MARCELLA WEAVER V CITY OF DETROIT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MARCELLA WEAVER, Personal Representative
of the Estate of DENNIS WEAVER, Deceased
FOR PUBLICATION
July 16, 2002
9:10 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 218514
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 96-644363
CITY OF DETROIT, a municipal corporation
Defendant-Appellant.
Updated Copy
September 13, 2002
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Hood, Cavanagh, Saad, Wilder, Owens, and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
We convened a special panel1 to resolve the conflict between Weaver v Detroit, 249 Mich
App 801 (2002), vacated 249 Mich App 801 (2002) (hereafter Weaver I ), and Ridley v Detroit
(On Remand), 246 Mich App 687; 639 NW2d 258 (2001). We examine here whether a
municipality is liable in tort for an alleged negligent maintenance of a streetlight pole, under the
highway exception2 to governmental immunity. The panel in Weaver I would have answered
"no" to this question had it not been bound by the prior holding in Ridley (On Remand). We find
that the panel in Weaver I was correct and hold both that a streetlight pole is not implicated in the
definition of the term "highway" found in MCL 691.1401(e) and that the highway exception to
governmental immunity does not apply here. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment entered by
the trial court against defendant based on the jury verdict and remand this case to the trial court
for entry of a judgment of no cause of action in favor of defendant.
I. Facts and Proceedings
The following summary of the facts and proceedings is adopted from our Court's opinion
in Weaver I, supra at 801-805:
1
Pursuant to MCR 7.215(I)(1).
2
MCL 691.1402.
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Defendant city of Detroit appeals by right the trial court's order entered
upon a jury verdict that found defendant liable for the wrongful death of Dennis
Weaver and that awarded plaintiff Marcella Weaver, the decedent's personal
representative, $2 million in damages plus interest. . . .
This case arises from an accident that occurred when a bus struck a light
pole, and the light pole fell on Dennis Weaver and killed him. Plaintiff 's theory
of the case was that because of defendant's failure to inspect and repair the light
pole, the pole corroded so seriously that when the bus merely bumped or rubbed
it, it fractured and broke. Testimony presented at trial established that the rusty
light pole, erected in 1970 and last inspected in 1979, was placed eighteen inches
from the highway's curb, which was in accordance with industry standards, and
was owned and maintained by defendant city.
Defendant city asserts that it is immune from tort liability in this case
because the highway exception to governmental immunity is inapplicable in this
case. . . .
* * *
. . . Defendant . . . asserts that the light pole at issue was a utility pole;
consequently, defendant is not liable under the highway exception to
governmental immunity. But in the recent case of Ridley (On Remand), supra at
691-692, a majority of this Court explicitly concluded that a light pole is not a
utility pole, so it is not excluded by definition from the highway exception of
governmental immunity and an action may be maintained. This Court's decision
in Ridley (On Remand) followed the Supreme Court's remand5 of this Court's first
decision in Ridley v Detroit, 231 Mich App 381; 590 NW2d 69 (1998)
(hereinafter "Ridley I"), for reconsideration in light of Evens v Shiawassee Co Rd
Comm'rs, 463 Mich 143; 615 NW2d 702 (2000), the companion case of Nawrocki
[v Macomb Co Rd Comm].
In Ridley I, supra at 383, a group of men attacked and beat the plaintiff 's
decedent. After the beating, an automobile struck the decedent when he tried to
stand. Id. After the first automobile knocked him down, a second vehicle struck
and killed him. Id. On the night and on the street where the decedent was killed,
the streetlights were not functioning and had not been for some time. Id. at 383384. The trial court found that the defendant, city of Detroit, was liable because it
had been negligent in failing to provide street lighting and awarded plaintiff
damages. Id. at 384. This Court affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment in
favor of the plaintiff and rejected the defendant city's argument that the plaintiff 's
claim was barred by governmental immunity. Id. at 383, 384.
__________________________________________________________________
5
Ridley v Detroit, 463 Mich 932 (2000).
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__________________________________________________________________
II. Standard of Review
Because this case involves a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo.
Pohutski v City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 683; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). We must give effect
to each word in the statute, according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. at 683-684.
Additionally, we should avoid construing the statute in a manner that renders any part of it
surplusage or nugatory. Id. at 684.
III. Analysis
A. Governmental Immunity with Regard to Municipalities
Recently, in Pohutski, supra, our Supreme Court reviewed the development of
governmental immunity in our state and noted the important historical distinction between
"sovereign immunity," which applies only to state government, and "governmental immunity,"
which initially through judicial construction was applied to "inferior" divisions of government,
including municipalities. Id. at 682. In Williams v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 250; 111 NW2d 1
(1961), however, the Michigan Supreme Court abolished the common-law doctrine of
governmental immunity as applied to municipalities. Pohutski, supra 682-683. Partly in
reaction to the Williams decision, the Legislature enacted the governmental tort liability act in
1964 with the intention of providing "'uniform liability and immunity to both state and local
governmental agencies' when involved in a governmental function." Id. at 683, quoting Ross v
Consumers Power Co (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 614; 363 NW2d 641 (1984).
As enacted, the act grants immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies involved
in exercising or discharging governmental functions. MCL 691.1407(1). The definition of
"governmental agency" includes municipal corporations such as defendant city of Detroit.
Weakley v Dearborn Heights (On Remand), 246 Mich App 322, 325; 632 NW2d 177 (2001);
Cox v Dearborn Heights, 210 Mich App 389, 392; 534 NW2d 135 (1995). At the time of the
accident in this case, a "governmental function" was defined as an activity that is "expressly or
impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other
law."3 MCL 691.1401(f). Here, there is no dispute that erecting and maintaining the streetlight
pole constituted a governmental function.
B. Extent of Immunity
The immunity granted under MCL 691.1407 is expressed in the "broadest possible
language . . . ." Nawrocki v Macomb Co Rd Comm, 463 Mich 143, 156; 615 NW2d 702 (2000).
However, it is subject to certain statutory exceptions, including the highway exception, MCL
3
The Legislature subsequently amended the definition of "governmental function" in 1999 PA
205, effective December 21, 1999, and in 2001 PA 131, effective October 15, 2001. However,
these amendments do not affect our analysis.
-3-
691.1402. Pusakulich v Ironwood, 247 Mich App 80, 83; 635 NW2d 323 (2001). Pursuant to
this exception, a governmental agency is not immune from tort liability that results from its
failure to "maintain the highway in reasonable repair so that it is reasonably safe and convenient
for public travel." MCL 691.1402(1).
C. Inapplicability of the Highway Exception
The Court in Ridley (On Remand) reaffirmed its previous determination that, because a
streetlight was not a utility pole and not otherwise specifically excluded from the definition of
"highway," the highway exception to governmental immunity applied and the defendant city
could be held responsible for failing to maintain a streetlight. Ridley (On Remand), supra at 690692. Moreover, the Ridley (On Remand) Court held that Nawrocki and its companion case,
Evens v Shiawassee Co Rd Comm'rs, were not controlling for two reasons: (1) Nawrocki and
Evens both involved claims against county road commissions, but the defendant in Ridley was a
municipality and (2) the Supreme Court did not address in Nawrocki and Evens whether a
streetlight is a utility pole. Ridley (On Remand), supra at 691-692.
We find these distinctions to be insignificant when the facts of this case are analyzed in a
manner consistent with the central theme of the Supreme Court's decision in Nawrocki. Critical
to the Court's analysis in Nawrocki is the basic principle that "the immunity conferred upon
governmental agencies is broad, and the statutory exceptions thereto are to be narrowly
construed." Nawrocki, supra at 158. Consistent with this basic principle, "[n]o action may be
maintained under the highway exception unless it is clearly within the scope and meaning of
[MCL 691.1402(1)]." Weakley, supra at 326.
Applying these principles, we conclude that the highway exception to governmental
immunity does not apply here because a streetlight pole is not part of the "highway." At the time
of the accident, MCL 691.1401(e), in part, defined "highway" to mean "every public highway,
road, and street which is open for public travel and shall include bridges, sidewalks, crosswalks,
and culverts on any highway."4 We agree with the Weaver I panel and hold that, as with traffic
signals and signs, see Nawrocki, supra at 180, 182 & n 37, the plain language of the statute does
not support the conclusion that streetlight poles are included within the definition of the term
"highway." Weaver I, supra at 804. Accordingly, we reject as inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute the holding in Ridley (On Remand) that a streetlight pole is part of the
"highway" because it is not specifically excluded from the definition of "highway" in MCL
691.1401(e). The Court in Ridley (On Remand) also concluded that the highway exception to
governmental immunity applies to cases involving negligent failure to provide street lighting
because a streetlight pole is not a utility pole as provided in MCL 691.1401(e). However,
4
The definition of "highway" was subsequently amended by 1999 PA 205, effective December
21, 1999. However, this amendment does not alter our analysis.
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because a streetlight pole is not included in the definition of "highway," we need not and do not
decide whether the Court in Ridley (On Remand) correctly decided this question.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the Court in Weaver I that a streetlight pole is
not part of the highway as defined in MCL 691.1401(e) and that Ridley (On Remand) was
wrongly decided. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of judgment in favor of plaintiff
consistent with the jury verdict, and remand this case to the trial court for entry of a judgment of
no cause of action in favor of defendant. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Harold Hood
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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