Brown v. Daniel Realty
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REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 01965 September Term, 2006 ___________________________________ LAN AY B ROW N, et al. v. THE D ANIE L REA LTY C OMP ANY , et al. Hollander, Eyler, Jam es R., Meredith, JJ. Opinion by Meredith, J. Filed: May 29, 2008 This appeal seeks reversal of a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City that was entered upon a jury verdict in favor of the defenda nts in a case seeking damages for lead paint exposure. Appellant Lanay Brown, through her legal guardian and next friend Catherlina Queen and Catherlina Queen, individually, were unsuccessful in persuading a jury th at the appellee s Dan iel R ealty C omp any, Wendy Perlberg, Daniel Perlberg, and Marvin Perlberg negligently maintained a house at 3630 Reisterstown Road in Baltimo re City, where Ms. Queen and Ms. Brown resided for approximately four years. The plaintiffs claimed that, because of the defen dants n egligen ce, the p roperty co ntained flaking , chipping, and peeling lead-based paint during the time Ms. B rown resided there. Ms. Queen alleged that Ms. Bro wn suff ered perm anent brain damage because of her exposure to the lead-based paint, and Ms. Queen also sought damages on her own behalf for medical expenses that she incurred as Ms. Brown s legal guardian and for severe emotional distress and mental anguish that Ms. Queen allegedly suffered. At the close of the plaintiffs case, the court granted the defendants unopposed motion for judgment as to Ms. Que en s personal claims. At the conclusion of all evidence, the case was submitted to the jury on issues, and the jury found there was no flaking, chipping, or peeling paint at the subject property while Ms. Brown resided there. Base d upon th at dispositive f inding of f act, the court entered judgment for the appelle es. Only Ms. Brown noted an appeal. Ms. Brown contends that the trial court committed reversible errors when it: (1) allowed a ppellees co unsel to read the transcript of the de bene esse deposition of one of the plaintiffs experts to the jury rather than playing the videotape of the deposition; (2) admitted an unredacted copy of a test report that had been prepared by an expert for the plaintiff; and (3) allowed the appellees to read into evidence portions of Ms. Queen s deposition after Ms. Queen s personal claims had been disposed of by the appellees motion for judgment such that she was no longer an individual plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below , we affirm the judgm ent of the c ircuit court. Facts and Procedural History Lanay Brown was born on December 17, 1990. Ms. Q ueen is Lanay Brow n s biological aunt and legal guardian, and Ms. Queen has cared for Ms. Bro wn as he r defacto mother since the child s birth. Although the parties disputed the exact dates when Ms. Brown resided at 3630 Reisterstown Road, the appellees concede that Ms. Brown s family began their tenancy no later than January 3, 1991, at w hich time M s. Brown was two and a half weeks old. Ms. Brown lived at the subject property until 1994, when she and Ms. Queen mov ed to another address in Baltim ore C ity. Appellee Daniel Realty Company owned the subject property from 1984 until October 11, 1995, and appellees Daniel Perlberg and Wendy Perlberg, among others, acted as property managers of the subject property. The appellees sold the property in 1995, and since that time, none of the appellees has owned any interest in the property. As a consequence, the appellee s had no know ledg e of w hat, if any, painting and repairs w ere performed at the subject property after October 11, 1995. 2 On May 26, 1999, at the request of appellant s counsel, representatives of ARC Environmental ( ARC ) tested the subject property for the presence o f lead. The test results indicated that the property contained lead. The present suit was filed on August 29, 2002. On June 2, 2006, appellant s counsel took the de bene esse deposition for use at trial of appellant s expert who was the representative of the firm that tested the property for lead. Pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-41 6, the depo sition of A RC s Pr esident, Shannon Cavalier, was videotaped and stenogra phic ally recorded. Although appellant elected not to offe r Mr. Cavalier s deposition in evidence as part of the plaintiffs cas e at trial, the appe llees read most of the deposition transcript to the jury. Two of appellant s questions on appeal arise from the appellees use of Mr. Cavalier s deposition. At the outset, appellant contends that the trial court should not have permitted the appellees to read the transcript in lieu of playing the videotape. Further, appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the complete test report prepared by AR C and ide ntified by M r. Cavalier d uring his deposition. Mr. Cavalier testified that he is an environ mental expert. His firm perform s a variety of real estate services, including tests for the presence of lead. Mr. Cavalier testified that the results of the lead testing performed by ARC at the subject property were summarized in a written report that was marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 2 for identification ( the unredacted report ) during the de bene esse deposition. The unredacted report included a Lead-Based Paint Testing D ata Sheet that reflected the information recorded by the technicians during 3 the testing process, including descriptions of the rooms and structural components tested, the condition of the paint at each tested location as of the time of testing , and the lead levels, if any, detected during testing. During Mr. Cavalier s deposition, the parties also marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 a copy of the ARC Report ( the redacted report ) which differed from the unredacted repo rt in only one respect: the column describing the condition of the paint at the time of testing had b een block ed out by app ellant s coun sel. Mr. Cavalier explained that the tests of the subject property were done by technicians from his company using an XRF machine that is capable of detecting the presence of lead below the top layer of paint without the need for an intrusive sample. Mr. Cavalier explained that XRF is an acronym for x-ray fluorescence. Using the XRF machine, ARC technicians took 40 readings from various locations through out the subject property and recorded the readings on a form that is custom arily used by ARC. Based u pon the data recorde d, Mr. Cavalier was of the opinion that there was lead-based paint in two-thirds of the subject prop erty. On cross-examination, Mr. Cavalier admitted that the XRF test detects lead regardless of whether the lead is in th e outermo st layer of paint o r all the way down at the bottom layer of several layers of paint. He conceded that if a tested door, for example, had once been painted with lead-based paint, and then was painted with ten coats of unleaded paint, the XRF machine would still give a positive reading for lead, and that reading did not provide any specificity with regard to whether the detected lead was buried beneath several layers of 4 paint. Mr. C avalier further conceded that some other testing devices, such as a Niton mach ine, could determine how close the lead is to the surface, but ARC does not own any of those machines. When asked about the column of data that had been blocked out on the redacted report, Mr. Cavalier explained that that column of data reflected the condition of the surface of each tested component at the time of testing, indicating whether the paint at that location was either intact, or in fair condition, or in poor c ondition. T he paint is de scribed as intact if the paint film is solid and there is no cracking or flaking, and the paint is not separating from the substrate. Of the 38 interior surfaces tested at the subject property, all but two were described in the redacted column a s intact, and the oth er two w ere in fair co ndition. ( Fa ir condition describes a surface on which the paint is largely intact, but 10% or less of the surface is cracked, worn, or chipping.) Mr. Cavalier acknowledged that [t]his condition section [of the report] is a piece of information that . . . [Mr. Cavalier himself] deemed relevan t for an i nspect or to tak e note o f . . . at the tim e of the inspec tion. Trial be gan on June 1 9, 2006 . For reasons that are not clear, several portions of the trial were not recorded. Nevertheless, the parties have stipulated to the circumstances under which the trial court admitted the evidence appellant now challenges on appeal. The plaintiffs called Ms. Queen to testify during their case-in-chief. She testified that she and Lanay Brown lived at the subject property from the time the child was born in December 1990 until the end of 1994. She testified: I m the only mother [Lanay] knew. Ms. Queen 5 acknowledged that when she first mo ved into the property in December 1990, the paint was okay. But she recalled that, after five or six months, the paint was chipping when you go up the stairs, and in the bathroom, the floor was chipping and the windows [were] chippin g. The appellant also called Dr. Jerome Paulson as an expert witness in the field of childhood lead poisoning. Dr. Paulson is a board certified pediatrician who also teaches environmental and occupational health subjects at the School of Public Health of George Washington Unive rsity. Prior to trial, Dr. Paulson reviewed a number of docum ents, including the unredacted A RC report of the lead inspection performed on May 26, 1999. Based upon h is review of M s. Brow n s me dical rec ords an d the A RC re port, D r. Paulson expressed the opinion that the appellant was exposed to lead-based paint at the subject property. Explaining his basis for that opinion, Dr. Paulson testified: [T]he CDC [i.e., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention] points out that the most likely place for a child to be poisoned is in the home in which they live. How ever, more importantly than that[,] we have documentation from an inspection done of the home at that address that there was lead paint on the surface, on multip le surfaces at that address. Lead-based paint was found at over 20 sites at that address when the home was inspected in May of 1999. (Emp hasis ad ded.) Dr. Paulson identified the ARC report as the only documentation he relied upon regarding the presence of lead-based paint at the subject property. Over appellees objection, plaintiffs counsel handed Dr. Paulson a copy of the redacted report which had been marked for iden tification only. In response to the appellees objection that the unredacted report was 6 what the docto r had seen before trial, the trial judge ruled: I m going to let [plaintiffs counsel] hand [th e witness] a re dact ed co py. When you get him on cross you can show h im an un-redacted copy. Questioning of Dr. Paulson by plaintiffs counsel continued: Q. Let me ask you this question. Can you ex plain to the membe rs of the jury how you can use a test for lead in 1999 to determine whether Lanay was exposed back in 1990 to 1994? A. The lead-based paint that s placed on a wall or a floor, or a door jam does not deteriorate over time. So . . . it stays there unless it s physically remov ed it is, it s there. So that s one p oint. Also, since 1978 it has been illegal to use lead-based paint for painting interior surfac es in homes. S o if one were to assum e that there was no lead-based paint at 3630 Reisterstown Road at the time Lanay Brown lived there and that there is lead-based paint or there was leadbased paint on Ma y 26, 1999, on e would have to assume that the house, the interior of the house ha d been pa inted with lead-based paint between the time she moved out and the time this test was done. Given the age of the home it is ve ry likely that the hom e was pa inted with lead-based paint when it was b uilt after it was built [sic] and that that s the origin of lead-based paint. It would make no sense that between 1994 when the family moved out of that address [and] 1999 someone would have gone in and [done] something illegal, that is paint, use leadbased paint in a house. Based upon the ARC report, Dr. Paulson expressed the opinion that appellant suffered damage, including a loss of IQ, due to lead poisoning caused by her exposure to lead-based paint at the subject property. The appellees cross examination of Dr. Paulson is one of the portions of the trial for which no trial transcript could be produced. The individual defendan ts were also called as witnesses during the plaintiffs case. During the cross examinations of those w itnesses, appellees introduced do cumentary 7 evidence and testimony tending to show that the property had been thoroughly wallpapered and painted in late 1990 a nd early 1991, before and shortly after the time the plaintiffs began their occupancy of the premises. At the close of the plaintiffs case, the court granted the appellees unopposed motion for judgment as to the claims asserted by Ms. Queen on her own behalf. During the defendants case, over appellant s objection, defendants read e xcerpts of Ms. Q ueen s discovery deposition. Defend ants also read the stenographic transcript of Mr. Cavalier s videotape deposition testimony during their case even though the appellant had not utilized that deposition. When appellant objected to M r. Cavalier s deposition being read, and requested that the videotape of the testimony be played instead, counsel for appellees explained to the court that the app ellees prefe rred to read the transcript excerpts to save time and avoid having to stop the videotape at the portions that the court had ruled were inadmissible. The trial court agreed that the transcript could be read to save time. While presenting Mr. Cav alier s depos ition testimon y to the jury, appellees offered the unredacted ARC report into evidence. Appellant objected on the ground that the column of the report d escribing the condition of the paint at the time of testing in 1999 had no relevance to the case because it described conditions at the house five years after Ms. Brown had moved out and four years after appellees had relinquished all interest in the property. Appellees argued that the unredacted report was admissible because the data contained 8 within the report, including the description of the paint s condition, had been relied upon by appellant s experts and, in part, formed the basis of the experts opinions. The circuit court admitted the unredacted report into evidence. Following six days of trial, the case was sub mitted to the jury on issues. See Maryland Rule 2-522(c). In response to the first issue, the jury found that there was no flaking, chipping, or peeling of the paint at the subject property while appellant resided there. The verdict sheet instructe d the jury to proc eed no fu rther if that was its answer to the first issue. Acc ordingly, judgmen t was entered in favor of appellees as to all remaining counts. Appellant filed a mo tion for new trial, raising the sam e issues that sh e raises on a ppeal. Following a hearing, the circuit court denied appellant s motion for new trial, and this appeal followed. Discussion 1. Reading Transcript of Expert s Deposition With respect to the trial court s decision to allow appellees counsel to read the stenograp hic transcript of the videotape deposition of Shannon Cavalier in to evidence, one missing portion of the trial transcript is any discussion that may have transpired between court and counsel on the day the deposition was read. But when the appellees counsel, at the end of the p reviou s day s pro ceedin gs, advised the court of his intention to read the transcript, rather than play the videotape, appellant asserted no objection. The available transcript of that exchange includes the following: 9 JUDGE MU RD OC K: O kay. We are o n schedu le but I m not sure where your schedule is anymore. Tuesday at 10:00 we are go ing to put on the video o r are you going to [Defen se counse l]: We are g oing to read it. JUDG E MU RDOC K: Read it. Wh ich will take longer? [Defense counsel]: No, actually it takes much less. JUDG E MU RDO CK: W hy, because you are not goin g to read it all? [Defense counsel]: We are going to read it but we are not going to have the video pauses Believe me. Reading a deposition is always quicker than the video and I have done it both ways 15 times. JUDG E MU RDO CK: B elieve me, it d epends o n who s reading it. [Defense counsel]: It will be [my associate] and I. I ll be on the stand, boom. JUD GE MU RD OC K: O kay. [Defen se counse l]: She will be asking the q uestions an d I will get it ou t. [Plaintiffs counsel]: Don t forget the objections -[Defense counsel]: I think we ve got it all marked. JUDGE M URDO CK: Okay. And you want me to rule on those objections? [Defense counsel]: We already have. JUDGE M URDOCK : Oh, you have. [Defense counsel]: Yes. JUDGE MUR DOC K: Oka y. Good. So you think that s g oing to take 52 minutes, is that the one that s going to take 52? [Defense counsel]: 40. It will take 40. 10 The parties have stipulated on appeal, however, that appellant objected to the trial court permitting appellees to read Mr. Cavalier s deposition into evidence and tha t this objection was overruled. According to the parties stipulation, which we will honor because of the lack of a transcript, the a ppellant arg ued that M aryland Rule 2-419(a)(3) permits the use of a witness s deposition only upon a showing that the witness is unavailable, and that appellees made no showing that Mr. Cavalier was no t available to testify live. Further, according to the stipulation, the appellant requested that the circuit court require the de bene esse videotaped deposition be played, rather than read to the jury, and in response to an inquiry from the court, appellees explained that they preferred to read the transcript rather than play the video tape in orde r to avoid having to stop the videotape at those portions that the court alre ady had ruled were inad missible, w hich, appe llees asserted, w ould save time. Because trial courts have broad discretion with respect to the management of trial proceedings, and in the absence of any contention that the videotape would have in some material way presented Mr. Cavalier s testimony in a light m ore favorable to appellant than the transcript did, we f ind no abu se of discre tion in the trial co urt s decision to permit the reading of the stenographic transcript of the videotape deposition. Appellant contends that the cou rt erred in perm itting appellee s to read the deposition transcript of a witness because there is no rule that specifically permits that to be done. Appellant notes that Maryland R ule 2-419(a)(3) is not applicable because there was no showing that the witness was unavailable. Appellant further asserts that the express language 11 of Rule 2-419(a)(4) do es not permit reading the transc ript because it makes no mention of using the transcript of a videotaped deposition, but rather permits only the use of the video tape. Maryland Rule 2-4 19(a)(4) reads in pertinent part: A videotape deposition . . . of any expert w itness may be u sed for an y purpose ev en though the witness is available to testify if th e notice of that d epositio n speci fied tha t it was to be take n for u se at trial. When the courts are called upon to interpret judicial rules of procedure, the canons of statutory construction are g enerally a pplicab le. Hoile v . State, ____ Md. ____, No. 87, Sept. Term 2007, slip op. at 34 (filed May 7, 2008); State v. Williams, 392 Md. 194, 206-07 (2006); State ex rel. L ennon v. S trazzella, 331 Md. 270, 274-75 (1993). We endeavor to discern the plain meaning of the words used in the rule. We seek to give a common sense interpretation to the language of the rule. Further, w e do not co nstrue indiv idual rules in isolation, but seek to harm onize rules th at deal with related matte rs. As the C ourt of A ppeals has stated in the context of statutory construction: When the statut e is part of a la rger statu tory scheme, it is axiomatic that the language of a provision is not interpreted in isolation; rather, we analyze the statutory scheme as a whole considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the enacting body, Serio, 384 Md. at 389, 863 A.2d at 961; Drew v. First Guar. Mortgage Corp ., 379 Md. 318, 327, 842 A.2d 1, 6 (2003), and atte mpt to harmonize provisions dealing with the same subject so that each may be given effect. Anderson v. Council of Unit Owners of Gables on Tuckerman Condominium, ___ Md. ___, No. 99, Sept. Term 2007, slip op. at 13-14 (filed A pril 15, 2008). 12 We note that videotape depositions are generally governed by Maryland Rule 2-416, which is captioned Deposition Videotape and audiota pe. Subsection 2-416(a) authorizes a party to cause a stenographic rec ord of the deposition to be m ade. The predec essors of both of these rules addressing videotaped depositions were adopted (as former Rule 410 and former Rule 413 a. 6.) on October 1, 1980, effective January 1, 1981, and we view the reference in Rule 2-419(a)(4) to [a] videotape deposition as a shorthan d cross refe rence to those depositions described in Rule 2-41 6. Rule 2-419(a)(4) authorized appellees to use the videotape de bene esse deposition of the appellant s expert witness. By reading Rule 2-416(a) in pari mate ria with Rule 2-419(a)(4), in a manner that harmonizes the two rules, we conclude that, even though Rule 2-419(a)(4) does not expressly authorize reading the stenograp hic record in lieu of playing the videotape, the broad authorization in the latter rule, which provides that a deposition of an expert witness taken pursuant to Rule 2-416 may be used for any purpose even though the witness is available to testify . . . , is sufficient authority for a trial judge to p ermit a party to read the stenographic transcript rather than play the videotape in the absence of an assertion that viewing the videotape somehow presents a different impression of the witness s testimony. Appellant has not asserted that the transcript of Mr. Cavalier s videotape deposition somehow distorted the testimony or created a different impression of the witness than the jury would have gained upon viewing the recording. In contrast to Rush v. Sta te, 403 M d. 68, 104 (2 008), wh ere the Co urt of Ap peals held that inf erence s draw n from viewin g the inte rview D VD, through observation of the 13 infl[e]ctions and demeanor exhibited by both [the defend ant] and [the interrogating of ficer], may differ from those inferences that can be drawn from the bare transcript, appellant in this case has made no argument whatsoever that the jury might have drawn different inferences from viewing the videotape of Mr. Cavalier s deposition than those it drew upon listening to a reading of the transcript. Given the lack of any asserted prejudice caused by reading the transcript in lieu of playing the videota pe, and in view of defen se counsel s uncontroverted proffer tha t reading the transcript w ould, in this instance, save time, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to permit the transcript to be read. 2. The unredacted version of the ARC Environmental report Appellant contends the circuit court erred by admitting into evidence the unredacted version of the ARC Environmental report from 1999 because, in appellant s view, the unredacted report contained a column o f totally irrelevant d ata that was prejudicial to appellant s case. Appellant contends the appellees should not have been permitted to question Mr. Cavalier about the condition of the paint on the date of the testing, and appellees respond: In this case, the evidence of the condition of the paint was not admitted to prove the condition of the paint at the time the Appellant resided at the prop erty, but rather was appropriate ly admitted in ac cordance with Maryland Rule 5 -703(b ), as data reason ably relied upon b y Appe llant s ow n expe rt. According to the appe llees, their line of questions a bout the co ndition of the paint during the testing by ARC , together w ith the unredacted repo rt, was proper to assist the jury to understand fully how the testing was performed, and to prevent the jury from making an 14 improper inference that the [ARC] data proved that there was lead paint at the property on the surf ace w here a p erson c ould be readily ex posed . We agree with appellees that the jury was entitled to know what conditions were observed by appellant s e xperts on th e date those experts tested the house for the presence of lead. Appellant s fear that the jury might not be able to comprehend that the testing took place many years after appellant v acated the p roperty gives the jury little credit for bein g able to understand the testimony that made that particular point absolutely clear. What was less clear from the ARC report was whether the lead that ARC detected by using the XRF machine was on any exposed surface of paint on the date of the tes t, and whether the ju ry could reasonably infer from ARC s positive lead readings that Ms. Brown was directly exposed to lea d in the su bjec t property. The data reflected in the condition column of the unreda cted report w as the only information in the ARC report that made it plain that, with very few exceptions, the lead detected by the XR F machin e was sub surface lea d. The co ndition colu mn wa s evidence that: (a) the ARC test for the presence of lead could produce positive readings even thou gh there was not currently any flaking or chipping paint at the site of the test reading; (b) the mere fact that the test could confirm th at there had been lead paint at some point in the past did not permit one to con clude that the re is currently any flaking or chipping paint in the areas that produced the positive lead readings; and (c) Dr. Pa ulson s testimony that the AR C report showed that there was lead paint on the surface, on multiple surfaces at the subject 15 property at least exaggerated, and arguably misrepresented, the amount of lead paint found on surfaces when the home was inspected by ARC in May of 1999. On all of those points, the information about the condition of the tested surfaces meets the legal standard for relevance set forth in Maryland Rule 5-401. The jury was entitled to know the data in the condition column in order to assist the jury in understanding the test results and limitations on the inferences one could draw from those test results. Rule 5-401 provides: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequenc e to the determination of the action more probable or less prob able than it would be without the evidence. Rule 5-40 2 provide s all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise excluded by constitutions, statutes, other specific rules of evidence, or M aryland case law. In ruling that the unre dacted report was admissible, the court ostensibly concluded, con sistent with Rule 5-403, that its probative value outweighed any danger of confusing or misleading the jury. Here, the trial judge did not err in concluding that the unredacted report was relevant and admissible. Moreover, appellees correctly assert that, even data that might not otherwise be admissible may, under Rule 5-703(b), be properly admitted if it is relied upon by an expert or is necessary to illuminate testimony. Rule 5-703(b) provides: If determine d to be trustw orthy, necessary to illuminate testimony, and unprivileged, facts or data reasonably relied upon by an expert . . . may, in the discretion of the cou rt, be disclosed to the jury even if those facts and d ata are not admissible in evidence. Upon request, the court shall ins truct the jury to use those facts and data only for the purpose of evaluating the validity and probative value of the expert s opinion or inference. 16 Here, the unr edacte d repor t was ad missible under R ule 5-7 03(b). M r. Cavalier testified on direct examination that he formed an opinion that the property contained leadbased paint based on his review of the data in the un-reda cted report and that he deemed the data describing the condition of the paint at the property trustworthy and relevant to the lead paint inspection. T he jury was e ntitled to know that the report upo n which he based his opinions included a column that indicates that nearly all of the painted surfaces in the house were intact at the time this report was prepared. Additionally, appellant s medical expert witness, Dr. Paulson, testified that he relied upon the ARC report in forming an opinion that Ms. Brown was exposed to lead at the subje ct property. As noted above, because of limitations in the ability of ARC s XRF machine to determine which strata of the paint contained the detected lead, the 1999 test d id not establish that there was exposed lead paint on surfaces in the property during the years appellant lived there. Yet, Dr. Paulson cited the ARC report as documentation of lead on multiple surf aces of t he su bjec t property. Appellant had provided Dr. Paulson with the unredacte d report fo r his review . Because both of the appellant s experts had the opportunity to consider the data regarding condition at the time of testing, the unredacted report was appropriately admitted under Rule 5-703(b) for the purpose of evaluating the v alidity and probative value of the ex pert[s ] opinion[s] or inferen ce[s]. 17 3. Reading excerpts of Ms. Queen s deposition As previously no ted, portions o f the trial proceedin gs could not be transcribed, and we have no trial transcript of appellant s objection to the court s decision to permit the appellees to read into evidence excerpts of the discovery deposition of Ms. Queen. The parties have stipulated on appeal that, near the close of appellees case, appellees requested that they be permitted to read into evidence certain portions of the discovery deposition of Ms. Quee n. By that point in the proceedings, Ms. Queen s personal claims had been eliminated because the court had granted the defendants motion for judgment as to those claims at the close of the plaintiffs case. The parties have no specific recollection of what was actually read into evidence, but stipulate that some testimony from M s. Queen s deposition was read in by the appellees. The parties stipulate further that appellant objected to the trial court pe rmitting M s. Queen s discovery de position testimony to be read in to evidence, and that the court overruled this objection. In support of appellant s objection, appellant argued that Ms. Queen was no longer a party to this case at the time the deposition was offered into evidence, and her deposition was therefore not admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2). Appellant contends that Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2), which provides that a deposition of a party . . . may be used by an adverse party for any purpose, was no longer applicable to Ms. Queen, who was, at that juncture, merely a next friend. See Berrain v. Ketzen, 331 Md. 693, 703 (1993) (suggesting that a next friend is an officer of the court , who stands very much in the 18 relation of an attorney to the case. ) (quoting Deford v. State, Use of Keyser, 30 Md. 179, 199 (186 9)); see also Thomas v. Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. of Balt., 73 Md. 451, 23 A. 3, 4 (1891). In support of admitting the deposition excerpts, appellees argued that Ms. Queen was a party to the case at the time the deposition was taken and at the time of her direct examination at the trial of this m atter. Appe llees further a rgued that, as next friend of the plaintiff, Ms. Queen was essentially an agent for appellant, and therefore her testimony was admissible pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-419(a)(2). Appellees further argue in this Court that, even if there was any error in permitting appellees to read Ms. Queen s deposition, such error was harmless because she had already testified and had been cross examined about her deposition te stimony. Although the parties ha ve focus ed primarily upon language in the discovery rules pertaining to the use of depositions, in the absence of restrictive provisions in those rules prohibiting the appellees use of such evidence, the rules of evidence control the question of whether the trial court erred in adm itting the challen ged ev idence . See Rule 5-402 ( Except as otherwise provide d by . . . these rules, all relevant evidence is admissible. ). Ms. Queen s status as the legal guardian of appella nt, as well as a former co-plaintiff, and the next friend who filed and prosecuted this suit, raises the possibility that her deposition testimony could have bee n properly admitted under M aryland Rule 5-803(a) as a statement by a party-opponent. That rule provides: 19 The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: (a) Statement by party-oppo nent. A statement that is offered against a party and is: (1) The party s ow n statemen t, in either an individual or representative capa city; (2) A statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth; (3) A statement by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concernin g the subjec t; (4) A statement by the party s agent or employee made during the agency or employment relationship concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment; or (5) A statement by a coconspirator of the party during the course and in fu rtheranc e of t he co nspi racy. We observe, without deciding, that subsections (a) (2), (3), and (4) might, depending upon the circumstances, be applicable to the statements made by Ms. Queen during her deposition in this case. But we need not resolve the interesting issues raised by the parties regarding the legal status of a nex t frie nd or the use o f a de posi tion of a w itnes s wh o wa s pre viou sly a party but is no longer a party to the case. In our view, the circuit court did not err by permitting appellees to read into evidence relevant portions of Ms. Queen s deposition, even though she was no longer pressing her individual claims against appellees by that point in the trial proceedings, because (1) the inconsistent deposition testimony was admissible as substantive evidence under R ule 5-802.1(a), and (2) to the extent that the deposition testimony was not inconsistent with the trial testimony, its admission wa s harmless error. 20 Rule 5-402 pro vides that a ll relevant ev idence is admissible [e]xcept as otherwise provided by constitutions, statutes, or these rules, or by decisional law not inconsisten t with these rules. Appe llant doe s not co ntend th at the de position excerp ts were not relev ant. To the contrary, appellant argued that she was prejudiced because the deposition excerpts w ere so at odds with Ms. Queen s trial testimony that Ms. Queen s credibility was impaired when the court admitted the deposition evidence. Appellant argues in her brief: The purpose of this exercise was to impeach the prior testimony of Ms. Queen. . . . Appellees should not have been permitted to read in Ms. Queen s deposition to impeach her credibility . . . . Appellant further contends that, during closing argument, counsel for appellees made reference to this attack on Ms. Queen s credibility when appellees argued: Ms. Queen testified there w as chipping and peelin g paint at the property, no doubt about it. But I ask you to think about when I read portions of her deposition she didn t remember anything about the house. She didn t remem ber if fa ther and mothe r lived th ere. . . . Clea rly, the deposition excerpts meet the definition of relevant evidence set forth in Rule 5401, quoted above. Although appellant complains about the impeaching effect of the appellees reading Ms. Queen s deposition testimony, any inconsistent deposition testimony of Ms. Queen, was admissible pursuant to Rule 5-802.1(a)(1) and (3), which provide: The following statements previously made by a witness who testifies at the trial or hearing and who is subject to cross-examination concernin g the statement are not excluded by the hearsay rule: 21 (a) A stateme nt that is inco nsistent w ith th e dec laran t s testimony, if the statement was (1) given under oath subject to the penalty of pe rjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceedin gs or in a de position; . . . or (3) re corded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic or electronic means contem porane ously wit h the m aking o f the sta temen t; . . . . See J OSEPH F. M URPHY, J R., M ARYLAND E VIDENCE H ANDBOOK ยง 700(A) at 257 (3d ed. 1999) ( Under Md. Rule 5-8 02.1(a), . . . three kinds of prior inconsistent statements are now admissible for more than the limited purpose of imp eachm ent. ). See also N ance v. Sta te, 331 Md. 549, 569 (1993) (holding, prior to the adoption of the Maryland Rules of Evidence, that testimony given by a witness before a grand jury is admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant is present as a witness at trial and subject to cross-examination regarding the prior statements). In this case, the deposition excerpts were prior statements made by a witness who testified at the trial. Although Ms. Queen was no longer on the witness stand at the time the deposition excerpts were offered, she was still available at trial for examination by the appellant, and appellee therefore met the condition of Rule 5-802.1 that the witness must be subject to cross-exa mination c oncerning the [prior inc onsistent] stateme nt[s]. Under such circumstances, the witness s deposition testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 5802.1(a) to the exten t the depositio n testimony w as inconsiste nt with her te stimony at trial. Because this evidenc e was ad missible as substantive evidence p ursuant to Rule 5-80 2.1(a), it was not subject to the same restrictions that apply to incon sistent stateme nts offered solely for impeachment purposes pursuant to Maryland Rules 5-613 and 5-616. 22 Assuming, arguendo, that some portions of Ms. Queen s deposition testimony were not inconsistent with her trial testimony and therefore were not admissible under Rule 5802.1(a) or Rule 5-803 or Rule 2-419 or any other rule appellant demonstrated no prejudice from the a dmission of such consiste nt de posi tion testim ony. Indeed, to the extent that any of the de position testim ony appellees read was not incons istent with Ms. Queen s trial testimony, we fail to see how permitting the appellees to offer such consistent deposition testimony could have prejudiced the appellant who called Ms. Queen as a witness in the first instanc e. See Owens-Illinois, supra, 325 Md. at 445. The appellate courts of Maryland will not rev erse a low er court judg ment if the error is harmle ss. Flores v. Bell, 398 M d. 27, 33 (2007 ). Accord Crane v. Dunn, 382 Md. 83, 91 (2004) ( It is the policy of this Court not to reverse for harmless error and the burden is on the appellant in all cases to show prejudice a s well as erro r. ); Hance v. State Roads Comm., 221 Md. 164, 176 (1959) ( Courts are relu ctant to set aside verdicts for errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence unless they cause substantial injustice. ). Appellant has not argued that she was in any way prejudiced by the appellees reading the passages of Ms. Queen s deposition testimony that were consistent with her trial testimony. Co nseq uently, even if the trial court erred in permitting some consistent deposition testimony of Ms. Queen to be read, the admission of such cumulative testimony was harmless. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 23
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