HNS v People's Counsel

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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPEC IAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 639 September Term, 2010 ______________________________________ HNS DEVELOPMENT, LLC v. PEOPLE S COUNSEL FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY, ET AL. ______________________________________ Eyler, De borah S ., Watts, Moylan , Charle s E., Jr., (Retired, Specially Assigned) JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Watts, J. ______________________________________ Filed: July 8, 2011 This case involv es the denia l of a propo sed amen dment to the development plan for a multi-lot subdivision in Baltimore County, known as Longfield Estates. Appellant, HNS Develop ment, LLC, filed with the Baltimore County Review Group (the CRG )1 a proposal to amend (the amended plan ) the original development plan for Longfield Estates, seeking to further subdivide and de velop the property. Appellees, Pe ople s Counsel fo r Baltimore County and Greater Kingsville Civic Association, objected to the amended plan, and the CRG denied approval of the amended plan. Both appellant and appellees appealed the CRG s denial to the Baltimore C ounty Board of A ppeals ( the Board ). The Board found, pursuant to Baltimore County Code ( B.C.C. ) § 22-47 (1978, 1988/89 Supp.), that the amended plan had been deemed approved through untimely action by the CRG, and remanded the matter to the Planning B oard for a determination as to whether the amended plan conflicted with the B altimore County Master Plan (the Master Plan ). The Planning Board ultimately determined that the amended plan conflicted with the Master Plan, and the Board affirmed the Plann ing Board s decision. A ppellant petitioned the Circuit Co urt for Baltimore County for judicial review. This appeal followed the circuit court s affirmation of the Board s decision. 1 Baltimore Coun ty Code § 22-57(a) (1978, 1988/89 Supp.), provides: The CRG consists of the directors of the department of public works and office of planning and zoning or their designated representatives. On appeal, appellant raised three issues2 which we have consolidated and rephrased as follows: I. Whether the Board erred in finding th e amended plan having been deemed approved pursuant to B.C .C. § 22-47 was subject to review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c) (1978, 1988/89 Supp.)? II. Whether the Board erred in finding that the amended plan conflicts with the Baltimore County Master Plan? For the reasons set f orth below , we answ er both qu estions no and sha ll affirm the judgment of the C ircuit Co urt for B altimore Coun ty. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On October 26, 2004, appellant acquired the property at issue, Longfield Estates. Longfie ld Estates is an existing residential subdivision in the King sville area of Baltimore Cou nty. On February 17, 2005, appellant filed an amended plan seeking an amendm ent to 2 Appellan t raises the issue s thus: I. Whether the Board of Appeals erred as a matter of law in failing to affirm the proposed CRG Plan Amendment which was approved by operation of law on account of the failure of Baltimore County, by and through the County Review Group, to act on the proposed amendment to the CRG Plan within the required 30 day period? II. Whether the Board of Appeals erred as a matter of law in denying the proposed CRG Plan Am endmen t due to a conflict with the Baltimore County Master Plan? III. Whether the Board of Appeals erred in relying on a finding by the Planning Board which was both legally faulty and unsupported by the record? -2- the Longfield Estates II CRG Plan, which was originally approved in 1991.3 Pursuant to the 3 On M ay 10, 1990, the original developer, Longfield Estates Development Corporation ( original developer ), obtained approval for Phase I of a development plan for property located on Belair Road in Kingsville. At this time, a home owned by Ann Lang enfeld er was on the p roperty. After obtaining approval for Phase I of development, on November 8, 1990, the approval of Phase II was referred to the Planning Board due to an appa rent conflict w ith the Master Plan of 1989-2000, relating to the scenic quality of the Langenfelder home. On January 17, 1991, the Planning Board issued a resolution finding that the development of nine lots of the plan for Phase II would conflict with the Master Plan, and therefore, the Planning Board recommended the CRG deny Phase II, as proposed. The Resolution also contained a finding that it was not in the public interest for the county to acquire the nine lots. In May of 1991, the original developer submitted a revised plan for Phase II. On June 27, 1991, the Office of Planning and Zoning submitted a report to the CRG recommending the CRG approve the plan subject to conditions. The revised plan for Phase II was approved on June 27, 1991. The approved plan designated two scenic view sheds, and contained two relevant N otes: Notes 18 and 1 9. Note 18 states: The Baltimore County Office of Planning & Zoning would not support future development on Lot 42 or Parcel A. Any future subdivision of Lot 42 and/or Parcel A would be considered a conflict with the Master Plan as detailed by the Planning Board s decision. L ot 42 as sho wn on th e revised C RG pla n is designed in accorda nce with th e Planning Board s a ction of Jan. 17, 1991, furthermore, the Offic e of Plann ing & Z oning sup ports and stro ngly encourages the applicant to seek a conservation easement to restrict future development on Lot 42 and Parcel A to permanently protect the integrity of the scenic view. Note 19 states: Longfie ld Estates D evelopm ent Corpo ration and th e Greater K ingsville Civ ic Association have entered into a Memorandum of Understanding Agreement with attached Declaration of Coven ants and R estrictions for th e develop ment, dated J une 27 , 1991. Both Lot 42, which contained the Langenfelder home, and Parcel A, were retained by Langenfelder. Althoug h Note 18 encouraged Langenfelder to seek a conservation easemen t, (contin ued...) -3- amended plan appellant sought: (1) to place a dwelling on a portion of Parcel A; (2) a lot line adjustmen t combinin g the rema inder of P arcel A w ith Lot 42; and (3) a subdivision of Lot 42 to obtain one additio nal lot. Appellees objecte d to the a mend ed plan . On February 17, 2005, a meeting notice was issued pursuant to the CRG process. 4 Per the notice issued on February 17, 2005, on March 21, 2005, a pre-CRG meeting was held. On April 1, 2005, a CRG meeting was conducted, and at this meeting, the CRG denied approval of the amended plan in light of Note 18 of the 1991 CRG Plan and the finding of the Planning Board in 1991, that there was a conflict w ith the Master P lan that proh ibited building on the two lots. On A pril 14 and 15, 2005, appellees, Peo ple s Counse l, and Gre ater K ings ville filed Notices of A ppeal, re spec tivel y, 3 (...continued) to date, no conservation easemen t has been o btained. Lo t 42 and P arcel A were exempted from both the Declaration of Covenants and Restrictions, and Memorandum of Understanding Agreement. In 1991, CRG approval became final, there was no appeal, and the original developer constructed two phases of Longfield Estates. 4 B.C.C. § 22-63 (1978, 1988/89 Supp.) provides that [a]ny material amendment to an approve d plan sha ll be reviewed and approved in the sa me ma nner as the orig inal plan . Further, as the Board explained in its April 6, 2007, Opinion: The CRG process was adopted in Baltimore County by Co uncil Bill 56, 1982, and codified in the [B.C.C.], 1978, in Sections 22-37, et. seq. The CRG process [was] superseded [in 1992] by the development plan process in use today in B.C.C. Section s 32-4- 101, et seq. However, any amendments to plans adopted using the CRG process were to be reviewed and approved in the same manner as the original plan. (Section 32-4-262). This requirement was changed by the passage o f Bill No. 24-06 on M arch 17 , 2006. Baltimore County Code § 32-4-262(2) provides: Any material amendment to an approved residential Development Plan or plat s hall be reviewed in accordance with this title, a nd with re spect to that p ortion of the original plan or plat to which the amendment pe rtains, the am endmen t shall be revie wed fo r complian ce with all current law. . . . -4- to preserve th eir rights to a de novo hearing before the Board.5 On April 26, 2005, appellant appealed the CRG s denial of the amended plan. The Board held six days of public hearings on the appeals,6 culminating in a public deliberation held on N ovembe r 9, 2006. O n April 6, 2007, the Board issued a final Opinion and Order, explaining that Baltimore County Charter § 603 provides that review by the Board is to be de novo, howe ver, the scope of re view is na rrow: T he final actio n on a plan shall be presumed correct and the person aggrieved shall have the burden of persuasion to show that such action was arbitrary or capricious, procured by fraud , or othe rwise ille gal. B.C.C. § 22-61(c ). In the Op inion, the B oard add ressed three issues: 1. Whose appeal goes forward? When the CRG met, it denied the amendm ent, which w ould mak e this [appe llant] s appeal. How ever, [appellan t] argues that because the CRG did not meet w ithin the timeframe specified by [B.C.C.], the [amended plan] became automatica lly approved which would make this case an appeal by the [appellees]. 2. Does the doctrine of res judicata apply to this proposal and preclude consideration of two additional lots for Parcel A and Lot 42? 3. Should this case go back to the Planning Board for review of the Master Plan conflict? 5 Although the amended plan was denied by the CRG , appellees file d appeals because of [appellant s] contention that the [CRG] did not hold a timely meeting and therefore the [amen ded pla n] had b een au tomatic ally appro ved. 6 The hearings were held on: October 19, 2005, January 31, 2006, February 15, 2006, May 17, 2006, May 24, 2006, and August 22, 2006. -5- The Board found, as to issue one, that [t]he amendment to the plan was adopted for filing on February 17, 2005. The thirty day deadline was March 19, 2005, yet, the CRG meeting was not held until April 1, 2005, twelve days after the deadline.7 The Board stated: This Board fin ds that the C ounty Cod e requirem ents regarding the time frames for the CRG process were very clear, and the CRG failed in its resp onsibility to either meet within the required timeframe or explain its failure to act w ithin seven days. The County Code places the burden to act on the CRG and not on the Deve loper. Therefo re, through its inaction and delayed meeting, the CRG in effect approved this amendment to the CRG plan, making this case an appeal from [ap pellees]. [8] As to the secon d issue, the B oard fou nd that the d octrine of res judicata does not apply in this case. Although appellees argued that the issues regarding Parcel A and Lot 42 were decided in 1991, the Board agreed with appellant that in Whittle v. Bd. of Zoning 7 B.C.C. § 22-56 (19 78, 1988 /89 Supp .) provides, in p ertinent part: (a) Within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the plan and the necessary review fee, the department of public w orks shall rev iew the pla n for com pliance w ith section 22-55 of these regulations; and if the plan is in compliance, the plan shall be accepted for filing and copies of the plan shall be forwarded to the county re view g roup (C RG) f or its actio n. . . . (b) The department of public works shall schedule a meeting of the CRG which shall occur no earlier than fifteen (15) days and no later than thirty (30) days after the plan has been accepted as filed. 8 B.C.C. § 22-47 pro vides: If any county agency fails to act on any plan or plat submitted in accordance with these regulations within the prescribed time, the plan or plat shall be deemed to have been approved by the agency unless the failure to act has been excused by the administrative officer, in writing, no later than seve n (7) days after the expirati on of th e presc ribed tim e. -6- Appea ls, 211 Md. 36, 44 (1956), the Court of Appeals stated, the doctrine of res judicata has been held not to be applicable where the earlier decision was made not by a court of record, but by a board of zoning appeals, an administrative agency and appellant pointed out that the initial CR G case was n ever litig ated, th erefore , res judicata does n ot apply. As to the th ird issue, the B oard fou nd in pertine nt part: [B.C.C .] Section 22-59 requires that the CRG refer prop osed plan s to the Planning Board in certain circumstances, including when the proposed plan conflicts with the Master Plan. *** At the heart of this case is the question of what Note 18 means and whether any development of these two lots would be a conflict with the Master Plan. But, this Board finds that a crucial piece of eviden ce is missing as a result of the CRG s inaction. The question of whether the proposed amendment is in conflict with the County Master Plan was never put before the Planning Board, as required by Section 22-59. Without that inpu t, this Board is unable to move forward. In this respect, we find that the CRG was arbitrary and capricious in its failure to act in a timely fashion and by not referring the matter to the Plan ning B oard as require d by law . This Board therefore votes unanimously to remand this proposed [amended plan] to the CRG for referral to the Plannin g Board for them to decide wheth er it conf licts with the Ba ltimore C ounty M aster Pla n. This Board will retain jurisdiction and will decide the m erits after the Planning Board reache s its decis ion. Appellees filed motions for reconsideration on May 2, 2007, and August 22, 2007. These motion s were denied on Au gust 10 , 2007, a nd Sep tembe r 7, 200 7, respe ctively. Following remand of the case, on February 20, 2008, the Director of the Planning Board, Arnold F . Pat Keller, III ( Director Keller ), submitted a report to the Planning -7- Board finding tha t the amended plan conflicted with the Master Plans of 1989-2000 and 2010. On April 17, 20 08, the Planning B oard adopted D irector Keller s report finding a conflict with the Master Plans and found that no further subdivision/develop ment or future development on Lot 42 and/or Parcel A would be permitted. The Planning Board forwarded its decision to the County Council on April 28, 2008 and the County Council took no action. On April 30, 2 008, the Pla nning Board s finding s were sent to the Bo ard, as the Board retained jurisdicti on und er the A pril 6, 20 07, Or der. On June 26, 2008, appellant reques ted a hearing before the Board. On December 17, 2008, the Board conducted a hearing, and on February 5, 2009, appellant filed a document titled, Memorandum of Petitioner Summary of Petitioner s Position with the Board. On February 5, 2009, appellees also filed Post-Remand Hearing Memoranda. On July 1, 2009, the Board issued an O rder affirming the Planning Board s decision that the amended plan conflicts with the 2010 Master Plan. In an Opinion accompanying the Order of July 1, 2009, the Board explained : As a result of the Reman d by the [Bo ard], the que stion of a possib le conflict of the Petition er s propos ed amen dment w ith the Baltimo re Coun ty Master Plan 2010 was taken up by the Plannin g Staff. T hey recomm ended in their report to the Planning Board of February 20, 2008 that there be a finding, that the proposed amendments to the original along with the CRG approval were in conflict w ith the Baltim ore Cou nty Master Plan. Th e Planning Boa rd met and adop ted the Staf f Report, a nd confir med that a conflict with the Maste r Plan 2 010, did in fact, e xist. . . . -8- It should be noted that the County Council took no action to over-ride the conclusion of the Planning Board.[9] This Board holds that the case at bar is being heard by us on a de novo basis, as a result of the various appeals filed by the parties. As such, prior actions and determinations alleged to have occurred by operation of law no longer stand. *** Nevertheless, having received the m atter de novo, our referral for the Planning Board determination as to Master Plan conflic t was essential to a final decision. The resultant finding of the actual existence of such a conflict can not, under the CRG Rules, be ignored. Therefore, once the Planning Board has now determined that such a c onflict with the 2010 Master Plan does in fact exist, and no action havin g been tak en to the co ntrary by the Cou nty Counc il, it is clear that the requeste d amend ment to the original CR G Plan in this mat ter cann ot be allo wed. On July 30, 2009, appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. On April 13, 2010, the circuit court conducted a hearing on the matter, and on April 30, 2010, the circuit court issued an Order and accompanying Opinion, affirming the decision of the Board and of the Planning Board.10 On May 28, 2010, appellant 9 Pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-60 (c) (1978, 1988/89 S upp.), the Planning Bo ard s decision is binding unless overruled by the County Council: Unless the decision of the planning board on an issue referred to it pursuant to section 22-59(a)(1) is overruled by action of the county council, any de cision of the board on an issue ref erred to it pursuant to section 2259(a) is binding upon the CRG and shall be incorporated as a part of the CRG final action on a plan. 10 Although we review this case by examining the action of the agency, and not the circuit court as describ ed, infra Standard of Review, we shall summarize the circuit court s holding. In th e circuit cour t s Opinion , the circuit court rejected appellant s argument that the Board erred in find ing that the am ended pla n conflicted with the M aster Plan statin g: (contin ued...) -9- 10 (...continued) [B.C.C .] 22-60(c) provides, that Unless the decision of the planning board on an issue referred to it pursuant to section 22-59(a)(1) is overruled by action of the county coun cil, any decision o f the board on an issue referred to it pursuant to Section 22 -59(a) is bind ing upon the CRG and shall be incorporated as a part of the CRG final action on a plan. [(Bill No. 56, 1982, § 2; Bill No. 35, 1988, § 2)] It is clear that the Plan ning Bo ard, and the refore, the [B oard] as w ell based their determination of a conflict based on evidence contained in the record. As stated earlier, Note 18 becomes the critical language in dispute. Note 18 states, that The Baltimore County Office of Planning & Zoning would not support future developme nt on Lot 42 or P arcel A. Any future subdivision of Lot 42 and/or Parcel A would be considered a conflict w ith the Master Plan as detailed by the Planning Board s decision. Acc ordingly, reasoning minds could most definitely determine this language to support the finding of a conflict with the Master Plan. Furthermore, Planning Director Pat Keller s February 20, 2008 repo rt provides detailed reasons to sup port a conflict. The repo rt reviews the elem ents of the M aster Pla n to pr otect . . . sensitive environm ental areas and to [P]rotect and maintain the [rural residential] areas character. Applied to the present land, the report states that the scenic quality of the Langenfelder Home was identified as worthy of preservation. This scen ic quality is a Kin gsville landmark known to residents as well as mo torists passing though [ sic] the area a nd is as viab le today as it was in 1991. The report also discusses the land as an [sic] historic and cultural resource. The Planning Board adopted this report. Therefore, the Board, by upholdin g the Plann ing Board decision ad opted the re port. Accord ingly, there is evidentiary support of a conflic t with th e Mas ter Plan . The circuit co urt rejec ted app ellant s s econd argum ent, that the amended plan was approved by operation of law for CRG s failure to act on the amended plan within th e required 30 day time-fram e, stating: [Appe llant] did not show or even allege that any prejudice occurred from a twelve day delay in a matter that was filed five years ago. Additio nally, People s Counsel filed a cross-appeal, so the case was heard by the [Board] either way. Fina lly, the 2007 [B oard ] rem and mad e this twelve d ay delay in (contin ued...) -10- noted a timely appea l. Additiona l facts will be set forth in this opinion as necessa ry to resolve the q uestions raise d on app eal. STANDARD OF REVIEW When we review the final decision of an administrative agency, such as the Board of Appeals, we look through the circuit court s and intermediate appellate court s decisions, although applying the same standards of review, and evaluate[] the decision of the agency. Judicial review of administrative agency action is narrow. The court s task on review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agenc y. People s Counse l for Baltimo re Coun ty v. Loyola Colle ge in Md., 406 Md. 54, 66-67 (2008) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (alteration in original). This Court in Umerley v. People s Counsel, 108 M d. App . 497, 50 3-04, cert. denied, 342 Md. 584 (1996) explained this Court s standard of review of an agency s decision in three steps: 1. First, the reviewing court must determine whether the agency recognized and applied the correct principles of law governing the case. The reviewing court is not constrained to affirm the agency where its order is premised solely upon an erroneous conclusion of law. 2. Once it is determined that the agency did not err in its determination or interpretation of the applicable law, the reviewing court next examines the agency s factual findings to determ ine if they are supported by substantial evidence, i.e., by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequ ate to su pport a conclu sion. . . . 3. Finally, the reviewing court must examine how the agency applied the law to the facts. This, of course, is a judgmental process involving a mixed question of law and fact, and grea t def eren ce m ust b e acc orde d to the ag ency. 10 (...continued) 2005 m oot. -11- The test of appellate review of this function is whether . . . a reasoning mind could reasonably ha ve re ache d the conclusion reach ed by the [ agen cy], consiste nt with a prope r applica tion of th e [con trolling le gal prin ciples]. [Comptroller v. World Book Childcraft, 67 M d. App . 424,] 4 38-39 [, cert. denied, 307 M d. 260 ( 1986) ] (citation s omitte d). Also, unlike our review of a trial court s judgment, we will only uphold the decision of an agency on the basis of the age ncy s reas ons an d findin gs. United Steel Workers of America AFL-CIO Local 2610 v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 298 Md. 665, 679, 472 A.2d 62 (1984). We ma y search the rec ord for ev idence to support a trial court s judg ment; and we may su stain that judgment for a reason plainly appearing on the record, even if the reason was not relied on by the trial court. Id. But we may not uphold an agency s decision unless it is sustainable on the agency s findings and for the reasons stated by the agency. Id. (Footnote omitted). In Marzullo v. Kahl, the Court o f Appe als explaine d: [A] court s task o n review is not to substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency. Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency. Thus, an administrative agency s interpretation and application of the statute which the agency administers should ordina rily be give n cons iderable weigh t by review ing cou rts. 366 M d. 158, 1 72 (20 01) (cita tions om itted). DISCUSSION I. THE DEEMED APPROVAL A. The Parties Contentions Appellant contends that because the CRG failed to act in a timely manner in approving the amended plan, the plan is deemed approved, by operation of law, pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-4 7, an d as a resu lt ma y not be set aside under B.C.C. § 22-61(c) or any subsequent -12- review.11 Appellant argues that [t]he [CRG] is required by law to conduct a hearing on a filed and accepted CRG plan within thirty (30) days of the acceptance of the Plan for filing pursuant to B.C.C., § 22-56(b) and, in this case, the CRG failed to do so. Appellant maintains that due to th e untimeliness of the CRG action, under the plain meaning of [B.C.C .] § 22-47, the [amended plan] must be deemed to have been approved. Appellant contends that because the amended plan was approved by operation of law, it cannot be found to be arbitrary or capricious, procured by fraud, or otherwise illegal under B.C.C. § 2261(c). In contrast, appellees respond that the failure of the CRG to act within the thirty (30) day time limit presc ribed in B.C .C. § 22-56 (b) does no t immun ize appella nt s amended 11 Appellant also argues that the area on which he proposed to build is lot 54, a lot not covered by Note 18. Appellees counter that the argument that there was confusion about the lots involved in the [amended plan] is another smokescreen. There has never been any genuine dispute that Lot 42 and Parcel A make up the relevant area. They are the tracts targeted by CRG plan Note 18 protection. We concur. In appellant s February 5, 2009, Mem orandum to the Boa rd, appellan t argued: While it is true that a subdivision is being proposed for Lot 42, there is no subdiv ision pro posed for Pa rcel A, o nly a build ing per mit. *** Denial of Petitioner s building permit on Parcel A and denial of a subdivision of Lo t 42 den ies the P etitioner rights un der the C ounty C ode. As such, rather than raise the issue that Note 18 does not pertain to the area affected by the amended plan, appellant conceded that the proposed development would occur on Lot 42 and Parcel A . -13- plan from Board review for arbitrariness, capaciousness, and illegality under B.C.C. § 2261(c). 12 Appellees maintain that appellant has waived the argument that the am ended plan s deemed approval immunized the plan from review for arbitrariness, capriciousness, and illegality, due to appellant s failure to make this argument at the 200 5-2006 Boa rd proceedings or at the 2008 post-remand hearing. Relying on Heft v. Maryland Racing Comm n , 323 Md. 257, 273-74 (1991), appellees assert that a person may not obtain judicial review of a matter when he or she failed to properly raise the matter before the administrative agency. If not waived, appe llees maintain that B.C.C. § 2 2-47 and § 22-5 1 (1978, 1988/89 Supp .) must b e read to gether, a nd B.C .C. § 22 -51, provides, in pertinent part: In addition to complian ce with the se develop ment regu lations, all deve lopment sh all comply w ith all other applicable laws, rules, or regulations of the county. Based on this language, appellees contend that the County Coun cil did not intend the provision fo r deemed approval to harbour, shelter, or shield an illegal re-subdivision. Appellees respond that finding tha t a twelve (12) day delay in th e process p rovided ap pellant with approva l and effe ctive immu nity from review would in effect deny appellee[s] the appeal rights guaranteed by th e [B.C .C.] 12 Appellees raise three additional arguments on appeal: (1) that appellant s amended plan application is disqualified for failure to apply for or secure the prerequisite zoning approva l; (2) that the Bo ard made two jurisdic tional mistak es when it remande d the case to the Planning Board in 2007: (a) the Board retained jurisdiction; and (b) the Board remanded the case directly to the Planning Board, rather than the CRG; and (3) that this case is barred by the doctrine of res judicata . Given that we answer both ques tions raised b y appellant in the neg ative, it is n ot nece ssary that w e reach these iss ues. -14- § 22-61 (19 78, 1988 /89 Supp .), County Charter §§ 602 -603, and Express Powers Act, Md. Ann. Code Art. 25A, § 5(U). Apx. 34, 45, 48. Finally, appellees contend that the amended plan conf licts with the M aster Plan an d is illegal. B. Ana lysis In sum, although set forth more comprehensively above, appellant argues that because the amended plan was deemed approved pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-47, its approva l is set in stone and not su bject to furth er review. W e disagree. First, appellant has waived the argument that the deemed approval caused by the CRG delay immunizes the amended plan from Board review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c), as appellant did not raise this issue before the Board. Secondly, a plain reading of the relevant provisions of the B.C.C. does no t support appellant s position. Thirdly, the legislative history of B.C.C. § 22-47 does not support the conclusion that further review of a matter deemed approved is foreclosed. Finally, relevant case law revea ls that the dead line for CR G appro val in the B.C.C. does not create a substan tive app roval b arring f urther re view. (1) Waiver Appellant failed to raise the issue of the amended plan being immunized from review at the 2005-2007 proceedings or po st-remand in 2008. A s such, the Board neither examined nor resolve d the issue in its July 1, 2009 Opinion. As this Court explained in Chertkof, 43 Md. A pp. at 17-18 : It is not our function as an appellate court to consider issues not raised, considered or decided in the court be low. Ou r review, pa rticularly in appea ls -15- from administrative bodies, must be limited to the determination based on the record. We must nece ssarily limit our con sideration to whether the agency had before it substantial evidence to support its conclusions, and whether these conclusions wer e arb itrary, illegal or capricious. Considering the state of the record in this case an d in deferenc e to Rule 1085, we will not review the new issue raised by the appellant in this app eal. The record is more than sufficient to establish that the Board of Review had before it substantial evidence to support its conclusions, and we find nothing illegal, arbitrary or capricious in its actions. (Emp hasis ad ded). Between October 2005 , and August 20 06, the Board held six days of public hearings on the CRG s denial of the amended plan. This issue was not raised by appellant before the Board at that time. In the Board s O pinion of April 6, 200 7, the Board phrased the issue as to the effec t of the dee med app roval of the amende d plan as fo llows: Whose appeal goes forward? When the CRG met, it denied the amen dment, which would mak e this [appellant] s appeal. However, [appellant] argues that because the CRG did not meet within the timeframe specified by [B.C.C.], the [amended plan] became automatically approved which would make this case an appeal by [appellees]. At that time, appellant raised the issue of who bore the burden to show the amended plan was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal pursua nt to B.C .C. § 22-61(c), not the issue of whether the plan was immunized from review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c) because the plan was deemed approved by the CRG s de lay. In its April 6, 2007 Opinion, the Board found that through its inaction and delayed meeting, the CRG in effect approved this amendment to the CRG plan, making this case an appeal from [appellees ]. The B oard mad e no findin g as to -16- whether or not the amended plan was immunized from review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c) as appella nt did n ot raise th e issue. In the decision of Ap ril 6, 2007, the Board remanded the matter to the Planning B oard for a determination as to whether the amended plan conflicted with the Master P lan. There is no indication that appellant raised the immunization argument befo re the Planning Bo ard on rem and. Similarly, appellant failed to raise the immunization argument when requesting a hearing before the Board in 2008, at the December 17, 2008 hearing, or at any time thereafter before the Board. On June 26, 2008, appellant submitted a letter to the Board requesting a hearing. In this letter,13 appellant did not contend that the amended plan was immune from review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c). At the December 17, 2008, hearing, appellant did not argue that the plan was immune from review, instead appellant argued, among other points, that the Board er red in rema nding the m atter to the Plan ning Bo ard: 13 In the letter, app ellant stated: Please accept this lette r as a follow up to the Plannin g Board s ruling on the above-referenced matter. As you recall, the Board of Appeals remanded the case to the Planning Board to decide whether the proposed amendment to the CRG Plan conflicted w ith th e Ba ltimo re County Maste r Plan. In remanding the case, the Board retained jurisdiction in order to decide the merits of the case following the Planning Board s decision. In light of the Planning B oard s recent ruling on the ma tter, we respectfully request that the case be set in for oral argument before the Board as soon as possible. The Board has received testimony and memoranda already, but due to the lapse o f time since last fall when the hea ring co nclude d, some addition al argum ent is de sired. -17- [APPEL LANT S COUNSEL ]: The Board really should never have remanded it to the planning board to begin with. The second argument is that the planning board, like the CRG failed to undertake a timely and proper review, which they wer e requir ed by law to do. *** [The CRG] also didn t act in a timely manner. And by operation of law, their ent ire decis ion then affirm ed the p lan. Once that was done, the Board actually had in front of it an affirmed plan, and that sho uld have b een the en d of the m atter, because the Bo ard actually -- there s noth ing in the co de that says the B oard of A ppeals sha ll reman d to the p lanning board. Prior to the decision of July 1, 2009, on February 5, 2009, appellant submitted the docume nt, Memorandum of Petitioner Summa ry of Petitioner s Position to the Board . In the February 5, 2009 Mem orandum , appellant did not raise the argument that review of the amended plan was foreclosed under B .C.C. § 21-61(c). In its Memorandum, contrary to arguing that the plan was immunized from review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c), appellant endorsed the availability of an appeal, stating: Once the Board determined that by operation of law the Plan was approved then no further review was required. The only way to overturn the decision would be to show that filing was illegal or fraudulent. There was no allegation that eithe r occur red. The Planning Board like the CRG failed to consider in a timely manner the questio n pose d by the B oard. T he [B .C.C.] protects the property owner or developer from un due delays in d ecisions. A fter the matte r was pres ented to the Planning Board o n Februa ry 21, 2008, the Planning Board fa iled to consider it in a timely manner by not responding to the county council un til April 28, 2008. By operation of law no master plan conflict was determined. -18- *** Any person aggrieved or feeling aggrieved by final action o n a plan is entitled to appeal to the County Board of Appeals. Unlike appeals under the current development review process in Baltimore County, appeals from CRG action are heard de novo. By not raising the immunization issue before the CRG, the Planning Board and the Board, appellant has failed to preserv e the issu e for ap pellate re view. Chertkof, 43 Md. App. at 17 ( We will no t review the new issue rai sed by the appella nt in this a ppeal. ). (2) The Baltimore County Code ( B.C.C. ) Alte rnatively, a plain reading of the relevant sections of the B.C.C. does not support the conclusion that further review of a matter deemed approved pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-47, is foreclosed by law. In this case, to be sure, there is no dispute that the CRG action was untimely. The proposed amended plan was accepted for filing on February 15, 2005, and the CRG meeting was held on April 1, 2005, twelve (12) days after the thirty (30) day time frame provid ed for in B.C.C . §22-5 6(b). B.C.C. § 22-47 pro vides: If any county agency fails to act on any plan or plat submitted in accordance with these regulations within the prescribed time, the plan or plat shall be deemed to have been approved by the agency unless the failure to act has been excused by the administrative officer, in writing, no later than seven (7) days after the expiration of the prescribed time. Again, it is undisputed in this case that the delay was not excused by an administrative officer, in writing, within seven days after the expiration of the thirty (30) day time frame. -19- Therefore, the proposed amended plan was properly deemed to have been approved by the agenc y, pursu ant to B .C.C. § 22-47 . Contrary to appellant s argument, however, B.C.C. § 22-47 contains no language indicating that the plan is approved by operation of law. B.C.C. § 22-47 simply states the plan shall be deemed to have been approved by the agenc y, no more tha n that. Although the amended plan was approve d pursuan t to B.C.C. § 22-47, B.C.C. § 22-61(a) provides for an appeal of the CRG s final action to the Board by any person aggrieved or feeling aggrieved by fina l action w ithin thirty ( 30) d ays of such final action. B.C.C. § 22-61(c) provides: The final action on a plan shall be presumed correct and the person aggrieved shall have the burden of persuasion to show that such action was arbitrary or capricious, procured by fraud, or otherwise illegal. Just as B.C.C. § 22-47 contains no language whatsoever stating that the plan is approved by operation of law, there is no language in the statute indicating that the plan shall not be reviewed pursuant to § 22-61(a) and § 22-61(c) after a deeme d approv al. Based on a pla in readin g of B .C.C. § 22-47 , § 22-61(a) and § 22-61(c), an appeal of a plan deemed to have been approved pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-47 is not precluded under the statute. (3) Legislative History The legislative history of B.C .C. §§ 22-3 7 through 22-104, en acted in 19 82, is contained in County Counc il of Baltimore County, Maryland, Legislative Session 1982, Bill -20- No 56-82,14 April 5, 19 82. Albeit b riefly stated, Bill No. 56-82 provides, in an introductory paragraph , that it is an Act c oncerning developm ent regulation s: For the purposes of repealing the subdivision regulations of the County and enacting new development regulations to govern development of all land in the Cou nty; defining terms; providing for the process of development approval; imposing certain requirements on developers; providing certain standards for all development; providing for the adoption of additional standards for developm ent; and generally relating to the regulation of the development of land in Baltim ore C ounty. (Emp hasis ad ded). As set forth above, Bill No 56-82 spe cifically states that one of the purposes of the Bill is to provide for the process of development approval. The legislative history gives no indication that a purpose of the Bill is to override sections of the statute providing for appeals in the development approval process. Additionally, the legislative history does not state that a plan may be approved by operation of law . Simply put, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that development plans which are deemed approved pursuant B.C.C. § 22-47 a re to be treated d ifferently in the development approval and review process than pla ns app roved t hroug h timely ac tion by the CRG . (4) Relevant Case Law This Court in Art Wood E nters. v. Wiseburg Cm ty. Ass n, 88 Md. App. 723, 729 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 397 (1992), held that CRG approval is merely one stage in the 14 This Bill ad ded §§ 2 2-37 throu gh 22-10 4, 105 inclu sive unde r the new title Article IV. Development Regulations of Baltimore County Title 22 - Planning, Zoning, and Subd ivision C ontrol, B .C.C., 1 978, 19 80 Su pplem ent. -21- land development and approval process. We explained that the B.C.C. authorizes the CRG to take any of three actions when analyzing a proposed development plan. The CRG can: (1) take final action on the plan, (2) refer the propo sed plan to th e Planning Board p ursuant to B.C.C. § 26-207, or (3) continue the meeting to a later date in order to receive additional information or to resolve any development matter raised at the initial meeting regarding the plan. Id. at 728-29; B.C.C . § 22-206(b). We explained that these actions must be interpreted in light of B .C.C. § 26 -203(a), w hich prov ides: [T]he plan shall set forth an informative, c onceptua l, and schem atic representation of the proposed development in a clear and legible manner by means of maps , graphs, cha rts, or other w ritten or draw n docum ents so as to enable the county and all reviewing agencies an opportunity to make reasonab ly informed d ecisions reg arding the d evelopm ent. Id. (footnote o mitted) (em phasis in orig inal). This C ourt further s tated: The language of B.C.C . § 26-203 (a) makes it clear that CRG ap proval is merely one stage (and an early one at that) of the land development review and approval process which takes a proposed development from its planning stages to its final form . As the B oard stated in its opinion on the C RG s approval of the Plan: [a]t the CRG stage, the developer need concern himself on ly with generalities and not specifics of his prop osed dev elopmen t. He may be granted approval of the conceptual plans, but numerous agency permits, inspections, and approvals will follow . . . Thus, the use of the term final action on th e plan in B.C.C. § 26-206(b)(1) cannot be interpreted to mean tha t the plan on which the CRG acts need b e in finished form, or that no additional rev iew or more detailed information, even -22- on subjects generally addressed in the deve lopment p lan, will be ne cessary in subsequent stages of the development review and approval process. Id. at 729- 30 (em phasis a dded). Although the facts in Art Wood do not involve the deemed approval of a development plan, the case is instructive as this Court examined the CRG approval process under the B.C.C. and explained that CRG approval is merely one stage . . . of the land development review and approval process which takes a proposed development from its planning stages to its final form. 88 Md. App. at 729. Given that the plan, at this stage, is not anticipated to be in finished form, it would be impossible to find that a plan deemed approved pursuant to B.C .C. § 22 -47 is ex empt f rom fu rther rev iew un der the B .C.C. Thus, it is clear that whether reviewing the plain language of B.C.C. §§ 22-47 and 2261(a) and (c), the legislative history of the statutes, or relevant case law, review under B.C.C. § 22-61(c) is indeed permitted of a development or subdivision plan deemed approved pursua nt to B.C .C. § 22 -47. II. THE MASTER PLAN CONFLICT Appellant contends that the Board erroneously denied approval of the amended plan based on faulty legal analysis of master plan conflicts. Appellant s theories as to the Board s error include the following premises: (1) The Master Plan is a guide and not a rule; (2) B.C.C. §§ 22-37 and 2 2-38 provide a ba sis for the amended plan to be deeme d approved; and (3) B.C.C. § 22-18 sets forth a specific process to be followed in the event of a master plan conflict, and the Board s failure to follow that process constituted an impermissible -23- taking of the property. Appellant also argues that the Board s decision is not supported by substantial ev idence. Fo r the reason s below, w e reject each argumen t. A. The M aster Plan : Guide o r Rule Appellant contends that the Master Plan is a guide not a rule. Relying on People s Counsel for Baltim ore Cou nty v. Beachw ood I Ltd. P ship, 107 Md. App. 627 (1995 ), cert. denied, 342 Md. 472 (1996), and Mayor an d City Coun cil of Roc kville v. Rylyns En ters., Inc., 372 Md. 514 (2002), appellant maintains that case law interprets local master plans not as regulations or ordinances but rather as guides in the promulgation of regulations and zoning classific ations. Appellant relies on language in the Baltimore County Master Plans of 1989-2000, and 2010, for the pro position that the Master Plan is mer ely a guide. Th e Baltimor e Coun ty Master P lan 1989- 2000, ado pted by the C ounty Cou ncil in 1990 stated, in part: This Master P lan shall s erve as a g uide to Baltim ore C ounty Governm ent as it implements plans for the development of this County. The propositions promulgated in this Master Plan constitute recommendations and guidelines concerning how this County should grow and develop as we approach the 21st Centu ry. In the event the within contain recommendations guidelines and Land Use Maps differ from a Comprehensive Zoning Map adopted by the Co unty Counc il, the Comprehensive Zoning Map shall take pre cedence and shall prevail. Baltimore County Master Plan 1989-2000, p. 7 (adopted Febru ary 5, 1990). The B altimore County Master Plan 2010, adopted by the Baltimore County Council in February 2000, states, in pertinent p art: -24- The statements of Master Plan 2010 are intended to guide the Coun cil in this role. .... The County Executive and County Council have recognized the Master Plan as an importa nt advisory too l for ensurin g that the gro wth of B altimore C ounty is managed in an orderly and rational manner. Ma ny of the activities of govern ment e ncoura ge con forma nce w ith the m aster pla n, . . . Baltim ore Co unty Ma ster Plan 2010, p . 6, 8 (ado pted Fe bruary 22 , 2000) . In contras t, relying on B.C.C . § 22-59 (1978, 1988/89 Supp.) and § 22-60, appellees respond that the M aster Pla n is not ju st a guid e, that [ B.C.C . § 22-59 and § 22-60] commanded the CRG to refer [M]aster [P]lan conflict issues to the Planning Board, set up a procedu re for Plan ning Bo ard review , and require d the CR G to incorporate the Planning Board decision in its final action unless the Coun ty Council chose to overrule the Planning Board . Relying on Bd. of County Comm rs v. Gaster, 285 M d. 233, 246 -50 (1979 ); Coffey v. Md. Nat l Ca p. P. & P. Com m n, 293 Md 24, 30-31 (1982) and Md. Nat l Cap. P. & P. Comm n v. Wash. Bus. Park Assocs., 294 Md. 302, 313-16 (1982), ap pellees con tend that: While the master plan is often described as a guide in zoning reclassification and special exception cases, the situation is different with development or subdivision plans where there is a direct statutory provision providing for a decisio n upon a master plan conflict. In this situation, the master plan is binding. On this issue, we agree with the position enunciated by appellees. Appellant relies on Rylyns Enters., 372 M d. 514, Beachwood I, 107 Md. App. 627, and People s Counsel for -25- Baltimore County v. Webster, 65 M d. App. 694, cert. denied, 306 Md. 70 (1986), cases involving zoning regulations in which Maryland appellate courts have found local m aster plans to be guide s. These ca ses are disting uishable as the cases inv olve zonin g matters in which there wa s no r equirem ent u nder the county code or charter that the zoning plan conform to the maste r plan. We shall briefly exam ine the case s relied on b y appellant to clarify the distinctio n in the c ase law in matte rs pertain ing to lo cal mas ter plans . In Beachwood I, this Court reversed the County Board s decision to grant a Petition for a Zoning Reclassification submitted by the developer, Beachwood. 107 Md. App. 627, 675. In Beachwood I., the Baltimore Coun ty Council reclassified the zoning o f Beachw ood s land to D.R.1, however, the County Board, on petition by the developer, reclassified the property as D.R . 3.5. 107 Md. App. at 636. Appellants argued that there was no showing before the Coun ty Board of a mistake or error in the zoning classification originally made by the County Council. Beachwood argued tha t the Coun ty Council s zo ning classific ation did not comply with the local master plan. Id. at 657. In affirming the zoning classification of the County Council, we explained that there is no re quiremen t that a comprehensive zoning plan must conform to the recommend ations of an applicable m aster plan and [a]s we have said, a master plan is only a guide and is not to be confused with a comprehensive zoning, zoning map or zoning classification. 107 Md. App. at 657 (citing Howard County v. Dorsey, 292 M d. 351, 363 (1982); Pattey v. Bd. of County Co mm rs, 271 Md. 352, 260 (1974 )). -26- In Webster, this Court upheld the County Board s affirmation of the Zoning Commissioner s grant of a petition for a special exc eption requ ired for a pro posed pro ject. 65 Md. App. at 696. Specif icall y, this Court ad dressed w hether the Baltimore County Master Plan 1979-1990, as amended on January 5, 1981, prohibit[ed] the use of appellee s property for a new office building permitted within its R-C zoning classification? 15 65 Md. 15 This Court began by explaining the history of the Baltimore County Master Plan: Article V, Subdivision 6, of the Baltimore County Charter (1978 ed., 1984 Supp .) creates the Office of Planning and Zon ing. T he offic e is direct ed by § 522.1 of th at Ch arter to plan fo r the develop men t of th e cou nty, including the preparation of a m aster pla n, a zoning map, subdivision regulations, and zoning rules and regulations. Section 5 23(a) of the Cha rter provides that the master plan shall set forth comprehensive objectives, policies, and standards to serve as a guide for the development of the county and § 523(b) states that the zoning maps are to be con sistent w ith the m aster pla n. Und er § 523 , the County Council, upon receipt of the master plan and zoning maps, and the rules and regulations, is empowered to accept or modify them and then adopt them by resolution. Sections 522.1 and 523 of the Charter were adopted b y the County C ouncil in 1978, approve d by th e voters o f the county, and became effective December 8, 1978. The Charter Revision Commission which proposed these charter amendm ents commented on the proposed § 523 in its report filed on March 14, 1978 : This section num ber corresp onds to an existing number in the Charter, but the text is all new. Because the master plan is a basic document which should serve as a guide to ord erly development in the County, the Commission recommends that a broad definition of it be given in the Charter. The Commission recommends that the County Council alter the Master Plan as necessary, then adopt it by resolution. It is not the intent of the Commission that all actions in the County sho uld autom atically (contin ued...) -27- App. at 695. We held that a master plan is a guide when executing the zoning process, stating: This charter language is not vague or ambiguous and evidences the clearest intent of its framers. That the master plan was to serve as a guide to the County Counc il in its promulgation of the maps and regulations when executing the zoning process is patent from the resolution of the Council in adopting the master plan. . . .This has b een the ge nerally accepte d role of the ma ster plan in this context. As we noted in Floyd v. County Council of P.G. Co., 55 Md.App. 246, 258 -59, 461 A .2d 76 (19 83): [I]t is commonly understood, in Maryland and elsewhere, that Master Plans a re guid es in the zoning proces s. Chapman v. Montgomery County C ouncil, 259 Md. 641, 271 A.2d 156 (1970); Board of Coun ty Com m rs. for P rince Ge orge s Co unty v. Edmonds, 240 Md. 680, 215 A.2d 209 (1965); see Montgomery Coun ty v. Woodward & Lothrop, Inc., 280 Md. 15 (...continued) be required to conform with every detail of the master plan because of this resolution. It would be up to the Cou ncil to define any enforcement mechanisms b y legislative act. However, the Commission does want the development of a Master Plan to which the Council can and will make a commitm ent. The Council then can enact a zoning map consistent with the master plan, as provided in subsection 523(b), and the master plan will provide a reference document Counc il members can depend upon w hen they must resist pressures to draw zoning maps to conform with transient political demands. Pursuant to § 522.1, the Office of Planning and Zoning prepared a master plan, the Baltimore County Master Plan 1979-1990, which was accepted by Counc il resolution on Novem ber 19, 1979. The master plan was am ended on Janu ary 5, 1981 b y Council Resolution 2-81 adopting the Towson Town Center Plan (the To wson Plan). Id. at 698- 99 (fo otnote o mitted). -28- 686, 376 A .2d 483 , cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1067 [98 S.Ct. 1245, 55 L.Ed.2d 769] (1977) (Master Plan a guide, not a straitjacket); Kanfer v. Montgomery County Council, supra [35 Md.App. 715, 733, 373 A .2d 5, cert. denied, 281 Md. 741 (1977)] (plan a prophecy as to future development). Master Plan guidelines are mandatory only if an ordinance so provides . Cf. Coffey v. Md.-Na t l. Cap. Park & Pl[anning] Comm n., 293 Md. 24, 441 A.2d 1041 (19 82) (subd ivision case); Board o f County Comm'rs. of Cecil County v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233 , 401 A.2d 666 (1979). See also Md.-Nat l Cap. P. & P. v. Wash. Bus. Pk., 294 Md. 302, 449 A.2d 414 (1982). Id. at 702-03. In Rylyns Enters., a case from Montgomery County, the Court of Appeals affirmed this Court s holding that the municipality s imposition, at the insistence of the County, of a condition limiting the use of the newly annexe d property more restrictively than allowed by the City zoning ordinance for the zoning district in which the property was placed was tantamount to improper conditional zoning. 372 Md. at 521. The Court of Appeals, however, explained: [Master] Plans are long term and th eoretical, and usually contain elements concerning transportation and public facilities, recommended zoning, and other land use recommendations and propo sals. Zoning, how ever, is a more finite term, and its primary objective is the immediate regulation of property use through the use of use classifications, some relatively rigid and some m ore flexible. We repe atedly have no ted that plans , which are the result of work done by plann ing com mission s and ad opted b y ultimate z oning b odies, a re advisory in nature and have no force of law absent statues or local ordinances linking planning and zon ing. Where the latter exist, how ever, they serve to elevate the status of comprehensive plans to the level of true regulatory device. -29- In those instances where such a statute or ordinance exists, its effect is usu ally that of requiring that zoning or other land use decisions be consistent with a plan s rec omm endation s reg arding la nd use an d density o r inte nsity. 372 Md. at 52 9-31 (footnotes om itted) (citations omitted). (1) Charter Counties Prince George s County, Wicomico County, Montgomery County, and Baltimore County are cha rter cou nties. Loyola College, 406 Md . at 70 -71 ( Ba ltimo re County is a charter county pursu ant to Article X I-A of the Maryland C onstitution. ); United Parcel Servs., Inc. v. People s Counsel for Baltim ore Cou nty, 336 M d. 569, 5 81 (19 94). As none of the cases relied upon by appellant, arising in Baltimore or Montg omery Cou nty, directly address the binding effect of the local master plan where the county reviews development or subdivision plans, we find cases involving development and subdivision plans, from sister charter counties, Prince George s County and Wicomico County, to be instructive. Maryland Ann. Code A rticle 25A, § 5(X)(1)(i) (1 957, 200 5 Repl. Vol.), autho rizes Baltim ore Cou nty and Wicom ico Coun ty to enact loca l law s fo r the protectio n and pro motion o f public s afet y, health, morals, and welfare, re lating to zoning and planning. Maryland Ann. Code A rticle 28, § 7-110, authorizes M ontgomery Coun ty and Prince George s County to enact a general plan for the protection and promotion of health, safety, morals, comfort, and welfare of the inhabitants of the regional district -30- (2) Prince George s County In Coffey v. Md. Nat l Cap. P . & P. Com m n, 293 Md. 24, 25 (1982), a case originating in Prince George s County, the Court of Appeals held, when subdivision regulations require that a proposed subdivision comply with the master plan, an application for approva l of a prelim inary subdivisio n plan that f ails to so com ply must be rejected. In Coffey, the Planning Board rejected a p roposed subdivision p lan finding that Prince G eorge s County Code § 24-103(a )(1) requires s ubdivision plats to conf orm with the Prince Georg e s County Master Plan. 293 Md. at 25. The circu it court af firmed this rejec tion. Id. The Court rejected the arguments of Coffey, who argued that master plans are guides and explained, [n]o opinion of this Court has made a statement relative to master plans acting only as guides in the context of the facts here involved. Id. at 26. At oral argument, counsel for the Commission explained, the Commission regarded the master plan as binding in subdivision matters subsequent to the ena ctment of the regulation re quiring propo sed subdiv isions to conform with the master plan. Id. The Co urt stated: As the auth or poin ts out in 4 R. An derson , American Law of Zoning 2d § 23.20, at 89 (1977), Subdivision controls are imposed for the purpose of implementing a comprehensive plan for commu nity development. To achieve this end, plats submitted to a planning commission for approval must be examined in relation to the official map and the master plan. M oreover, a s the court observed in Popular Refreshments, Inc. v. Fuller s Milk Bar, etc., 85 N.J. Super. 528, 537, 205 A .2d 445 ( 1964) , petition for certification denied, 44 N.J. 409, 209 A.2d 143 (1965), If planning boards had no alternative but to rubber-stamp their approval on every subdivision plat which conformed with the zoning ordinance , there wou ld be little or no re ason for th eir existence. While pla nning and zoning co mpleme nt each oth er and serv e certain common objectives, each represents a separate municipal function and neither -31- is a mere rubber-stamp for the other, citing Levin v. Livingston Tp., 35 N.J. 500, 506, 173 A .2d 391 (1961). Id. at 29-3 0. In Coffey, the Court a nalyzed the fa cts of the ca se, and con cluded: Here we have a regulation duly enacted by the legislative body for Prince George s County which specifies that the planning board shall not approve a subdivision plat not in compliance with the master plan. This subdivision regulation is as much entitled to obedienc e as any other le gislative enac tment. The need for the regulation specifying that a subd ivision plan must confo rm to the master plan can be illustrated by comparison to the putting of w ater in a teacup drop by drop. After a period of time there comes the drop w hich will cause the cup to overflow . By analogy, dev eloping so me of the lots in conformity with the existing zoning will not disrupt the master plan. Concentrated use and develo pmen t, howe ver, w ill disrupt it. The legislative body wished to avoid this w hen it specif ied that subd ivisions mu st comply with the master p lan. Acco rdingly, the Co mmission was justified in rejecting Coffey s proposed subdivision for his failure to conform that proposal with the master plan. 293 M d. at 30- 31. The Court of Appeals, in Wash . Bus. Park Assocs., 294 Md. at 303, reviewed a dispute over the subdivision of vacant land in Prince George s County. The Court of Appea ls vacated the judgment of this Court, remanding without reversal or affirmance, and held: Coffey, 293 Md. 24, was decided subsequent to consideration of this case by the Commission a nd both courts w hich have review ed the matter. Moreover, although failure of the proposed subdivision to comply with the master plan was argued before the Comm ission, both lower courts, and us, that issue is not properly before us, as we have pointed out. We do not know why the Commission reached the conclusion it did. Its action may have been based upon noncompliance with the master plan, some other provision of the subdivision regulations authorized by statute, a desire to accommodate the -32- State Highway Administration, or some other reason. Given those facts we believe the Comm ission should have an opportunity to address the issue here with knowledge of the fact that in Coffey we have held that when the Prince George s County sub division reg ulations requ ire that a subd ivision plan comply with a master plan, that plan is not considered a mere guidepost or set of recommendations as in zoning matters. Id. at 316. In Archers Glen Partners Inc. v. Garner, 176 M d. App . 292 (2 007), aff d, 405 Md. 43 (2008), this Court analyzed the binding effect of the Prince George s County Master Plan on a developer s application for approval of a prelimin ary plan for a subdivision. T his Court stated: Af ter obser ving generall y, neither type of plan [master plan or general plan] imposes mandatory criteria, we rec ognized a provision c ontained in the Coun ty s subdivision regulations, specifi cally, § 24 -121(a )(5), Prin ce Ge orge s C ounty C ode. It provides that the subdivision plan shall conform to the area master plan. 176 Md. App. at 301. We concluded that based on this conform to language and the Coffey decision, the master plan is a bind ing doc umen t in the co ntext of subdiv ision reg ulations . Id. at 315. In Md.-Nat l Cap. P. & P. Comm n v. Greater Baden-Aquasco Citizens Ass n, 412 Md. 73, 102 (2009), the C ourt of Appeals reiterated that the Prince George s County Master Plan is binding when the County reviews subdivision plans, as the County s Subdivision Regulations, namely Prince George s County Code §24-121(a)(5), provides that, the plat shall conform to the Master Plan. -33- (3) Wicomico County In Pomeranc-Burke v. Wicomico Envtl. Trust, Ltd., 197 Md. A pp. 714, 716 (201 1), Pomeranc-Burke submitted a proposed subdivision plan to the Wicomico County Planning & Zonin g Com mission . The Commission denied the proposed subdivision plan and Pomeranc-Burke appealed the denial to the County Board of Appeals, which affirmed the denial of the p lan. Id. at 716-17. Pomeranc-Burke then appealed to the circuit court which affirm ed the d ecision of the C ounty B oard. Id. at 717. Pomeranc-Burke appealed to this Court, contending that the Wicomico Planning and Zoning Commission did not have the authority to deny appellant s application on the ground that the application did not comply with the general purposes provisions of Wico mico Cou nty, Md., Code Art. I, §§ 225-27 or 225-5 1A. Id. at 717- 18. This Court, speaking through Judge James Eyler, affirmed the Board of Appeals, holding that, the Board was entitled to consider the purposes of the ordinances and the [Wi com ico C oun ty] Comprehensive Plan as part of its analysis and the purpose sections are part of the ordinances themselve s, not a pream ble to an ordinance, and there is no asserted internal inconsistency. Id. at 748. It is settled that an agency may deny approval of a proposed subdivision, even if it meets zoning requirements, when it does not comply w ith an applica ble plan and the relevant jurisdiction requires com pliance with th e plan. See Maryland National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. Washington Business Park Associates, 294 M d. 302, 449 A.2d 41 4 (1982); Coffey v. Maryland-National Capital Park and Planing Commission, 293 Md. 24, 441 A.2d 1041 (1982); and Board of County Commissioners v. Gaster, 285 Md. 233, 401 A.2d 666 (1979). -34- Almost all of the Bo ard s findin gs related to th e size, location and design of the specific subdivision (e.g., findings related to siz e, street arrang ement, entrances, linear arrangement, forest bu ffers, and slopes). App ellant s argument is that the Board could not consider and rel y on legislative expressions of general purposes and general planning goals, regardless of whether legally binding, as distinguished from specific requirements. Our reading is that the Board co nsidered th e purpose s of the app licable ordinances and consistency with the relevant Plan provisions in interpreting and applying the cluster developmen t ordinances in their entirety. It had the power to do so as long as it did not violate specific legislative requiremen ts. An agency s denial shall not be arbitrary, but here, there was substantial evidence to supp ort the findings. Id. at 750. (4) Analysis Based on the facts of this case and the relevant case law, we conclude that the Master Plan is binding as to development and subdivision plans in Baltimore County. Here, direct statutory provisions - B.C.C. §26-166(a) of the 1988 B.C.C., providing: All development of land must conform to the master plan, including adopted community plans and these regulations. . . and the current B.C.C. § 32-4-102 (a)(1), provid ing: Sub ject to limitation in the Charter, all developmen t of land shall conform to: The Master Plan; . . . 16 - support the conclusion that the Master Plan is binding. These statutes are the equivalent of Prince George s County Code § 24-121(a)(5). 17 The Co urt of Ap peals and th is Court concluded that 16 We shall refer to both the 1988 a nd curr ent vers ions of the B.C .C., as the Planning Staff, Planning Board and Board considered whether the amended plan conflicted with the 1989- 2000 a nd 201 0 Ma ster Plan s. 17 Prince G eorge s C ounty Cod e § 24-12 1(a)(5) prov ides: The plat shall conform to the area master plan , including m aps and tex t, (contin ued...) -35- under Prince George s County Code § 24-121(a)(5), the County s master plan is binding when Prince G eorge s C ounty reviews subdivision matters. Like wise, we conclude that, in light of B.C.C. § 26-166 and B.C.C. § 32-4-102, the Master Plan is not merely a guide, but rather is b inding when Baltim ore Co unty revie ws de velopm ent and subdiv ision m atters. As this Court explained in Archers Glen, even though the master plan itself does not impose any mand atory criteria, the provision contained in the County s subdivision regulations, specifically, § 24-121(a)(5), Prince George s County Code provides that the subdivision plan shall conform to the area master plan. 176 Md. App. at 301. Given that the language of B.C.C. § 26-166 and B.C.C. § 32-4-102 is identical to that in Princ e George s County Code § 24-121(a )(5), we rejec t appellant s a rgumen t that the Baltimore County Master Plans of 1989-2 000 and 201 0 are guides because the plans do not contain m andatory criteria. As the Court o f Appe als explaine d in Coffey, and as ado pted by this Co urt in Pomeranc-Burke, when subdivision regulations require that a proposed subdivision comply with the master plan, an application for approval of a preliminary subdivision plan that fails to so comply must be rejected. 293 Md. at 25; 197 Md. App. at 750. As such, based on B.C.C. § 26-166(a) of the 1988 B.C.C. and the current B.C.C. § 32-4-102, the Board did not 17 (...continued) unless the Planning Board finds that events have occurred to render the relevant plan recommendations no longer appropriate or the District C ouncil has not imposed the recommended zoning. -36- err on April 6, 2007, in remanding the propo sed amen ded plan to the Plannin g Board to determine whether it conflicted with the Master Plan, nor did it err in finding on July 1, 2009, that the plan, in fact, conflicted with the Master Plan. B. B.C.C. § 22-37 and § 22-38 Appellant contends that the languag e of B.C .C. § 22-38 , which pro vides: Co mpliance with the development regulations hereinafter set forth shall be deemed the fulfilment of the development policies set forth in Section 22-37 and purposes set forth in Section 22-38 should be interpreted to mean that compliance with the development regulations shall be deemed in conform ity with the master plan. App ellant argues that [b]ecause th ere were no comments returned by any county agency at the CRG Meeting on April 1, 2005 indicating that the [amended plan] failed to comply with any of Baltimore County s development standards, and more importantly because the CRG approved the amended plan by operation of law, the [amended plan] fulfilled the d evelopm ent policies an d purpose s set forth in B.C.C. § 22-37. Appellant contends that by virtue of B.C.C. § 22-38 the amen ded plan is deem ed to be in com pliance with th e Mas ter Plan . Appellant s argument that B.C.C. § 22-37 and § 22-38 create a system of deemed compliance with the M aster Plan is without m erit. B.C.C. § 22-38 is an introductory section of the B.C.C. addressing the purposes of the regulations contained within Article Four, Develo pment R egulations o f Baltimo re Coun ty, and provid es, in pertinen t part: (b) To impleme nt the future growth a nd develo pment of Baltimore County in accord ance w ith the m aster pla n. -37- *** Compliance with the de velopme nt regulation s hereinafte r set forth sha ll be deemed the fulfilment of the development policies set forth in section 22-37 and purposes set forth in section 22-38. Our goal in construing any regulatory scheme is to extract and effectuate the actual intent of the Legislature in enacting the statute. Our inquiry in this regard begins with a reading of the p lain lang uage o f the sta tutory text. Casey v. M ayor of Roc kville, 400 Md. 259, 288 (2007) (citations om itted). As the Court of Appeals explained, in Kane v. Bd. of Appea ls, 390 M d. 145, 1 61-62 (2005 ), cert. denied, 547 U.S . 1179 (20 06): This Court has previously stated that local ordinances and charters are interpreted under the same canons of construction that apply to the interpretation of statutes. It is also a well settled principle of law that the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature[. . . .] For that purpose, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute, and, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we ordinarily end our inquiry there also. Finally, this Court must construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. (Citations omitted). Appellant s argument fails based on a plain reading of Article Four. Article Four of the 1978 B.C.C. (1988/89 Supp.) provides for a specific and detailed development review and approval process for subdivision plans. The subsections composing Article Four set forth a process under which a proposed development plan is to be re viewed a nd appro ved in Baltimore County. One of the determinations req uired to be m ade during this process is whether a proposed plan conflicts with the Master Plan. Specifically, B.C.C. § 22-54 (1978, -38- 1988/89 Supp.) provides for a predevelopment conference in which an applicant is provided with information about government policies, standards, and legislatio n which could perta in to the applicant s property including master plan intent and conflict. After the predevelopment conferen ce, pursuan t to B.C.C. § 22-54, an a pplicant may submit a development plan for consideration. The plan is preliminarily reviewed by the Department of Public W orks, pursu ant to B.C.C. § 22-56, and if the plan is approved, it is sent to the CRG. Pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-57 and § 22-58, the CRG may find that the proposed plan conflicts with the Master Plan, and, pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-59, the CRG may refer the plan to the Planning B oard to con sider the plan . Under B .C.C. § 22 -60, the Plan ning Bo ard is authorized to make a determina tion on the p lan and fo rward the determina tion to the C ounty Counc il. In the event that the County Council takes no action, the Planning Board s determination is binding on the CRG, pursuant to B.C.C § 22-60. Finally, pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-61, appeals may be taken to the Board. Appellant has failed to provide case law or any other authority to substantiate the theory that a plan may be deemed in compliance with the Master Plan under B.C.C. § 22-38, after the proposed plan has been denied through the process described in B.C.C. §§ 22-53 through 22-68. Contrary to appellant s position, the process described in B.C.C. §§ 22-53 through 22-68 pro vides the very basis by which Baltimore County determines w hether a development plan is in com pliance w ith the Ma ster Plan. Th is Court m ust construe a statute as a whole so that no word, clause, sentence, or phrase is rendered surplusage, superfluous, -39- meaningless, or nugatory. Kane, 390 Md. at 162. In this case, after the deployment of the process set forth in B.C.C. §§ 22-53 through 22-68, the CRG, the Planning Board and the Board determined that appellant s proposed amended plan conflicted with the Master Plan. To determine otherwise would render the extensive process set forth in B.C.C. §§ 22-53 through 22-68 surplusage, superfluous, meaningless, or nugatory. C. The T aking A rgum ent Appellant argues that B.C.C. § 22-18 (1978, 1988/89 Supp.) provides a specific process to be follow ed in the event of a Master Plan Conflict, and this process provides that if the county decides not to purchase the property subject to a master plan conflict, it cannot deny dev elopm ent. A ppellan t conten ds that, p ursuan t to B.C .C. § 22-18 , a finding of a conf lict with the M aster Pla n may be used to preclud e deve lopme nt, only where the property is reserved f or acquisition by the Coun ty for a pub lic improvement pursuant to the master plan. According to appellant, under B.C.C. § 22-18(b), 18 the County Council had 18 B.C.C. § 22-18(b) p rovides: If at its next meeting after the receipt of such report the planning board sha ll by resolution so direct, the d irector of pla nning sha ll then refer th e question to the agency most nearly affected by or concerned with such proposals for any such public improvement or facility, whether such agency be the county board of education, the department of public works or any other governmental agen cy. Such agency shall then have thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the inquiry within which to notify the planning board and the county coun cil whether or not it believes that it would be in the public interest to reserve any portion or all of the land involved in such application for a building permit or for approv al of a p relimina ry subdiv ision pla n. The agency s recommendation, (contin ued...) -40- sixty (60) days from receipt of the Planning Bo ard s decision to pass a resolution reserving the property for possible purchase, but did not do so. Appellant maintains that the Board, in denying the amen ded plan without purchasing the property, effectively permitt[ed] an unconst itutio nal ta king of t he prope rty. Appellees argue that this issue is not preserved for review. Appellees contend that appellant waited until December 17, 2008, to argue that the County failed to follow the B.C.C. § 22-18 reservation process. Appellees maintain that the Board s Opinion in 2007 demonstrates that this claim was not raised earlier, and that the Board, in its July 1, 2009, 18 (...continued) if affirmative, shall include a map showing the boundaries and area of the parcel to be reserv ed and an estimate of the time, not to exceed fourteen (14) months following the date of such app lication, required to complete the acquisition of the land involved in such application. The agency s report and recommendation, if affirmative, shall be sent to the county council and to the planning board. The plann ing b oard shall hav e a pe riod of th irty (30) da ys from the date of the agency s report, to submit its recommendations to the County Counc il for their consideration. After receipt of the planning board s recommendation or after the e xpiration of thirty (30) days from the date of the agency s report, which ever shall first o ccur, the cou nty council sha ll, if it determines that all or part of the land de scribed in the agency report should be reserved, pass a resolution declaring the reservation a nd describ ing the land to be reserve d. Failure by the county co uncil to pass such resolu tion within s ixty (60) days of the da te of the ag ency s report an d recomm endation shall terminate the procedure under this section and shall prevent any or all of the land described in the agency s report and recommendation from being subject to the procedures of this section for a period of two (2) years from the date of the agency s report and recommendation. -41- Opinion properly refrained from addressing appellant s argument as to B.C.C. § 22-18. In the alternative, appellees contend that B.C.C. § 22-18 does not apply where a substantial develo pmen t is appro ved, su bject to c onditio ns imp osed to satisfy the master plan. As a threshold matter, we must examine whether the claim is properly before us. Appellees contend that the Board correctly declined to rule on this argument as appellant failed to raise the issue prior to the December 17, 2008, hearing. We agree. Ap pellant s counsel conceded at oral argument, in this Court, that he was unable to locate a point in the record, prior to December 17, 2008, at which he previously raised the impermissible taking argum ent. Appellant did not raise the taking argument in its Notice of Appeal, filed on April 26, 2005, w hich stated: NOW COM ES HN S DEV ELOP MEN T, LLC , by and throug h its attorneys . . . and ap peals th e final a ction of the [C RG] ta ken A pril 1, 2005 denying the [amended plan] filed by [appellant] to the County Board of Appea ls of Baltim ore Cou nty. This appe al is taken pursuant to Baltimore County Code , 1988, e d., as amended, Sectio n 22-61 a nd Baltim ore Cou nty Code of 200 3, Sectio n 32-4 -104. Appellant, HNS Develop ment, LL C was th e Petitioner se eking to amen d the ap proved CRG for Ph ase II of Long field E states. Between October 2005, and August 2006, the Board held six days of public hearings on CRG s denial of th e plan. This issue was not raised b efore the B oard at that tim e. On A pril 6, 2007, the Board issued a decision remanding the matter to the Planning B oard for a determination as to whether the proposed amended plan conflicted with the Master Plan. On -42- April 17, 2008, the Planning Board adopted Director Keller s report finding a conflict with the Mas ter Plan and forward ed its findings to the Board.19 In the decision of July 1, 2009, the Board stated: Nevertheless, having received the m atter de novo, our referral for the Planning Board d etermination as to Ma ster Plan co nflict was e ssential to a final de cision. In Grasslands Plantation, Inc. v. Frizz-King Enters., LLC, 410 Md. 191, 213 (2009) (quoting Halle Companies v. Crofton Civic Ass n, 339 Md. 131, 141 (1995)), the Court of Appea ls held: [T]he context in which the term de novo is used . . . means that on appe al there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which have been appealed and not on every ma tter covered in the application. In this sense de novo means that the Board of Appeals may hear testimony and consider additional evidence pertaining to the issue or iss ues presen ted on app eal. The Court of Appeals explained: Although the issues to be addressed on review by the Board may be limited, new and additional evidenc e is permitted. The procee dings, therefore, are wholly original with regard to all issues properly raised. Id. (quoting Halle Companies, 339 M d. at 142 ). 19 At oral argument, in this Court, appellant alleged that it was not until the Planning Board found a Master Plan conflict on April 17, 2008, that it could raise the B.C.C. § 22-18 taking argument. We disagree. The Planning Board was charged by the Board w ith determining whether the amended plan conflicted with the Master P lan. Appellant s contention that denial of approval of the am ended pla n would constitute a taking, pursuant to B.C.C. § 22-18, was directly relevant to appellant s position that the Planning Board co uld not find the amended plan conflicted with the Master Plan. Further, B.C.C. § 22-18 explicitly directs that the Plannin g Board examine a preliminar y plan to determine if it will interfer e with th e Cou nty s ability to effect uate ce rtain cap ital impro veme nts. -43- In Halle Companies, 339 Md. at 141-42 (quoting Daihl v. C ounty Bd. of Appea ls, 258 Md. 157, 162 (1970)), the Court of Appeals held: We think that the con text in which the term de novo is used in Section 501.6 and 501.3 . . . means that on appeal there shall be a de novo hearing on those issues which h ave been appealed and not on every matter covered in the application. In this sense de novo means that the Bo ard of Appeals may hear testimony and consider additional evidence pertaining to the issue or issues presented on app eal. See Vol. 2, The Law of Zoning and Planning, Rathkopf, ch. 65-30, § 7. The original nature of a de novo hearing w ith its quality of newness is in contra-distinction to a review upon the record as ex ists where matters are hea rd on ce rtiorari. 73 C.J.S. Public Ad ministrative Bodies and Procedure, § 204. We conclude that the Board did not err in failing to address this issue in its July 1, 2009, decision. The issue had not been raised previously in the CRG process, before the Board on appeal in 2005 , through 2006, or bef ore the Planning B oard on remand and, as such, was not a part of Planning Board s April 17, 2008, Report to the Board. By not raising the issue in its N otice of A ppeal to the Board, before the Board in the 2005, through 2006, proceedings, or before the Plannin g Board, on remand, when the Planning Board was charged by the Board with reviewin g the ame nded plan to determin e whethe r or not it conflicted with the Master Plan, appellant failed to properly bring the issue before the Board, and fa iled to pr eserve the issue for rev iew. Alte rnatively, we conclude that denial of appellant s proposed amended plan does not constitute an unauthorized taking under B.C.C. § 22-18. B.C.C. § 22-18(a) provides: When any application for a building permit or for approval of the preliminary plan of any subdivision shall be forwarded to the director of planning for his conside ration and a pproval. -44- . . . (Emph asis added ). Here, app ellant sough t approva l of an amendment to an existing subdivision plan, not a building permit or approval of a preliminary plan of a subdivision. In the Notice of Appea l, filed on A pril 26, 2005, appellant acknowledged: Appellant, HNS Develop ment, LLC was the P etitioner seek ing to amend the approved CRG for Phase II of Longfie ld Estates. The application for approval of the preliminary subdivision plan of Longfie ld Estates w as submitted in 1991. It w as in 1991, that, if applicable, the reservation process of B.C.C. § 22-18 would have been considered by the Planning Board. In 1991, the County approved the application for the subdivision of Lo ngfield E states, and L ongfield Estates was developed in compliance with the plan.20 Appellan t has cited no case law to support the contention that the B.C.C. § 22-18 reservation process applies to a proposed amendment to an ex isting de velope d subd ivision. By plain reading, B.C.C. § 22-18 does not apply to th e appro val of a n ame ndme nt to an e xisting a pprov ed plan . In zoning cases, in determining whether the challenged zoning regulation a mounts to a taking of priv ate prop erty, we have said that no compensable taking occurs so long as the zoning reg ulation does not deprive the owne r of all beneficial use of the pro perty. Md.-Nat l Cap. P. & P. Comm n v. Chadwick, 286 Md. 1, 10 (1 979) (citations omitted); Penn Cent. Tran sp. Co. v. N .Y. City, 438 U .S. 104 , 127 (1978) (to constitute a taking the 20 No appeal was taken from the 1991 approval of the app lication for the preliminary subdiv ision of Long field E states. -45- county by denying the proposed plan wo uld have to de ny appellant all re asonable u se of its proper ty). Longfie ld Estates is an existing development consisting of 194 acres and 67 lots. During the Dece mber 17 , 2008, hea ring, couns el for appellees explained that in 2004, appellant purchased thirteen ac res of L ongfie ld Estate s for $8 80,000 .00. Su bsequ ently, while seeking approval of the amended plan, appellant renovated the Langenfelder mansion and sold a five acre lot containing the mansion for $1,350,000.00. Appellant acknowledges having sold Lot 4 2 in 2007 , while retainin g the right to su bdivide the lot. Given th at the property has already been improved and sold,21 in part, appellant has not bee n denied a ll reasonable o r ben efic ial us e of t he prope rty. D. Substantial Evidence Appellant argues that the Board s July 1, 2009, decision was both legally faulty and unsupported by the record. Appellant argues that the Board committed reversible error by relying exclusively on the findings of the Planning Board, and by failing to provide any independent analysis of how the plan conflicts with the Master Plan. Appellant contends that the Planning Board s decision, was based on a vote to sim ply affirm (essentially rubber stamp) a prior decision, namely the Planning Board s 1991 decision. Appellant argues that this action by the Planning Board was not based on an analysis of the evidence and 21 Appellant concedes in its brief that, [ i]t is correct that [appellant] has sold Lot 42 in 2007 . The p arties ref er to the m ansion lot as Lo t 42. -46- testimony relating to whether a Master P lan conflict a ctually existed at the time. Appellant contends that the Planning Board did not consider changes in condition or in the development of the site since the 1991 decision. Appellees respond that Director Keller s report of February 20, 2008, providing updated information, contains adequate facts and reasons to find that the [amended plan] conflicts with th e maste r plan. Appellees contend that the Board s final decision of July 1, 2009 was correct as [t]he B oard recognize d that the Pla nning D irector s Rep ort, as adopted by the Planning Board, was thorough and well-conceived, with adeq uate findings of fact, and a reasonab le basis to find a Master Plan conflict based on the 1991 CRG approval, Note 18 particul arly, and th e entire h istory. By contending that the Board s decision is not supported by the record, a ppellant, in essence, raises the issue of whether the d ecision is supported by substantial eviden ce. In an assessment of whether an administrative agency s decision is supported by substantial evidence, we traditionally apply the rule that substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reason able mind might acc ept as adeq uate to support a conclusion. Md. State Police v. Lindsey, 318 Md. 32 5, 333 (1990). Therefore, this Court will review the Board s decision to determine whethe r a reasonin g mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. Id. In applying the substantial evidence te st, we do not substitute our judgmen t for the e xpertise of th e age ncy and we must review the a gency s decision in a light most favorable to the agency, since decisions of administrative agencies -47- are prima facie correct, and carry with them the presumption of validity. Id. 333-34. The Co urt of Ap peals furthe r explained the substan tial evidence test as follow s: [T]he test is a deferential one, requiring restrained and disciplined judicial judgment so as not to interfere w ith the agen cy s factual co nclusions[ .] This deference applies not only t o agency factfinding, but to the drawing of inferences from th e facts a s well. W hen, ho weve r, the agency s dec ision is predicated solely on an erro r of law, no deferenc e is approp riate and the reviewing court may substitute its judgment for that o f the agen cy. In brief, so long as the agency s decision is not predicated solely on an error of law, we will not overturn it if a reasoning mind could reasonably have reached the conclusion reach ed by the a gency. Md. State Police, 318 Md. at 334 (citations omitted) (quoting State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws v. Billhimer, 314 Md. 46, 58 (1988)). In this case, there is substantial evidence to support the Board s conclusion that the amended plan conflicted with the 2010 Master Plan. The Board in its post-remand order of July 1, 2009 relies primarily on Director Keller s report of February 20, 2008, in which Director Keller found that the amended plan conflicted with the 1989-2000 and 2010 Master Plans. In the report, Director Keller explicitly stated that he considered the 1991 conflict with the Master Plan, the Baltimore County Master Plan of 2010, and the Greate r Kingsville Area Community Plan of 1996. In his recommendation, Director Keller explained that Note 18 puts everyone (existing and future property owners) on notice that development on Lot 42 and/or Parcel A was not permitted, and was considered a conflict with the Master Plan. Providing current info rmation, D irector Kelle r examine d how the area be tween B ig Gunpowder River and Little Gun powde r River has maintained its character alo ng Belair -48- Road since the original approval in 1991 and concluded, [o]ver the past 17 years the area has remained remarkably similar. Director Keller also explained how the Development Regulations although significantly changed over the past 17 years still maintain the same purposes and directio n in effec t at the time that th is project was reviewed. In conclusion, Director Keller stated, the Baltimore County Master Plan 2010 and Greater Kingsville Area Comm unity Plan adopted as part of the Master Plan strongly support and provide [a] rational[e] for citing again as occurred in 1991 a Master Plan conflict. In the written Opinion, accompanying the July 1, 2009, Order, the Board explained: As a result of the Rem and by the [B oard], the qu estion of a p ossible conflict of the Petition er s propos ed amen dment w ith the Baltim ore Cou nty Master Plan 2010 was taken up by the Planning Staff. . . . The Plan ning Board met and adop ted the Staf f Report, a nd confirm ed that a con flict with the Maste r Plan 2 010, did in fact, e xist. . . . *** Therefore, once the Planning Board has now determined that such a conflict with the 2010 M aster Plan d oes in fact e xist, and no action having been taken to the contrary by the County Council, it is clear that the requested amendment to the or iginal C RG P lan in thi s matter canno t be allow ed. Contrary to appellant s contentions, the Board considered the current condition of the property and the current status of areas surrounding the property, and determined that the -49- amended plan co nflicted with th e 2010 Maste r Plan. Such evidence was su fficient to constitute substantial evidence to support the Board s July 1, 2009, decision that the amended plan co nflicts w ith the M aster Pla n. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. -50-

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