Titan v. Advance
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HEADNOTE Titan Custom Cabine t, Inc. et al. v. Advan ce Con tracting, Inc . et al., No. 1957, September Term, 2006 Collateral Source Doctrine Maryland Rule 5-411 which provides that Evidence that a person w as or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully further provides that the Rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agenc y, owne rship, or contro l, or bias o r prejud ice of a witnes s. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a w itness. Haischer v. CSX Transp., Inc., 381 Md. 119, 134 (2004) (holding that the collateral source rule permits an injured person to recover the full amount of his or her provable damages, regardless of the amount of compensation which the person has received for his injuries from sources un related to the tortfeasor. ); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1979). Appellees reference to appellants insurance, during the crossexamination of appellants president and principal Anders Johansson, was offered to impeach Johansson s prior statement that he initially believed appellees were at fault for the flood, which prompted the suit sub judice. Trial court properly concluded that impeachment of appellants evidence relative to the critical issue of the case was probative of appellants motivation to pursue litigation three years after the flood. Because, during the course of the cross-examination, appellees never suggested that appellants had been satisfied in whole or in part, through their insurance provider or prior litigation to implicate the collateral source rule, the trial judge d id not abuse his discretion in allowing appellees to enter into evidence Johansson s note to his insurance provider and in permitting the cross-examination of Johan sson re gardin g his rela tionship with th e insura nce pro vider. Evidence Weight a nd Conc lusiveness in Gen eral: Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Scarlett Harbor Assocs., 109 Md. App. 217 (1996). The trial court s ruling admitting certified copies of the U.S. Department of Commerce s weather records for the BaltimoreWashington International Airport rep orting rain patterns at the airport between the day of the roofing job and the date of the flooding was a proper exercise of discretion. Appellees offered the records as circumstantial evidence that their conduct did not cause the damage in question, but that some other intervening cause was at fault. Furthermore, the records were not beyond the grasp of a layperson s understanding as they merely quan tified rainfall at a give n locatio n. Acc ording ly, the adm ission o f the w eather r ecords was ap propria te. New Trial Discretion of Trial Court: A.S. Abell Co. v. Skeen, 265 Md. 53 (1972). Exercise of a trial court s disc retion wh en ruling on motion for new trial generally will not be disturbed on appeal. Because appellants failed to pro ve that the trial ju dge abus ed his discretion in allowing the admission of evidence at issue, the judge did not erroneously deny appellants M otion for N ew Trial. REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 1957 September Term, 2006 TITAN CUSTOM CABINET, INC. ET AL. v. ADV ANC E CO NTR ACT ING, INC. ET AL. Davis , Salmo n, Karwacki, Robert L. (retired, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Davis, J. Filed: February 7, 2008 Appellants, Titan Custom Cabinet and Johansson Corporation, appeal from the denial of a Motion for New Trial entered by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City (Ross, J.) on September 23, 2006. This appeal arises out of a tort claim, in which appellants allege that appellees, Advance Contracting, Inc. and Timothy Nickels, negligently repaired the roof of appellants premises, thereby clogging a roof drain that ultimately resu lted in a flood of their premises. On March 18, 2005, appellants filed suit against appellees in the Cir cuit Court for Baltimore City; app ellees an swere d the C ompla int on M ay 6, 200 5. Appellees then filed a Third Party Complaint on August 9, 20 05 against Crow n Industrial Park (Crow n), the owner of the property where appellants premises are located. Crown, however, was never served with the Third P arty Compla int. On Sep tember 21 , 2005, the T hird Party Co mplaint was amended to add Wayne Kirchner, the property manager of Crown, as a defen dant/third-pa rty plaintiff. The Amended Third Party Complaint alleged that Kirchner s negligence caused or contributed to the flood and, thus, he should be liable for any damages awarded to appella nts. Kirc hner fil ed his A nswe r on D ecemb er 19, 20 05. Prior to the commencement of trial, appellants and appellees agreed to a jury trial on the issue of liability only. On August 30, 2006, a three-day trial began. At the conclusion of the third day, the jury returned a judgment in favor of appellees. Thereaf ter, appellants filed a timely Mo tion for N ew Trial a nd for Jud gment N otwithstanding the Verdict. The Motion was denied on September 23, 2006. This timely appeal followed, presenting for this Court three questions, which we have rephrased as follows: 1 1. Did the trial court err in permitting cross-examination of appellants witnesses with prior inconsistent statements made to their property insurance carrier and re garding the ir relationship w ith their prope rty insurance carrier? 2. Did the trial court err in admitting certified cop ies of we ather reports from Baltimore -Washin gton Intern ational Airp ort to show rain accumulations? 3. Did the trial co urt err in denying appellants M otion for N ew Trial? We answer the questions presented in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgm ent of th e trial jud ge. 1 The issues on appeal, as framed by appellants, are: 1. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred when it permitted appellees to introduce documents and cross-examine appellants witnesses about app ellants prope rty insurance an d their relations hip with their property insurance carrier? 2. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred when it allowed the admission of official weather records from Baltimore-Washington International Airport without explanation by an expert witness? 3. Whether the Circuit Court for Baltimore City erred when it denied appellants M otion for a N ew Trial? -2- FACTUAL BACKGROUND Since 1997, appellants have occupied a commercial leasehold space at 56N of the Crown Indu strial Park loc ated on E astern A venue in Balt imore, M aryland. Crown is the owne r and lan dlord o f this pro perty loca ted with in the C rown Industr ial Park . The building at 56N has an A frame roof, in which the center line of the roof runs parallel to the front of the building. There are other buildings in the industrial park which adjoin appellants premises on both sides and in the back. Con sequently, wh en water f alls on the back part of the roof, the water flows downward, until it accumulates at the bottom of the roof. As a result, two drains were installed in the low area of the back portion of the roof to allow a ny accum ulated w ater to dr ain. During the winter of 2001 to 2002, appellants premises, located below the low point on the back of the roof , began to leak. For the thirty years preceding this leak, Crown had not experienced any roofing problems. After being notified of the leak, Kirchner told A nders Johansson, the presiden t and princip al of both a ppellants, that p ermanen t repair wor k would need to be completed du ring the spring. In the meantime, a temporary system of troughs was put into place to catch th e leakin g wate r. By mid-April of 2002, Crown had contracted with appellees to repair the roof. Thereafter, appellees installed an asphalt roof on the 56N bu ilding including the area near the drains. George Harris, one of appellees employees, supervised the job and performed much of the work. He testified that the drains on the roof were protected during the repair -3- work with the use of microsopic/KWRAPD, a roofing industry product, commonly referred to as a mop head or yard. These pro tective products were placed over the drains to prevent clogging. One of the drains, however, was clogged prior to appellees beginning work. Appellees notified C rown of this clogged drain and were told by Crown that it would take care of the problem. O n April 15 , 2002, app ellees com pleted the job without inc ident. On May 2, 2002, after a heavy rainfall, Preston Fulk, one of appellants employees, reported water leak ing along th e back wall of the premises that had formed into a pool of water approximately eight inches deep. The employee began moving equipment and materials away from the water and called Johansson to inform him of the leak. Johansson instructed the employee to contact K irchner. Kirc hner we nt onto the roof of the building to inspect the leak. Near the back wall of the roof, Kirchner found water that was in areas eighteen inches deep. He also noticed that one of the drains w as clogged and subse quently removed approxim ately two han dfuls of debris, including one or two bottles from the drain. When the drain still would not allow water to flow, Kirchner used a piece of wooden molding in an attempt to free the drain. Shortly thereafter, the drain gave way and thousands of gallo ns of w ater pou red into appella nts prem ises. Kirchner helped remove the water from appellants premises. Afterward, he testified that he found a broken piece of pipe filled with gravel and a mixture of old and new tar. The following day, Johansson conducted his own investigation of the water damage. Johansson testified that, during his investigation, he observed an elbo w joint pipe filled with a m ixture -4- of old and new tar lying on the floor below the roof drain in the ceiling. All testimony at trial indicated that the distinction between old and new tar is its color old tar is gray and oxidize d, while new ta r is dark b lack on the outs ide. During Johansso n s investiga tion, he took thirty to forty photographs of the scene of the damage and made important notes. Johansson, however, did not take a photograph of the elbow pipe. The elbow pipe and th e notes rega rding the elb ow pipe were sub sequently discarded during clean-up. Three days after the flood, Johansson composed a letter to appellants insurer, The Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford), regarding the loss and, in relevant part, wrote: In discussing th is claim with . . . (our agent) h e noted tha t it is not up for subrog ation. You know as well as I know tha t the landlord s appointed manager (Wayne) [Kirchner] poked the hole in the pipe that caused the damage. I like that you subrogate this claim, since it will otherwise stay on my insura bility profi le. A provision in the lease between Crown and appellants, h oweve r, barred a dire ct claim agains t Crow n. During the year following the flood, appellants made a claim under the property damage portion of their Co mmercia l & Com prehensiv e Genera l Liability (CGL ) policy with Hartford. The insur ance com pany paid most of the claim, but failed to pay all of appellants -5- business interruption claim. A ppellants su bsequen tly sued Hartfo rd in Baltim ore City Circu it Court for the balance of their business interruption loss. Hartford moved the case to federal district court w here it cla imed th at a Pro of of L oss, which appellants had executed, was an accord and satisfaction of the claim. The federal district court agreed and appe llants appealed. The appeal w as ultimately settled for a n ominal am ount and H artford relea sed its subrogatio n claim as p art of the settlem ent agreem ent. Almost three years after the flood, in 2005, app ellants broug ht suit in Baltim ore City Circuit Court against appellees. Before trial commenced, the court granted appellants Motion to Bifurcate so that no issues would be presented to the jury regarding damages. During the three-day jury trial, appellees, o ver the obje ction of ap pellants, introd uced into evidence the letter from Johansson to Hartford. Appellees, also over the objection of appellants, cross exa mined ap pellants w itnesses rega rding that correspondence and the lack of success appellants had achieved in pursuing claims against Crow n and Hartford. In addition, app ellants objecte d to the weather data records compiled by the U.S. Department of Commerce Weather Station at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport that were introduced into evidence without an explanation of an expert witness. On September 1, 200 6, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. A ppellants subsequently filed a Motion for New Trial and f or Judgm ent Notw ithstanding th e Verdict, which was lat er denie d. -6- DISCUSSION I Appellan ts initially contend th at the circuit co urt erred in allo wing ap pellees to introduce Johansso n s note to Hartfor d into evidence. App ellants further aver that the court improper ly permitted cross-examination of their witnesses regarding their relationship and insurance coverage with Hartford, thereby violating the collateral source rule. Appe llees, in rejoinder, argue that appellants witness, Joh ansson, w as properly questioned regarding h is prior inconsistent statement contained in the note to Hartford. Appellees also insist that the factual chronology elicited through the cross-examination of appellants witnesses regarding appellants unsuccessful recovery against Hartford explained appellants new motivation to pursue a claim against appellees almost three years after the flood. Upon our review of the proceedings below, w e hold that th e trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting appellants witness to be impeached by prior inconsistent statements and we conclude that there w as no v iolation of the c ollateral s ource r ule. STANDARD OF REVIEW Ge nera lly, the standard of review with respect to a trial court's ruling on th e admissibility of evidence is that such matters are left to the sound discretion of the trial court and unless there is a showing that the trial court abused its discretion, its [ruling] will not -7- be disturbed on appeal. Hall v. Univ. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 82 (2007) (quoting Bern-Shaw Ltd. P ship v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 377 Md. 277, 291 (2003)) (brackets in original). The application of that standard depends on whether the trial judge s ruling under review was based on a discretionary weighing of relevance in relation to other factors or on a pure conclusion of law. Bern-S haw, 377 Md. at 291. If the trial judge s ruling involves a pure lega l question, w e will review the trial court s ruling de novo. Id.; see also Bernad yn v. State, 390 Md. 1, 8 (2005) (concluding that, in a criminal case, the trial court s dec ision to adm it or exclude hearsay is not d iscretionary and is thus reviewed de novo). Given that the trial judge s ruling under our review was based on a discretionary weighing of relevance in relation to other factors, we shall review the legal questions presented at bar using the abuse of discretion standard of review. Moreover, as we reiterated in Lomax v. Comptroller of the Treasury, 88 Md. App. 50, 54 (1991), we will only reverse upon a finding that a trial judge s determination was both manifestly wrong and substan tially injurio us. PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT Prior to addressin g Johanss on s corres ponden ce with Hartf ord b efor e the jury, appellees counsel approached the bench and advis ed the cou rt of his intentio n to cross examine Johansson regard ing his prior in consistent sta tement m ade to Ha rtford, in which he blamed Crown for appellants loss and requested legal pursuit of Crown to preserve -8- appellants insurance status. Appellees counsel als o proffer ed that he p lanned to cross examine Johansson about the fact that there was a three-year delay in any assertion of negligence against app ellees; these cla ims were pursued o nly after appellants claims against Crown and Harford we re unfavorably resolved. Appellant objected to the proposed line of cross-examination, protesting that it was totally improper for a party to bring issues of insurance in a case like this. The trial judge, however, ruled that this was not an instance where appellees were insinuating that appellants had already been fully paid. The court, after reviewing the Johansson correspondence and listening to the argumen ts of couns el, found that the critical iss ue of the c ase was whether Johansso n did in fact observe an elbow joint pipe clogged w ith fresh tar lying on the ground the day following the floo d. Consequently, the court permitted the cross-examination of Johansson regarding his inconsiste nt statemen ts and the fact that appellants waited three years befo re initiating suit aga inst app ellees. T he cou rt, sua spon te, treated appellants objections to appellees proposed line of questioning as a Motion in Limine by appellants and denied it. Johansson was then cross-examined and the testimony in dispute has been reproduced in pertinent pa rt below: [Appellees counsel]: Q. You had insura nce on your property in the building, correct? [Appellant s counsel]: Objection. THE COU RT: O verrule d. -9- [Appe llees couns el]: You h ad insuran ce on it? A. Yes. Q. And one concern you had you were familiar with something called an insurability profile? A. Yes. Q. The fact is: If you had too many claims, you may lose your insurance; the rates may go u p; you may not b e able to get in surance, co rrect? A. That could be one description, yes. Q. You also knew [Appellants counsel]: Can I have a continuing objection on this line of questioning? THE CO UR T: Y ou m ay. [Appellants counsel]: Thank you. [Appellees counsel]: Y ou also kn ew that if you had a claim and are able to have it be somebo dy else s fault, someone that the insura nce com pany could get the money back from, that would not go on your insurability profile, correct? A. I wasn t sure of that. Q. Let m e sho w you what has been marked as Defense Exhibit 17. Tell me if you can identify it. (W hereup on ther e was a pause i n the pr oceed ings.) - 10 - A. Yes. Q. Wh at is it? A. It s a le tter to an in sura nce c omp any. Q. Wh o wrote it? A. Me. Q. That h e [sic] was the date on it? A. May the 6th. Q. W ould you please rea d it to the ju ry? A. Suit. In discussing this claim with M r. Heartly [sic], our agent, he noted that it is no t up for subrog ation. Q. Let me ask you, subrogation you knew is a principal [sic] by which the insurance c ompany go es after the p erson that ca used the cla im, right? A. Yes. Q. In you r dep osition you said it s mak ing the guilty p arty pay, correct? Is that correct? A. I w ould n t sa y guilty. Re spon sible party. Q. Please continue. I won t interrupt again. A. You knew as well as I know that the landlord appointed the mana ger to - 11 - put the hole in the point th at caused th e break. I like th at you subrog ated this claim sin ce it wo uld oth erwise stay on m y insurab ility profile. Q. So it is true that as of May 6th, 2002 at least based upon that letter the person that you considered re sponsible for the flood w as Mr. Kirchne r? A. Yes. From what I knew at the time. Q. And you copied - - you were already repre sented by M r. Chaifetz [appellee s counsel] at th e time, wer e you not? A. Mr. Chaifetz is my lawyer for many years. Q. You cop ied him on that letter? A. Yes. [Appellees counsel]: Your Honor, I introduce Exhibit 17. [Kirchner s counsel]: Objection THE COU RT: Overruled. [Appellees counsel]: N ow, you sub sequently did make a claim against your insurance c ompany fo r damage s; is that correct? [Appellants counsel]: Objection. THE COU RT: Overruled. THE WIT NESS: Yes. - 12 - [Appellees counsel]: Incidentally, you found out at some point that under your lease agreement, you couldn t sue your landlord? A. No. Q. Correct? A. No. Q. And your lease says you can t do it. The landlord is not responsible? A. I knew that all the time. Q. You knew that? So you made the claim agai nst yo ur insura nce c omp any, but that didn t en d satisfactorily. Th ere was a dispute as to what the proper payment should be and you felt fe lt [sic]. It h adn t been handled c orre ctly, so you su ed th e insuran ce co mpa ny? A. Corre ct. Q. And ultimately, you lost that c ase, correct? A. No, we settled the case. Q. Well, you settled it for this much, correct - - compared to wh at you were looking for? A. It was the best deal we could make under the circumstances. Q. On a percentage basis, without getting into numbers, what percentage of what you were loo king for did you settle for? - 13 - A. How can I answer you that without giving a number? Q. Yo u don t. Just giv e a perc entage . A. I can t give a percen tage because that s a num ber. Q. One service of a hundred dollars is just one percent of the number, but whether it is a thousan d dollars, $10 ,000 or $1 , one perce nt is one per cent. We don t have to g ive th e numbe rs be caus e of a certa in ruling by the Court. But what is the percentage? A. I don t know. Q. Isn t it a fact it is a very, very small pe rcentage, w hat you settled f or in terms of what you were looking for? A. I do n t think so. [Appellant s counsel]: May I approach? THE CO UR T: Y ou m ay. (Whereupon the parties approached the bench and the following proceeding ensued on the reco rd).2 *** Q. That lawsuit concluded the beginning of 2005, correct? That is w hen it was resolved? 2 The collo quy with cou nsel is not relevan t to the issue at bar. The court allowed no further discuss ion of th e amo unt app ellants re ceived from H artford . - 14 - A. It s possible. Q. And it is after it resolve d that you filed you r lawsuit ag ainst my client, correct? A. As supervisors [sic], we heard that your client was responsible. We attempted to find him and serve him, but w e spent a co uple of years trying to find him , but we couldn t. Q. I see. That s the delay. It took a couple of years to sue my client because you didn t know who had done the roofing work? A. No. W ell, that we kn ew. But to get hold of him to discuss it with him was impossible. Q. I see. Assu me you sen t him some letters? I assume there is some written evidence of the assertion you are just making now? A. I think we have the private detective that went out to his last given address. Q. After you filed suit is what you re talking about, sir; isn t that true? A. No. Q. Do you have any written documentation or does [appellants counsel] have any written documentation to back up what you are saying? A. Yo u d hav e to ask [appe llants co unsel] th at. Appellan ts argue that the mention of insurance during Johansson s cross-examination contaminated the trial, resulting in a fatal error and they point to the holding of Morris v. - 15 - Weddington, 320 Md. 674, 681 (1990), to the effect that [o]ur cases generally prohibit the slightest references in front of the jury primarily because such reference is irrelevant and has no bea ring on the issue of dam age to advan ce its arg umen t. Maryland Rule 5-411 delineates the general rule regarding admission of evidence of liability insurance to show negligence: Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admissible upon the issue whether the person acted negligently or otherwise wro ngfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against liability when offered for a noth er pu rpos e, such as proo f of agen cy, owne rship, or contro l, or bias o r prejud ice of a witnes s. It is well-established that evidence of a party s insurance is not permitted to show the ability or inability to pay and is, furthermore, not relevant to the proceeding as it may prejudice the jury s consid eration o f dam ages. See Morris, 320 Md. 674. Maryland case law and Md. Rule 5-411, however, have carved exceptions out of the general prohibition against admitting evidence regarding a party s liability insurance . See Snowhite v. State, Use of Tenant, 243 M d. 291 ( 1966) . In Snow hite, the Court s et forth and exam ined exce ptions to the rule. Two of these exceptions are relevant in the case sub judice: the fact of insurance may be relevant as bearing upon the credibility of a witness and an admission of a party bearing on negligence or damages may include a reference to the fact of insurance which cannot be severed without substantially lessening the evidential value of this admission. Id. at 301 (q uoting McC ormick of Ev idence § 168, p . 356). While these two exceptions a re applicable, the trial judge did not have to rely on the exceptions because the cross- 16 - examination of Johansson did not involve his insurance coverage, but instead only referenced appellants communication with their own insurance carrier. Thus, we hold that the mention of insu rance w as to imp each Jo hansso n s prio r incon sistent sta temen t. Appellan ts further argue that an analysis of the cross-examination shows that appellees counsel did not imp each Joh ansson s te stimony. Ap pellants claim that the line of questioning regarding Johansso n s initial belief that Kirchner was responsible for the flood was not proper and that, even assuming it was proper, it was not developed. We disagree. The correspondence that was read into evidence directly contradicts Johansson s assertion that he initially believed appellees were at fault after allegedly finding the joint elbow pipe. In the note to Harford, Johansson blames Kirchner, writing: You know as well as I know that the landlords [sic] appointed manager [Kirchner] poked the hole in the pipe that caused the damage. Moreover, Johansson not only maintains that Kirchner was responsible for the damage sustained, but even urged his insurance company to pursue Crown for subrogation. We disagree with appellants asse rtion that an inquiry into Johansson s initial belief as to who was responsible w ould only even arguab ly be proper if appellants had first sued M r. Kirchner, given that a provision in the lease agreement between Crown and appellees barred this type of suit. A juror, hearing the contents of the letter and, upo n learning that appellants w ere unable to sue their landlord for the flood damage, may conclude that Johansson did not see any new tar in th e elbow jo int and had only later, contrary to his direct testimony, formulated - 17 - the opinion that appellees were at fault after all other avenues of recovery had proven unsucce ssful. Given this inference, the court allowed appellees, through cross-examination, to show the chro nology o f the sh ift in app ellants f ocus f or reco very. Appellees impeached the alleged observation of the clogged elbow joint pipe on several grounds throughout trial. They elicited varying descriptions of the elbow joint pipe from appellants witnesses, one describing the joint as intact and another describing it as shattered in pieces. Furthermore, the only photograp h of the elb ow joint sh owed it still connected to the other pipes near the ceiling of the warehouse and not on the ground as Johansson had described. Johansson also testified that, the day after the flood, he found an elbow joint pipe lying on the groun d above th e drain pipe in the ceiling. He claimed that the elbow joint was filled with old and new tar. Johansson then immediately suspected appellees as the cau se of th e flood . During his investigatio n, Johanss on contem poraneo usly photographed the entire scene, but failed to photog raph the elb ow joint. B ecause of his suspicion that appellees were the cause of the flood, Johansson documented his observations of the elbow joint pipe in notes. The notes and the elbow joint pipe at issue, howeve r, were subseq uently de stroyed. Continuing to impeac h appellan ts evidence relative to the critical issue of the case, appellees remarked that, after immediately concluding appellees were at fault, Johansson wrote a letter to Hartford insisting that Kirchner poked a hole in the drain pipe that caused the water dam age. In the letter, Johansson r equested th at Hartford pursue C rown in - 18 - subrogation to preserve his comp any s insurance record. A claim for subrogation against Crown, however, was barred by the lease provision. In the year following the flood, Hartford paid most of appellants prop erty claim, but failed to pay all of its business interruption claim. Conseq uently, appellan ts brought su it against Ha rtford. Afte r losing at trial, appellants and Hartford settled on appeal for a nominal amount and on the condition that Hartford release its subrogation claim as part of the settlement agreement. Appellees finished its sequential timeline by pointing out that, after the litigation with Hartford ended unsatisfactorily, appellants sued appellees alleging negligence. The chronological timeline evidences, in our view, why the reference to appellants insurance carrier was relevant and probative to the critical issue of the case. B COLLATERAL SOURCE EVIDENCE Appellan ts further submit that the cross-examination ran afoul of the collateral source rule. The collate ral source ru le permits an injured person to re cover the f ull amoun t of his or her provable damages, regardless of the amount of compensation which the person has received for his injuries from sources unrelated to the tortfeasor. Haischer v. CSX T ransp., Inc. 381 Md. 119, 134 (200 4) (holding that collateral s ource evid ence is sub stantively inadmissib le is consistent w ith decisions o f this Cou rt regarding s uch evide nce ); see also - 19 - Restatement (Second) of Torts § 920A (1979). Appellees acknowledge that there are circumstances where the insurance status of a plaintiff may raise collateral source concerns, but aver that Johansson s cross-examination does not raise such a concern. Instead, appellees contend that appellees counsel properly questioned Johansson about his lack of success in pursuing collateral sources. We agree. Appellan ts conclude that a defendant could not in a tort case, such as this one, introduce evidence of the fact that the plaintiff had received insurance payments from a policy for which he had paid, relying on Haischer to support its proposition. In Haischer, however, the Court of Appeals analyzed whether the railroad com pany could introduce p ostinjury benefits af ter it claimed th at its employee, suing under the Federal Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 20701, made a claim of financial distress and demonstrated maling ering. Id. at 129. The Court reviewed potential exceptions to the collateral source doctrine and determined that disproving allegations of financial distress and malingering were not applicable. Id. at 135. Thus, Haischer makes clear that collateral source evidence may at times be admiss ible to atta ck dam ages. Despite the rationale and holding of Haischer, the case is not determinative of the issue sub judice. Johansson was not cross-examined on the issue of damages, but impeached regarding a prior inconsistent statement. Nowhere in the record does appellees counsel imply that appellants had already received compensation for their damages and, thus, sh ould not be compensated again. The court instead allowed the line of questioning to suggest that - 20 - appellants changed their theory for recovery, three years after the flood, only after they were unsuc cessfu l in pursu ing their claims a gainst C rown and H artford . Appellees attempt to bolster their collateral source argument by asserting that the bifurcated nature of the trial, whereby no issues regarding damages were presented to the jury, undermines any claim of prejudice. Appellants counter that the mention of insurance and the fact that appellants received payment, eve n if only partial, from Har tford is always harmful because it paints the plaintiff as a party which is trying to obtain an improper (at least in the jury s eyes) double recovery. Regardless of w hether appellants dama ges were at issue, the collateral source rule was not implicated. The purpose of the cross-examination was to impeach Johan sson s credibility by pointing out his prior inconsistent statement and not to suggest that appellants were partially paid. Furthermore, appellants brought suit against appellees only after litigation ended unsatisfactorily with Hartford. This, coupled with the fact that, amid appellants forty photographs and documented notes that there was no physical evidence to corrobo rate their witnesses claims that a joint elbow pipe clogged with ne w tar ex isted, reb uts the critical iss ue in th e case. Fina lly, appellees argue that appellants had the opportunity to request a collateral source instruction, but failed to do so. Appellees claim that the instruction could have been modified to inform the jury that its determination of the liability issues should not be affected by an in fere nce o r testimony regarding potential recoveries by appellants from collateral sources. Appellants contend that, because appellees opened the insuran ce Pan dora s B ox, - 21 - they were on ly obligated to object to the testimony and not to cure it with a p attern instruction. As stated previously, there was no prejudice to appellants from appellees mention of their insurance carrier. Consequently, the issue of who, if anyone, should have requested a modified pattern instruction regarding the collateral source rule is not determinative of the issue sub jud ice. We, theref ore, conclu de that the trial c ourt prope rly exercised its discretion in permitting the impeachment of Johansson through his prior inconsistent statement an d in allowin g appellees to question a ppellants m otivation to pursue litigation three years after the flood. II Appellants, in their second issue, contend that the circuit court erred in allowing the introduction of weather records into evidence without an expert to explain the information contained therein. Appellees counter that weather reports regarding amounts of rainfall were proper ly admitted . In their cas e, appellees offered certified copies of the U.S. Departme nt of Comm erce s weather records for the Baltimo re-Washington In ternational Airport reporting rain patterns at the airport between the day of the roofing job, April 15, 2002, and the date of the flooding, May 2, 2002. Appe llants objected to appellees proffer of evidence, protesting that the distance between BWI Airport and its premises at 56N was approximately ten miles and, thus, too great a distance for a jury to speculate as to whether it had also rained at appellants - 22 - place of business. The court found that appellants argument went to the weight of the eviden ce and not its ad missibili ty and ad mitted th e wea ther rec ords. The court s evidentiary ruling on whether or not to admit the weather records is also governed by the ab use of discretio n stand ard. Hall v. Un iv. of Maryland Med. Sys. Corp., 398 Md. 67, 82 (2007). The trial judge s determination is given broad latitude and is not disturbed on appea l unless a bused . Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 60 Md. App. 104, 118 (1984). The trial court s ruling admitting the weath er reports w as a prope r exercise of its discretion. We explain. First, the issue in dispute is whether appellees negligently clogged the drain during their installation of the asphalt roof. Appellees offered weather records indicating that the airport received o ver three an d a half inc hes of rain between April 16 and May 1, including two days, April 18 and Ap ril 28, of rain a ccumula tions greater th an one inch. Appellees offered the records showing this significan t rainfall betw een April 16 and May 1 as circumstantial evidence that their cond uct did not c ause the da mage in q uestion, but that some other interve ning caus e was at fa ult. As such, the records were probative to rebut appella nts claim that app ellees ne gligentl y repaired the build ing s ro of. Secondly, upon reviewing the documents, although lengthy, we agree that the records were not com plicated or outsid e of the ordina ry layperson s know ledge. In fact, the last column of the cha rt clearly denotes precipitation totals for the day. In appellants brief, they argue that the thirty-page exhibit co ntains literally thousa nds of m easureme nts which were - 23 - beyond the ability of the la y jurors to understand without the assistance of an expert and thus, pursuant to Md. Rule 5-702, an expert should have assisted the jury in understanding the meaning of the weather records. There is, however, no authority for appellants assertion that an expert opin ion is neede d to interpret o r explain the recorded r ainfall amo unts contain ed with in a we ather re port. To support their assertion that expert testimony was needed, appellants cite the unreported decision of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois in Schultz v. American Airlines, Inc., 1989 WL 64725 (N.D. Ill June 8, 1989). In Shultz, the plaintiff sought to introduce evidence of a weather report available to the airline before the aircraft took off showing turbulence in the area. The plaintiff contended that the airline should have known that there was heavy turbule nce in the area and that therefore, the aircraft should have remained grounded. The court did not, as appellants suggest, refuse to allow the plaintiff to introduce the weather reports in the absence of expert testimony, but instead found that the weather report of heavy thunderstorms and wind, without an expert to show a standard of care violation by the airline, did not by itself create a prima facie case of neglige nce. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing appellees to enter the weather records into evidence. The records were not beyond a layperson s understanding as they merely quantified rainfall at a given location . The fact that the airport was approximately ten miles from appellants premise does not go to the admissibility of the - 24 - evidence, but to the weight of the evidence. In sum, the admission of the weather records was ap propria te. III In their last argument, appellants assert that the circuit court erred when it denied appellants Motion for New Trial by re-argu ing the grou nds adva nced in the ir first two questions presented for our rev iew. Fo r the rea sons w e have stated, supra, and our discussion in this section, we hold that the circuit court properly denied appellants motion. Maryland Rule 2-533 provides that a motion for new trial is within the sound discretion of the tr ial court and its ru ling is or dinarily no t review able on appea l. Brinand (Brenan) v. Denzik, 226 M d. 287 (19 61); Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 600 (1984) (An appellate court does not generally disturb the exercise of a trial court s discretion in denying a motion for new trial. ). As the Court of Appeals iterated in Buck v. Cam s Broadloom Rug, 328 Md. 51, 59 (1992), [b]ecause the exercise of discretion under these circumstances depends so heavily upon the unique opportunity the trial judge has to closely observe the entire trial, complete with nuances, inflections, and impressions never to be gained from a cold rec ord, it is a d iscretion that will rarely, if ev er, be dis turbed on app eal. Appellan ts assert that errors regarding the admission of statements made by Johansson to his insurer and the weather reports warrant a new trial. These two bases advanced by appellants are, as we have pre viously discussed, evidentiary determinations within the trial - 25 - court s discretio n. Therefore, appellants must prove that the trial judge abused his discretion twice once when he allowed the admission of the said evidence and then again, when he denied appella nts M otion fo r New Trial. W e hold th at appe llants fa il on bo th acco unts. The trial court properly permitted the cross-examination of Johansson s inconsistent statements. The cross-exam ination was probative in that it questioned appellants motivation to pursue litigation against appellees only after all other avenues of financial recovery had been foreclosed. Appellees never suggested that appellants had been satisfied in whole or in part through their insurance carrier or prior litigation to implicate a collateral source issue. Add ition ally, the trial court properly admitted certified records from a government agency clearly indicating rain fall amou nts in the Ba ltimore area during the relevant period. The circuit court d id not err in de nying appella nts motion for new trial. JUDGMENT OF TH E CIRCU IT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS. - 26 -
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