Champagne v. State
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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2424 September Term, 2009 DEVIN JAMES CHAMPAGNE v. STATE OF MARYLAND Kraus er, C.J., Graeff, Kenney, James A ., III (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ. Opinion by Krauser, C.J. Filed: July 7, 2011 Having been fou nd guilty by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Howard County of theft of property, specifically, a laptop computer, with a value of $500 or more, appellant, Devin James Champagne, claims that the evidence did not support a finding that the value of the stolen laptop computer was $500 or more at the time it was stolen. We agree and therefore vacate the judgment of the circuit court and, for the reasons set forth below, direct that a verdict of guilty of theft of property worth less than $500 be entered and that appellant then be sentenced on that conviction. FACTS On August 23, 2008, Joh n Engleh art, Sr., reported a burglary at his h ome in Columbia, Maryland. Among the items he reported stolen was a Dell Inspiron laptop computer. After the laptop was recov ered from appe llant s home, he was c harged with first- and fourthdegree burglary and theft of property (the laptop) with a value of $500 or more. The only evidence of the laptop s value was the testimony of Engleha rt, who, at trial, testified as follows: [Prosecutor]: What was the approximate value of that laptop computer? [Englehart]: I think I bought it originally for probably about - with all the - - the loaded software a nd all on it for about sixteen, eighteen hundred dollars. [Prosecutor]: When h ad you - - or ho w old was it, if you know? [Englehart]: About - - about three years. [Prosecutor]: About three years old? [Englehart]: Mmm-hmm. When the jury returned a guilty verdict on the count alleging theft of property with a value of $500 or more b ut was un able to reach a verdict on either the first- or fourth-degree burglary counts, the S tate entered a nolle prosequi as to each of those counts. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to a term of ten years impris onment, to run con secutively to a sentence he was currently serving for violating his probation in an unrelated case. DISCUSSION Because appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to convict him of the theft of the computer, the sole issue, on appeal, is whether the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the value of the laptop at the time of the theft was $500 or more.1 Appellant claims that, although the jury heard evidence as to what Eng lehart paid for the computer three years before it was stolen, there was no effort to determine the fair market va lue of the th ree-year-old computer, nor was there any effo rt to show wha t Mr. Englehart would have had to pay to replace his three-year-old compute r at the time o f trial. Con sequ ently, the evidence was not sufficient, insists appellant, to establish that the computer was worth $500 or more at the time of the theft. The State contends otherwise, asserting that the jury was free to make a fair inference of market value based on evidence regard ing the o riginal p urchas e price. 1 Although there was testimony that other items were stolen from Mr. En glehart s home, there was no evidence as to the value of those items. 2 Under Maryland s consolidated theft statute that was in effect at the time of the theft at issue, felony theft, as opposed to misdemeanor theft, was a theft of property or services with a value of $50 0 or mo re. Md. Code (2002), § 7-104(g) of the Criminal Law Article.2 Value was (and still is) defined in section 7-103 of the Criminal Law Article, as the market value of th e property or service at the time and place of the crime or, if the market value cannot satisfactorily be ascertained, the cost of the replacement of the property or service within a reaso nable tim e after th e crime . To determine whether the evidence was sufficient, we must decide whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crim e beyond a reaso nable d oubt. State v. Smith, 374 M d. 527, 533 (2003) (citin g Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)) (additional citations omitted). In making that decision, we give great deference to the trier of facts opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses, weigh the evidence, and resolve conflicts in the evidence. Pinkney v. State, 151 Md. A pp. 311, 329 (200 3). The present m arket value of stolen pr operty may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence and an y reasona ble infe rences drawn therefr om. Wallac e v. State, 63 Md. App. 399, 410 (198 5) ( [T]he test for the value of stolen goods is market value, but proof of market value ma y be indirect as w ell as direct. (quoting Vucci v. Sta te, 13 Md. App. 694, 2 The monetary thre shold for felony theft has since been raised to $1,000. Md. Code (2002 , 2010 S upp.), § 7-104(g) of the Criminal Law Article. 3 701 (1971))) (citations omitted). Moreover, a property owner s testimony regarding the original purchase price is circumstantially relevant to the present market value of that prop erty. Id. at 410-11. Thus, Englehart s testimony as to the original purchase price was relevant to the determina tion of the m arket value at the time of the theft. It does not follow, however, that his testimony, alone, was sufficient to establish that the value of the three-year-old computer was, in fact, over $500 at the time o f the theft. It is comm on know ledge, the C ourt of A ppeals has observed , that in the field of computer technology advances are constantly being made so that used equipment depreciates in value over relatively short periods of time. In re Christopher R., 348 Md. 408, 41 2-13 (1998). Nor is Maryland alone in acknowledging the difficulties in assessing the value of computer equipment at the time of theft because of the rapid decline in the value of such equipme nt. Florida s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently observed that [e]lectrical components such as computers . . . are subject to accelerated obsolescence because manufacturers are con stantly rele asing n ew, im proved techno logy at low er price s. Lucky v. State, 25 So. 3d 691, 692 (Fla. 4th D ist. Ct. App. 2 010). Fo r this reason, it concluded, the purchase price alone is generally insufficient to establish the value of such property in theft cases. Id. (citations omitted). No less significant, for our purposes, is an earlier observation by another Florida District Court of Appea l, the Fifth District, that com puter equip ment can become obsolete very quickly and that, consequently, testimony as to the manner in which the items had 4 been used , its gener al co ndition a nd qualit y, or its depreciation percentage was warranted. Doane v. State, 847 So. 2 d 1015, 1 018 (Fla. 5 th Dist. Ct. App. 2003). No such testimony was presented here, and, like the Florida appellate courts, we believe that its absence left the claimed value of the equipment at issue, namely $500 or more, unsupported by the evidence. We, therefore, co nclude tha t Englehart s testimo ny as to the price he paid fo r his computer three years earlier was insufficient to establish that its value was $500 or more at the time it was stolen. In so holding, we acknowledge that there are cases, of course, where the value of a stolen item is so obvious or so clearly within the common knowledge and experience of the ju ry, see, e.g., Angulo-Gil v. State, ___ Md. App. ___, 2011 Md. App. LEXIS 35, at *41 (filed Mar. 31, 2011) ( [W]e are convinced that a jury reasonably may conclude that, in April 20 07, a one yea r-old opera ble Ford F ocus wa s worth m ore than $500. ), or where the item stolen is manifestly not subject to rapid depreciation or obsolescence, see, e.g., State v. Spikes, 961 A.2d 426, 433 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) ( Unlike the situation with electronic equipment, which is generally subject to prompt depreciation, we have reco gnized tha t jewelry may app reciate in value. ); Williams v. United States, 805 A.2d 919, 928 (D.C. 2002) ( Unlike the electrical goods, . . . [the] jewelry was not subject to prompt depreciation or obsolescence. ) (citation omitted) ; People v . Womb le, 111 A.D.2d 283 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (noting that jewelry is the sort [of property] not subject to prompt depreciation or obsolesc ence ) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Parsons, 335 A.2d 800, 805 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) ( [J]ewelry is one of the few types of goods that 5 does not usually depreciate in value with use a nd age. ), tha t such eviden ce is unneces sary. But that, as we have pointed out, is not the case here. Although we conclude that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the value of the laptop computer was $500 or more at the time of the theft, there is, as appellant acknowledges, no need for a new trial as to whe ther appellan t was guilty of th eft of prop erty worth less than $500. Theft of property worth less than $500 is a lesser included offense of theft of property worth $500 or more, see Hag ans v. State , 316 Md. 429, 438 (1989), and, because a conviction for a greater offense constitutes a finding of guilt for all lesser included offen ses, Smith v. Sta te, 412 Md. 150, 165 (2009) (citing Brooks v . State, 314 Md. 585, 601 (1989)), he was, in fact, convicted of that offense. Consequently, as appellant requests, w e direct that the judgmen t in the circuit court be vacated, that a verdict of guilty of the lesser included offense of theft of prope rty worth less than $500 be entered, and that appellant be sentenced on that conviction. JUDGMENT VACATED. CASE REMANDED TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR HOWARD COUNTY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSIS TENT W ITH TH IS OPINION. ALL COSTS IN THIS COURT TO BE PAID BY HOWARD COUNTY. 6
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