CITY COUNCIL OF CITY OF FLINT V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CITY COUNCIL OF FLINT, DARRYL
BUCHANAN, JOHN COLEMAN, and SCOTT
KINCAID,
FOR PUBLICATION
October 4, 2002
9:25 a.m.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 243029
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001017-AV
STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
January 3, 2003
Before: Owens, P.J., and Holbrook, Jr., and O'Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following this Court's order reversing the circuit court order, in which the circuit court
had granted plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief, and remanding the matter for review
consistent with MCL 141.1217, defendant state of Michigan seeks peremptory reversal of the
circuit court's decision on remand pursuant to MCR 7.211(C)(4). We agree that error is so
manifest that an immediate reversal of the order should be granted without formal argument or
submission, and reverse in this final decision entered pursuant to MCR 7.205(D)(2).
I. Factual Background
A. Introduction
This case arises in the context of the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act, MCL
141.1201 et seq., and presents questions of first impression. Senate Resolution 184, 2002
Journal of the Senate 576 (No. 23, March 13, 2002), sponsored by Senator Robert L. Emerson,
the state senator for the district that includes the city of Flint, sought a preliminary review by the
state treasurer of the city of Flint's financial condition pursuant to MCL 141.1212(1) of the act.
At the conclusion of his review, the state treasurer reported to the Governor that a serious
financial problem existed in the city of Flint. As required by MCL 141.1213(1)(b) when such a
report is received, the Governor appointed a financial review team to conduct an assessment of
the city's fiscal situation.
B. The Financial Review Team's Report
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The review team found that the city's general fund deficit had doubled from $13 million
to $26 million in the fiscal year ending June 30, 2001. In addition, the city had borrowed money
from special purpose funds to supplement the general fund to a point where the other funds were
not sufficient to permit the performance of major functions such as street repair, water and sewer
services, and maintenance or replacement of equipment. The financial audit reports for the last
three fiscal years showed that the city's actual revenues and expenditures varied significantly
from the budgeted revenues and expenditures, rendering the adopted budget for those years
"meaningless as a financial management tool." The review team concluded that city officials
demonstrated an inability "to accurately monitor revenues and expenditures throughout a given
fiscal year and to amend city budgets accordingly." The 2000 and 2001 financial audit reports
indicated that "the city failed to maintain an accurate and timely general ledger, failed to perform
timely reconciliations of bank balances to the general ledger, and incurred an excess of
expenditures over revenues."
The city still owed the state approximately $12 million in uncollected taxes for the years
1986 through 1991. It had also failed to timely file annual financial reports with the Department
of Treasury, as it was required to do by statute, for the past five fiscal years. The audit reports
were due on December 30 of each year and were sometimes not filed until August or October of
the following year. The review team expressed concern that the proposed budget for fiscal year
2003 did not address the accumulated general fund deficit. Although a deficit elimination plan
was approved by the Department of Treasury for fiscal year 2001, the city had not adhered to it.
The review team report noted that "there was a surprising difference of opinion among city
officials regarding what the general fund deficit will be for the current fiscal year ending on June
30th [2002]." The report concluded that the fact that "city officials could not even agree upon
the magnitude of the accumulated deficit, let alone upon a credible plan for its elimination, was
troubling and suggestive of an inability to resolve the serious financial problem confronting the
city."
Although city officials had proposed issuing financial stabilization bonds, the report
opined that "the capacity of the city to issue further debt is substantially limited." In order to
finance such bonds, the city would most likely have to pledge future state revenue sharing
proceeds; however, because seventy-five percent of these anticipated funds had already been
pledged for existing debt and the city expected that it would have to issue additional obligations
to meet state and federal drinking water requirements, further pledging of that revenue source
would be forestalled and the issuance of such bonds was "unlikely." The report also noted that
the city was currently involved in arbitration proceedings regarding its collective bargaining
agreement with police officers, and that city officials had failed to budget for any salary
increases that may be awarded; the award "may be retroactive to 1998 and any award greater
than zero will immediately add to the existing deficit."
The report concluded that three of the conditions for state intervention set forth in MCL
141.1214(2) existed: that the city failed to eliminate an existing deficit within the two-year
period preceding the end of the current fiscal year [MCL 141.1241(2)(e)]; that the city was
delinquent for more than thirty days in remitting $12 million in tax payments to the state for the
years 1986 through 1991 [MCL 141.1214(2)(b)(ii)]; and that the general fund deficit for fiscal
year 2002 is likely to exceed ten percent of the general fund revenues for that year [MCL
141.1214(2)(f)]. The review team determined, in accordance with MCL 141.1214(3)(c), that a
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local government financial emergency existed "because no satisfactory plan exists to resolve the
serious financial problem," and recommended that the Governor appoint an emergency financial
manager pursuant to MCL 141.1218.
C. The Governor's Review Hearing
On May 22, 2002, as required by MCL 141.1215(2),1 the Governor notified city officials
in writing that he concurred in the review team's finding that a financial emergency existed. The
notice informed the officials of their right to request a hearing. The acting mayor of Flint
requested a hearing on the determination, which was held on June 24, 2002.
As permitted by MCL 141.1215(2), the Governor's designee, Julie Croll, deputy director
of the Department of Treasury, served as hearing officer. Ms. Croll began the proceedings by
informing the parties that the hearing was "not . . . an original fact-finding situation," but was in
the nature of an appeal, and that the standard of review would involve the determination whether
the review team's findings were supported by the evidence or whether the findings were arbitrary
or capricious. At the hearing, the city's representatives did not dispute the findings of the review
team, and acknowledged that there was a need for immediate action. However, they claimed that
since the review team's report, they had made substantial progress toward resolving their
financial problems.
On July 2, 2002, Ms. Croll issued her report to the Governor. She reviewed the evidence
and arguments presented by the city, but noted that "any efforts that may have taken place since
the review team submitted its report . . . are outside the scope of review." The hearing officer
concluded that the review team's determination that a financial emergency exists in the city was
supported by the evidence and recommended the appointment of an emergency financial
manager.
1
MCL 141.1215(2) provides:
If the governor determines pursuant to subsection (1) that a financial
emergency exists, the governor shall provide the governing body and chief
administrative officer of the local unit with a written notification of the
determination, findings of fact utilized as the basis upon which this determination
was made, a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the
factual findings, and notice that the chief administrative officer or the governing
body of the local government has 10 days after the date of this notification to
request a hearing conducted by the governor or the governor's designate.
Following the hearing, or if no hearing is requested following the expiration of the
deadline by which a hearing may be requested, the governor shall either confirm
or revoke, in writing, the determination of the existence of a local financial
emergency. If confirmed, the governor shall provide a written report of the
findings of fact of the continuing or newly developed conditions or events
providing a basis for the confirmation of a local financial emergency, and a
concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting these factual
findings.
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On July 3, 2002, the Governor notified Flint city officials in writing that he was adopting
the hearing officer's conclusions and directing that an emergency financial manager be
appointed. The specific findings that were cited as supporting this action were that the city's
general fund deficit doubled from $13 million to $26 million in one year, the city's cash reserves
had been depleted by $74 million over three years, audit reports during the last three fiscal years
reflected the city's inability to accurately budget revenues and expenditures, and the city's
inability to adhere to its current deficit elimination plan. Pursuant to the Governor's directive,
Edward J. Kurtz was appointed on July 8, 2002, as the city's emergency financial manager.
D. The City's Appeal to the Circuit Court
On July 9, 2002, the city filed an appeal and complaint in the Ingham Circuit Court,
along with a motion to show cause and a request for issuance of a preliminary injunction against
the appointment of the emergency financial manager. Ingham Circuit Judge James R. Giddings,
in a ruling from the bench, concluded that the Governor violated the statute because the
Legislature intended that the Governor's hearing under MCL 141.1215(2) be an evidentiary,
adversarial hearing using the preponderance of the evidence standard, in which the city could
present evidence not available to the financial review team. On July 22, 2002, the court
amended its order to include remand of the matter to the Governor with instructions that the
Governor provide the city with a new hearing of the type outlined in its previous ruling and
without limitations on the city's right to present evidence. The court stated that it would decline
to rule on plaintiffs' claim that the city was denied due process. On July 29, 2002, the court
denied defendant's motion for a stay and entered a preliminary injunction enjoining the financial
manager from fulfilling his appointed duties.
Defendant filed an emergency application for leave to appeal to this Court and motion for
a stay. In our order entered August 20, 2002, we stated:
In lieu of granting the application for leave to appeal, the Court orders
pursuant to MCR 7.216(A)(1) that the order appealed from is VACATED. "It is
clear that separation of powers principles, Const 1963, art 3, § 2, preclude
mandatory injunctive relief . . . against the Governor." Straus v Governor, 459
Mich 526, 532; 592 NW2d 53 (1999); see also Musselman v Governor, 200 Mich
App 656, 662; 505 NW2d 288 (1995) ("mandamus will not lie to compel the
Governor to act, regardless of whether the actions sought to be compelled are
discretionary or ministerial."). Because the court's order in this case required the
Governor to take specific, court-ordered action, it was in the nature of mandamus
and in violation of the Michigan constitution. Moreover, the Local Government
Fiscal Responsibility Act does not permit a circuit court to grant injunctive relief,
and there is no other statute or legal basis for a finding that the court possesses
such authority.
This matter does not fall within a circuit court's original jurisdiction under
MCL 600.605, since MCL 141.1217 of the Local Government Fiscal
Responsibility Act clearly provides that the circuit court proceeding is in the
nature of an appeal. While MCL 600.605 and Const 1963, art 6, §§ 13 and 28
provide circuit courts with appellate jurisdiction over decisions of inferior courts
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and administrative tribunals, the Governor's determination that a financial
emergency exists under the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act fits into
neither of these categories. Finally, MCR 7.105(G) applies only to administrative
agencies and their decisions following contested case proceedings. Under MCR
7.105(A), the Governor is expressly excluded from the definition of "agency," and
"contested case" is defined as an agency decision. There was simply no legal
authorization for the action taken in this case.
In addition, there is no basis for a finding that defendant violated the act.
Although MCL 141.1215(2) provides for a hearing, it does not specify what kind
of hearing is required. This fact compels the conclusion that the Legislature left
the scope of the hearing and other procedural matters to be determined by the
Governor in his discretion. While subsection 15(2) refers to "newly developed
conditions or events," this reference is expressly limited to those conditions or
events supporting the finding that a local financial emergency exists. Thus, the
statute does not encompass any right to present evidence of last-ditch efforts by
city officials to avoid the consequences of years of mismanagement. Regardless
of the court's statement in its order that it was not addressing constitutional issues,
the order necessarily granted plaintiffs the relief they sought in connection with
their claim that the hearing violated due process. It is well established that local
units of government lack standing to challenge a state statute on due process
grounds. Kent Co Aeronautics Bd v Dep't of State Police, 239 Mich App 563;
609 NW2d 593 (2000). Accordingly, plaintiffs were clearly not entitled to the
relief granted.
Therefore, the matter is REMANDED to the circuit court for review
consistent with MCL 141.1217, i.e., a review of the existing record to determine
whether the Governor's decision was supported by competent, material and
substantial evidence, or whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or an
unwarranted abuse of discretion. The circuit court shall issue its opinion or order
regarding this matter within fourteen days of the clerk's certification of this order.
Jurisdiction is retained. [Emphasis in original.]
In light of the decision to vacate the lower court's order, the motion for stay was denied as moot.
On remand, the circuit court issued an order on September 3, 2002, in which it found that
the "Official Record" of the proceedings at the Governor's hearing was "incomplete" and that the
court's review indicated that the Governor's determination that a financial emergency exists in
the City of Flint was not supported by competent, material, or substantial evidence on the whole
record and that the determination was arbitrary and capricious and constituted an abusive and
unwarranted exercise of discretion. The court subsequently issued a written opinion in which it
characterized portions of this Court's previous order as "dicta" and reached the same result as it
had initially, concluding that the Governor was obliged to conduct a hearing de novo at which
the city could present whatever evidence it wished. Defendant moved for peremptory reversal of
the decision.
II. Standard of Review
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This case involves questions of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.
Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs v Michigan Property & Casualty Guaranty Ass'n, 456 Mich
590, 610; 575 NW2d 751 (1998).
III. Analysis
A. The Circuit Court's Actions on Remand
It is well established that under the law of the case doctrine, a circuit court may not take
action on remand that is inconsistent with the judgment or order of an appellate court. Grievance
Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 260; 612 NW2d 120 (2000); Sokel v Nickoli, 356 Mich
460, 465; 97 NW2d 1 (1959); Driver v Hanley (After Remand), 226 Mich App 558, 565; 575
NW2d 31 (1997). "Thus, a question of law decided by an appellate court will not be decided
differently on remand" provided the facts of the case remain the same. Driver, supra. Contrary
to plaintiffs' assertions on appeal, the relevant facts of this case have not changed since our prior
order.
In that order, we determined as a matter of law that the Legislature, by failing to specify
any procedural requirements for the Governor's hearing under MCL 141.1215(2), intended that
the scope and nature of the hearing was to be left to the Governor's discretion, and that the
reference to "newly developed conditions or events" in that subsection is "expressly limited to
those conditions or events supporting the finding that a local financial emergency exists." Thus,
we reversed the circuit court's ruling that the Governor violated the act, and held that MCL
141.1215(2) limited the court's review to the record as it was presented to the hearing officer,
who specifically declined to consider actions taken by city officials after the review team's report
was filed. These statements were not dicta, but were necessary to our decision outlining the
parameters of circuit court review under MCL 141.1217. Not only did the review provided for in
the statute not include the authority to issue injunctive relief, it also did not include the authority
to dictate the procedure to be utilized in connection with the Governor's review hearing under
MCL 141.1215(2). Thus, because the holdings were clearly "necessary" to the decision in light
of the lower court's attempts to impose a set of procedural rules on the Governor's hearing, Judge
Giddings was not free to ignore them.
B. The Statutory Framework
We begin by observing that the Local Government Fiscal Responsibility Act is an
exercise of the state's authority over its political subdivisions. A municipal corporation's
"existence is entirely dependent on the legislation that created it, and the Legislature that may
also destroy it." Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs, supra at 609. As has been stated many
times, the Legislature's authority in this regard is absolute except with regard to certain express
constitutional grants and limitations of power. Id.; Kent Co Aeronautics Bd, supra at 580; see
also Williams v Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 289 US 36, 40; 53 S Ct 431; 77 L Ed 1015
(1933). As we stated in our previous order in this case, the city has no standing to raise a claim
that the act deprived it of due process. Kent Co Aeronautics Bd, supra at 580. Consequently, the
Legislature had no obligation to provide the city with any sort of notice or hearing at all. The
fact that it did provide for notice and hearing in this act, however, requires us to determine what
those provisions entail.
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Although the Supreme Court has held that the Legislature must provide an administrative
agency with standards for the exercise of the power delegated to it, Blank v Dep't of Corrections,
462 Mich 103, 124; 611 NW2d 530 (2000), we are not dealing here with an administrative
agency; rather, this case involves a decision by the chief executive officer of the state, who
stands on an equal level with the Legislature and the judiciary. "The Governor's power is limited
only by constitutional provisions that would inhibit the Legislature itself." Straus, supra at 534.
It is further well established that while the Legislature can authorize the exercise of executive
power, it cannot place conditions on the exercise of that authority without violating the
constitutional principle of separation of powers. Blank, supra at 120 (Kelly, J.) and 147
(Markman, J.). Thus, we conclude that the fact that the Legislature did not attempt to impose
procedural requirements with regard to MCL 141.1215(2) indicates its intent to leave the scope
of review to the Governor's discretion.
Certainly, had the Governor decided to conduct a hearing de novo, it would have been
within his authority to do so. However, the Governor determined, in his discretion, that the
hearing would be conducted as an appeal of the financial review team's factual findings, a
procedural stance which, even in the context of the completely unique process provided for in
this act, is consistent with the review procedures followed in virtually every administrative
agency in this state in which the initial findings of fact by a hearing officer are reviewed on the
basis of the established record by a board or commission whose decision subsequently may be
appealed to the circuit court. We also note that in the preamble to the act, the Legislature
indicated that it was providing "for a review and appeal process," language that, while not
dispositive, is also consistent with the standard administrative review process and the commonly
understood usage of the term "appeal."
Amicus curiae Michigan Municipal League contends that the Legislature must have
intended that the first level of review involve a hearing de novo because it used the word
"hearing" in MCL 141.1215 rather than "appeal," as it did in MCL 141.1217 in reference to
proceedings in the circuit court. While this argument points out a valid distinction between the
two provisions, we are not persuaded that it compels a different result. The term "appeal" has
always been confined in its use to references to judicial review or quasi-judicial administrative
review proceedings, a category into which the Governor's hearing does not fit in light of the fact
that the Governor is expressly excluded from the definition of "agency" under the Administrative
Procedures Act. MCL 24.203(2); see also MCR 7.105(A)(1). Hence, the Legislature's failure to
specify that the Governor's review under MCL 141.1215(2) was in the nature of an appeal does
not compel the conclusion that any review hearing be conducted under a de novo standard. On
the contrary, as we have stated, in light of separation of powers principles, the absence of any
limits on the scope of the Governor's review indicates not that the review would be unlimited,
but that the Legislature intended that the parameters of the review would be left to the Governor
to determine.
Nor does the fact that the Legislature used the term "hearing" provide any insight into the
type of hearing to be provided; plaintiffs were given notice2 and an opportunity to be heard, and
2
The city claims for the first time on appeal, and without citation of authority, that the entire
proceedings were void because it was not notified in writing by the state treasurer of his intent to
(continued…)
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were free to point out any errors or omissions in the review team's findings. In addition, they
have never claimed to have been restricted in any way in terms of their presentation to the
financial review team. Thus, even if the city had standing to claim that its due process rights
were violated by the review that was accorded in this case, which, as we have noted, it does not
(Oakland Co Bd of Co Rd Comm'rs, supra at 609-610, and Kent Co Aeronautics Bd, supra at
581), the hearing conducted in this case did not contravene any constitutional requirements. See
Rental Property Owners Ass'n v Grand Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 271; 566 Mich 514 (1997).
The city contends that because the reference in MCL 141.1215(2) to "continuing or
newly developed conditions or events" is phrased in the present tense, the hearing must be
conducted on a de novo basis and include a right on the part of city officials to present evidence
of their recent efforts to remedy the local financial situation. This argument, however, fails to
take into account the fact that any such "conditions or events," regardless of whether they are
"continuing or newly developed," are expressly confined by the plain language of the statute to
those supporting the confirmation of the existence of a local financial emergency. The city's
interpretation of the statute violates the well-established rule that courts should avoid any
construction that would render statutory language nugatory. McAuley v General Motors Corp,
457 Mich 513, 518; 578 NW2d 282 (1998); Gebhardt v O'Rourke, 444 Mich 535, 542; 510
NW2d 900 (1994). Thus, we find no reason to alter our previous holding that "the statute does
not encompass any right to present evidence of last-ditch efforts by city officials to avoid the
consequences of years of mismanagement." This is particularly true in light of the purpose of the
act, which is to protect our citizens from the potentially disastrous consequences of long-term
mismanagement of municipal funds by providing local officials with a powerful incentive to
meet standards of fiscal responsibility before state intervention becomes necessary. See MCL
141.1202. Consequently, while the Governor may, in his discretion, consider evidence of late
efforts by a municipality to remedy its financial situation, there is no basis in the statute for
finding that a municipality has a right to have such evidence taken into account.
As illustrated by the lower court's opinion on remand, virtually all the actions taken by
the city to correct its financial problems occurred after the passage of Senate Resolution 184. At
the hearing, the city, both in writing and on the record, did not dispute the financial review
team's findings, but stated, in its written response to the review team's report, that the city had
"begun the task of amending its Deficit Elimination Plan to fully address the remaining deficit."
Frederick Headen, a member of the financial review team who presented its findings at the
hearing, acknowledged the city's efforts, but concluded that "[n]othing in the recent history of the
city . . . suggests that whatever progress has occurred would have taken place but for the threat of
state intervention . . . ." The hearing officer determined that "[m]uch, if not all, of the testimony
(…continued)
conduct a review, as required by MCL 141.1212(1). Because this issue was not raised during the
proceedings before the Governor's designee, we decline to address it, particularly in view of the
fact that it is not disputed that the city had actual notice of the state's actions. Furthermore, this
Court will not search for authority to support a party's position, and the failure to cite authority in
support of an issue results in its being deemed abandoned on appeal. Davenport v Grosse Pointe
Farms Bd of Zoning Appeals, 210 Mich App 400, 405; 534 NW2d 143 (1995).
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and material offered by the City pertained to what it intends to do to solve its financial problem."
To dismiss the significance of the previous years of profound mismanagement in light of these
eleventh-hour efforts would seriously undermine the Legislature's goal of motivating local
municipalities to take prompt and decisive action to prevent the occurrence of serious financial
problems. That the city now attempts on appeal to disclaim its actions at the hearing and
challenge the review team's conclusions does not affect our analysis, because we are not at
liberty to make new factual findings. Furthermore, a party may not seek redress on appeal on the
basis of a position contrary to that it took in the proceedings under review. Phinney v
Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 544; 564 NW2d 532 (1997); Living Alternatives for the
Developmentally Disabled, Inc v Dep't of Mental Health, 207 Mich App 482, 484; 525 NW2d
466 (1994).
Finally, we find the cases relied on by the city to be distinguishable on their facts. In
Dullam v Willson, 53 Mich 392; 19 NW 112 (1884), the Governor's removal of a public official
from office was overruled because the constitution in force at the time did not give the Governor
removal powers, and the subject of the executive action in that case was an individual, not a
municipality. In Teasel v Dep't of Mental Health, 419 Mich 390; 355 NW2d 75 (1984), the issue
related to judicial oversight of agencies; however, as we have repeatedly stated, the Governor is
not an agency.
C. The Governor's Decision
The circuit court's order and opinion on remand found that the Governor's decision was
not supported by any evidence and was arbitrary and an abuse of discretion because the
Governor failed to conduct his review according to the procedures dictated by the circuit court.
We have already explained the errors inherent in this holding, and now proceed to a proper
analysis under MCL 141.1217.
The statute provides that the reviewing "court shall not set aside a determination of the
governor unless it finds that the determination is either of the following: (a) Not supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record[; or] (b) Arbitrary, capricious,
or clearly an abuse or unwarranted exercise of discretion." Substantial evidence has been
defined as that evidence which reasonable minds would accept as adequate to support a decision.
It is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. In re Payne, 444
Mich 679, 692; 514 NW2d 121 (1994); In re Kurzyniec Estate, 207 Mich App 531, 537; 526
NW2d 191 (1994). The Supreme Court set forth the accepted definitions of "arbitrary" and
"capricious" in Goolsby v Detroit, 419 Mich 651, 678; 358 NW2d 856 (1984):
"Arbitrary is: '"[Without] adequate determining principle . . . Fixed or
arrived at through an exercise of will or by caprice, without consideration or
adjustment with reference to principles, circumstances, or significance, . . .
decisive but unreasoned.'"
"Capricious is: '"[Apt] to change suddenly; freakish; [or] whimsical. . . . '"
[Id., quoting United States v Carmack, 329 US 230, 243; 67 S Ct 252; 91 L Ed
209 (1946), and Bundo v City of Walled Lake, 395 Mich 679, 703, n 17; 238
NW2d 154 (1976).]
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Finally, an abuse of discretion "occurs only when the result is 'so palpably and grossly violative
of fact and logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but perversity of will, not the exercise
of judgment but defiance thereof, not the exercise of reason but rather of passion or bias.'"
Alken-Ziegler, Inc v Waterbury Headers Corp, 461 Mich 219, 227-228; 600 NW2d 638 (1999),
quoting Marrs v Bd of Medicine, 422 Mich 688, 694; 375 NW2d 321 (1985), and Spalding v
Spalding, 355 Mich 382, 384-385; 94 NW2d 810 (1959).
According to the record of the hearing before the Governor's designee, and despite
plaintiffs' assertions to the contrary on appeal, the city, both in writing and on the record, stated
that it did not dispute the financial review team's findings. We conclude that these findings
provide more than an adequate basis for the Governor's decision. Further, we believe that the
Governor's decision, which was the culmination of a thorough and deliberative process based on
the standards set forth in the act, was not arbitrary or capricious or an abusive or unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we find that, at their core, the city's arguments are simply an attempt to assert that
it was denied due process, a claim that it lacks standing to bring. Kent Co Aeronautics Bd, supra
at 581. There is likewise no language anywhere in the act that would support a finding that the
city has a right to present evidence at the hearing provided by MCL 141.1215(2) that was not
available to the financial review team. As we have held, the Governor's decision was amply
supported by the undisputed record. Accordingly, the lower court's opinion and order are
reversed, and the Governor's decision is affirmed.
Reversed. No costs to plaintiffs, a public question being involved.
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Donald E. Holbrook, Jr.
/s/ Peter D. O'Connell
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