice is presumed. People v Collins, 388 Mich 680, 690; 202 NW2d 769 (1972). If
the delay is less than eighteen months, the burden is on the defendant to show actual prejudice.
Once the eighteen-month mark is reached, however, the prosecutor must show that the defendant
was not prejudiced by the delay. Id. at 695.
-8-
In the case at bar, the prosecutor disputes whether the delay not attributable to defendant
exceeded eighteen months. First, the prosecutor argues that the delay in the preliminary
examination until April 30, 1998, was at defendant's request. Second, the prosecutor argues that
a trial originally began on June 21, 1999, which resulted in a mistrial being declared at
defendant's request so that he could investigate newly discovered evidence.9 Neither defendant's
brief on appeal, nor his reply brief, contradicts either of these assertions. In fact, defendant's
brief acknowledges that the trial court held that two months of the delay were attributable to
defendant. Defendant does not argue that the trial court erred in so holding. If either of these
delays are attributable to defendant, then the delay not attributable to defendant is less than
eighteen months and, therefore, prejudice will not be presumed.10 Accordingly, prejudice will
not be presumed and, therefore, the burden is on defendant to establish that he was prejudiced.
With respect to prejudice, defendant makes no showing that he was, in fact, prejudiced by
the delay. There was no continued incarceration awaiting trial inasmuch as defendant was
incarcerated on an unrelated offense for much of the period. Furthermore, defendant points to no
evidence that was lost because of the delay. Indeed, the only argument of prejudice defendant
makes, other than that prejudice should be presumed, is that the prosecution used much of the
delay to enhance the quality of its DNA-testing evidence. While a delay that impairs the defense
must be taken most seriously, Collins, supra at 694, we do not equate an enhancement of the
prosecution's case with the impairment of the defense. This does not, for example, involve an
issue of the reliability of eye-witness identification that may degrade over time, or the loss of a
defense witness. See Collins, supra at 694-695. Indeed, as our Supreme Court noted in People v
Den Uyl, 320 Mich 477, 490; 31 NW2d 699 (1948), the "[r]ight of speedy trial should not
operate to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly prosecuting criminals." In sum,
in determining prejudice to a defendant, we do not look at how the prosecutor's case was
improved during the delay, but to whether the defendant's defense was degraded. In the case at
bar, defendant makes no showing of such a harm to his defense caused by the delay.
In looking at the other speedy-trial factors, the delay in the case at bar was somewhat
lengthy. Much of it, however, was due to the mtDNA testing, and the retesting to confirm
results. Indeed, we note that at the onset of this case, only the FBI laboratory did mtDNA testing,
and there was a fourteen-month delay in their testing. LabCorp, the first laboratory to which the
prosecutor submitted the hairs for testing, had just begun testing hairs for mtDNA. Furthermore,
9
Although the record before us does suggest that a trial was commenced in June 1999, there is
no indication regarding why it was halted.
10
A June 21, 1999, trial date was within eighteen months of defendant's arrest and there is no
indication of further delay in trial attributable to the prosecutor. Further, if because of
defendant's request, the preliminary exam was delayed until April 30, 1998, then trial would have
to commence before October 16, 1999, for the delay to be less than eighteen months (even
charging the initial fourteen days against the prosecutor, the time required by statute, MCL 766.4,
in which to conduct the preliminary examination). Trial in the case at bar commenced on
October 11, 1999, nineteen months and eight days after his March 3, 1998, arrest. For that
matter, with defendant not challenging the trial court's conclusion that two months of the delay is
attributable to defendant, the delay not attributable to defendant is less than eighteen months.
-9-
given the cutting-edge nature of this technology and some of the issues raised with respect to
LabCorp's procedure, we cannot disagree with the trial court that submitting the sample to a
second laboratory, Mitotyping, was consistent with the interests of justice.
Regarding defendant's demand for a speedy trial, it does not appear that he did so until
March 1999, when the prosecutor requested a delay in the scheduled March 29, 1999, trial date to
submit the samples to Mitotyping. The delay in making such a request raises the issue of the
nature of defendant's concerns regarding a speedy trial. Meaning, defendant raised the speed-trial
claim in the context of trying to prevent the hair samples from being subjected to a second test by
a different laboratory, which would conceivably (and, in fact, did) enhance the quality of the
prosecution's DNA evidence. As noted by the Court in Collins, supra at 696, the defendant's
"assertion of his right to a speedy trial came so late as to be devoid of any sincerity or
conviction," where the defendant in that case raised a speedy-trial issue the day before trial was
to begin. In the case at bar, defendant, already incarcerated for another offense, did not seem
concerned with how long it took to bring him to trial until a speedy-trial demand presented itself
as a tactic to prevent the prosecutor from attaining additional evidence against defendant.
For the above reasons, we conclude that defendant was not denied his right to a speedy
trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Robert J. Danhof
-10-
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