MACOMB COUNTY DEPT OF SOCIAL SERVICES V RICHARD MARTIN WESTERMAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MACOMB COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES on behalf of TAMMY JO
ROBERTS a/k/a TAMMY JO SCHOTT,
FOR PUBLICATION
March 8, 2002
9:25 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 223563
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 92-003781-DS
RICHARD MARTIN WESTERMAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Updated Copy
June 7, 2002
Before: Neff, P.J., and Wilder and Cooper, JJ.
NEFF, P.J.
We granted plaintiff Tammy Roberts' delayed application for leave to appeal the trial
court's denial of her motion for relief from a consent judgment entered in 1989 following her
paternity action against defendant.1 We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
Following the birth of her son out of wedlock in April 1986, plaintiff filed a paternity
action against defendant, alleging that he was the child's father. According to defendant, the case
was "litigated extensively," and "blood and tissue typing tests were performed." In 1989, the
parties agreed to a settlement, in which defendant acknowledged paternity. The trial court
entered a consent judgment based on the parties' settlement.
1
The present action and the 1989 paternity action were brought by the Macomb County
Department of Social Services on behalf of Tammy Jo Roberts. For the sake of clarity, we will
refer to Tammy Jo Roberts as the "plaintiff," unless otherwise indicated.
-1-
A
The essentials of the parties' settlement agreement were that defendant acknowledged
paternity and agreed to pay past child support, consent to an anticipated stepparent adoption,
provide an annuity to benefit the child, and be relieved of any future support obligations.
Accordingly, the consent judgment ordered that defendant "shall acknowledge paternity of the
minor child," and "is determined by this Court to be the father of the minor child." The judgment
required that defendant purchase an annuity policy guaranteeing payouts to the child beginning
either at age eighteen or age twenty-one. The judgment ordered that defendant reimburse the
Macomb County Department of Social Services (MCDSS) $6,500 for costs of confinement and
past support. It further provided that defendant "shall not be liable for future support or
maintenance regarding the minor child, and that the defendant shall have no further obligations,
financial, support, medical expenses, maintenance or otherwise, to the minor child or any of the
parties hereto, except as provided for in this Judgment."
It is undisputed that defendant purchased an annuity policy and made payment to the
MCDSS as required under the consent judgment. However, the anticipated stepparent adoption
did not occur, and plaintiff subsequently divorced. In March 1991, plaintiff again began
receiving public assistance for the minor child.
B
The MCDSS brought the present action for support and restitution on behalf of plaintiff
in September 1992, pursuant to MCL 722.3 and MCL 552.454, after the child began receiving
public assistance. The MCDSS sought child support of $163 a month and reimbursement of over
$3,000 for past public assistance. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, on
the ground that the consent judgment was a nonmodifiable settlement agreement in a paternity
action pursuant to MCL 722.713(b),2 which barred the MCDSS from seeking additional support
from defendant absent rescission or modification of the original agreement and judgment.
In 1999, plaintiff filed a motion in the circuit court to rescind the consent judgment under
MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f). The circuit court denied plaintiff 's motion, finding that defendant had
completely performed his obligations under the consent judgment, and thus, the court was unable
to modify it because, under the terms of the judgment, the court had retained jurisdiction only
until the parties had performed their obligations. This Court granted plaintiff 's delayed
application for leave to appeal the order denying her motion to rescind the consent judgment.
II
2
The Legislature, in 1996 PA 308, has since repealed this statutory provision, effective June 1,
1997. Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248, 252, n 1; 615 NW2d 218 (2000).
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Plaintiff argues that although the parties entered into the consent judgment pursuant to
MCL 722.713, which allows for the parties to a paternity action to enter into a nonmodifiable
support agreement, MCL 722.713 was thereafter declared unconstitutional by the Court of
Appeals, Dones v Thomas, 210 Mich App 674; 534 NW2d 221 (1995), and repealed, 1996 PA
308. Thus, plaintiff alleges the parties' agreement is modifiable, and the circuit court has
continuing jurisdiction over the issue of child support. We agree, although under different
reasoning, that the parties' child support agreement is modifiable and that the circuit court has
jurisdiction over the issue of child support.
Since the circuit court's opinion in this matter, and after the submission of plaintiff 's brief
on appeal, the Supreme Court issued a decision clarifying the circumstances under which a
settlement agreement under MCL 722.713 is nonmodifiable, Crego v Coleman, 463 Mich 248,
252, n 1; 615 NW2d 218 (2000). Under the analysis in Crego, id. at 256-257, 276-277, we
conclude that the parties' agreement is not a nonmodifiable settlement agreement under MCL
722.713 because defendant acknowledged paternity, and thus his child is entitled to modifiable
support, just as any other child whose paternity has been ascertained.
III
Biological parents have an inherent obligation to support their children. Evink v Evink,
214 Mich App 172, 175-176; 542 NW2d 328 (1995). A biological parent must support a minor
child unless a court of competent jurisdiction modifies or terminates the obligation or the child is
emancipated. MCL 722.3. The purpose of child support is to provide for the needs of a child.
Evink, supra at 176. The parents of a child are not permitted to bargain away a child's right to
receive adequate support. Id. This Court has stated that it has "a dim view of agreements
purporting to sign away the rights of a child, particularly when the result of such an agreement
may be that the child becomes a public charge . . . ." Van Laar v Rozema, 94 Mich App 619,
624; 288 NW2d 667 (1980).
MCL 722.713 allowed for nonmodifiable child support in the settlement of a paternity
action:
(a) An agreement or compromise made by the mother or child or by some
authorized person on their behalf with the father concerning the support and
education of the child shall be binding upon the mother and the child only when
the court having jurisdiction to compel support and education of the child shall
have determined that adequate provision is reasonably secured by payment or
otherwise and has approved the agreement or compromise.
(b) The performance of the agreement or compromise, when so approved,
shall bar other remedies of the mother or child for the support and education of
the child.
-3-
However, in 1996 PA 308, the statutory provision was repealed after this Court, in Dones, supra,
found that it was an unconstitutional denial of equal protection. Sturak v Ozomaro, 238 Mich
App 549, 556; 606 NW2d 411 (1999). Nonetheless, our Supreme Court in Crego, supra at 281,
has since declared that the statute does not violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection3
and that child support agreements pursuant to MCL 722.713 may be valid and nonmodifiable
under the following conditions:
(1) a paternity action was filed; (2) the child's mother and putative father
voluntarily entered into an agreement regarding child support, in lieu of a judicial
determination of paternity; (3) the circuit court made a determination that the
agreement secured "adequate provision" for the child's needs; and (4) the
agreement failed to include language preserving the right to modify support levels
at a later time. [Crego, supra at 255.]
Only where paternity is uncertain and the parties have entered into an agreement regarding child
support, in lieu of a judicial determination of paternity, is nonmodifiable child support allowed
under MCL 722.713. Crego, supra at 255, 276.
In this case, defendant acknowledged paternity, and the court determined that he was the
father of the minor child. "[O]nce a putative father has acknowledged paternity, his child is
entitled to fully modifiable support, just as any other child whose paternity has been ascertained."
Id. at 276; see also id. at 256-257.
If a defendant in a paternity action "acknowledges paternity either orally to the court or by
filing with the court a written acknowledgment of paternity," the court shall enter an order of
filiation declaring paternity and providing for the support of the child. MCL 722.717(1)(b). The
court has continuing jurisdiction over proceedings brought pursuant to the Paternity Act to
increase or decrease the amount of support fixed by an order of filiation. MCL 722.720.
According to the consent judgment, defendant acknowledged paternity before the circuit
court at the time of the parties' settlement agreement. However, we are unable to determine from
the record in this particular action whether the court entered an order of filiation. We therefore
remand for further proceedings.4
3
The decision in Crego addressed the constitutionality of the statute with regard to the time
frame in which the settlement agreement in Crego occurred and did not decide whether the
statute, had it not been repealed, would remain constitutional in today's technological context.
Crego, supra at 277, n 16.
4
We recognize that various statutes governing the acknowledgement of paternity have been
amended since defendant acknowledged paternity in this case. Further, Michigan has enacted the
Acknowledgment of Parentage Act, MCL 722.1001 et seq., which may govern aspects of this
case. E.g., MCL 722.1012. Because the limited record in this action does not include the
(continued…)
-4-
On remand, the court shall determine whether entry of a filiation order is necessary, and,
if so, shall enter the proper order. Child support in this case is modifiable
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
(…continued)
original documents and record concerning defendant's acknowledgement, any issues concerning
the appropriate proceedings are best resolved by the circuit court, under the guidance of Crego,
supra, and the relevant statutes.
-5-
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