Jones v. Rosenberg

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HEADNOTE: Tanya Jones v. Diane Rosenberg , No. 124, September Term, 2007 ________________________________________________________________________ REAL EST ATE – FOR ECLOSU RES – The availability of discovery related to exceptions to a foreclosure sale rests in the sound discretion of the court. REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 124 September Term, 2007 TANYA JONES v. DIANE ROSENBERG Eyler, Jam es R., Barbera, Murphy, Jr., Joseph F. (Associate Judge of the Court of Appeals, specially assigned), JJ. Opinion by Eyler, James R., J. Filed: January 31, 2008 This case raises several issues stemming from a real estate foreclosure action initiated in the Circuit Court for Ch arles County by substitute trustees Diane S . Rosenberg and Mark Meyer, appellees, against mortgagors Donna P. Jones and Tanya L. Jones, appella nts. Ap pellants unsuc cessfu lly sough t to stay for eclosu re prior to the sale. Following the foreclosure sale, appellants filed exceptions to the sale and sought discovery. The circuit court denied discovery, overruled appellants’ exceptions, and ratified t he fore closure sale. On app eal, appellan ts raise severa l issues: (1) w hether the c ircuit court erre d in denying appellants’ requests for injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure sale, under Maryland Rule 14-209(b); (2) whether the circuit court erred in quashing appellants’ notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum served on appellees shortly before the hearing on appellants’ second request for injunctive relief;1 (3) whether the circuit court erred in ratifying the foreclosure sale; (4) whether the circuit court erred in denying appellants’ motion to stay enforcement of the judgment ratifying the sale, pending appeal to this Court; and (5) whether the circuit court erred in denying appellants’ motion to alter or amend the judgment ratifying the sale. Perceiv ing no e rror, we shall af firm. 1 The second request for injunctive relief also served as exceptions to the foreclo sure sale . -1- Factual Background On August 31, 2005, appellants executed a deed of trust for property located at 10693 Jacksonhole Place in Charles County, Maryland, to secure a loan in the amount of $224,8 00. Th e lende r was G reenPo int Mo rtgage F unding , Inc. of S anta R osa, Ca lifornia . The deed of trust included a provision that the borrower, after default, had a right to have enforcement of the deed of trust suspended upon compliance with certain conditions, including the payment of all amounts due, plus expenses. The deed also contained an adjustable rate rider, with an initial interest rate of 1 percent. The deed provided the interest rate would change on November 1, 2005, by a rate calculated by adding 3.375 percent to th e current rate index, but n ot exceed ing 12 per cent. The in itial monthly payment was $723.05. The monthly payments were subject to change each year, and were to increase substantially after November 1, 2005. As time progressed, the interest rate on the loan increased, and the amount of the periodic pa yments ow ed by appellan ts increased. B y October, 20 06, the loan was in default, triggering acceleration of the loan balance. Appellants were notified that the matter would proceed to foreclosure. Upon receiving notice, appellants, in a letter dated October 30, 200 6, requested validation of the d ebt. On Octobe r 30, 2006, the foreclosu re action was docketed in circuit court, and appellees were appointed as substitute trustees that same day. Appellees’ statement of debt showed a balance due in the amount of $238,568.16, which consisted of $225,273.78 principal, accrued interest and other -2- charge s in the a moun t of $12 ,780.18 , comp uted at a n interes t rate of 6 .875 pe rcent. Appellees filed a petition for a nominal bond on October 30, 2006, which was approved on Novem ber 20, 2006. The bond was filed o n Novem ber 29, 2006, and the foreclosure sale wa s sched uled fo r Novembe r 29, 20 06. On November 10, 2006, appellees sent a letter to appellants, by certified mail and first class mail, notifying them that the foreclosure action had been filed and that an auction sale of the property would occur on November 29, 2006. On November 20, 2006, appella nts, pro se, filed in circuit court a motion for an emergency injunction to stop the foreclo sure sale and to q uash se rvice. T he mo tion did not con tain a su pportin g affid avit. On December 8, 2006, appellees responded to the motion. The circu it court did no t rule on app ellants’ motio n for an em ergency injun ction to stop the for eclosure sa le and to qu ash service prior to the fo reclosure sa le, and the sa le occurred o n Nove mber 29 , 2006. On Decem ber 6, 2006 , the report of sale and af fidavit of notice were filed. The property was sold to Craig Heurich and Alison Mason for $262,000, which was in excess of the amount owed by appellants, according to the statement of debt. The circuit court issued a notice that the sale would be ratified on Januar y 5, 2007 . On D ecemb er 21, 20 06, app ellants, pro se, filed a second motion for an emergency injunction to stop the foreclosure sale or, in the alternative, to stop the ratification of the sale. The objections stated in the motion included lack of an opportunity to cure the -3- default; lack of notice of the foreclosure sale by registered mail; that appellants had filed suit against appellees in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland on November 17, 2006, alleging that the deed of trust violated federal mortgage laws;2 that appellants submitted a surety bond on Novem ber 20, 2006, to the clerk o f the circuit court and the bond covered any debt owed;3 that appellants were denied due process; and certain other objections re lating to the fo rm of the f oreclosure docume nts. Appe llants also alle ged tha t they paid the deb t throug h an “in ternatio nal bill o f exch ange,” 4 although appellants n ow con cede such docume nts are not rec ognized b y Maryland co urts as valid legal documents. On December 27, 2006, appellees responded to appellants’ motion, asserting that appellants’ request for an injunction did not comply with the affidavit requirements of Maryland Rule 14-209(b); the international bill of exchange was a fraudulent document and frivolous; the purported bond filed by appellants was not a proper bond; the stated grounds of appellants’ motion were without merit and did not state a basis for granting an 2 Appellants’ complaint in the United States District Court was dismissed on February 5, 2007. Appellants appealed the dismissal of the complaint and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal on October 24, 2007. A copy of the complaint is attached to this opinion as Appendix A. Through other cases pending on this Court’s docket, we a re aware that other deb tors in foreclosure procee dings h ave file d simila r comp laints in f ederal c ourt. 3 The doc ument is fa cially invalid. A c opy is attached to this opinion as Appe ndix 4 The doc ument is fa cially invalid. A c opy is attached to this opinion as Appe ndix B. C. -4- injunction; to th e extent the c ourt view ed appellan ts’ motion as constituting e xceptions to the foreclo sure sale, all of the excep tions had to b e overruled ; upon def ault, appellan ts had no right to cure, only a right to redem ption; on Novem ber 10, 2006, appe llants were mailed a rein state quote a nd payoff q uote, and a ppellants ha d an opp ortunity to reinstate their loan but failed to do so; appellees were in full compliance with notice requirements; and appellants had not set forth any procedural irregularities with particularity. Appellees requested that the court deny appellants’ request for an emergency injunction to stop foreclosure, deny appellants’ exceptions to the foreclosure sale, and grant further relief as the court deemed appropriate. The court scheduled a hearing on appellants’ motion for an injunction against foreclosure and exceptions to the sale and appellees’ response, to be held on February 27, 2006. On February 12, 2006, counsel entered an appearance on behalf of appellants. 5 On February 21, 2007, appellants moved for a continuance of the hearing, which was denied on February 23, 2007. On February 26, 2007, appellants moved for a statement of payout and arrearage owed. Prior to the hearing, appellants served notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum on appellees, to occur on March 6, 2007. On February 27, 2007, the same day as the motions hearing, appellees moved to quash the notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum. At the hearing,on February 27, 2006, appellants requested discovery of the original 5 Appellan ts continue to be represe nted on ap peal, but by diff erent coun sel. -5- loan documents, including the original deed of trust, in order to determine whether the mortgage was usurious and improper, as well as discovery of whether appellants received actual notice of the foreclosu re sale. By order entered on M arch 2, 2007, the circuit court granted appellees’ motion to quash appellants’ requested discovery, overruled appellants’ exceptions to the foreclosure sale, ratified the sale, and ordered that the matter be referred to the co urt aud itor for a n acco unting . On March 9, 2007, appellants noted an appeal from the ratification of the foreclo sure sale , and m oved to stay enfo rceme nt of the ratificatio n of sa le pend ing app eal. Appellants did not file a supersedeas bond with the motion. Appellees filed an opposition to a stay of ratification pending appeal, and on March 15, 2007, the circuit court denied appella nts’ mo tion. On M arch 20, 20 07, appellan ts, pursuant to Maryland R ule 2-535 , filed a motio n to alter or amend the judgment of ratification of sale, based upon the court’s revisory power under subsection (a); fraud under subsection (b); and newly discovered evidence under subsection (c). In that motion, appellants alleged that the foreclosure action was improper becau se appe llees had violated the Tru th In Le nding A ct (TIL A), 15 U.S.C . § 1601 , et seq., and the Real E state Se ttlemen t Proce dures A ct (RE SPA ), 12 U .S.C. § 2 601, et seq., and that, w ith additional d iscovery, appe llants could p rove the vio lations. App ellants attached to the motion a packet of materials purportedly prepared by Linda J. Rougeux, an “auditor” w ith “Advo cates for Ju stice” based in Abilene , Texas. Th e packet p urports to -6- represent the audit of a loan involving appellants and “IndyMac Ba nk,” but the terms are very differen t from the te rms of the loan that is the subject of th is case. Mo reover, w hile the audit purports to conclude that there are possible violations of federal law with respect to the audited loan, the papers do not indicate the source of the information and do not provide a conclusion under oath. Some of the papers appear to be form documents which the organization presumably makes available to members of the public. Appellants also attache d to the m otion an article pr omulg ated by th e “Cen ter for R espon sible Le nding,” dated De cember, 2 006, conta ining data o n the “fore closure risk in the subprim e market” and a copy of remarks made to the Congressional Black Caucus by a policy analyst at the Center for Responsible Lending on the issue of sub-prime mortgage lending. On March 23, 2007, appellees filed a response to appellants’ motion to alter or amend the judgment. Appellees contended they were not involved in the mortgage settlement with appellants and, therefore, were not liable for any potential violations of federal mortgage laws; that appellants had not cited any authority providing that violations of federal mortgage laws were a defense against foreclosure; and that appella nts had not set f orth an y facts or e videnc e to sup port the ir claims . On April 6, 2007, the circuit court denied appellants’ motion to alter or amend the judgment of ratification of sale. On April 11, 2007, the third party purchasers of the foreclosed property filed a motion requesting judgment awarding possession, and on May 2, 2007, appellants filed an opposition. On May 3, 2007, the circuit court entered an -7- order a wardin g posse ssion. Additi onal fa cts will b e adde d as nec essary. Discussion I. Ratification of the Fo reclosure S ale On appeal appellants contend their two motions for injunctive relief from foreclosure, one filed before and one filed after the foreclosure sale, were permitted under Maryland R ule 14-20 9(b), and tha t they should ha ve prevaile d on the m erits. Appella nts also contend they were entitled to further discovery at the time of the February 27, 2006 hearing, and the circuit court abused its discretion in quashing their notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum. Finally, appellants contend they presented valid exceptions to the foreclosure sale, although labeled as the second motion for injunctive relief, and that the c ircuit co urt erred in ratifying the sale. A. Injunc tion to S top Fo reclosu re Sale under Mary land R ule 14- 209(b) The grant or denial of an injunction lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, an d on ap peal, w e review the trial co urt’s dec ision fo r an abu se of d iscretion . See Md. Comm’n on Human Relations v. Downey Commc’ns, Inc., 110 Md. App. 493, 521 (1996 ) (citation s omitte d). A debto r who ow ns property su bject to a lien c reated by a lien in strument possesses three means of challenging a foreclosure: “obtaining a pre-sale injunction pursuant to Maryland Rule 14-209(b)(1), filing post-sale exceptions to the ratification of -8- the sale under Maryland Rule 14-305(d), and the filing of post-sale ratification exceptions to the auditor’s statement of account pursuant to Maryland Rule 2-543(g), (h).” Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. v. Neal, 398 M d. 705, 726 (2007) (citatio ns omitted); see also Greenbriar Condo., Phase I Council of Unit Owners, Inc. v. Brooks, 387 Md. 683, 746-47 (2005 ). “In order to enjoin a sale pursuant to Md. Rule 14-209(b), the injunction must be filed prior to the foreclosure sale. If filed after the foreclosure sale, the injunction is in respect only to subsequent proceedings.” Brooks, 387 M d. at 738 . In this case, ap pellants’ first req uest for an injunction w as not in com pliance w ith Rule 14-2 09(b). Tha t subsection states, in part: The mo tion shall not b e granted u nless the m otion is supported by affidavit as to all facts asserted and contains: (1) a statement as to whether the moving party admits any amount of the deb t to be due a nd payable a s of the date the motion is filed, (2) if an amount is admitted, a statement that the moving party has paid the amount into court with the filing of the motion , and (3) a de tailed stateme nt of facts, sh owing th at: (A) the debt and all interest due thereon have been fully paid, or (B) there is no default, or (C) fraud was used by the secured p arty, or with the se cured party’s k nowled ge, in obtainin g the lien . Appellan ts’ motion d id not com ply with any of th e above re quiremen ts, and the co urt did not err in failing to grant re lief. Appellants second request for an injunction to stay foreclosure under Rule 14209(b) was filed after the foreclosure sale and, therefore, was untimely for purposes of halting the foreclosure sale. Consequently, we shall direct our attention to appellants’ -9- reques ts for dis covery a nd app ellants’ e xceptio ns to the sale. B. Motion to Quash Discovery We re view th e denia l of disc overy un der the a buse o f discre tion stan dard. Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 28 (2 005). A trial court abuses its discretion only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court in denying discov ery. See id. at 28. When ruling on exceptions to a foreclosure sale, Rule 14-305(d)(2) provides: “The court shall hold a hearing if a hearing is requested and the exceptions or any response clearly show a need to tak e evidenc e.” On the issue of disc overy related to exception s to foreclosure sales, Gordon on Maryland Foreclosures explains: There are, essentially, no real guidelines for the procedures relating to exc eptions and , particularly, discov ery in preparation for the hearing . On request, most C ircuit Court judges will allow a reasonable period of time for depositions and docu ment prod uction bef ore the hea ring, albeit substan tially less tim e than in routine civil litiga tion. Alexand er Gordo n, IV, Go rdon on M aryland Forec losures § 24 .2, at 1016 (4 th ed. 2004). At the mo tions hearing , appellants req uested disc overy of the c losing doc uments on the loan, including the original copy of the deed of trust, in order to show the loan was usurious an d improp er. Appella nts claimed the original term s of the pro missory note were altered after appellant signed the note, and that appellant was forced to pay $18,000 more th an wa s legally pe rmitted. Appellants’ counsel also explained that appellants claimed they did not receive -10- proper notice of the foreclosure sale, and counsel requested discovery to determine whether appellants received notice. Appellants’ counsel stated he had recently taken appellants’ case, that prior to that appellants had been acting pro se, and that counsel had not review ed the cou rt file by the time o f the hearin g and nee ded additio nal time to conduct disc overy. The circuit court noted appellants’ counsel made an appearance on behalf of appellants on February 12, which gave him two weeks to prepare for the motions hearing on Febru ary 27. Add itionally, the circuit co urt noted all o f the docu ments app ellants sought for discovery were on public file, the only exception being the original deed of trust, which appellees were not required to present to appellants in proceeding with the foreclosure sale. The court then granted appellees’ motion to quash the notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum. Regardin g appellan ts’ request fo r discovery of the lending docume nts in order to show the loan was usurious and improper, usury is not a proper ground for setting aside a foreclo sure sale , and the questio n of us ury shou ld be co nsidere d at the tim e of the audit. See Kirsner v. Sun Mortgage Co., 154 Md. 682, 688 (1928). Thus, the question of whether the loan was usurious or improper was not relevant to the hearing on exceptions to the sale, an d dis covery of the le ndin g docum ents was not n eces sary. As to appellants’ request for discovery as to whether they had received actual notice of the foreclosure sale, we agree with the circuit court’s finding that, upon entering -11- an appearance on February 12, appellants’ counsel had sufficient time prior to the February 27 motions hearing to collect evidence on this issue. Moreover, appellants had actual notice of the foreclosure proceeding, no later than November, 2006. Therefore, we hold there was no abuse of discretion in de nying appellants additional time for disco very and granting appellees’ motion to quash appellants’ notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum.6 C. Exceptions to the Foreclosure Sale Having failed to file a proper pre-sale injunction to the foreclosure sale under Maryland R ule 14-20 9(b), appella nts’ next reco urse was to file excep tions to the sale under Rule 14-305(d). In ruling on exceptions to a foreclosure sale and whether to ratify the sale, t rial cour ts may co nsider b oth que stions o f fact a nd law . See S. Md. Oil, Inc. v. Kamine tz, 260 Md. 443, 451 (1971) (explaining questions of fact and law may be raised in exceptions to foreclosure sales). In reviewing a trial court’s finding of fact, we do “not substitute our judgment for that of the lower court unless it was clearly erroneous” and give due consideration to the trial court’s “opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, to judge their c redibility and to pa ss upon th e weight to be given th eir testimony.” Young v. Young, 37 Md. App. 211, 220 (1977). Questions of law decided 6 Appellants’ reference to Pacific Mortgag e & Investmen t Group, Ltd. v. Ho rn, 100 Md. App. 311 (1994), is unpersuasive. The discovery at issue in Horn was in the context of a lawsu it by the borrower against the lende r and substitute trustee for statutory violatio ns rega rding th e mortg age loa n, see id. at 317-18, and did not involve exceptions to a fore closure sale. -12- by the trial court are subject to a de novo standa rd of re view. See Liddy v. Lamone, 398 Md. 2 33, 246 -47 (20 07). After a foreclosure sale, a debtor’s right to redemption ends, however, a debtor may file exce ptions challe nging on ly procedural irre gularities in the f oreclosure sale Brooks, 387 Md. at 746, under Rule 14-305(d). Rule 14-305(d)(1) provides: (d) Exceptions to Sale. (1) How Taken. A party, and, in an action to foreclose a lien, the holde r of a subo rdinate interes t in the prope rty subject to the lien, may file exceptions to the sale. Exceptions shall be in writing, shall set forth the alleged irregularity with particularity, and shall be filed within 30 days after the date of a notice issued pursuant to section (c) of this Ru le or the filing o f the report o f sale if no n otice is issued. Any matter not specifically set forth in the exceptions is waived unless the court finds that justice requires otherwise. The procedural irregularities might include: “allegations such as the advertisement of sale was insufficient or misdescribed the property, the creditor committed a fraud by preventing someone from bidding or by chilling the bidding, challenging the price as unconscionable, etc.” Id. at 741. There is a presumption in favor of the validity of a judicial s ale, and the bur den is o n the ex ceptan t to estab lish to the contrar y. See Jackson v. Townshend, 249 M d. 8, 13-14 ( 1968) (citatio ns omitted); PAS Realty, Inc. v. Rayne, 46 Md. App. 445, 446 (1980) (citing Hardy v. Gibson, 213 Md. 493 , 508 (1957)). Appellants raised a number of challenges in their motion opposing ratification of the sale, as outlined above. The only challenge relating to procedural irregularities in the -13- foreclosure sale, however, was that appellees failed to send notice by registered or certified ma il. The circuit co urt made th e followin g finding o n this issue: I conclude that the trustees have as a matter of fact complied, and I find as a fact that they have complied with the expectations of [Rule 14-206(b)(1)-(2)]. That is to say, and the timing contemplated by subsection 2B with regard to the notices . There’s evidence in the file here of the published notices in the local new spaper. Th ere is eviden ce in the file of the postal receipts attesting to or as evidence associated with the af fidavits attesting to the mailing by first class mail and certified mail. The closest thing I’ve gotten to a proffer here is a suggestion that Ms. Jo nes didn’t re ceive it. But th at flies in the face of the actual history here where she must have received so mething o r she wou ldn’t have a sking [sic.] u s to enjoin the sale in the first place. So that suggestion is not, the only factual proffer we have here is simply not supported by the case history. The court then denied appellants’ motion to stay ratification of the sale, ratified the foreclo sure sale , and ord ered tha t the case be refe rred to a n audito r for an accou nting. The record contains an affidavit by appellees, stating that they gave notice of the foreclosure proceedings as required by Maryland Code (1957, 2003 Repl. Vol., 2007 Supp.) § 7-105 of the Real Property Article and notice of the foreclosure sale, by regular and certified mail, advising app ellants as to the time, place, and terms of the foreclosure sale. See Maryland R ule 14-20 6(b)(2) (bef ore sale, “the p erson auth orized to m ake sale shall send notice of the time, place, and terms of sale by certified mail and by first class mail to the last known address of . . . the debtor”). Attached to the affidavit are copies of -14- the letter t hat wa s sent to a ppellan ts and c opies o f the po stal rece ipts for th e mailin gs. Appe llants ha ve not p resente d any evi dence to the co ntrary. Th e circuit c ourt did not err. Appellants’ challenge on the basis of improper notice was the only procedural challenge to the foreclosure sale and, thus, was the only proper exception to the foreclosure sale. Therefore, we hold the circuit court did not err in overruling appellants’ exceptions to the foreclosure sale and ratifying the foreclosure sale.7 II. Motion for Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment Ratifying the Sale, Pending Appeal Appellants contend the circuit court erred in denying their motion to stay enforc emen t of the ju dgme nt ratifying the fore closure sale, pen ding ap peal. [A] stay pending appeal is governed by Rules 8-422 through 8-424. If the court determines that because of the nature of the action enforcement of the judgment should not be stayed by the filing of a supersedeas bond or other security, it may enter an an order denying a stay or permitting a stay only on the terms stated in the order. Maryland Rule 2-6 32(e). A party against whom a judgment has been rendered may stay its enforcement by filing a supersedeas bond that is in compliance with the requirements in Maryland Rule 8423. In a forec losure a ction, a s uperse deas bo nd mu st be file d. See Creative Dev. Corp. v. Bond, 34 Md . App. 279 , 282-83 (1 976) (exp laining that w ith the excep tion of six 7 Appellants point out that, at the motions hearing, they discussed their then pending complaint in federal court, in which they asserted violations of federal law, but the circuit court failed to consider those allegations. The allegations did not constitute a procedural challenge to the foreclosure sale and, therefore, were not proper exceptions that cou ld have been ra ised at th e Febru ary 27 he aring. -15- specific actions, that do not include foreclosure actions, civil judgments cannot be stayed unless a sup ersedeas b ond is filed); Onderdonk v. Onderdonk, 21 Md. App. 621, 623-24 (1974) (explaining parties must file a supersedeas bond when moving to stay enforcement of judgment to ratify a foreclosure sale). Appe llants did not file th e nece ssary bon d. It is well-settled law in Maryland that the rights of a bona fide purchaser of mortgaged property would not be affected by reversal of the ratification of sale, in the absenc e of a su persed eas bon d. Poku v. Friedman, ____ Md. _____ (filed January 10, 2008); Baltrosky v. Kugler, 395 M d. 468, 4 74 (20 06) (cita tions om itted). There are only two exceptions to this rule: (1) unfairness or collusion between the purchaser and trustee and (2) when the mo rtgagee purcha ses the d isputed proper ty at the fo reclosu re sale. Id. at 475 (ci tations o mitted). There is no contention that the third party purchasers in this case are not bona fide purcha sers, and no con tention t hat eithe r of the t wo ex ception s to the ru le apply. Therefore, the court did not err in denying appellants’ motion to stay enforcement of the judgment to ratify the sale. III. Motion to Alter or A mend the Judgme nt of Ratif ication of S ale Finally, appellants contend the court erred in not exercising its revisory power over the judgment of ratification of sale under Maryland Rule 2-535. Appellants argue that the court ab used its d iscretion becau se appe llants m ade a sh owing of frau d or irreg ularity. We review the circuit court’s decision to deny a request to revise its final judgment -16- under t he abu se of d iscretion standa rd. See Mullaney v. Aude, 126 Md. App. 639, 666 (1999). The effect of a final ratification of sale is res judicata as to the validity of such sale, exc ept in the case of fraud o r illegality. See Bachrach v. Wash. United Co-op., 181 Md. 315, 320 (1943); Manigan v. Burson, 160 Md. App. 114, 120 (2004) (citations omitted). The burden of proof in establishing fraud, mistake, or irregularity is clear and convin cing ev idence . See Billingsley v. Lawson, 43 Md. App. 713, 718 (1979). To establish frau d under R ule 2-535 (b), a mova nt must sho w extrinsic fraud, not in trinsic fraud. See Manigan, 160 M d. App . at 120 ( citations omitted ). This Co urt explaine d the distinctio n betwee n intrinsic frau d and extrin sic fraud in Billingsley: [A]n enrolled decree will not be vacated even though obtained by the use of forged documents, perjured testimony, or any other frauds which are “intrinsic” to the trial of the case itself. Underlying this long settled rule is the principle that, once parties have had the op portunity to pres ent before a court a matter for investigation and determination, and once the decision has been rendered and the litigants, if they so choose, have exhausted every means of reviewing it, the public policy of this S tate dem ands th at there b e an en d to that l itigation . . . [.] This policy favoring finality and conclusiveness can be outweighed only by a showing “that the jurisdiction of the court has been imposed upon, or that the prevailing party, by some ex trinsic or collatera l fraud, has p revented a fair submi ssion o f the co ntrove rsy.” Billingsley, 43 Md. App. at 719 (quoting Schwartz v. Merchs. Mortgage Co., 272 Md. 305, 30 8-09 (1 974)). Fraud is ex trinsic whe n “it actually prev ents an adv ersarial trial but is intrin sic -17- when it is employed during the course of the hearing which provides the forum for the truth to appear, albeit, the truth was distorted by the complained of fraud.” Manigan, 160 Md. App. at 121 (quoting Billingsley, 43 Md. App. at 719). Irregularity under Rule 2535(b), is de fined as: [“]the doing or not doing of that, in the conduct of a suit at law, which, conformable to the practice of the court, ought or ought not be to be done.” (citation omitted) “As a consequence, irregularity, in the contemplation of the Rule, usually means irregularity of process or procedure . . . , and not an error, which in legal parlance generally connotes a departure from the truth or accuracy of which a defendant had notice and could have challenged.” (citation omitted) Manigan, 160 Md. App. at 121 (quoting Billingsley, 43 Md. Ap p. at 720). In their motion, appellants made general allegations that appellees violated TILA and RESPA, and contended that with additional discovery they could prove such violations. Appellants attached a document, described as an audit report, but which pertains to a mo rtgage lo an that d oes no t involv e appe llees and is unrela ted to thi s case. Appellants also attached a public policy report that presented empirical data on sub-prime mortgag e len ding , as w ell as remarks mad e to th e Co ngre ssional B lack Cau cus b y a policy analyst at the Center for Responsible Lending on the issue of sub-prime mortgage lending. Appellants’ motion contained no probative evidence showing extrinsic fraud or irregula rity in the fo reclosu re sale a nd did n ot prese nt new ly discove red evid ence. W e hold the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not exercising its revisory power over the judg ment to ratify the f oreclos ure sale . -18- In conclusion, we note that we are not unaware of the issues that exist with respect to subprime mortga ge lending, and that som e persons believe that curren t foreclosure proced ures do not pro vide de btors w ith suff icient op portun ities to ch allenge foreclo sure. Assum ing, arguendo, that that belief has merit, a debtor does n ot advance the deb tor’s cause by filing documents that do not comply with the Maryland Rules, are incomplete, inaccurate, a nd mislead ing. Becau se we ha ve seen so me of the same “fo rm” docu ments in other foreclosure cases, in which the debtor, as here, acted pro se, we assume that someone (not appellants’ current counsel) has provided bad advice and bad docum entation . Conclusion We hold the circuit court did not err (1) in denying appellants’ requests for an injunction to stop the foreclosure sale, (2) in granting appellees’ motion to quash appellants’ notices of deposition and subpoenas duces tecum; (3) in overruling appellants’ exceptions to the foreclosure sale and in ratifying the sale; (4) in denying appellants’ motion for a stay of enforcement of the judgment ratifying the foreclosure sale, pending appeal; and (5) in denying appellants’ motion to alter or amend the final judgment of ratificatio n of sa le. JUD GM ENT S AF FIRM ED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APP ELL ANT S. -19- In the United States District Court For the District of Maryland Greenbelt, Maryland NOV 1 7 2005 AT GAEENBEI.T CLeM,Y,ADIITAIClT OOUfIT DIST""" 01' IINlYlANO No'JllT DI;PO~I'r Bel: Pro Se Tanya and Donna Jones 12109 Crestwood Tum Brandywine, MD 20613 casJ)KC06 CV3038 vs EMC Mortgage Company P.O. Box 141358 Irving, Texas 75014-1358 Mortgage Electronic Registration System, Inc. P.O. Box 202 Flint, Ml48501-2026 Rosenberg & Associates, LLC 7910 Woodmont Avenue, Suite 750 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. P.O. Box 908 Newark, NJ 07101-0908 Defendants Complaint (Breach of Contract, Fraud) Now comes Plaintiff, (fanya and Donna Jones) (herein after "plaintiff') Pro Se and complains as follows; Jurisdiction I. "This court has jurisdiction pursuant to diversity of citizenship in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. ---~ ~-~-- --~--~----~~ ~--~ -- - - - - - - - - - - ' 1 2. This court has jurisdiction as the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000.00 in accordance with Federal Rules of Civil Procedures. 3. During all times mentioned in this complaint, Plaintiffwere residents of the State of Maryland and resided at 12109 Crestwood Tum in Brandywine, MD 20613. 4. EMC Mortgage Company, it's agents and co-parties (defendants), was the Mortgage company licensed to do business in the state of Maryland, whose business address is P.O. Box 141358 Irving Texas 75014-1358. Count I Breach of Contract 5. Date of Settlement, August 31, 2005. 6. Facts; their inability to validate the alleged debt and subsequently attempted to coerce payment is also creating a commercial injury. a.) If "Lender" does not provide verification and! or adequate assurance ofthe alleged debt as herein requested pursuant to the laws of the land, and any debt allegedly owed by me is extinguished as an operation oflaw. An obligation once extinct, it never revives again. "OGDEN v SA UNDERS. 25 U.S. 213 (1827) 7. A notice sent pursuant to the FDCPA, Title 15 U.S.C. 1692g Section 809(b) that your claim is disputed and validations is requested.(EEOC V Shell Oil Co. 466 U.S. 54, 76 n. 32 (1984) and Edelman V. Lynchburg College. S. Ct. May 19, 2002) b.) Until the debt is validated the defendant and it's co-parties shall cease collection of the alleged debt and they must show positive proofthat you owe them some money and it should not be a computer generated printout of the debt. The Defendant continued to try and collect the alleged debt during the entire validation process. 8. Plaintiff sent various letters ofvalidation to Defendant via certified mail. Defendant was non-responsive to all letters mailed. To date Defendant has failed to comply otherwise. By and through acquiescence, silence is known as agreement of understanding by parties to consent judgment without further controversy. a.) The initial letter of validation was made on January 26, 2006 b.) On February 15,2006 another letter was mailed to Defendant c.) On March 8, 2006 another letter was mailed to Defendant d.) On March 28, 2006 yet another letter was mailed to Defendant e.) On April 18, 2006 another letter was mailed to Defendant f.) On May 22, 2006 another letter was mailed to Defendant informing them that they were in Breach of the Contract g.) On June 15,2006 a Notice of Default was mailed to the Defendant 9. Any collateral attack on this agreement/contract is in Bad faith and is an attempt to violate the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 10. 10. EMC Mortgage Company and its Agents is not the holder in due course. a.)The Defendant and its agents are required to give proof of claim! verification of the purported debt and status as holder is due course. Such is required as a matter of due process oflaw. (Morris V. Jones 329 U.S. 545 (1947) 11. Plaintiffs promissory note was deposited into said customer transaction account, creating new money and increasing the assets of EMC Mortgage 3 Company and then issued a check drawn on the customer transaction that contained the new money, there by zero balancing the ledger on the plaintiffs customer transaction account. 12. Pursuant to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), plaintiffs should now be paid for their promissory note when endorsed pay to the order without recourse. 13. The Defendant is indebted to Plaintiffs in the amount of the promissory note. The defendant never issued a receipt to the Plaintiffs for the promissory note and it has never been recorded. 15. The Defendants have made false and fraudulent entries into specially coded files such as Customer Transaction accounts that courts rely upon as undisputed evidence. 16. Defendant violated contract law by not property disclosing Yield Spread Premium (fraud in the factum), the Plaintiff was prevented from understanding the basic nature of the bargain when the broker and defendant failed to properly disclose the Yield Spread Premium and what it would ultimately mean to the Plaintiff and the interest rate. 17. Defendant failed to acquire a UCC-I on the property as required and in contravention ofArticle 9 of the UCC. a.) The Plaintiffs must sign the UCC-I for the original and each time the note is sold the Plaintiffs must sign again for each new assignee. b.) Defendant failed to provide that the Plaintiffs signed papers acknowledging receipt ofthe UCC-llien. ..' Count ill Unjust Enrichment 18. Plaintiffs are no longer liable for additional charges pursuant (GAAP). 19. Defendant sold promissory note to a third party, while requiring plaintiff to submit monthly payments that were not due or owed. 20. Defendants have never made a assessment or signed an Assessment Certificate under penalty of perjury, true, correct, complete and not misleading. 21. Defendant never risked any of its funds in the purported loan transaction. Wherefore, the plaintiffpray this Honorable Court award judgment in the amount of Five Hundred and Fifty Thousand dollars (550,000.00) plus interest, filing fees and other court costs for unjust enrichment. Count IV Violations ofTruth in Lending Act (TILA) 22. Plaintiff does not need to prove that the lender intended to violate the TlLA in order to prove a violation (Wright v. Tower Loan ofMississippi, Inc. 679 F. 2d 436,445 j'h Cir. 1982)( Mills v. Home Equity Group, 871 F. Supp. 1482, 1485­ 86 D.D.C. 1994) 23. Defendant failed to provide a copy of the appraisal in the loan documents a.) Defendant failed to provide that the appraisal meets FNMA/FHLMC standards for establishing value per FNMA/FHLMC MRl's1ALL Regsll 2 USC §3349(a)(l) (2) b.) Defendant failed to provide that appraiser meets licensing requirements (1,000,000 < State Certified) per 12 USC §3342(l) or (2) and §3350 (5) (A) (B) and (C) 24. Defendant failed to provide that the finance disclosure fOIro has an OMB number, Title 12 and 31 U.S.C. §1901. c.) Defendant failed to provide that either the Note or Mortgage had a valid OMB number. (Paperwork Reduction Act of1995) d.) Defendant failed to provide a complete copy of all loan documents signed by both the lender and the borrower within three days of consummation, both the lender and the borrower must sign the Note and Mortgage or Deed of Trust. 25. Defendant failed to provide a separate sheet for each of the charges summarized on the Good Faith Estimate. 26 .Defendant failed to provide to the Plaintiffs a settlement statement disclosing interest rate. Violation: Pursuant Title 12 Code of Federal Regulation, Section 226.180). 27. Defendant failed to provide the Plaintiffs with a notice of right cancel or rescind in their mortgage documents and it must be two copies for each borrower. Violation: Regulation Z §§265.5 (a) (1) and 226.1 7(a)(1). 15 USC 226.15 (b) and 226. 23 (b). 28. Defendant failed to provide to the Plaintiffs a right to cancel signed by both parties. Violation: Pursuant 12 Code of Federal Regulations, §226.18 et seq. 29. Mortgage lenders who failed to provide disclosures prior or at time of signing contrary to TILA is a UDAP violation. Hill v. AI/right Mortgage Co., 213 B.R. 934. 30. The mortgage lender failed to provide that certain disclosures were clear and conspicuous. Various documents among the loan papers were confusing. Violation Equal Credit Opportunity Act Codified to 12 C.F.R. §202.1 6 The Court reserves the right to condition rescission If there are two or more homeowners who are borrowers, each one must receive two copies ofthis notice. If the lender does not provide two copies of the Notice of Right to Cancel at the time the loan is signed each homeowner borrowing against his or her home, each homeowner has the right cancel the loan for three years after he or she has signed the papers. Violation: Regulation Z §§ 226.5 (a)(l). 15USC 226. 15(b) and 226. 23(b) 31. Defendant violated 12 USC §2604 et seq. A.15 U.S.C. §§ 1604(b), 1638(b)(l); RegulationZ,12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18 et seq. B. 15 USC Section 1638(a)(2)(B), (a)(9), (a)(II) and (a)(12) and Regulation Z, Part 226.17 et seq. C. 12 U.S.C. 2601-17, RESPA Section 8, (24 CFR 3500.21) a) The Defendant gave a kickback to the broker violating RESPA and Unfair Deceptive Trade Practices. b) The Defendant paid the Yield Spread Premium to the Broker in exchange for the Broker selling an increased interest rate to the borrower (the broker was paid 1,686.00). c) The Defendant should require invoices for all appraisals And processing fees due to be paid out to third parties. There is no invoice for the 790.00 processing fee paid to the broker on the HlJD..l. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES UNDER TlLA AND RESPA The Defendant willingly and knowingly failed to comply with the requirements of the TILA and should be fined not more than 5,000.00 per violation or imprisoned not more than one year,or both. TlLA section 112. The Defendant should also be held liable to the Plaintiff for actual damages and court cost and for other damages arising out of individual or class action if certain requirements of the TILA were violated. TILA section 130 and 131. A Creditor may be held liable to a consumer for Failure to comply with RESPA Section 8 Prohibitions, Regulation X, 24 CFR 3500 re kickbacks and unearned fees: (I) a fine of not more than $10,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both; (2) civil liability equal to three times the amount of any charge paid for such settlement service; and (3) court cost and attorney fees. Under Title 15 USC § 1601(a) any consumer harmed by a violation of TILA may bring a suit against the lender. Generally TILA provides for the following remedies; (1) actual damages (2) damages Twice the amount of any finance charge in connection with the transaction (3) damages Not less than $200 or greater than $2000 for each violation (4) attorney's fees. Jury Demand Plaintiff request a trial by jury guaranteed by both state and federal constitutions. Bill of Rights Amendments VIL Prayer for Relief Wherefore, the plaintiff demand judgment: A. Awarding plaintiff one million dollars (1,000,000.00). B. Awarding plaintiff the reasonable costs, including interests, court costs, and ---~------------------------ - -----------------~---- legal fees for this action. C. And awarding plaintiffs punitive damages in the amount of One Million Dollars (1,000,000.00) D. Granting Plaintiff such other and further relief as may be just Respectfully submitted. -~~ ~ by...Lc"=-,""'-="'-"l;o""-"-"'""':::'" Tanya Jone Donna Jones 12109 Crestwood Tum Bnlnd~e,~.20613 AppMlrAi)( (] cOPY SILVER SURETY BOND # TLJ10693 County of Prince George's State of Maryland I, Tanya Lorraine Jones, do hereby enter myself security for the costs in the cause, and acknowledge myself bound to pay cause to be paid (effect payment) all costs which may accrue in such actions upon proof of claim and proof of loss to any party injured by any UNBONDED claim presented against (TANYA LORRAINE JONES ). And, I (Tanya Lorraine Jones) underwrite with my private exemption(Tanya Lorraine Jones) (261597522), all such costs that may be proven. Dated this 15th day of October, 2006 action ~ dMur non damnitlc8to JUSTIFICATION OF SURETY SUBROGATION County of Prince George's ) )as State of Maryland ) IAN'if\~ Personally appeared this day before meL~~"'lI'f5 JONt:...5 of the County and State aforesaid, surety on the bond of Tanya Lorraine Jones, being duly swom, deposes and says that he is seized of his right mind, and that over and above all of her just debts and liabilities, in property not exempt by law from levy and sale under execution, of a clear unencumbered estate of the value in the excess of (unlimited), within the jurisdiction of this State and/or the District of Columbia. . ~E [m ~~~."..j Subscribed and sworn to before me Nl\cl in Prince George's, Maryland State. On the Notary Public Seal I ,a Notary Public residing day of October, 2006 8 ro COpy 12109 Crestwood Tum Brandywine, Maryland 20613 (Tanya Lonaine: Secured Party) (County of Prince Georges) Asseveration (state of Maryland) (United States of America) (.-Tanya Lorraine Jones) Only in capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction NOTICE OF SURETY ACT Al '4D BOND Re: UCC Contract Trust Account number 261-59-7522 KNOW ALL MEN, BY TIlESE PRESENTS; I, (:Tanya Lonaine Jones), Principal,Titled Sovereign, neutral, surety, guarantor, a free man upon the free soil of (Maryland), state that I am not a corporation, am a living being, of legal age, competent to testi &, have personal first-hand knowledge of the truths and facts stated herein as being true, correct, complete, certain, and not misleading. I, (:Tanya Lonaine Jones), of my own free will and accord, in the presence of Almighty God, in capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, in good conscience, do willingly undertake to act as surety, to pledge and provide private bond, in the amount oftwenty-one Dollars coinage, minted by the American Treasury (at the legal and lawful 24 to 1 ratio prescribed by law) united States ofAmerica, Lawful coin dollars of the united States of America, personally held in my ownership and possession. This undertaking is in accordance with Article VII in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the United States. This bond is to the credit of the private part listed hereon, (:Tanya Lorraine Jones) capacity as beneficiary to the Original Jurisdiction, by his appellation, as full faith and credit guarantee to any Lawful Bill in redemption, duly presented under Seal in Lawful specie money of the account of the untied States of America, Original Jurisdiction, to wit, pursuant and in parity to the cost-expense ration of senate bill 760 on fill with this State. The Bill of Redemption is a tender as set off for any alleged contract, agreement, consent, assent purportedly held, as an obligation of duty against (:Tanya Lorraine Jones) so as to cause an imputed disability, or presumption against the capacity, Rights and powers of (:Tanya Lonaine Jones). The specific intent of the bond, under seal, is to establish, by My witness, the good credit and Lawful money specie of (:Tanya Lonaine Jones). I, (:Tanya Lorraine Jones), do make this surety, pledge, bond, under My seal, as full faith and credit guarantee, to any Lawful Bill, duly presented, to Me under Seal, under penalties ofperjury, in Lawful money of account of the united States of America, PUBLIC NOTICE AND SURETY BOND cc: Director afthe Mint in the matter of correct public judicial/corporate actions in the forum of Original Rules. Original Jurisdiction, for the benefit and credit of the peculiar private party listed above and their hein and assigos. The intent of the bond, under Seal, is to establish, by My witness, the good credit, in the sum certain amount of at least twenty-one dollan in silver coinage, which carries no debt obligation worldwide, minted by the American Treasury, united States of America, Lawfullpecie doUan of the united Statts of America, available to the bond the actions of the private party listed above, and further, in reservation of Rights UDder common law and customs of the united Statts of America, Original Jurisdiction, Original Rules, has, before this assembly of Men, a bond in tender of twenty-one DoDan Silver, Coinage Act of A.D. 1792, Bond of Identity and Character OAS proof positive, competent evidence, (:Tanya Lorraine Jones,)cannot be bankrupt, the causa debendi, not cessio bonorum. or ajorma pauperis, dolus trust (f ANYA WRRAINE JONESlOTM ). The life of this bond coven elVe (5) yean from the date entered below unless the claimant enten a true bill of particulan and aD related causes of action and advice of counsel (who claimant works for?) and information with testamentary documentation UDder the penalties of perjury per Title 26 USC 606S into evidence in the case of the peculiar private party listed above, in which case the life of the bond will be eItended for a period of two (2) yean after such documentation is presented under the penalties of perjury per Title 26 USC 606S in the case of the peculiar party listed above, whereby, by the signature Jurat and Seal of (:Tanya Lorraine Jones,), in capacity as beneficiary of the Original Jurisdiction, surety, guarantor herein confirms, attests, and affirms this bond. AD assumptions and presumptions have to be proven in writing, signed and sealed before three witnesses as a valid response, if any. Upon failure of response required UDder the three (3) day grace period under Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, to respond and rebut, point for point, this Notice of Surety Act and Bond, from receipt, UCC Section 1-204, unless a request for an extension of time is presented in writing, claimant is hereby coDateral1y estopped from any further advenarial actions against the peculiar private party listed above, and for good cause not limited to the laws of coDateral estoppel, coercion, fraud and want of subject matter jurisdiction, the peculiar private party listed above demands that the caule(S) be vacated, dismissed and the accounts be immediately discharged with prejudice. A lack of response or rebuttal under the penalties of perjury means claimant assents to this Notice of Surety Ad and Bond and that a fault eDsts, UCC Section 1-201 (16), creating fraud through material misrepresentation that vitiates all forms, contracts, testimony, agreements, etc. express or implied, from the beginning, UCC Section 1-103, of which claimant may rely on, and there is no longer permission by consent or assent for any demand of payment being ordered or levied against the peculiar private party listed above; and the peculiar private party listed above further demands that the record be eIpunged and the records and facts PUBLIC NOTICE AND SURETY BOND cc: Director of the Mint 2 oftbe above attacbed captioned federal agency for tbeir investigation of violations of federal law and any interlocking agencies, et al. Failure to comply punuant to tbe Trutb in Lending Act will negate all remedies for claimant. Any Third Party compelled to serve will make claimant liable for civil and criminal prosecution in accordance witb tbe Erie aod Clearfield Doctrines. NOTICE TO THE PRINCIPALS IS NOTICE TO THE AGENTS NOTICE TOT HE AGENTS IS NOTICE TO TIlE PRINCIPALS Teste Meipso Done this the 17th day of the October month, anno Domino, in the year of our Lord, two thousand, and six ...:::...~~~q~~~~-4ll!"""""""-~:::""'-_- Secured Party acity as beneficiary ofthe Original Jurisdiction All RIGHTS RESERVED WITHOUT PREJUDICE, UCC 1-308 County of Prince Georges) ) (State of Maryland) ) ss: (:Tanya Lorraine Jones known by Me or made known for Me by proper identification and duly sworn, Certified, Verified, and Exemplified, pursuant to applicable state status this 17th day ofthe October month, in the year of our Lord, two \ t:ousand and SiX:. , )!!!fi:!-'''­ My Commission Expires: ;)-1- dtJl1) PUBLIC NOTICE AND SURETY BOND cc: Director oftbe Mint 3 -20- P,PfWloA ~ C INTERNATIONAL BILL 0 No.1 :,);;'" XCHANGE (liNCITRAL Convention) I PURSUANT TO AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH FINAL ARTICLES OF THE UNCITRAL CONVENTION IN EFFECT ON THE DATE HEREOF. REF: Ratified Convention Artides 1-7, 1112, 13,46-3, 47-4(c), 51 For International/Interstate and Cross-Border Transactions. Registered Mail # RB 503 231 537 US PUBLIC POLICY DOCUMENTARY DRAFT ISSUED BY A PRIVATE UNINCORPORATED NATIONAL BANKING ASSOCIA'nON .;ui1.~·arte~('1 i.~q;.~l 'eqris:" !.·lbl;~:F)ti~I:.: . . ~t th~:~ :~ . ')I"pCJr;jtt- ,JNITED STt,TES legal Tender for An Debts, PUbic Charges, Ta,es and Dues payable without Deductions 101 and Free of any Levy, Duties. or Impost of any nalure in UNITED STATES DOLlARS (USD). PRESENT DIRECTLY TO THE COLLECTING PARTY WITH DOCUMENTS. ACCEPTANCE FOR HONOR TO CREDIT ON SIGHT. RECORDED / REGISTERED / CERTIFIED FUNDS No. (UCC3 No. O'JO(!C'(!(; Ii<1 ;'[i4nl) DOCUMENT No, 106913 PER GUARANTEE OF U,C,C. CONTRACT UNITED STATES TREASURY PRIORITY PREPAID EXEMPT ACCOUNT J BOND No. E95523290 CREDIT UPON SIGHTTO PAYEE: JOHN VELLA EMC MORTGAGE COMPANY ACCOUNT #0014109946 2780 Lake Vista Drive Lewisville, TX. 75067 DRAWEE: SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES OR OTHER AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES JONES.TANYALOR8!~NE.2615I!i~ ;~].!·~_Jx~y Stm~J..J:t!;~ THRU ENS LEGIS U.S. CITIZEN,TRUST \"{~!~I]'JJi.!~)i!~.~~;~~0_Q.L~ [j COpy BILL OF EXCHANGE (an obligation ofthe United States) Presented For Acceptance On Demand REMIT AT PAR VIA FEDWIRE CREDIT UNCONDITIONALLY EMC MORTGAGE COMPANY TO THE ORDER OF US $ 227,273.78 USD IN THE SUM CERTAIN AMOUNT OF: Two Hundred Twenty Seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Three 781100T!..<a"'-n~ya':!-L="o"'rr"'ai="rte'":_'.: J.ynes, ,!,!DlJra!.!!w"'e!.':r:_:-- private banker Receiving post at: do General Delivery Brandywine. Maryland by rule of lex domicilii united States of America 1776 ~ I"",malional (II ~ " Signature By DOLLARS. /1JI £­ d p .... , "As good as aval", Authorized Representative. agent, U,C.C. 3·402(b)(1) ~"'~;rL"\'i~ !.l. f .::~ Date As Holder·ln·Du.Course of the Account. ' ......j On this 15" day of November, A.D.. Two Thousand Six. before me. a Notary Public of the slale ot Maryland, came a man who proved 10 me on the basis 01 salislaetory evidence 10 be the man Whose~' SUbsaibed'Vb:hef. The said man soIermly swore under oath thai he has filSl hand kn n re is e of !he co' . th are \rue, COfT8Ct . compleleand ,11 ,{ , / , VAaUAWLLIAMI Signature By if/~ /t~ . Notary Public NoIaIy I'ubIc '/ Special Instructions (Treasury Control System (offset payments») MuI~ CounIf' 1. Noncash Item-Prepaid Electronic FlIlds Transler Only. ..... 20lIl 2. This Sighl Draft of Bankable Paper GuallV1leed as a Direct Obligation 01 the United Stales is con~dered . pUblic conlraclual daim I ofter to InckJde those flat are verbal. Th.. valuable document written in Good Faith under the llodtine Necessity and ender8d 101 Transfer by Assignment of ACCOUnl to the Drawee 10 Render SeI1lemenIIn Fun Salis/adion and Closure of Claim I Accounl No. (none) by !he lransler 01 aedk for credk on account 3. See endosed Leiter of Instruction DocumenI.l06913A, and MelOO/llndum 01 iJlw and Points and Authorities. 4. Aa:epled for VakJe Invoice I demand insbUmenl and FORM UCC3 musl remain attached to this insbUmenl ACCOUNT DOMAIN: PAYOR: Bank DOCUMENT No. CI06913C SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY OF THE UNITED STATES / U.S. SECRETARY OF TRANPORTATION UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY - Treasury Control System (offset payments) TOGS, P.O. BOX 1686 BIRMINGHAM AL 35201-1686 ABA ROUTING No. ACCOUNT No. A062736011A 95523290C LEITER OF JN~. ,<UCTION REGARDING INTERNATIONAL BILL OF REGISTERED MAIL No. US Creditor Secured Party Notary Acceptor L ;HANGE No Document No us Registered Mail No. LElTER OF INSTRUCTION Your charges are Accepted for Value and for Consideration in Return for full settlement/discharge and . Tanya-LolTlline: Jones, closure of your demand presentment letter concerning account # Creditor Secured Party does not accept your contract or the conditions of your contract, however accepts your invoice for value and honon it with this Discharge instrument as the remedy provided by law. The attached International Bill of Exchange Document No for full settlement and closure of your account # by a Notary Public OD demand for acceptance or dishonor. is tendered in the amount of . These Instruments are presented $ I) Process the International Bill of Exchange through the collection department of your bank. 2) Your bank is required by law to treat the Instrument as an obligation of the United States to the ban 11.. 3) Once the Internmional Bill of Exchange is used as an asset such as in a borrower in custody (BIC) arrangement, you are required by law to adjust the account, provide to me a copy of the executed/franked document and evidence ofthe discharge accounting within 30 days of receipt of these documents. (See attached Memorandum of Law and Points and Authorities document) 4) Should you fail to adjust the ac<:ount and/or respond within 30 days, the Notary Public willoote your non resJlOIUe. 5) Sbould you fail to respond and act accordingly, your non actioD will be evidence of conversion (theft) of fUDds. Return to: , Points and Authorities, (Accepted for Value The enclosed International Bill of Exchange No. presentment), and this letter of Instruction are presented by: . ( ~.- . -);1 '.- /IU"~ :iii· 11;//,_ . ,vvvt/u.-H I ~1U-1/ , Notary Public, agent, uee 3-402(b)(l) Dated: II -! ~1- .;J WICVUA WUINoII NtlIIIIy NIIID ........ MulltIGI Iff e-tIr ... CGNIIllIIIan. . . . JllII .. _ . AITACHMENT TO INTERNATIONAL BILL OF EXCHANGE No. rage I of I 0