HARBOR TELEGRAPH 2103 LLC V OAKLAND CNTY BD OF COMMISSIONERS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HARBOR TELEGRAPH 2103, L.L.C.,
BLOOMFIELD ACRES ACQUISITION
COMPANY, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH
1881, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH 1899,
L.L.C., and HARBOR VOGUE PLAZA, L.L.C.,
a/k/a HARBOR COMPANIES,
FOR PUBLICATION
September 6, 2002
9:05 a.m.
Plaintiffs,
and
CITY OF PONTIAC
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
OAKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS and OAKLAND COUNTY
COMMISSIONER,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD,
Intervening Defendant/Cross
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
OAKLAND COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
Defendant/Cross DefendantAppellant.
-1-
No. 239211
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-036872-CZ
HARBOR TELEGRAPH 2103, L.L.C.,
BLOOMFIELD ACRES ACQUISITION
COMPANY, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH
1881, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH 1899,
L.L.C., and HARBOR VOGUE PLAZA, L.L.C.,
a/k/a HARBOR COMPANIES,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
and
CITY OF PONTIAC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 239246
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-036872-CZ
v
OAKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS and OAKLAND COUNTY
COMMISSIONER,
Defendants,
and
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD,
Intervening Defendant/Cross
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
OAKLAND COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
Defendant/Cross Defendant-
Appellee.
HARBOR TELEGRAPH 2103, L.L.C.,
BLOOMFIELD ACRES ACQUISITION
COMPANY, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH
1881, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH 1899,
L.L.C., and HARBOR VOGUE PLAZA, L.L.C.,
a/k/a HARBOR COMPANIES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-2-
and
CITY OF PONTIAC,
Intervening Plaintiff,
v
OAKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS and OAKLAND COUNTY
COMMISSIONER,
No. 239249
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-036872-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD,
Intervening Defendant/Cross
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
OAKLAND COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
Defendant/Cross DefendantAppellee,
HARBOR TELEGRAPH 2103, L.L.C.,
BLOOMFIELD ACRES ACQUISITION
COMPANY, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH
1881, L.L.C., HARBOR TELEGRAPH 1899,
L.L.C., and HARBOR VOGUE PLAZA, L.L.C.,
a/k/a HARBOR COMPANIES,
Plaintiffs,
and
CITY OF PONTIAC,
Intervening Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 239255
-3-
OAKLAND COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS and OAKLAND COUNTY
COMMISSIONER,
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-036872-CZ
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF BLOOMFIELD,
Updated Copy
November 22, 2002
Intervening Defendant/Cross
Plaintiff-Appellee,
and
OAKLAND COUNTY EXECUTIVE,
Defendant/Cross DefendantAppellee.
Before: Gage, P.J., and Cavanagh and Wilder, JJ.
GAGE, P.J.
This case revolves around efforts to detach a parcel of land that had been successfully
annexed from the jurisdiction of intervening defendant Charter Township of Bloomfield to that
of intervening plaintiff city of Pontiac. See Bloomfield Charter Twp v Oakland Co Clerk, 253
Mich App 1; ___ NW2d ___ (2002). The corporate entity plaintiffs (hereinafter the Harbor
Companies), which own the area of land in dispute, commenced the instant action for declaratory
relief by filing a complaint challenging the validity of township petitions to reclaim the annexed
property through the statutory process of detachment and the authority of defendant Oakland
County Board of Commissioners to verify the detachment petitions and schedule a detachment
election. After the Harbor Companies filed their complaint, the Oakland County Executive
vetoed the board of commissioners' resolution to schedule a detachment election and was joined
as a defendant in the action. The circuit court entered two separate orders, which ultimately
concluded that the executive's veto was invalid, and to which the parties raise various challenges.
We reverse and remand.
I
A
Given the expedited nature of the circuit court proceedings, the factual record is less than
complete but permits the following summary of background facts. The Harbor Companies
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owned land in Bloomfield Township that they wished to develop, but the township refused to
permit the proposed development. Consequently, the Harbor Companies initiated efforts to have
their land annexed to the adjoining city of Pontiac, which apparently had expressed support for
the proposed development. In an annexation election that took place on September 11, 2001,
voters in Pontiac and the area of the township to be annexed approved the annexation.
Bloomfield Charter Twp, supra at ___.1
Shortly before the occurrence of the annexation election, the township entered an
agreement with the city of Birmingham to transfer property, including a portion of the land
within the annexation area, pursuant to 1984 PA 425, MCL 124.21 et seq. (Act 425).2 The
agreement between the township and the city of Birmingham, dated August 30, 2001, appears to
reflect the township's effort to shield the property from the annexation election.3
Following the approval of the annexation measure in the September 2001 election, the
township initiated efforts to reclaim the annexed property by filing detachment petitions with the
county clerk on October 26, 2001, pursuant to MCL 117.8.4 The county board of commissioners
reviewed the number of petition signers and their voter registration status, the content of the
petitions and the petitions' description of the area proposed for detachment, and concluded that
the detachment petitions satisfied the requirements of MCL 117.6 and MCL 117.8. On
December 13, 2001, the board of commissioners adopted miscellaneous resolution #01305
verifying the detachment petitions and scheduling a detachment election for February 5, 2002.
Also on December 13, 2001, the Harbor Companies initiated the instant action.
On December 21, 2001, the county executive vetoed the detachment resolution by the
board of commissioners. The county executive explained that the petitions incorrectly identified
the area proposed for detachment as a part of Bloomfield Township instead of Pontiac, that the
map attached to the detachment petitions included "not only the purported detachment area but
also additional parcels not included in the detachment effort," and that the legal status of the
detachment area was uncertain in light of several pending litigations involving the land. The
1
In Bloomfield Charter Twp, supra, this panel affirmed the circuit court's refusal to enjoin the
annexation election and the court's dismissal of the remaining counts of the township's complaint
challenging the legality of the annexation petitions. We note that, according to the parties to the
instant case, after the annexation election some Bloomfield Township voters filed a quo warranto
action challenging the annexation election pursuant to MCL 600.4545.
2
The act authorizes that under certain circumstances "[t]wo or more local units may
conditionally transfer property for a period of not more than 50 years for the purpose of an
economic development project." MCL 124.22(1).
3
According to the parties, the Harbor Companies filed a separate Oakland Circuit Court action
challenging the Act 425 agreement.
4
According to the Harbor Companies' complaint, the detachment petitions had several defects,
including that they improperly encompassed a portion of the land that the township had agreed to
transfer to Birmingham under the Act 425 agreement.
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county executive also mentioned that the board of commissioners improvidently had ignored the
advice of the county's corporation counsel regarding the detachment petitions and resolution, and
improperly retained the services of an outside counsel.
B
The Harbor Companies filed their complaint for declaratory relief against the county
board of commissioners and two individual members of the board. The complaint contained the
following relevant claims: count I sought a declaration that the detachment petitions were
invalid because they described the detachment area as a part of Bloomfield Township and
contained maps inaccurately depicting the area proposed for detachment;5 count III requested that
the circuit court declare the board of commissioners without jurisdiction to consider the validity
of the detachment petitions in light of the pending lawsuits regarding the annexation of the area
at issue and the Act 425 agreement, which actions might affect the legal jurisdiction of the
detachment area and the validity of the detachment petitions and election; and count IV sought a
declaration that the board of commissioners' adoption of a resolution verifying the detachment
petitions was invalid on the basis that two individual commissioners participated in the
circulation and signing of detachment petitions.6
On December 26, 2001, the township filed a motion to intervene that also requested the
circuit court's addition of the county executive as a defendant. The township requested an
expedited hearing by the circuit court in light of the rapidly approaching February 5, 2002,
detachment election, for which the township already had commenced preparations. The
township described itself as a necessary party under MCR 2.205(A) and also suggested that it had
a right to intervene according to MCR 2.209(A)(3) given its incurrence of substantial expense in
preparation for the detachment election, its interest in recovering jurisdiction of the previously
annexed parcel, and its interest "in protecting the rights of its citizens to vote."
Regarding the merits of its legal position in favor of the holding of the detachment
election, the township argued that because MCL 117.8 vests in the county board of
commissioners the exclusive authority to determine with finality the validity of detachment
petitions, the county executive's veto constituted a nullity. The township suggested that the
county executive's veto powers were derived from a distinct statute that did not authorize a veto
in the context of a detachment proceeding. The township argued in the alternative that because
the "scope of the County's review [of petitions] under [MCL 117.8] is limited to the ministerial
determination whether the petition complies with statutory requirements," "both the
Commissioners and [Executive] are bound by the same ministerial duty to submit the question to
electors." The township requested a writ of mandamus compelling the holding of the scheduled
detachment election.
5
Although not relevant to this appeal, the Harbor Companies also suggested that the detachment
petitions contradicted the terms of the purported Act 425 agreement.
6
We note that count II, entitled "Declaratory Relief as to the Tabulation of the Votes of the
Affected Areas" is not at issue in this appeal.
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The circuit court scheduled a hearing for December 28, 2001, to address the propriety of
the township's intervention. The court further ordered that the county executive appear as a party
defendant to "show cause as to why his veto of the Board of Commissioners resolution shall not
be set aside and held for naught."
The December 28 hearing constituted the sole circuit court hearing that took place. At
the hearing, the court ruled that the township and Pontiac could intervene in the lawsuit.7 The
court also entertained the county executive's contention that he did not belong in the case because
he had not been afforded due process. The executive argued that the court should dismiss him on
the basis that none of the parties to the action had filed a pleading naming him as a party
defendant. The circuit court explained that it had ordered the executive's presence "out of
courtesy" to afford him an opportunity to raise arguments regarding the validity of his veto. The
court offered to dismiss the executive from the case, but ultimately did not do so after the
executive decided to "withhold the issue" of dismissal. With respect to another procedural
matter raised by the Harbor Companies, the court refused to order consolidation of the instant
detachment case with the pending lawsuits involving the annexation and Act 425 agreement on
the basis that the cases involved different issues and different parties.
The township reiterated its arguments regarding the invalidity of the county executive's
veto of the board of commissioners' detachment resolution.8 The executive averred that MCL
45.561 endowed him with far-reaching discretion to veto resolutions by the board of
commissioners subject to only four limited exceptions, and that resolutions scheduling
detachment elections did not come within one of these narrow exceptions.9 At the close of the
hearing, the circuit court indicated that within the week the parties could "file any kind of briefs,
replies, or whatever you want to do."
Following the parties' submission of additional briefs, the circuit court issued an opinion
and order on January 11, 2002.10 The court found that the township had standing to intervene in
the action on the basis of its interest in the detachment area and its "interest in seeing that its
citizens have the opportunity to vote at the [detachment] election." The court concluded that
MCL 45.561 vested the county executive with the authority to veto the board of commissioners'
detachment resolution. The court explained that the executive's veto did not constitute a
"proceeding" questioning the sufficiency or legality of the detachment petitions, which MCL
117.8 forbids, and distinguished cases cited by the township on the basis that they did not involve
vetoes by county executives. In response to the board of commissioners' suggestion that
7
The court entered orders indicating that it had granted the motions to intervene pursuant to
MCR 2.209.
8
The board of commissioners concurred in the township's arguments.
9
The county executive also suggested that any legal action against him qualified as unripe in
light of the fact that the board of commissioners had not yet determined whether to override the
executive veto. The board ultimately failed to override the veto by the required two-thirds
majority vote, and the issue of ripeness is not involved in this appeal.
10
In Docket No. 239246, the township appeals from the January 11, 2002, order.
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recognizing the authorization of an executive veto of detachment resolutions in only three
Michigan counties would create an "absurdity," the court observed that Oakland County voters
had chosen their statutorily authorized form of government.
The court lastly requested further briefs from the parties regarding the following issues
related to the township's request for a writ of mandamus requiring the executive to approve the
board's detachment resolution:
1. Is the County Executive's approval or disapproval (veto) of the
detachment petition pursuant to MCL 45.561 a purely ministerial function?
2. Assuming it is a purely ministerial function, but a factual dispute exists
between the Board and the County Executive regarding whether the detachment
petition meets the statutory requirements, may the Court resolve the factual
dispute in order to determine whether or not to issue a Writ of Mandamus
compelling the County Executive to approve the Board's resolution?
As requested, the parties filed supplemental briefs.11
On January 29, 2002, the circuit court entered a declaratory judgment ordering that voters
within the township and Pontiac had the right to vote in a February 5, 2002, detachment election.
The court explained that the board of commissioners' duty to determine the validity of
detachment petitions according to relevant statutory requirements plainly involved a purely
ministerial function. The court reasoned that because the board's duty regarding the petitions
involved a ministerial function, the county executive's approval or disapproval also consequently
constituted a ministerial function. According to the court, a contrary decision would ignore the
legislative intent within MCL 117.8 that the filing of a detachment petition meeting the relevant
statutory requirements should entitle citizens to vote regarding the detachment. The court
concluded that because the detachment petitions in this case achieved substantial compliance
with statutory requirements, "the voters of both the City of Pontiac and Charter Township of
Bloomfield are entitled to vote on the detachment issue," and that a "vote on the detachment
issue should go forward . . . notwithstanding the county executive's veto."12
11
The county executive had filed a motion for dismissal from the action, but the court declined to
address the issue because "[t]hat motion is not before the Court at this time."
12
Docket Nos. 239211, 239249, and 239255 all involve challenges, by the county executive, the
Harbor Companies, and Pontiac, respectively, to the circuit court's January 29, 2002, declaratory
judgment order. On February 4, 2002, this Court granted the four applications for leave to appeal
in this case, consolidated them for appeal, and granted a stay of the February 5, 2002, detachment
election and any further circuit court proceedings pending resolution of the instant appeals. The
circuit court's January 29 order, which was not a final order, left unresolved some issues raised
by the parties, including the alleged conflict of interest of the individual county commissioner
defendants and the county executive's motion to be dismissed from the case.
-8-
II
We first address the arguments by the county executive, the Harbor Companies, and
Pontiac that the circuit court violated the separation of powers doctrine in substituting its
judgment for the judgment exercised by the county executive when he vetoed the board's
resolution and the judgment exercised by the board when it failed to override the executive veto.
Whether a violation of the separation of powers doctrine has occurred is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo. Hopkins v Parole Bd, 237 Mich App 629, 635; 604 NW2d 686
(1999).
We conclude that the circuit court did not violate the separation of powers doctrine in
considering the question of the county executive's veto authority for the simple reason that the
separation of powers doctrine stated in Const 1963, art 3, § 2 applies only to the state level of
government and therefore does not apply to local governmental units. Rental Property Owners
Ass'n of Kent Co v Grand Rapids, 455 Mich 246, 266-268; 566 NW2d 514 (1997); Armstrong v
Ypsilanti Charter Twp, 248 Mich App 573, 586-588; 640 NW2d 321 (2001).
III
We next address the central question presented by this case, whether the county executive
possessed the authority to veto the resolution by the county board of commissioners that verified
the detachment petitions and scheduled a detachment election.13 We review de novo the legal
questions involved in statutory interpretation. In re MCI Telecommunications Complaint, 460
Mich 396, 413; 596 NW2d 164 (1999).
A
Our primary goal in interpreting a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the
Legislature's intent in drafting the statute. When the statutory language involved appears clear
and unambiguous on its face, we must presume that the Legislature intended the meaning it
plainly expressed; judicial construction is neither permitted nor required, and we must enforce
the statute as written. Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002);
In re MCI, supra at 411. "[C]ourts may not speculate about an unstated purpose where the
unambiguous text plainly reflects the intent of the Legislature." Pohutski, supra at 683. Courts
must accord the words of a statute their plain and ordinary meanings and should look beyond the
statutory language itself to ascertain legislative intent only when the statutory language appears
ambiguous. Id.; In re MCI, supra.
The parties rely on two distinct statutory provisions to support their arguments regarding
the county executive's authority to veto a resolution of the county board of commissioners
regarding detachment. The township and the board of commissioners refer to a section of the
13
Because we find the issue of the county executive's veto authority clearly dispositive of this
case, we will assume for the sake of argument that the detachment petitions substantially
complied with statutory requirements.
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Home Rule City Act, MCL 117.1 et seq., specifically MCL 117.8, which delineates as follows
the responsibilities of a board of commissioners on its receipt of detachment petitions:
Said petition [for boundary alteration in accordance with MCL 117.6]
shall be addressed to the board of supervisors of the county in which the territory
to be affected by such proposed incorporation, consolidation or change of
boundaries is located, and shall be filed with the clerk of said board not less than
30 days before the convening of such board in regular session, or in any special
session called for the purpose of considering said petition, and if, before final
action thereon, it shall appear to said board or a majority thereof that said
petition or the signing thereof does not conform to this act, or contains incorrect
statements, no further proceedings pursuant to said petition shall be had, but, if it
shall appear that said petition conforms in all respects to the provisions of this
act, and that the statements contained therein are true, said board of supervisors
shall, by resolution, provide that the question of making the proposed
incorporation, consolidation or change of boundaries shall be submitted to the
qualified electors of the district to be affected at the next general election,
occurring in not less than 40 days after the adoption of such resolution, and if no
general election is to occur within 90 days, said resolution may fix a date
preceding said general election for a special election on such question: . . . After
the adoption of such resolution neither the sufficiency nor legality of the petition
on which it is based may be questioned in any proceeding. [Emphasis added.]
The township and the board of commissioners aver that § 8 vests in the board the exclusive and
final authority to determine the validity of detachment petitions and to schedule a detachment
election. The county executive, Pontiac, and the Harbor Companies refer to MCL 45.561, a
section of the act authorizing the adoption of "an optional unified form of county government."
MCL 45.551.14 With respect to a county that adopts the optional unified form of county
government designating a county executive, MCL 45.552(1)(b), § 11 of the act invests the county
executive with the following authority:
14
According to MCL 45.552(1),
[a]n optional unified form of county government shall include either:
(a) An appointed county manager, who shall comply with the
qualifications and exercise the responsibilities detailed in sections 7 and 8. This
form of county government shall be known as alternate A.
(b) An elected county executive, who shall comply with the qualifications
and exercise the responsibilities detailed in sections 8, 9, 10, and 11. This form of
county government shall be known as alternate B.
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(1) Except as provided in this section, the county executive may veto an
ordinance or resolution adopted by the board, including items of an ordinance
appropriating funds. The veto shall be certified by the county executive to the
board of county commissioners within 10 days after date of adoption of the
ordinance or resolution and the board may override the veto by a 2/3 vote of all
members elected and serving. The county board of commissioners shall override
a veto by the second meeting following deliverance to the county board of
commissioners of the message of veto. The county executive may not approve or
disapprove resolutions or motions pertaining to any of the following:
(a) The organizational structure of the county board of commissioners.
(b) Appointments by the county board of commissioners.
(c) Resolutions concerning the county board of commissioners' policy
positions as to pending legislation.
(d) The abolishment of the optional unified form of county government
under section 23.
(2) Under the unified form of county government containing alternate B [a
county executive], an ordinance or resolution shall become effective on approval
of the county executive, on expiration of 10 days, measured in hours and minutes
from the time presented to the county executive, without approval or veto, or on
the overriding of a veto in the manner above described. [MCL 45.561 (emphasis
added).]
The county executive, Pontiac, and the Harbor Companies assert that the executive's veto
authority provided within § 11 plainly encompasses detachment resolutions.
B
The clear and unambiguous language of MCL 45.561 inescapably leads to our conclusion
that the county executive possessed the authority to veto the board of commissioners' detachment
resolution, and thus acted properly in doing so. The Legislature plainly provided that with the
exception of the four specifically prescribed limitations enumerated within § 11 itself, the county
executive may veto ordinances and resolutions adopted by the board of commissioners. The
Legislature's explicit restriction of the county executive's veto power to only four limited
instances clearly signals the Legislature's intent that a county executive otherwise should have
broad authority to veto the board's ordinances and resolutions. Similarly, the fact that the
Legislature did not include detachment resolutions within its enumeration of the four specific
exemptions from the county executive's veto authority plainly reflects the Legislature's intent to
forgo any detachment resolution exemption. Bradley v Saranac Community Schools Bd of Ed,
455 Mich 285, 298-299; 565 NW2d 650 (1997) (noting that "[t]his Court recognizes the maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius; that the express mention in a statute of one thing implies the
-11-
exclusion of other similar things"); Alcona Co v Wolverine Environmental Production, Inc, 233
Mich App 238, 247; 590 NW2d 586 (1998).
Although the parties have argued at length attempting to characterize the county
executive's veto of a detachment resolution of a county board of commissioners as ministerial or
not, we find no statutory basis for engaging in this exercise. The veto power the Legislature
provided the county executive within MCL 45.561 simply does not distinguish that the executive
may exercise his discretion to veto under certain circumstances, but that in different situations the
executive either must or must not invoke his veto power. As we stated above, the Legislature
plainly granted the executive broad veto power circumscribed only by the four enumerated
exceptions within MCL 45.561. These four specific exceptions do not include a "ministerial
duty" exception. We will not engage in prohibited judicial legislation by engrafting a further
exception for which the Legislature clearly did not provide. Pohutski, supra at 683; In re Wayne
Co Prosecutor, 232 Mich App 482, 486; 591 NW2d 359 (1998).
We reject the township's suggestion that MCL 117.8 precludes an executive veto in the
instant case because it constitutes a section of a more specific act than the conflicting general
legislation encompassing MCL 45.561, and that the language of MCL 117.8 places the exclusive
and final determination regarding the validity of detachment petitions in the hands of the board of
commissioners. We find instructive Oakland Co Comm'r v Oakland Co Executive, 98 Mich App
639; 296 NW2d 621 (1980), in which this Court considered the Oakland County Executive's
authority to veto certain resolutions adopted by the Oakland County Board of Commissioners.
At the time the case arose, MCL 45.561(1) contained no enumerated exceptions to a county
executive's veto powers, instead providing that a "county executive may veto any ordinance or
resolution adopted by the board . . . ." Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 651. This Court considered
and rejected as follows arguments similar to those that the township raises in this case:
Plaintiffs argue that the resolutions [by the board of commissioners] to
withdraw from SEMTA [the Southeastern Michigan Transportation Authority] and
to merge the offices of public works and drain commissioners were made pursuant
to specific statutory authority granted it by the Legislature [specifically, MCL
124.405(1) and MCL 280.21(3)]. Arguing that 1973 PA 139 [the optional unified
form of county government act] represents general legislation, plaintiffs contend
that the special legislation under which the resolutions were passed takes
precedence over the veto power granted the county executive in the act as
exceptions to the general statute which must be given effect to carry out legislative
intent. Plaintiffs conclude that where, as here, a general intention is expressed and
also a particular intention which is incompatible with the general one, the
particular intention shall be considered as an exception to the general one. . . .
While plaintiffs correctly state the general rule of law, we are unable to
agree that the rule applies here. We do not find the conflict in legislation alleged
by plaintiffs to be present. To the contrary, we find 1973 PA 139 to be completely
harmonious with the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act of 1967, MCL
124.401 et seq. . . ., as well as with the Drain Code of 1956, MCL 280.1 et seq. . . .
-12-
The ability of the board of commissioners to vote in favor of a SEMTA
withdrawal, or a public works/drain commissioner merger, does not conflict with
the ultimate veto power of the county executive, nor with the board of
commissioners' subsequent ability to override such vetoes. One represents
legislative action; the other executive fiat. The subject matter covered by each
does not directly overlap. Surely, the words "subject to veto" need not have been
included by the Legislature as a part of the SEMTA withdrawal and merger
enactments. [Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 651-652 (emphasis added).]
The circuit court correctly found in its January 11, 2002, opinion and order that no conflict
existed between the statute authorizing the board to adopt resolutions verifying detachment
petitions and the statute authorizing the county executive to veto resolutions, including
detachment resolutions. Consequently, we cannot accept the argument by the township that
MCL 117.8 conflicts with MCL 45.561 and must be construed as a specific exception to the veto
power that authorizes the board in every case to make decisions regarding detachment petitions
immune from and unaffected by an executive veto15—especially in light of the clear and
unambiguous language within MCL 45.561 authorizing the county executive's veto in a broad
variety of circumstances limited only by the four enumerated exceptions that make no mention of
detachment resolutions.16
15
We find misplaced the township's heavy reliance on Raven, Inc v Southfield, 69 Mich App
696, 702-704; 245 NW2d 370 (1976) (dissenting opinion by Danhof, C.J.), rev'd 399 Mich 853
(1977) (adopting the reasoning within the dissenting opinion by Danhof, C.J.). Raven involved
the validity of the Southfield mayor's veto of a city council resolution approving the plaintiff 's
liquor license. 69 Mich App 697. The circuit court granted the plaintiff summary disposition,
apparently finding that the mayor's attempted veto constituted a nullity. Id. at 698. This Court
reversed, however, on the basis that the mayor, who possessed the authority to veto council
resolutions pursuant to the city charter, constituted a part of the "'local legislative body'" entitled
to approve liquor licenses pursuant to MCL 436.17. 69 Mich App 701-702. In the dissenting
opinion adopted by the Supreme Court, Chief Judge Danhof reasoned that MCL 436.17 plainly
provided for the approval of liquor license applications by only the local legislative body, which
did not include the mayor. 69 Mich App 703-704. Chief Judge Danhof concluded that the
mayor's city-charter-based authority to veto council resolutions did not apply in light of the plain
language of MCL 436.17, which contemplated no role for the mayor in liquor license application
approval. 69 Mich App 704.
Quite unlike the instant case, however, Raven did not involve a broad, statutorily
authorized veto by a county executive. The circuit court also properly distinguished the several
cases the township cited in support of its argument regarding the board's exclusive and final
authority to determine the validity of detachment resolutions. These cases cited by the township
likewise did not contemplate the statutorily authorized county executive veto authority within
MCL 45.561.
16
In Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 653, this Court further addressed the plaintiffs' "contention
that the veto power was intended to be exercisable only as to matters dealing with the optional
unified form of county government . . . ." This Court rejected the plaintiffs' suggestion because
MCL 45.561 "plainly and unambiguously refers to any action of the board of commissioners as a
(continued…)
-13-
The township and the board of commissioners rely on the final sentence of MCL 117.8,
which sets forth that "[a]fter the adoption of such resolution neither the sufficiency nor legality of
the petition on which it is based may be questioned in any proceeding," in support of their
contention that the board of commissioners must have the last word with respect to the validity of
detachment petitions. For several reasons we find this contention unpersuasive. First, the
Legislature presumably was aware of the role played by the board of commissioners with respect
to the processing of detachment petitions pursuant to MCL 117.8, but nonetheless subsequently
granted the county executive the broad authority to veto resolutions by the board without
excepting detachment resolutions. See Malcolm v East Detroit, 437 Mich 132, 139; 468 NW2d
479 (1991) (noting the "well-tested principle of construction that the Legislature is held to be
aware of the existence of the law in effect at the time of its enactments"). The Legislature not
only failed to include a detachment resolution exception when it initially enacted MCL 45.561,
but it also declined to incorporate a detachment resolution exception when it later amended MCL
45.561 to include the four limited exceptions that it currently possesses.
Second, in response to the township's suggestion that the Legislature did not include a
detachment exception within MCL 45.561 because it knew that the last sentence of MCL 117.8
already precluded a county executive veto of a detachment resolution, we remain unconvinced
that the Legislature's use of the word "proceeding" within the ultimate sentence of MCL 117.8 is
intended to apply to a county executive's veto. According to Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed), the
term "proceeding" refers to "[t]he regular and orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts
and events between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment," or "[a]ny procedural
means for seeking redress from a tribunal or agency." [Emphasis added.] While one of the
further, more general meanings of "proceeding" includes "[a]n act or step that is part of a larger
action," id., we note that in considering the meaning of the last sentence within MCL 117.8 the
Michigan Supreme Court has observed that "[a]pparently the provision that such resolution shall
not thereafter be questioned was intended to prevent undue delay resulting from litigation."
French v Ingham Co, 342 Mich 690, 698; 71 NW2d 244 (1955) (emphasis added). Third, even
were we to accept an all-encompassing definition of "proceeding" within MCL 117.8, we would
find that the last sentence of § 8 did not apply to this case because the detachment resolution
technically had not been adopted in light of the county executive's veto and the board's
subsequent failure to override the veto. MCL 45.561(2); Livonia Drive-In Theatre Co v Livonia,
363 Mich 438, 445; 109 NW2d 837 (1961) (observing that "no valid resolution" existed after
(…continued)
proper subject for exercise of veto power. No judicial construction to the contrary is possible."
Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 653 (emphasis in original). Although the Legislature since has
enacted exceptions to the executive's veto authority, these exceptions are specific and exclusive
and do not purport to limit the executive's veto authority only to matters dealing with the optional
unified form of county government. In light of this Court's previous holding regarding the broad
nature of the executive's veto authority and the Legislature's subsequent limitation of that
authority only in limited respects, we reject the suggestion by the board that the executive's veto
power applies only to resolutions involving the board's passage of legislation or action with
respect to the operation of county government.
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"the exercise of the veto power by the mayor, and the failure of the common council to override
such action").
We lastly note regarding the issue of the county executive's veto authority that we fail to
detect any "absurdity" resulting from our enforcement of the plain and unambiguous legislative
vesting of a broad veto power in the county executive within the optional unified county form of
government act, as chosen by the voters of Oakland County. Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 647
("Oakland County adopted this [county executive] form of government pursuant to the strictures
found in MCL 45.553 . . . through initial adoption thereof by the board of commissioners and
subsequent approval by the voters.").
We conclude that the circuit court erroneously imposed a ministerial duty exception on
the county executive's veto authority. Because the executive properly invoked his broad
discretion pursuant to MCL 45.561 to veto the board's detachment resolution, and because the
board failed to override the county executive's veto, we further conclude that the board's
detachment resolution had no effect, MCL 45.561(2); Livonia Drive-In Theatre, supra, and could
not form the basis for scheduling a detachment election pursuant to MCL 117.8.
IV
Our conclusion that the county executive had authority to veto the board of
commissioners' detachment resolution, and the resultant fact that the county executive's veto of
the December 13, 2001, detachment resolution of the board precluded the occurrence of the
scheduled detachment election, render unnecessary our disposition of the various secondary
issues raised by the parties.17 Although the township's briefs on appeal decry its perception that
the county executive "single-handedly usurp[ed] the rights of approximately 77,000 Pontiac and
Bloomfield electors," we find this characterization inaccurate. In this case, the voters of the
township and Pontiac had no right to vote in the detachment election because the executive
vetoed the detachment resolution pursuant to a clear investment of authority by the Legislature,
which itself is elected by Michigan voters. Furthermore, the county executive acted in his
capacity as an official elected by the voting citizens of Oakland County, MCL 45.559, who also
17
We nonetheless note our belief that the township's financial stake in the detachment election
and its need for guidance with respect to its election obligations constituted an adequate basis for
its standing in this case. Lee v Macomb Co Bd of Comm'rs, 464 Mich 726, 739-740; 629 NW2d
900 (2001). We also note that we need not address the county executive's arguments regarding
the propriety of his dismissal from the case because the executive ignores the basis for the circuit
court's decision to order his appearance. Joerger v Gordon Food Service, Inc, 224 Mich App
167, 175; 568 NW2d 365 (1997). The executive addresses alleged defects in the township's
motion to add him as a party defendant, ignoring that the circuit court sua sponte ordered the
executive's appearance "as a courtesy." Moreover, we note that the circuit court never ruled on
the motion to dismiss filed by the executive. Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541, 549;
599 NW2d 489 (1999). We further note that the circuit court properly declined to transfer the
instant detachment action to the circuit judge entertaining cases involving the prior annexation of
the property because the cases arose from different transactions or occurrences. MCR
8.111(D)(1); Ross v Onyx Oil & Gas Corp, 128 Mich App 660, 668-669; 341 NW2d 783 (1983).
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voted to select the optional county executive form of government with its accompanying
executive veto authority. Oakland Co Comm'r, supra at 647. Accordingly, this case reflects the
proper functioning of the form of county government specifically chosen by the county's voters,
who have recourse to the voting booth should they feel inclined to express dissatisfaction with
the county executive's veto.
We reverse the circuit court's January 29, 2002, declaratory judgment order and remand
this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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