ELROY MOORE V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ELROY MOORE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 17, 2002
APPROVED FOR
PUBLICATION
July 30, 2002
9:10 A.M.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 230400
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 98-839992-NO
CITY OF DETROIT and
MANIEL V. PATEL,
Defendants-Appellees.
Updated Copy
October 11, 2002
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Smolenski and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the circuit court's order granting summary disposition
for defendants pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) concerning plaintiff 's false imprisonment and
intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) claims. We reverse in part, affirm in part, and
remand.
This Court reviews de novo decisions on motions for summary disposition. Spiek v Dep't
of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under MCR
2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim and is reviewed to determine
whether the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, or any other documentary evidence establish a
genuine issue of material fact to warrant a trial. Id.
The first issue on appeal is whether there is a distinction between the torts of false
imprisonment, which plaintiff pleaded, and false arrest, which he did not. We conclude that the
torts can be distinguished and that plaintiff was not required to allege an arrest involving
government law enforcement. There has been confusion in Michigan law regarding whether
false arrest and false imprisonment are separate causes of action. See, e.g., Lewis v Farmer Jack
Division, Inc, 415 Mich 212, 231, n 4; 327 NW2d 893 (1982) (Williams, J., dissenting). Many
precedents do not distinguish between the two tort claims, which are often brought together. See,
e.g., Adams v Nat'l Bank of Detroit, 444 Mich 329, 341 (Levin, J.), 343, (Boyle, J.), 354 (Mallett,
J., and Cavanagh, C.J., concurring); 508 NW2d 464 (1993), Clarke v K mart Corp, 197 Mich
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App 541, 546-547; 495 NW2d 820 (1992), and Hill v Taylor, 50 Mich 549, 552; 15 NW 899
(1883). Other authorities imply that while the torts overlap, there are distinguishing
characteristics allowing separate causes of action. See, e.g., SJI2d 116.01 and SJI2d 116.02
(providing separate and distinct definitions and instructions for the torts of false arrest and false
imprisonment);1 see also Willoughby v Lehrbass, 150 Mich App 319, 350; 388 NW2d 688
(1986), Tumbarella v Kroger Co, 85 Mich App 482; 271 NW2d 284 (1978), Stowers v
Wolodzko, 386 Mich 119; 191 NW2d 355 (1971), and Hall v Pizza Hut of America, Inc, 153
Mich App 609, 613; 396 NW2d 809 (1986) (implying a distinction between false arrest and false
imprisonment). In our view, the general concept of false imprisonment as an "unlawful restraint
of an individual's personal liberty" is broader than, but includes, a false arrest involving law
enforcement. See Clarke, supra at 546-547, quoting Tumbarella, supra at 489; see also Black's
Law Dictionary (7th ed), p 618 (the tort of "[f]alse imprisonment . . . applies to private as well as
government detention"). Thus, we conclude that an action for false imprisonment can be
maintained without alleging such an arrest.
Nevertheless, we conclude that plaintiff failed to present a genuine issue of material fact
concerning whether defendants falsely imprisoned him and that summary disposition of this
claim was, therefore, proper. The elements of false imprisonment are "[1] an act committed with
the intention of confining another, [2] the act directly or indirectly results in such confinement,
and [3] the person confined is conscious of his confinement." Adams, supra at 341 (Levin, J.),
see also 354, n 8 (Mallett, J., and Cavanagh, C.J., concurring), citing 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, ยง
35, p 52.
With respect to the second element, plaintiff came forward with insufficient evidence that
he was ever actually confined or restrained for any significant period in the building, yard, or
parking lot. The record reveals that the front door was likely unlocked, a fence was down
between the outside yard area and the parking lot, and, for a significant period, the gate of the
parking lot to the street was also open. According to plaintiff 's deposition testimony, some of his
co-workers left the premises through these exits.
Further, even if plaintiff was briefly locked in some enclosure, brief confinements or
restraints are insufficient for false imprisonment. See, e.g., Willoughby, supra at 350 (holding
that where a teacher took hold of a student, led him to the principal's office, and released him,
there was no actionable detention by the teacher for purposes of false imprisonment). The
confinements allegedly caused by defendant Maniel V. Patel's conduct were momentary and
fleeting. Plaintiff 's escape was stalled at length only when, through his own recklessness, he
injured himself.
Finally, "[t]he essence of a claim of false imprisonment is that the imprisonment is false,
i.e., without right or authority to do so." Hess v Wolverine Lake, 32 Mich App 601, 604; 189
NW2d 42 (1971). The uncontested facts of this case are that plaintiff returned to his former
1
Although the standard jury instructions are not legal authority, they are intended to accurately
state applicable law. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co v Couvier, 227 Mich App 271, 273, n 1;
575 NW2d 331 (1998).
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workplace without requesting permission to do so from management and did so at a time of day
he knew was inappropriate for employees to be on the premises. Further, he participated in an
activity that he knew was against workplace rules. Plaintiff does not argue or present any
evidence that Patel did anything outside his management authority in his attempts to limit the
ways that plaintiff and the others could leave the premises and thereby to identify the persons
involved for appropriate disciplinary action. Therefore, we are not persuaded that the circuit
court erred in granting summary disposition for the defendants with respect to the false
imprisonment claim.
However, we conclude that plaintiff established a genuine issue of fact regarding whether
defendants were liable for IIED. The elements of IIED are "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct;
(2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; and (4) severe emotional distress." Johnson v Wayne
Co, 213 Mich App 143, 161; 540 NW2d 66 (1995). According to plaintiff 's deposition, Patel
saw plaintiff lying on the ground and actually established eye contact with him following the
accident in which he broke his leg. Patel denies that, but a genuine issue of material fact is
presented. If the factfinder determines that Patel saw plaintiff in this position and understood
that he had experienced a serious physical injury, the factfinder could conclude that Patel's
leaving plaintiff behind or his locking the facility in a manner that would prevent others,
including medical personnel, from assisting plaintiff was extreme and outrageous conduct. If so,
the factfinder might also conclude that this conduct caused plaintiff severe emotional distress
apart from that distress he already experienced as a result of his physical injury, which Patel had
not caused.
We reverse the trial court's order to the extent that it granted summary disposition to
defendants on the IIED claim, and we remand for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is not
retained.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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