Prioleau v. State
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
Mauric e Darryl P rioleau v. Sta te, No. 2669, September Term 2005 CRIMINAL LAW CONFESSIONS MIRANDA INTERROGATION A police officer s question to an arrestee, What s up, Maurice? does not constitute formal interrogation, nor is it the functional equivalent of interrogation. The phrase what s up? is com mon ly used as a greeting and was not spoken under circumstances that the officer should have kno wn we re reasona bly likely to elicit an incriminating response. Appellant s statement that followed the greeting, therefore, was not the product of custodial interrogation. REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2669 September Term, 2005 MAURICE DARRYL PRIOLEAU v. STATE of MARYLAND Kraus er, C.J., Hollander, Barbera, JJ. Opinion by Barbera, J. Filed: March 6, 2008 We consider in this appeal whether the phrase What s up, Maurice?, when uttered by a police officer to an arrestee, is interrogation or its functional equivalent as those terms are understood in the parlance of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S . 436 (196 6), an d its p roge ny. For the reasons that follow, we hold that words What s up, Maurice? were merely a greeting, given the circumstances in which they were spoken. The officer s words did not constitute formal interrogation, nor were they spoken under circumstances that the officer should have kno wn we re reasona bly likely to elicit an incriminating response from the arrestee. The arrestee s statement that came on the heels of the officer s greeting was therefore not the product of custodial interrogation. The case has its genesis in charge s brought against Maurice Darryl Priole au, appellan t, alleging his involvement in an operation to distribute cocaine on the streets of Baltimore City. Appellant, having been found guilty of the crimes of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and related offenses, presents two issues for our review: (1) whether the motion court erred in denying the motion to suppress the statement; and (2) whether the eviden ce is sufficient to sustain the convictions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgments. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS The Motion to Suppress The hearing he ld on appe llant s motion to suppress his statement to the police produced the following evidence. On March 28, 2005, Baltimore City Police Detective Timothy Stach and his partner Officer Jenkins were conducting a covert surveillance of the 1600 block of R egester Stree t. Det. Stach testified that, at about 6:00 p.m., he observed an Acura automob ile pull to the curb. An individual, whom the detective recognized as Maurice Prioleau, ap pellant, got ou t of the Ac ura and jog ged to 161 4 Reges ter Street. Det. Stach watched as appellant took out a clear plastic bag and tossed it onto the front steps of the house at that address. Det. Stach was using 10 by 50 binoculars at the time and could see small via ls inside the pla stic bag. The detective opined at the hearing as an expert in the packaging, distribution, and identification of controlled dangerous substances that the bag contained cocaine. Det. Stach saw appellant walk around the corner at the end of the block. The detective then saw a man, later identified as Keith Evans, walk up to the house at 1614 Regester Street to retrieve the bag. Det. Stach watched Evans distribute the contents of the bag to several individuals who had fo llowed him. Tho se individuals walked away after the transactions. Evans continued to pace Regester Street, distributing items from the bag to individuals who approached him. Appellant appeared and walked with Evans south on Regester Street toward Federal Street. Appellant turned onto Federal Street, while Evans continued to distribute the conten ts of the bag to additiona l individuals a long Reg ester Street. Det. Stach r ecalled that, at ab out 4:2 0 p.m., 1 appellant returned. He entered 1610 Regester Street, and, after one minute, emerged with another bag of suspected cocaine. Appellant gave the bag to Evans, who resumed his routine of strolling back and forth on 1 Det. Stach had also testified at the suppression hearing that appellant drove up at about 6 :00 p.m . The tim e discre pancy w as not a ddress ed furth er. -2- Regester Street, enga ging in hand-to-h and transac tions with individuals who approached. Det. Stach alerted Officer D avid Crites, who was at the police station, that he believed he was witnessing narcotics activity, and appellant and Evans were working in tande m. Officer Crites responded to the scene, driving a marked police vehicle. Officer Crites saw Evans walking northbound toward the house at 1608 Regester Street and handing off the bag to an un know n perso n at that a ddress . Offic er Crites arrested Evan s. Det. Stach and Officer Jenkins emerged from their undercover observation position and joined Officer Crites. Det. Stach instructed Officer Crites to go get [appellant]. Det. Stach then escorted Evans into the house at 1610 Regester Street. The detective testified that there were numerous torn clear plastic bags on the floo r, indicating dr ug activity in the house. Meanwhile, Officer Crites located appellant, arrested him, and placed him in the cruiser. Officer Crites then drove to the front of 1610 Regester Street and removed appellant from the vehicle. Appellant was reluctant to move, so Officer Crites employed a wrist lock and walked appellant up to the entrance of the house. As Officer Crites appeared at the front door of 1610 Regester Street with appe llant, Det. Stach was standing there. He said to appellant: What s up, Maurice? Appellant then said: I m no t going in that ho use. I ve never been in that house. Det. Stach testified that his words to a ppellant w ere not a question on anything that has to do w ith illegal activity. He stated, moreove r, that appellan t appeared very agitated an d nervou s when h e blurted o ut -3- those words. Det. Stach acknowledged that appellant was under arrest by the time he was brought to the house. He was not sure whether appellant had been given his Miranda warnings. Inside 1610 Regester Street, the police recovered a handgu n with live ro unds in it and three plastic bags containing 25 clear vials of cocaine, all of which had been stashed above the ceiling tiles. The police searched appellant incident to his arrest and recovered $210.00. Appellant moved to suppress th e statemen t.2 The court denied the motion, reasoning that the comments made by Det. Stach amounted to merely an exchange of greetings, and appellan t s sta teme nt w as sim ply a b lurt n ot co vere d by Miranda. The Trial Appellant was tried on charges of distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine w ith the intent to distribute, several conspiracy charges, and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense. Det. Stach was accepted at trial as an expert in the area of recognitio n of narcotics, packaging[,] distribution and also the manner in which the organizations operate in th e streets in Ba ltimore City spe cifically having to do with cocaine[.] He testified about his knowledge of drug d istribution org anizations in Baltimore City. He explained that those organizations typically include a stash location, where the majority of the drugs are housed, and involve more than one member, each of whom has a 2 Appellant also sought suppression of the currency found during the search of his person. The court denied that motion. Appellant does not challenge that ruling on appeal. -4- specific role in the operation. Det. Stach also te stified abou t his observa tions, by use of 10 by 50 binoculars from a covert position 80 yards away, of appellant an d Evans on the 160 0 block of Regester S treet. Det. Stach s testimony was essentially the same as his testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress. Det. Stach testified that he saw appellant drop a bag of what he believed to be cocaine in front of 1614 Regester Street, then go into 1610 Regester Street. Det. Stach saw Evans pick up the bag that appellan t had drop ped and d istribute its conte nts to individu als who approached him. After that, appellant met Evans in front of 1610 Regester Street. Appellant went into th at building a nd, upon exiting it, hand ed Evan s a clear plastic bag of suspected narcotics. Evans resumed dealing. The detective testified that the police arrested appellant and Evans later that evening and recovered bags of cocaine and a loaded gun from 1610 R egester Street. Officer Jenkins, who had conducted the surveillance with Det. Stach, testified about his observations of appellant and Evans. Because his observations were without the benefit of binoculars, his testimony was limited to describing the comings and goings of the two men. Officer Crites also te stified about appellant s arrest. He recounted that appellant became very aggressive when he was re moved in handcuf fs from th e marked cruiser in front of 1610 Regester Street. Officer Crites testified that, at that point, appellant said I m not going in there. I wasn t around here. You didn t see me in that house. Officer Crites -5- used a control technique to force appellant s entry into the house. After the State rested, th e defe nse mo ved fo r a judg ment o f acqu ittal. The trial court denied the motion. The defense pu t on a brief case, offering the testimony of appellant s sister, and the State of fered o ne witn ess in reb uttal. Defense counsel renewed the motion for judgm ent of a cquittal, s ubmittin g on all c ounts. T he cou rt denied the mo tion. The jury acquitted appellant of the charges of distribution of cocaine, possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, a nd possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense and rendered no verdict on the charge of possession of cocaine. The jury found appellant g uilty of conspira cy to distribute cocaine, conspiracy to possess c ocaine w ith intent to distribute, and conspiracy to possess cocaine. The court imposed a single sentence of 20 years imprisonment, the first ten of wh ich are to be served without the possibility of parole. DISCUSSION I. Appellant argues that the court erred in den ying the motio n to suppress his statement to Det. Sta ch. He maintains that the statement was the product of custodial interrogation that was not preceded by the war ning s and waiver r equired by Miranda. The State responds that the detective s question What s up, Maurice? was neither interrogation nor its functional equivalen t. Consequently, the State argues, appellant s statement that followed the question was a blurt, not subject to suppression. We agree with the State. -6- We evaluate this issue by considering only the evidence that was introduced at the suppression hearing. Blake v. State , 381 M d. 218, 2 30 (20 04), cert. dismissed as improvid ently granted, 546 U.S . 72 (2005 ). We view that eviden ce in the light most favorable to the pa rty that prev ails on th e motio n, in this c ase, the S tate. See State v. Rucker, 374 M d. 199, 2 07 (20 03). W e review the cou rt s find ings of fact fo r clear er ror. Id. The Supreme Court held in Miranda that the pro secution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstra tes the use o f procedu ral safegua rds effectiv e to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444. Miranda warnings are required only when a suspec t is in cus tody and subjec t to interro gation. Id. The State does not dispute that appellant was in custody. The issue before us is therefore limited to w hether D et. Stach s salu tation to appellant constitutes interrogation or its func tional eq uivalen t. Interrogation, for Miranda purposes, is not limited to police interrogation practices that involve express questioning[.] Rhode Is land v. Innis , 446 U .S. 291 , 298-9 9 (198 0). The Supreme Court recognized in Innis that such an approach to interrogation would be inconsistent with the concern in Miranda about the use by law enforcement personnel of various psycholog ical ploys in custo dial settin gs. Id. at 299. The Court concluded, therefore, that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either exp ress question ing or its fun ctional equ ivalent. Id. at 300-01. The -7- Court explained what it meant by the functional equ ivalent of interrogation: [T]h e term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to exp ress question ing, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (o ther than thos e normally atte ndant to arrest and custod y) that the police sh ould kno w are reas onably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 301 ( footno tes omit ted). Notwithstanding that the test for determining whether statements or conduct constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the susp ect, rathe r than th e intent o f the po lice, id. at 301, the intent of the police is not without relevance. The Innis Court noted that the intent of the police may well have a bearing on whether the police should have known that their word s or action w ere reason ably likely to evoke an incriminating response. Id. at 301-02 n.7. Whether Det. Stach s question What s up, Maurice? was the functional equivalent of interrogation requires that we consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the detective s utteranc e. Fenner v . State, 381 Md . 1, 10, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 885 (20 04). Appellant argues that the detective s question to him was not merely innocent social chitchat or a polite gr eeting. He insists that the question, however informally phrased, was reaso nably like ly to elicit, as it in fact d id, an inc riminatin g respo nse. Before we address whether appellant is correct that the detective s question was an interrogation, we note the fact that appellant s statement followed, or even perhaps responded to, Det. Stach s question is not dispositive of the legal question we must decide. The focus -8- is not upon appellant s response, but rather upon the words or actions of the police that preceded the response. The issue, again, is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, Det. Stach should have known that his question to appellan t was reaso nably likely to elicit an incriminating response. The motions court concluded that Det. Stach s words, under the circumstances, were merely a greeting. Upon o ur independent assessment of the record, we agree. The phrase what s up? is co mmon ly used as a gre eting, espec ially, as the State points out, among young people. At least one othe r jurisdiction ha s recognize d that the ph rase is gene rally understood as a gre eting. See Arne tt v. State, 122 S.W.3d 484, 488 (Ark. 2003) (stating that the phrase W hat s up? constitutes a g eneral term of salutation , and holdin g that the officer s use of the p hrase, und er the circum stances of that case, w as not interrog ation or its functional equivalen t); United States v. Paredes, 388 F. Supp. 2d, 1185, 1193-94 (D. Ha. 2005) (holding state men t adm issib le where there wa s no e vide nce t hat a simp le O kay, what s up? b y the polic e offic er wou ld elicit an incrimin ating res ponse ). Det. Stach s testim ony indicates th at he did no t intend the w ords he sp oke to appellant to be anything o ther than a g reeting. He testified that W hat s up, M aurice? w as not a questio n on an ything tha t has to d o with i llegal ac tivity. The cou rt did not indic ate that it disbelieved that testimony, and we accept it. That fact is significant because the police surely cannot be held acco untable fo r the unfor eseeable re sults of their w ords or actions, and the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police -9- officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02 (footnote omitted). The words at issue in the present case are less susceptible to being deemed the functional equivalent of interrogation than were the word s and conduct an alyzed by the Court of Appea ls in cases raising contentions like appellant s. In Fenner, for example, the Co urt held that a District Court judge s statement to a defendant at a ba il review hearing, Is there anything you d like to tell me about yourself, sir? was not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. 381 Md. at 10. Similarly, the Court held in State v. Conover, 312 Md. 33, 44-45 (1988), that the officer s reading to the appellant a statement of charges and application upon which the statement of charges was based was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Given that the phrase what s up is generally understood to be a greeting, and that Det. Stac h did not inten d the phra se to relat e to a nything illegal, we conclude that the detective s utterance of the words what s up, Maurice was not the functional equivalent of interrogation, under the circumstances of this case.3 Consequently, appellant s statement that followed on the heels of Det. Stach s greeting was not the product of interrogation but rather was volunteered by appellant. It was a classic blurt, to which the protections of 3 Appellant does not even suggest, much less directly argue, that the fact that police forcibly brought h im to the stash location where Det. Stach spoke the words at issue makes his case more like several case s in which the Court o f Appe als held that po lice condu ct did constitute interrogation or its functional equivalent. See, e.g., Blake, 381 Md. at 235-36; Drury v. S tate, 368 M d. 331, 3 41, cert. denied, 537 U .S. 942 (2002 ). -10- Miranda do not ap ply. See Fenner, 381 Md at 10; Conover, 312 M d. at 45; see also Conboy v. State, 155 Md. App. 353, 373 (2004) (ho lding that a p olice office r s comm ent, remarking that a key discovered in defendant s pocket fit the ignition o f a car invo lved in an a ccident, was merely an observation made without inviting a response; and, although the appellant nonetheless did respond, the response was not the product of interrogation and was properly admitted into evidence at trial). The court prop erly denied ap pellant s mo tion to suppress h is blurted statem ent. II. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for conspiracy. H e maintains that there was no evidence establishing that what passed between appellant an d Evans was in fa ct cocaine. He add s that there w as insufficient evidence of a cons piratorial agree ment. The State responds that appellant preserved , at most, only the s econd pr ong of h is claim. The State points out that, at the close of its case, appellant argued only the lack of evidence of a conspiratorial agreement. Further, at the end of all the evidence, appellant merely renewed the motion. An appellant m ay not argue g rounds in support of a claim of legal insufficiency unless those groun ds we re prese nted to th e trial cou rt. Md. R ule 4-324 ; Cain v. State, 162 Md. App. 366, 37 7-78, cert. denied, 388 Md. 673 (2005). Appellant did not argue at trial the lack of evidence that drugs passed between Evans and him, as part of his challenge to the conspiracy -11- charges. Therefore, the argum ent is not pro perly before u s at this juncture . Even so, b oth aspects of appellant s c laim fail. It is well established that when reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Rivers v. Sta te, 393 Md. 569, 580 (2006 ). There is su bstantial evid ence to suppo rt appell ant s co nspirac y convic tions. A criminal conspiracy co nsists of the c ombinatio n of two or more p ersons to accomplish some unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawf ul purp ose by un lawfu l mean s. Townes v. State, 314 Md. 71, 75 (1988). A conspiracy is complete at the time that the unlawful agreement is reached; there is no need for an o vert act in further ance. Id. Moreover, the State is not required to offer proof of any formal arrang emen t; rather, a conspiracy can be inferred from the actions of the accused. Coope r v. State, 128 Md. App. 257, 26 7 (199 9). The jury heard the te stimony of D et. Stach, w ho qualifie d as an ex pert in drug packaging, identification, and the manner in which th e organiza tions opera te in the streets of Baltimore City. He testified that, through the use of binoculars, he observed appellant, approximately 40 to 50 feet away, dispose of a package that was identical to the ones later recovered from the ceiling of 1610 R egester Stree t, which the detective ref erred to as a stash -12- location . Det. Stach also testified to his observations of appellant going into and out of the stash location and meeting up with Evans. The detective saw, on at least one occasion, appellant hand Evans a bag of suspected cocaine. He also watched Evans, in turn, distribute to other individuals what the detective believed to be narcotics. That evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to infer a conspiracy between appellant and Evans to distribute cocaine. It was not necessary for the State to prove that the items that passed between the two men were in fact cocaine (although the jury certainly could have inferred that fact from the evidence). Appellant further contends that Det. Stach s testimony was implausible given that the detective made his observations at dusk during a steady drizzle. On appellate review, however, we do not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the w itnesses, as tha t is the respon sibility of th e trier of fact. See Bryant v. S tate, 142 Md. App. 604, 622, cert. denied, 369 M d. 179 (20 02); accord Jones v. State, 343 Md. 448, 465 (1996). The jury was free to credit the detective s testimony and be persuaded by that testimony and the remaining evidence that appellant and Evans had an agreement to engage in cocaine distribution. JUDGMENTS AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE P AID BY THE APPELLANT. -13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
