IN RE ANDREW ALAN STARK MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In re ANDREW ALAN STARK, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
FOR PUBLICATION
February 22, 2002
9:00 a.m.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 233043
Midland Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 99-000292-DL
Updated Copy
May 24, 2002
ANDREW ALAN STARK,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, C.J., and Fitzgerald and Gage, JJ.
BANDSTRA, C.J.
The prosecutor appeals as of right from a circuit court order granting defendant's motion
to quash and dismissing a charge of possession of marijuana.1 We reverse and remand.
Defendant, a minor, was at a party where he had consumed alcohol and was in possession
of marijuana. He was issued a citation for violation of the minor in possession of alcohol
statute,2 and the marijuana offense was apparently referred to the prosecutor's office. Defendant
admitted responsibility for being a minor in possession of alcohol and was placed on probation.
Following entry of the order of adjudication, the prosecutor filed a petition charging defendant
with possession of marijuana. Defendant claimed that the charge was precluded by the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy,3 and the trial court agreed. We review double
jeopardy issues de novo on appeal.4
The parties agree that the offenses of minor in possession of alcohol and possession of
marijuana are general intent, not specific intent, crimes. Accordingly, the double jeopardy
provision bars the successive prosecutions at issue in this case if "the offenses are part of the
1
MCL 333.7403(2)(d).
2
MCL 436.1703.
3
US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, ยง 15.
4
People v Mackle, 241 Mich App 583, 592; 617 NW2d 339 (2000).
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same criminal episode, and . . . involve laws intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil,
not a substantially different, or a very different kind of, harm or evil."5 The prosecutor has
conceded on appeal that the two offenses alleged in this case were part of the same criminal
episode.6 Accordingly, the only issue presented is whether the two charging statutes were
intended by the Legislature to prevent similar or different harms.
We conclude that they were intended to prevent different harms. To begin with, it is
insufficient to say, as the lower court did here, that both statutes were intended to prevent the
same or similar harm or evil simply because both of them attempt to prevent substance abuse.
Under that logic, the Double Jeopardy Clause would prohibit successive prosecutions for
offenses as disparate as underage smoking7 and the manufacture for resale of substances that are
not just controlled, but subject to a total ban.8 Certainly, some conduct made criminal for the
purpose of preventing the abuse of substances might be sufficiently similar to other such conduct
for the Double Jeopardy Clause to apply. However, to end the analysis by simply noting that the
same broad purpose might be ascribed to two charging statutes results in an inappropriately
expansive application of the Double Jeopardy Clause.
The laws at issue here are distinctly different from one another in two important ways.
First, the category of persons whose behavior becomes potentially criminal by operation of the
statutes is different. Anyone can be guilty of the offense of possessing marijuana, regardless of
age. In contrast, only a subset of people, i.e., those who are under twenty-one, can be guilty of a
minor in possession of alcohol offense. Second, the Legislature has chosen different methods to
prevent abuse of the two substances at issue in the statutes. Regarding marijuana, a complete
prohibition has been imposed; for alcohol, a regulatory scheme has been considered sufficient.
Marijuana possession or use is simply banned completely. Alcohol possession or use is only
illegal in certain situations and contexts, as in this case depending on the age of the person
possessing it and, in other cases, depending on the incapacity resulting from its use.
On the basis of these distinctions, we conclude that the two laws at issue here were not
intended to prevent the same or similar harm or evil but, instead, a substantially different harm or
evil. The minor in possession of alcohol statute seeks to prevent harms associated with the use
of alcohol by persons lacking the maturity necessary to do so responsibly. For example, it seeks
to reduce underage drinking and, by extension, the fatalities and serious injuries caused by
5
Crampton v 54-A Dist Judge, 397 Mich 489, 502; 245 NW2d 28 (1976).
6
We question that concession. It seems a good argument might be made here, as was made in
the various cases considered by the Crampton Court, that defendant's arrest for minor in
possession of alcohol was simply the occasion for the discovery of the additional offense of
marijuana possession and thus the two offenses were not part of the same criminal episode. See,
e.g., id. at 506. In any event, we do not further consider this issue because it has been waived.
7
See MCL 722.642.
8
See MCL 333.7401 and MCL 333.7211. Or, in another context, successive prosecutions for
both felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and armed robbery, MCL 750.529, would
be disallowed, because the statutes criminalizing these offenses both intend to prevent the social
harm of violence.
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teenage drunk driving. See House Legislative Analysis, HB 4136, August 16, 1995. In contrast,
statutes such as that which outlaws marijuana possession are intended to prohibit the use of
substances themselves considered physically harmful under any circumstance9 and to stem the
further criminal acts and social losses such use can cause.10 Thus, while both statutes criminalize
possession of the substances they address, they are intended to prevent substantially different
harms resulting from that possession.
The trial court erred in ruling that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy
precluded prosecution of the marijuana charge. We reverse and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
9
Crampton, supra at 507.
10
Orzel v Scott Drug Co, 449 Mich 550, 563; 537 NW2d 208 (1995).
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