Scapa Dryer Fabrics v. Saville

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Scapa Dryer Fabric s, Inc. v. Carl L. Saville, No. 39, September Term 2010, Opinion by Green e, J. CIVIL PROCEDURE MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT An appellate court will not weigh the evidence presented by a party whose burden is to prove substantial factor causation in a negligence claim for injury sustained by exposure to asbestos-containing products, but an appellate court will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party upon a motion for judgment or judgment notwithstan ding the ve rdict. CIVIL PROCEDUR E PARTY ADM ISSIONS Party admissions are conclusive of their substan ce, but d o not es tablish lia bility as a m atter of la w. TORTS REDUC TION OF JU DGME NT Settleme nt ag reem ents ente red into b y a plaintiff and a trust created pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) of the Bankrup tcy Code are relevant and discoverable by defendants for the purposes of assessing any off-sets to a jury verdict to account for settlement payments made to plaintiff in the nature of a joint tort-feasor release . In the Circu it Court for B altimore C ity No. 24x02001421 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 39 September Term, 2010 SCAPA DRYER FABRICS, INC. v. CARL L. SAVILLE Bell, C.J. Harrell Battaglia Greene Murphy Adkins Barbera, JJ. Opinion by Greene, J. Filed: March 23, 2011 Petitioner, Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. ( Scapa ), appeals the Court of Special Appeals s decision in Scapa v. Saville, 190 Md. A pp. 331, 988 A .2d 1059 (2010 ) ( Saville II ) affirming the judgment of the C ircuit Court for Baltimore City, which awarded damages to Responden t, Mr. Carl L. Saville ( M r. Saville ).1 Petitioner asks us to review alleged procedural errors by the trial judge, review the sufficiency of the evidence presented on the issue of causation regarding Respondent s negligence claim, and to reduce the amount of compensatory damages in light of settlement payments received by Respondent from special trusts created under federal bankruptcy law. We shall affirm the judgment in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings. Facts and Procedural History On June 14, 2002, Carl and Sharon Saville filed suit against approximately 30 companies2 claiming negligence, strict liability, loss of consortium, conspiracy and fraud 1 Respondent moved to strike a report, which Petitioner appended to its Reply Brief submitted to this Court. The report is outside the scope of the record because it was not included in the original papers filed in the action in the lower court ¦. Md. Rule 8-413. As such, it should not have been included in Petitioner s Reply Brief. Md. Rule 8-501(f) ( The appellan t may inclu de as an ap pendix to a re ply brief a ny additional part of the record ) (emphasis added). Thus, the report was not considered. Nor did we consider materials appended to Mr. Saville s Motion to Strike as they similarly were not part of the record below . Mr. Sa ville s M otion to Strike is hereb y granted . 2 The defendants included: ACandS, Inc., Hopeman Brothers, Inc., Uniroyal, Inc., Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc., Rapid American Corp., Westinghouse Electric Corp., General Refractories, Co., Th e Flintk ote, Co ., Durab la Mf g., Co., E. L. Stebbings & Co., Hampsh ire Industries, Inc., Quigley Company, Inc., Georgia Pacific Corp., Metropolitan Life Insurance, Co., Selby, Battersby & Co., Foseco, Inc., Union Carbide Corp., Amchem Products, Inc., Pfizer, Inc., Da na Co rp., Cert ainteed Corp., Com bustion Engin eering, I nc., Anchor Packing, Co., Garloc k, Inc., Interna tional P aper C o., Foste r Whe eler Co rp., Bertram C. Hopeman, J.E. (contin ued...) relating to Mr. Saville s asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma. A judgment against Scapa was entered on October 15, 2003 in the am ount of $3,000,00 0.00. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals vacated that judgmen t, Scapa v. Saville, No. 2172, Sept. Term, 2004 (Nov. 17, 2005) ( Saville I ) and remande d the case for a new trial. Prior to commencement of the new trial, Mr. Saville settled with three defendants, against whom Scapa unsuccessfully asserted cross-claims for joint tort-feasor liability and contribution, namely Viacom, Inc. f/k/a Westinghouse Electric Corp. ( Westinghouse ), AstenJohnson, Inc. ( Asten ), and Albany International Corp. ( Albany ). The new trial began on January 8, 2008 and con cluded on Janua ry 25, 2008. The jury found Scapa and co-defendant Wallace and Gale Asbestos Settlement Trust ( W & G ) to be jointly and severally liable and returned a verdict in the amount of $1,718,000.00. The trial judge subsequently reduced the verdict to account for settlement payments that Mr. Saville had received from certain bankrupt asbestos-containing product m anufactu rers, namely C elotex Tru st, the Johns M anville Personal Injury Settlement Trust, and the H.K. Po rter, Inc. Asb estos Trust, resulting in a final verdict of $1,684,415.00. Scapa moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ( JNOV ) 2 (...continued) Stegierw ald Co., Inc ., 3M C o., Cutler-Hammer Inc., The Eaton Corp., McCormick Asbestos Co. On January 30, 2003, Mr. Saville added Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. ( Scapa ) as a defendant. Wallace and Gale Asbestos S ettlement Trust ( W & G ), a defend ant at trial in Baltimore City and Co-Petitioner on appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, was added by Scapa s third-party com plaint and th en as a def endant by interlineation on November 10, 2006 in Mr. Saville s case. Prior to t rial, Aca ndS, In c., Combustion Engineering, Inc., Dana Corp., and Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. filed petitions in bank ruptcy and M r. Saville ultima tely dismissed all claims against them. -2- as to Mr. Saville s claims and as to its cross-claims. Both motions were denied, as was Scapa s request, in the alternativ e, for a new trial, and for a re duction in th e verdict to account for any and all bankruptcy trust payments received by Mr. Saville. Final judgment was en tered on April 3 0, 2008 and ap peals w ere time ly noted. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court s judgment in Saville II, holding, relevant to the instant case: that there was sufficient evidence that Scapa s product was the proximate cause of Mr. Saville s injuries to support the trial court s denial of Sc apa s motions for judgm ent and fo r JNOV ; that Mr. Sa ville s admis sions did n ot conclusiv ely establish liability against the settling cross-defendants; that the trial judge s denial of Scapa s JNOV motion on its cross-claims would not be disturbed on the basis of procedural defects; and that the trial court had no evidence upon which to base fur ther reductio n of the ve rdict. Saville II, 190 M d. App . at 348, 3 51, 353 , 988 A .2d at 10 68, 107 0-71. Scapa presents the following questions to this Court, which we slightly reworded and reordered for clarity: 1. Did Mr. Saville present sufficient evidence to satisfy the fre quency, regularity, proximity test for substantial factor causation of Scapa s products for his injuries? 2. Did Scapa preserve its right to m ove for JNOV on its cross-claims? 3. Did Mr. Saville s admissions under Md. Rule 2-424(d) conclusiv ely establish liab ility against the settling cross-defendants? 4. Should the judgment against Scapa be reduced under the -3- Maryland Uniform Contribu tion Am ong Join t Tortfeasors Act to acc ount for p ayments that M r. Saville received from trusts establish ed purs uant to 1 1 U.S.C . § 524 of the Bankruptcy Code ( § 524(g) Trusts )? I. Scapa s Balbos claim Scapa challenges the Court of Special Appeals s application of the frequency, regu larity, prox imity test, enunciate d in Eagle-Picher v. Balbos, which is the common law evidentiary standard u sed for esta blishing sub stantial-factor c ausation in negligence cases alleging asbesto s expo sure. Balbos, 326 Md. 179, 213, 604 A.2d 445, 461 (1992) (holding that [t]he jury ¦ could find that the decedent was frequently exposed to fibers from the Eagle 66 asbestos cement in the proximity of the engine room of ships where that product was regularly used. ). Our task u pon Scapa s ch allenge to the sufficiency of M r. Saville s evidence, is to determin e whethe r the interme diate appellate court s judgment upholding the trial court s dismissal of Scapa s motions for judgment and for JNOV on Mr. Saville s claims was in error. An appellate court reviews the trial court s decision to allow or deny judgment or JNOV to determine whether it was legally correct[,] Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 343, 988 A.2d 1065 (citing Houghton v. Forrest, 183 Md. A pp. 15, 26, 959 A .2d 816, 823-34 (2 008)), while viewing the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and determining whether the facts and circumstan ces only perm it one inf erence with re gard to the issue presen ted. See Md. R ule 2-519 (2010) ( Motion for Judgment ). We will find error in a denial of a motion for -4- judgment or JNOV if the evidence does not rise above speculation, hypothesis, and conjecture, and does not lead to the jury s conclusion with reasonable certainty. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 343, 988 A.2d at 1066 (quoting Bartholomee v. Casey, 103 Md. App. 34, 51, 651, A.2d 908 (1994)). Our resolution of this question in Scapa s favor would render the remain ing que stions m oot, ther efore, w e addre ss it first. In Balbos, we described how a court would assess whether the exposure of any given bystander to any particular supplier s product [w ould] be legally sufficient to permit a finding of substan tial-factor cau sation, notin g that: The finding involves the interrelationship between the use of a defendant s product at the workplace and the activities of the plain tiff at the work place. This requires an understanding of the physical characteristics of the workplace and of the relationship between the activities of the direct users of the product and the bystander plaintiff. Within that context, the factors to be evaluated include the nature of the product, the frequency of its use, the proximity in distance and in time, of a plaintiff to the use of a product, and the regularity of the exposure of that plaintiff to the use of that product. Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460 (emphasis added and citations omitted). Relying on the Balbos frequency, regularity, proximity test, the Court of Special Appeals held that there was more than enough circumstantial evidence to conclude that [Mr. Saville] performed a significan t amount o f work on Scapa s product ¦ [that Mr. Saville] was significantly exposed to Scapa s product ¦ and that [the jury] did not contradict itself when it found [Scapa] liable and the [c]r oss-[d ]efend ants no t liable. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 345-48, 988 A .2d at 1067-68. Therefore, it upheld the trial court s denial of the motions, -5- finding sufficient proffered evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to Mr. Saville, to generate a jury question on causatio n. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 345-48, 988 A.2d at 1067-68. Scapa asserts that [t]he Court of Special Appeals s published opinion in Saville II stands for the proposition that a plaintiff in an asbestos product-liability case may reach the jury if he establishes the mere possibility of an undefined, unquan tifiable expo sure to asbestos[,] and that the intermediate appellate court s holding waters down the Balbos test. We disagre e. Scapa raises five evidentiary gaps, which it asserts were fatal to Mr. Saville s negligence claim and made it impossible that a jury could have determined that the alleged injuries were caused b y Scapa s dryer felts without resorting to an untenable chain of speculative inference s, namely: (1) n o evidenc e on the am ount of tim e Mr. Sa ville spent on the machine where Scapa s dryer felts were installed; (2) no eviden ce on his p roximity to the second position of machine numb er 9 ( N o. 9 Machine ) where Scapa s asbestos-containing felt indisputably ran; (3) no evidence on proximity of different machine positions to each other; (4) medical expert opinion testimony on the causation of M r. Saville s mesothelioma based on assumed facts that were never proven at trial; and (5) no discernable evidence of the le vel of e xposu re to resp irable as bestos f ibers sp ecifica lly caused by Scap a s felts. A. Evidence of exposure When v iewed in th e light most f avorable to Mr. Saville, however, the evidence that Mr. Saville regularly handled and/or worked in arm s length to Scapa s asbestos-containing -6- felts on a daily basis for at least one year w as legally sufficie nt to permit a jury question on proximate cause, and, therefore, the denials of Scapa s m otions for judgmen t and JNOV were not in er ror. The frequency prong of the Balbos test addresses the frequency of use [of the product] in the pla intiff s w orkpla ce. Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460 (stating the factors to be evaluated include th e nature of the p roduct , the freq uency of its use ) . Scapa s witness, Ivan Fearnhead, testified that Scapa provided 75 felts to the Westvaco Mill between 1964 and 1978, which ran on the No. 8 and No. 9 paper machines and that two of those fe lts contained asbestos. M r. Saville testified that he was employed in the Eight and Nine Machine Room Building o f the We stvaco M ill from 1968 until 1978, with a brief hiatus for educational leave from 1974 un til 1976. Ad ditionally, according to master cards3 kept by Scapa, and submitted to the jury as Plaintiff s exhibits, Scapa provided two asbestoscontaining dryer felts which ran on the second position of the No. 9 Machine from October 1969 until November 1970. Scapa contends that Mr. Saville presented no evidence on the time that he spent between machines No. 8 and No. 9, and that because Scapa s asbestoscontaining felts were only on No. 9, the jury could o nly speculate ab out the freq uency of his 3 Master cards were described in the testimony of former Scapa employee, Ivan Fearnhead. A master card is a card that is kept at the manufacturing f acility. And it s sort of like a recipe card. What it does is give th e basic info rmation fo r producin g a type of fe lt for a particular mill paper machine and position on that paper machine . ¦ So that when you come to make that felt again, you can make it the same way so that we get continuity of length. -7- exposure to those felts. There was circumstantial evidence, h oweve r, that Mr. Sa ville did work on machine No. 9 by way of Mr. Shoemaker s video testimo ny that as Mr. Saville s cohort he worked o n machine N o. 8 during the same sh ift as Mr. Saville, both of them being headquartered in the dryer sectio ns of their resp ectiv e ma chin es. F requ ency, therefore, was addressed directly by the testimony of Ivan Fearnhead, which linked Scapa to asbestoscontaining felts at Westvaco; by the master cards that established, with particularity, where those felts ran; as well as a co-worker s testimony on the logistics of the maintenance work. While not explicitly defined in Balbos or subseq uent cases, re gularity in the context of asbestos exposure indicates periodic exposure, i.e., something that happens at regular interval s. Balbos, 326 Md. at 213, 604 A.2d at 461 (involving a work-site where decedent was covered regularly with asbestos dust ). Mr. Saville and co-w orker, Mr. Shoem aker, testified that their duty as broke-hustlers 4 was to ke ep the six fe lts that ran on each of the No. 8 and No. 9 machines clean and runn ing. Mr. S hoemak er testified that h e scraped o nly on mach ine No . 8, leaving by reaso nable in ferenc e, Mr. S aville sc raped o n mac hine N o. 9 when the two w ere work ing on the s ame shift. M r. Saville testified that at least once, and sometimes twice a day for about 10-20 minute s, the broke hustlers would scrape the dryer felts clean with a big b lade while standing ab out an arm s length aw ay from the m oving felt. 5 4 The Fifth Circuit has stated that a broke hustler s job was to gather nonsa leable trash paper from the machine and take it away for recycling. Manville Forest Prod. v. United Paperworkers Intern., 831 F .2d 72, 7 3 (5th C ir. 1987 ). 5 Mr. Shoemaker testified that five employees would collectively operate the blade (continued...) -8- Mr. Saville s testimony about the scraping process being hot and dusty was corroborated by Mr. Shoemaker s testimony that the scraped residue would fly in the area as opposed to building up on the surf ace of the s craping too l.6 Mr. Saville and Mr. Sho emaker b oth testified that their work-sites were dusty from both the scraping and the blowing7 of the felts. Testimony from Mr. Dennis Davidson, a former W & G employee, indicated that dust created from work on the asbestos-insulated pipes throughout the Eight and Nine Paper Machine Building would not be sucked through the ventilation system and would remain in the building, thus provid ing more c ircumstantia l evidence that any dust containing asbestos fibers would remain in Mr. Saville s work-site. In addition, Mr. Saville testified that most of the scraping was done at the first section of the machine because that is where the sheet was the wettest and the scale or residue could be more easily scraped from the felt. Conflicting testimony was heard by the jury suggesting that the dryer felts w ould have to be changed, and theref ore hand led directly, every six months, but no less than every few years. (...continued) used to scrape the felts. Mr. Shoemaker also testified that he did not scrape every shift, but only when th e forema n said it was necessary to rea ct to defects in the paper. Therefore, the eviden ce wa s not dire ct, but cir cumsta ntial, as to the regu larity of ex posure . 6 This tes timony w as cont radicted by Scott G raham , a former employee at Westvaco, who testified that Mr. Saville s categorization of the dryer section as being bone dry was incorre ct and th at it was actually a v ery hum id atmo sphere . 7 Occ asionally, the employees would use air hoses to more thoroughly clean the felts, which release d particu late ma tter from the felts into the a ir. -9- While our review of the record uncovered contradictory accounts of the dustiness of the atmosphere, bearing on the likelihood of the existence of respirable asbestos fibers, it is not the province of an appellate court to weigh the evidence because the trier of fact, i.e., the jury and the jury only has the power to assess the weight of the evidence, a power which passes to the trial judge's discretion upon motion for a new trial. Owen s-Cornin g v. Garre tt, 343 Md. 500, 522, 682 A.2d 1143, 1153 (1996) (citing Weissman v. Hokamp, 171 Md. 197, 201, 188 A.2d 923, 925 (1937). Collectively, the evidence presented s upports Mr. Sav ille s periodic, i.e., regular, expo sure to Sca pa s asbesto s-containing dryer felts and re spirable asbestos fibers emanating from their upkeep, thus it was sufficient to w arrant jury consid eration. The last prong of the Balbos test requires evidence of the proximity of the plaintiff, in distance an d in time, to the use of the p roduct . Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460. Scapa contends that Mr. Saville presented no evid ence that he was in the proximity of position two on the No. 9 machine, which is where the asbestos-containing dryer felts ran. Moreover, according to Scap a, Mr. Saville did not present evidence that positions one and two were in proximity to each other so that even if he was located in position one he w ould still be exposed to asbestos. The jury heard accounts of the size of the Eight and Nine Paper Machine Buildin g from variou s witne sses, e.g ., that is was the size of a city block, or a football field, or 150 yards, somewhere between three and five stories high, and 80 feet wide, while also hearing from Mr. Shoemaker that the broke hustlers worked in very close -10- prox imity, 10 to 30 feet away from one another. Therefore, while the (machine ) building is very large, the work-site for each machine s broke hustler, i.e., the dryer sections of the No. 8 and No . 9 machin es, were in re lative proxim ity. Consequ ently, even if the evidence did show, through th e master ca rds, that Scap a s asbestos -containing felts were only on the second section of the No. 9 machine, testimony from Scott Grah am, in particular, indicated that the dryer cans upon which the felts ran were only a foot or a foo t and a h alf apa rt. There is no direct evidence in the reco rd of the precise distance between sections one and two of Machine No. 9. There is direct evidence, ho wever, that Scapa s asbestos-containing dryer felts ran on section two of Machine No. 9 and circumstantial evidence that Mr. Saville worked on Ma chine No . 9 primarily at section one. An inference may be reasonably drawn, therefore, about the proxim ity of Mr. Sav ille to the asbestos-containing dryer felt, which was on his machine, but in a different section. Scapa contends that this collective evidence on frequ ency, regularity, and proximity was legally insufficient to require submission of the negligence case to the ju ry. Sp ecif ically, Scapa dis agrees w ith the intermed iate appellate court s a pplicatio n of its p rior case , Reiter v. AcandS, 179 Md. App. 645, 947 A.2d 570 (2 008), aff d sub nom, Reiter v Pneumo Abex, 417 Md. 57, 8 A.3d 725 (2010) to the instant case implying that if we affirm we will be endorsing the previou sly disavowed theories of market-share or fiber drift liability. We disagre e. In Reiter, the widows of three deceased former employees of Bethlehem Steel -11- Corporation s Sparrows Point facility appealed the decision of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City granting summary judgment in favor of Eato n Corpo ration, succe ssor in interest to Cutler-Hammer, Inc, Pneumo Abex LLC, and Square D Company. The Court of Special Appeals and this Court affirmed that decision. The Court of Special Appea ls held that the evidence and inferences, in a favorable light to the wid ows, wo uld not perm it a reasonab le jury to conclude that the decedents expo sures to the compan ies products were a substantial contributing cause of decedents lung c ancer. Reiter, 179 Md. App. at 662, 947 A.2d at 580. Specifically, relying on the requirements of the frequency, regularity and prox imity test of Balbos, there was no evidence identify[ing] the dust as having come from the wear o f the cra ne brak e linings , and the main witness could not identify the suppliers of any brake linin gs used in the slab yard. Reiter, 179 Md. App. at 662-63, 947 A.2d at 580. As to one of th e appellants , the intermed iate appellate c ourt noted th at an inference on exposure would be speculation at best ¦ without evidence linking his exposure to dust generated by the wear of Square D brake linings. Reiter, 179 Md. App. at 665, 947 A.2d at 582. The appellant s problem in Reiter of linking a particular company s asbestoscontaining products to the work -site of a claima nt persisted o n appeal to this Court, where we affirm ed summ ary judgmen t holding tha t: Petitioners evidence was sufficient to generate a jury issue on the question of whether (1) each decedent was exposed to asbestos dust at h is work place, a nd (2) Resp ondents manufactured some of the crane brake products used at the faci lity. We also conclude, however, that Petitioners evidence was insufficient to establish that any of the Respondents -12- products were used at the specific site(s) where the Petitioners actually worked. Reiter v. Pneumo Abex, 417 Md. at 61, 8 A.3d at 727-28 (concluding, for example , that [e]vidence that some Square D products were used somewhere in the 480 acre tin mill does not establish that a Square-D product was on the crane that was in the 5 0 square feet wh ere Mr. Reiter actually worked. ). In addition to satisfying Balbos, a plaintiff must link the defendant to the pr oduct. See Reiter v. ACandS, 179 Md. App. at 665, 947 A.2d at 582 (citing Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F.Supp. 89, 93 (1989 ) ( Maryland courts app ly traditional products liability law which requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant manufactured the product which allegedly caused the injury. ) We affirm the intermediate appellate co urt s judgm ent on the trial c ourt s rulings in the instant case, which is consistent with our recent decision in Reiter, quoted supra. There is more evidence in the instant case than there was in Reiter, that Scapa s asbestos-containing dryer felt frequently ran on a machine for which Mr. Saville was responsible for a particular kind of maintenance because it was used daily, at least fo r the period o f one year, in proximity to Mr. Saville s workstation on the No. 9 machine, where he would p eriodically either directly handle th e asbestos-c ontaining f elt or be exposed to dust emanating from the scraping and blo wing c lean-up proced ures. The inferences that were found too speculative in Reiter do not arise in this case be cause of th e amount of testimonial and circumstantial evidence placing the asbestos-co ntaining dryer f elts within an arm s leng th of Mr. Saville s work -site. -13- At oral argum ent, before this Court, the parties were unsure whether the evidence of Mr. Saville s exposure to Scapa s asbestos-containing dryer felts was circumstantia l or direct, a distinction that is immaterial because circumstantial evidence of exp osure w ill suffic e. See Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 345-46, 988 A.2d at 1067 (concluding that there is more than enough circumstantial evidence to conclude that [Mr. Saville] performed a significant amount of work on Scapa s prod uct. ); Balbos, 326 Md. at 210, 604 A.2d at 460 ( Exposure, however, may be estab lished circum stantially. ) (citing Roehling v. National Gypsum Co. Gold Bond Bldg. Products, 786 F.2d 1255, 1228 (4th Cir. 1986) ( The evidence, circumstantial as it may be, need only establish that [plaintiff] was in the same vicinity as witnesses who can identify the products causing the asbestos dust that all people in that area, not just the product handlers, inhaled. ); see also Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156, 11 62-63 (4th Cir. 1986) ( To sup port a reaso nable inference of substantial causation from circumstantial evidence, there must be evidence of exposure to a specific product on a regu lar basis ove r some ex tended pe riod of time in proximit y to where th e plaintiff actually w orked. ). Our holding on this sufficiency of evidence question is not as emphatically stated as the Court of Special Appeals s holding because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to survive the motions, bu t decline to state that the evidence conclusively established proximity as a matter of law. C.f. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 346, 988 A.2d at 1067 ( Unlike Reiter, the evidence in this case conclusively established that plaintiff worked in close -14- proximity to Scapa s asbestos-containin g felt for a sig nificant perio d of time, lea ving him covered in dust. ). Nonetheless, the Court of Special Appeals did not err in affirming the denial of Petitioner s motions for judgment and JNOV on Mr. Saville s claims, nor did that court misapply or misinterpret the rigors of the Balbos test. II. Procedural Issu es with C ross-claims and C ross-Defenda nts Scapa as ks this Cou rt to reverse the holding of the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the trial court s denial of Scapa s JNOV motion on its cross-claims against settling Co-Defendants, Westin ghous e, Asten , and A lbany. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 351, 988 A.2d at 1070. The Court of Special Appeals held that Scapa did not comply with Md. Rule 2-532, requiring a m otion for jud gment prio r to a motion for JNO V. The in termediate appellate court reasoned that because this Court s opinion in GMC v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 879 A.2d 1049 (2005) requires strict compliance with Rule 2-532 and because Scapa did not prove that the stipulation entered into between the parties on the management of the crossclaims was an a dequate su bstitute for a motion for judgment, the denial of the motion by the trial court would not be overturned. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 350-51, 988 A.2d at 1070. The Court of Special Appeals noted that: [e]ven if appellants were able to navigate around that mandate [that GMC v. Seay, 388 Md. 341, 879 A.2d 1049 (2005) requires strict compliance with Ru le 2-532], they would have to demonstrate to our satisfaction that the rule s two fundamental purposes were met by other means. The record before us does not support that contention. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 350, 988 A.2d at 1070. -15- Notwithstanding clever phra sing on Sc apa s part, 8 this Court s ta sk on this issu e is, again, to determine whether the trial court erre d in not granting Scapa s motion for JNOV on its crossclaims a t the clos e of all th e evide nce. Before the Court of Special Appeals, Scapa argued that the evidence against the cross-defe ndants proved that [Mr. Saville] had more exposure to the cross-defendants products than to Scapa s prod ucts, and that the jury s verdict [asse ssing liability against only Scapa and W & G] is therefore inconsistent and warrants a JNOV. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 347, 988 A.2d at 10 68. We iter ate the sum mation of the intermed iate appellate c ourt: We review the trial court s decision to allow or deny judgment or JNOV to determine whether it was legally cor rect. Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate if all evidence and inferences permit only one consideration. If there is any competent evidence, however slight, leading to su pport the plaintiff's right to recov er, the ca se shou ld be su bmitted to the jur y. 8 Scapa phrases its third issue as follows: Did Scapa preserve its right to move for JNOV on its cross-claims where the trial court specifically advised defense counsel that anything else you may raise is reserved for post-trial motions a nd the trial court subseque ntly confirmed that there was no waiver? Scapa, therefore, presents a question of waiv er, based on the analysis of the Court of Special Appeals s determ ination that there were procedural defects in violation of Md. Rule 2-532. The record reveals, however, that the trial judge did not consider Scapa to have waived its right to move for JNOV and did not base his denial of the motion on a waiver argument. Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals s holding that we are not willing to disturb the trial court s denial of that motion [for JNOV on the cross-c laims,] was rig ht, but fo r the wr ong rea son. Saville II, 190 Md. at 351, 988 A.2d at 1070. The trial judge recognized that Mr. Saville opposed Scapa s JNOV on the cross-claims on procedural grounds, but noted that Scapa s position regarding the necessary procedural ab normalities o f its cross-claim s against settling defenda nts was logical, therefore the trial judge did not deny Scapa s JNOV on procedural/ waiver grounds, but rather because it was difficult to separate out the evidence and the claims. The trial judge stated: Where I end up getting in trouble is trying to distinguish between striking all the judgmen ts because there s illogical inconsistency and granting your motion for judgmen ts against third-party defendants ¦. -16- Saville II, 190 Md. App . at 343, 988 A.2d 1 065-66 (internal citations omitted). The record indicates, and we have discussed supra, that there w as sufficien t evidence to deny Scapa s motions for judgment and JNOV on M r. Saville s claims. Additionally, a review of the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the non-mo ving cross- defenda nts, to subm it the issue of c ross-defen dants liability to the jury. The trial judg e s com ments, supra footnote 8, indicate that he considered the merits of Scapa s JNOV motion, an d ruled that th ere was su fficient evidence to support the jury s verdict that assessed no liability against the cross-defendants. Accordingly, we affirm that judgm ent. Scapa asserted cross-claims against all of the companies named in Mr. Saville s original suit. On January 18, 2008, Scapa filed, and W & G ado pted, a Motion fo r the Court to Adjudicate Cross Claims in Non-Jury Cross Claims Proceeding drawing the trial court s attention to the tri-furca ted trial condu cted in the Circuit Court for B altimore City, noting that the procedu re was no t condem ned on ap peal. See MC IC, Inc. v. Ze nobia, 86 Md. App. 456, 484-93, 587 A.2d 531, 545-47 (1991 ), rev d in part on other grounds, Owens-Illinois, Inc. et al. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992) (affirming the trial court s ruling on cross-claims for contribution where the trial judge conducted a separate, non-jury crossclaims trial on liability and damages and relied chiefly on the trial record in granting all the cross-claims for contribution). Scapa argued in the motion that it intended to put on evidence in its case-in-chief against defendants who had previously settled with Mr. Saville: -17- Westinghouse, Asten, A lbany, Garloc k, Inc., and C ertainteed; as well as against the remaining non-settling co-defendant, W & G; and against defendants who were then in Ban krup tcy, namely Celotex Asbestos Trust, Combustion Enginee ring Persona l Injury Trust, Eagle Pitcher Industries Personal Injury Settlemen t Trust, H.K . Porter, Inc. A sbestos Tru st, and Manv ille Personal In jury Settlemen t Trust. Scap a argued th at the eviden ce wou ld prove their joint tort-feasor status under the M aryland Un iform Co ntribution A mong Jo int TortFeasors Act, Md. Code, (1973, 2006 Repl. Vol.) §§ 3-1401 09 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article ( Joint Tort-feasors A ct ).9 The record does not indicate that the trial judge expressly ruled on Scapa s January 18th motion to adjudicate all cross-claim issues, of liability and damages, in a non-jury trial, but the trial judge did express reluctance at proceeding that way base d on M d. Rule 2-325(e), which req uires a jury trial as to all claims once ele cted by any party.10 9 Certainteed and Garlock do not appear in arguments presented to this Court, therefo re, we d o not referenc e those settling c ross-de fenda nts in this opinio n. 10 Md. R ule 2-325 ( Jury trial. ) (2011 Repl. Vo l.) states in pertinen t part: (a) Demand. Any party may elect a trial by jury of any issue triab le of right by a ju ry ¦. **** (e) Effect of election. When trial by jury has been elected by any party, the action, including all claims whether asserted by way of counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, a s to all parties, and as to all issues triable of right by a jury, shall be design ated up on the d ocket a s a jury trial. -18- Scapa s counsel argued that the cross-defendants had to be placed on the verdict sheet because if the jury found them to be liable for Mr. Saville s injuries, then there w ould necessarily be a pro rata reduction of any judgment according to the Joint T ort-Feasors Act. Scapa, Mr. Saville, and co-defendant W & G, agreed that the liability of the settling crossdefenda nts would have to be proven at trial because their releases with Mr. Saville had been executed without an y admission o f liability. The parties , howev er, did not ag ree on ho w to determine the cross-claim shares of any ultimate jury damage award. Ultimately, the parties resolved th e impasse by stipulation, on January 23, 2 008, stating: The Parties are goin g to s tipulate that A sten, Alb any, or [and] Westinghouse go on the verdict forms as potential shares. There will be n o judgm ent from the plea dings o n them . Scapa will put into evidence with respect to those we are going to truncate wh at we are going to offer to Your Honor. And it will be verified interrogatories about them and some documents, but that we wo n t need to g et into the issue of all these other coworker depositions. Scapa arg ues to this Court that the stipulation meant that in exchange for truncating its cross-claim evidence , Mr. Saville would re frain from moving for judgm ent at the close of Scapa s case-in-chief on the cross-claims. The record indicates that the parties agreed that the shares of any awarded damages would be determined post-verdict by the court, with the assistan ce of c ounse l. On January 24, 2008, Scapa presented the evidence on its cross-cla ims. It read into evidence: Answ ers to a Request for Admissions b y Carl Saville; deposition testimony of M r. -19- Green, former Westvaco employee; interrogatory answers from Carl Saville, Westinghouse, Asten, and Albany; and A nswers to a Request for Admissions from W & G. I n additio n, W & G adm itted into evidence excerpts from deposition testimony of Mr. Jack Smith, a former W & G employee. A t the close of evidence on the cros s-claims, w hich was the close of all the eviden ce, the follow ing excha nge took p lace: [SCAP A S COUN SEL]: Judge, we wanted to renew our motion -THE COU RT: Y es. [SCAP A S COUNSEL ]: - - motion and the testimony of our witnes ses we believe show s that w e shou ld prev ail, Judg e. THE COURT: All right. I ll deny the motion for both parties for the same - [W & G S CO UNSEL]: And renew mine. THE COU RT: W allace & Gale m otions. [SCAPA S COUNSEL]: And we also have what we filed originally in the court - THE COURT: Yes, for the same reasons on the same grounds and you ll reserve all those arguments for post-trial motions and anything else you may raise. Neither party has p resente d argum ent to thi s Cou rt, on specifically which motions were being add ressed in th is exchange. From our own investigation of the record, we conclude that the motion being ren ewed is necessarily Scapa s Motion for Judgment at the close of Plaintiff s Evidence filed on January 21, 2008. Moreover, because the parties and -20- the trial court had previously agreed that apportionment of damages amongst any liable crossdefenda nts would b e determin ed post-ve rdict, the later instru ction by the trial co urt to reserve all those argu ments log ically reference s those con tentions on th e cross-claim shares, not cross-claim liability. Scapa has told this Court that the stipulation restricted Mr. Saville from moving for judgment on the cross-claims, but did not assert that it was so restricted. Given that all the parties agreed to a liability determination by the jury, and a postverdict determination of apportionment of damages, it does not appear that Scapa was precluded from moving for judgment on the cross-claims, and indeed it probably should have done s o. Scapa, and W & G by adoption of S capa s motion, chose to bring cross-claims against certain co-defendants in Mr. Saville s case. When procedu ral rules, particu larly Md. R ule 2-325 requiring a jury trial on all claims, threatened Scapa s desired outcome, namely that the cross-defendants would share in its potential liability, it stipulated to a jury trial on liability and a post-verdict resolution of potential cross-claim shares of any damage award. When the cross-defendants were found to be not liable and Scapa and W & G were found liable, Scapa moved for JNOV on Mr. Saville s claims, and in the alternative, Scapa moved for JNOV on the cross-claims. The motions were denied. The trial judge found that there was legally sufficient evid ence supp ortin g the verd ict ag ainst Sca pa. A ccor ding ly, the trial judge denied the motion for JNOV as to the cross-claims, not because of a procedural violation of Md. Rule 2-532, which requires moving for judgment prior to moving for JNOV, -21- but because th e trial judge did not find a logical way to disrupt the jury s handling of the cross-claim eviden ce wh ile upho lding its tr eatmen t of M r. Saville s evide nce. Thus, we decline to reverse the trial court s ruling on Scapa s motion for JNOV on its cross-claims. III. Admissions As part of its case against the settling cross-defendants, Westinghouse, Albany and Asten, as well as co-defendant W & G, Scapa read into evidence answers to its request for admissions ( admissions ) served upon Mr. Saville. Before this Court, Scapa contends that, if Mr. Saville s evidence was sufficient to support a verdict against Scapa, then Scapa s evidence against the cross-defendants required verdicts against the cross-defendants ¦ because the eviden ce presente d in its case-in-chief on its cross-claims was uncontested and consisted almost entirely of admissions from Mr. Saville, particularly responses to formal requests for admis sions. Th e Court of Special A ppeals held that the Mr. Saville s admissions were merely statements of fact and the jury was not bound to accept that evidence as conclusive o f liab ility, and th eref ore [ the ju ry] did not con tradict itself wh en it found [Scap a and W &G] liable an d the C ross-D efend ants no t liable. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 348, 988 A.2d at 1068 (emphasis added). Scapa requests that this Court correct the Court of Special Appeals and clarify that [Mr. Saville s] Rule 2-424 admissions are, as provided for by the rule, conclusively established. Scapa is mistaken in its understanding of the effect o f party admissions on its burden as cross-plaintiff in its suit against the crossdefenda nts and co-d efendan t. Accordingly, on this very narrow question relating only to the -22- legal ef fect of Md. R ule 2-4 24 adm issions, w e affirm . Md. R ule 2-424 states in pertine nt part: (a) Reque st for adm ission. A party may serve one or more written requests to any other party for the admission of ¦ (2) the truth of any relevant matters of fact set forth in the re quest. **** (d) Effect of admission. Any matter a dmitted un der this Rule is conclusively established unless the c ourt on m otion perm its withdraw al or amen dment. Md. Rule 2-424(a), (d) (emphasis added). This Court has held that admissions must be conclusively binding in order to achieve the purpose of the rule, which is to eliminate the need to prove factual matters at trial wh ich the adversary cannot fairly contest, Murnan v. Joseph J. Hock, Inc., 274 Md. 528, 534, 335 A.2d 104, 108 (1975), and to avoid the necessity of preparation, and proof at the trial, of matters which either cannot be or are not dispute d. Mullan Co. v. International Corp., 220 Md. 248, 260, 151 A.2d 906, 913 (1959) (footn ote om itted). Scapa read into evidence ap proximately 40 selected exce rpts from Mr. Sa ville s admissions as part of its case alleging joint tort-feasor liability against the cross-defendants: Westinghouse, Asten , and A lbany an d co-de fenda nt W & G. Examples of such admissions include: Both wet felts and dry felts were used during plaintiff s employment at the Westvac o paper m ill. Westinghouse turbines were used at the Westvaco pap er mill during plaintiff s emplo yment. -23- Installation and removal of the insulation from the Westinghouse turbines during plaintiff s employment created dust which contained respirable asbestos fiber. Plaintiff was in the vicinity of workers installing and removing asbestos insulation materials from the Westinghouse turbines at the Westvaco paper mill. Plaintiff inhaled dust caused by the installation and removal of insulation materia ls from the W estingh ouse tu rbines. The plaintiff was never warned about hazards from the installation and remov al of asb estos ins ulation f rom the Westin ghous e turbin es. There were no warnings on the Westinghou se turbines regarding the da ngers of asb estos. Once a dryer felt was removed form its packaging, plaintiff could not identify the ma nufac turer of the dryer f elt. Warnings were not placed on any dryer felts used at the W estvaco pa per mill during the plain tiff s em ploymen t. Plaintiff saw no warnings on any of the dryer f elts used at the Westvaco paper mill dur ing his e mploym ent. The admissions, including those not excerpted here, addressed Westinghouse and W & G by name, while alluding to the asbestos-co ntaining dryer f elts produc ed and pr ovided to Westvaco paper mil l by cross-defendants Asten and Albany. Additionally, Scapa asked about exposure to dust con taining respir able asbestos fibers from the installation and removal of pipe insulatio n and f rom the prepar ation of asbesto s ceme nt insula tion. Mr. Saville s admissions established conclusively that he was exposed to dust from Westinghouse s asbestos-containing product; however, whether that exposure was a -24- substantial cause of Mr. Saville s injury was a question for the trier of fact. This evidence differs from the evidence presented against Scapa, and additionally, fails to prove Westinghouse s liability as a matter of law because the admissions did not address how often the maintena nce wo rk on the tur bines wa s perform ed thereby em itting respirable dust (frequency); or whether such maintenance w as perform ed regularly. Ev en if we w ere to assume that Mr. Saville s admissions satisfy the proximity prong of the Balbos test, as a matter of law, the admissions did not likewise satisfy the frequency and regularity prongs. The admissions were also presented as evidence against Albany and Asten, producers of dryer felts. Unlike testimony and physical evidence regarding the Scapa dryer felts, Mr. Saville s admission s did not indicate whether or when the Albany or Asten dryer felts w ere installed on the No. 9 machine, where Mr. Saville was stationed. Those admissions, therefor e, do not s atisf y Balbos as a ma tter of law . Here, Scapa asks us to hold that Mr. Saville s admissions established the crossdefendants s liability as a matter of law. Accordingly, Scapa concludes that its motion for JNOV on its cross-claims should have been granted. A party is not entitled to judgment n.o.v. unless the facts and circumstances so considered are such as to permit of only one inference with regard to the issue presented. Owen s-Illinois v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 117, 604 A.2d 47, 52 (1992) (quoting Impala Platinum v. Impala Sales, 283 Md. 296, 327, 389 A.2d 887, 905 (1978)). Although the facts ad mitted did p rovide som e evidenc e to support Scapa s cross-claims, they did not establish substantial factor causation under -25- Balbos, as a matter of law, and they did not compel only one inference. Therefore, the admissions were properly submitted to the jury for consideration as part of Scapa s case-inchief agains t the cros s-defe ndants and co -defen dant. See Wilson v. Crane, 385 Md. 185, 201, 867 A.2d 1077, 1086 (2005) (holding that Rule 2-40 4 admissio ns were re levant to the merits of the claim ag ainst an asb estos-conta ining prod uct manu facturer, bu t petitioners at tria l still had the burden of establishing that [the] asbestos-containing gaskets were a substantial contributing fact or ). Accord ingly, the Court of Spe cial Appeals correctly denom inated Mr. Saville s admissions to be statements of fact, and no t, as Scapa suggests, conclusive evid ence of lia bility. Moreover, Scapa errs in its analogy to MCIC , Inc. v. Zeno bia, a case wherein the Court of Special Appeals held that answers [provided by cross-appellants] are admissions of exposure properly considered by the trial court in finding GAF liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor in this case. Zenobia, 86 Md. App. at 486, 587 A.2d at 546. The intermediate appellate court went on to say that evide nce [adm issions of ex posure to GAF s products] was legally sufficient to support the trial court s determination that GAF was a joint tortfeasor liable for contribution ¦. Zenobia , 86 Md. App. at 488, 587 A.2d at 547. All that Zenobia stands for in this instance, is that uncontested factu al matters, which are introduced into evid ence th rough party adm issions, a re conc lusively es tablishe d. The jury, or the trial court in the case of Zenobia , was still required to weigh the evidence in light of prevaili ng law . -26- IV. Treatm ent of § 524 B ankruptcy Trust Settleme nt Pay ments to Mr. Sa ville At the commen cement of M r. Saville s original action numerous defendants entered bankrup tcy. Several of th ose defen dants settled with Mr. Sa ville. Pu rsuant to 11 U.S .C. § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, a trust ( 524(g) Trust ) may be created to pay claims of personal injury caused by asbestos exposure in exchange for an injunction forestalling asbestos litigation.11 See e.g. Dartez v. Fibreboard Corp., 765 F.2d 456 , 474 (5th Cir. 1985) 11 The Th ird Circuit de scribed the e volution of trusts established pursuant to Federal Bankru ptcy Code, 1 1 U.S.C . § 524(g) ( § 524(g) T rusts ), stating: In an effo rt to grapple with a social, econom ic and legal c risis of national importance within the statutory framework of [C]hapter 11, the [New York] bankruptcy court oversaw the largely consensual plan leading to the establishment of a trust out of which all asbestos health-related claims were to be paid. Id. at 621. Th e trust was designed to satisfy the claim s of all victims, whene ver their disea se manife st[ed], (the Manv ille Trust ). [In the Matter of Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R.] 618 [(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986)], 628. ¦ The M anville Trust was the basis for Congress s eff ort to deal with the problem of asbestos claims on a national basis, which it did by enacting § 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code as part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-835, at 40 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3340, 3348-49. Section 524(g) authorizes courts to enjoin entities from taking legal action for the purpose of ¦ collecting, recovering, or receiving payment or recovery with respect to any [asbestos-related] claim or demand through the establishment of a trust from which asbestos-related claims and dem ands are p aid. 11 U.S .C. § 524(g )(1)(B) . In re Grossman s Inc., 607 F .3d 114 , 126 (3 d Cir. 20 10) (em phasis a dded). -27- (noting that [11 U.S.C.] § 362(a)(6) of Bankruptcy code, which prohibits any act to assess a claim against the debtor seems to prevent any determination in the current action of the percentage of liability attributable to [bankrupts] Johns-Manville and Unarco. ) Scapa seeks to reduce the trial judgme nt by the amounts of payments made to Mr. Saville from such 524(g) Trusts by appealing to a tort-feaso r s right of co ntribution en shrined in th e Joint Tortfeasors Act; however, Scapa has not presented any analysis of how to apply the particular provisions of the Ac t to a § 524(g ) Trust. 12 As it argued before the Cou rt of Special Appeals, Scapa maintains that § 524(g) Trusts should be considered jointly and severally liable, as a matter of law, under the Joint Tort-feasors A ct because a § 524(g ) Trust paym ent is tantamount to an adm ission or con cession of liability, and/or beca use a payme nt is the functional equivalent of an adjudication, and/or because public policy calls for prevention of game smanshi p and double reco very. 12 Scapa suggests that an automatic off-set to its verdict would be consistent with how other state courts are handling § 524(g) Trusts. No appellate state court, however, has rendered an opinion about the p roper han dling of § 5 24(g) Tru st settlement agre ements in concert with state laws implem enting the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tort-feasors Act. Scapa cites to Case Management Orders created by the Circuit Court of Kanawha Cou nty, West Virginia, a state which has not adopted the Act, and several Courts of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania requiring disclosure of bankruptcy trust submissions and claim forms prior to trial. Given Scapa s decision not to challenge Mr. Saville s disclosures, or nondisclosures, under the Maryland Rules, these examples are irrelevant as they only evidence that trial courts have the auth ority to issue ord ers to man age e ffic ient a nd timely d iscovery. Scapa also mis charac terized a federa l district co urt case , Lewin v. A merican Export Lines, Inc., 224 F.R.D. 389, 396 (N.D. Ohio 2004), in which a motion to compel an answer to an interrogatory concernin g bankru ptcy trust settlemen t payments was denied, bu t that court did conclude that if the jury found the defendant liable then it would compel production of the settleme nt infor mation . -28- Being persuade d that there w as not a full accou nting of the § 524(g) T rust paymen ts made to Mr. Saville during trial, and concluding that the judgment aw ard of $1,684,415.00 should be reduce d by any and all § 524(g) T rust paymen ts that express ly require off-se ts to a judgment, received up to and including the date of entry of the final judgment, April 30, 2008, we reverse the ju dgment o f the Cou rt of Specia l Appeals with directio n to reman d to the trial court for discovery of § 524(g) Trust settlement agreements so that the trial court can adju st the jury verdict ap prop riate ly. 13 A. Relevant Procedural H istory and Facts The record extra ct indicates tha t Mr. Sav ille concede d that off-se ts to the judgment are warranted, but only when expressly required by the § 524(g) Trust settlement agreements. According to the record, Scapa had a list of such § 524(g) Trust settlements at the time of the pre-trial hearing on January 7, 2008, during which the trial court addressed Scapa s Motion in Limine for Declaration of Settled Parties and Entities, and Notice Confirm ing Intent to 13 In briefs to this Court, Scapa asserts that it is entitled to discovery on all issues relating to the claims that Mr. Saville submitted to any bankruptcy trusts and any resulting payme nts. Petitioner s B rief p. 27 (em phasis add ed). We h eld in Bullinger, that the relevant portions of ¦ settlem ent agreem ents reached between the Plaintiffs and the Manv ille trust and oth er settling joint tort-f easors, wh ich were p rovided to th e trial court in camera, were d iscove rable. Porter Hayden v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 467, 713 A.2d 963, 969 (1998). W e did not lim it discovery to settling co-defen dants. The refore, it is equ itable and consistent with our resolution of the Bullinger case, to order discovery of all § 524 Trust settlement payments, not just those made by entities who were at one time parties to the instant litig ation. -29- Seek Settlem ent Sha re Re duction . 14 At that hearing, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: Oka y. Motion in limine for declaration of settled parties. **** [SCAP A S COU NSEL ]: ¦ I understood that we had to file the motion up front requesting the declaration of settled parties and then reque sting any kind o f reduction in terms of a verdict. THE COURT: How is that actually used ? How is that dealt with? [MR. SAVILLE S COUNSEL]: We don t believe the settlement should be dealt with a t all. If they put in evidence against other cross-defendants, then maybe they will overcome a motion for judgment to let the jury consider if they are joint tortfeasors, but we don t believe there should be any reference to settlement or anything that settlement or releases should have any affect in th is trial. [SCAP A S COUNSEL ]: Then maybe I misunderstand the procedure, Your Honor. I thought that I had to request the list of settled parties, which I do have , then I had to request up front and in advance of the trial the right to have a credit for those settlements if I prove their share. For exam ple, As ton (sic) , which is also a d ryer felt manufacturer, if I prove that their asbestos-containing dryer felts were a substantial contributing factor and they paid $100,00 0 to Mr. Saville, that I co uld, in the event of a plaintiffs verdict of a million dollars, argue about setoffs and credits. 14 On May 18, 2007, Scapa filed a Motion in Limine for Declaration of Settled Parties and Entities, and Notice Confirming Intent to Seek Settlement Share Redu ction. The mo tion was o riginally made in the Beeman May 9, 2006 Mesothelioma Consolidated Trial Group (Case No. 24x04001106); however the Beeman case was severed from the trial group prior to ruling on the motion. -30- [MR. SAVILLE S COUNSEL]: As long as we are go ing to argue about that p ost-verdict, I can make any argu ments th en. ¦ THE COU RT: T his is a po st-verdi ct. [SCAP A S COUNSEL ]: I understood that part . Its post-verdic t, but getting th e list is pre-verd ict. THE COU RT: All right. I ve got you. [SCA PA S C OUN SEL]: I have the S aville list. THE COU RT: Ok ay. That s fine. W e ll deal with th at postverdict. Therefore, the record indicates that, prior to trial, Scapa had at least some information relating to settlemen t agreeme nts negotiate d by Mr. Sa ville and disclosed § 524(g) Trusts. Upon return of an unfavorable jury verdict, Scapa filed a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative For New Trial , including therein a request that the trial court re duce the v erdict amo unt [on a p ro tanto 15 basis] by any and all settlements received by Plain tiff from a ny bankrup tcy trusts for his alleg ed expos ure to asbestos-containing materials and order disclosure of documentation identifying am ounts paid or owed to Mr. Saville. Subsequently, Scapa responded to Mr. Saville s Motion for Entry of Judgment claiming that no judgment should be entered until a full accounting of all payments by bankruptcy settlement trusts had been conducted, specially noting that Mr. 15 A pro tan to release directs a dollar-for-dollar reduction in a verdict a ward. Garlock, Inc. v. Gallagher, 149 Md. App. 189, 205-06, 814 A.2d 1007, 1016 (2003) ( The releases ¦ state that a dollar for dollar reduction be credited ¦ thus creating ¦ pro tanto releases. ). -31- Saville s Motion accounte d for only two of the six trusts that Scapa had knowledge of at the time. At the Ap ril 11, 20 08 pos t-trial mo tions he aring, the trial judge considered S capa s JNOV motion and Mr. Saville s Motion for Entry of Judgment. Scapa s JNOV motion was denied, therefore no post-verdict discovery took place regarding the § 524 Trust(g) pa yments to Mr. Saville.16 The trial court entered a final judgment for Mr. Saville in the amount of $1,684.415.00, having reduced the jury verdict of $1,718,000.00 by the amounts of settlement payments that Mr. Saville received from three asbestos settlement trusts, which allegedly contained a provision requiring a dollar for dollar off-set from a jury award, including: $17,50 0.00 fr om the Man ville settle ment, $ 15,165.00 from the Celotex settlement, and $920.00 from the H .K. Porter se ttlement. 17 The judge did not off-set the verdict by other amounts that Scapa alleged had been paid to Mr. Saville, including: $20,000.00 from the 16 Scapa s request for a full accounting of settlement agreements and resulting payments is tantamount to a request for discovery, therefore we find that the issue of treatment of the § 524(g) Trust payments is ripe for review because the trial court denied the request and entered judgment without permitting discovery to address the issue of additional off-sets. See Steven son v. State , 180 Md. App. 440, 447, 951 A.2d 875, 879 (2008 ) ( Before this Court, appellant raises the same issue that she presented to the circuit court; therefore, despite the circuit court s avoidance of that issue, it is properly before us. ) (citing Md . Rule 8-131(a) (generally, an appellate court will not decide issues not raised in or decided by the trial cou rt )). 17 In his Motion for Entry of Judgment filed January 31, 2008, Mr. Saville argued that the verdict was subject to reductions in the amounts of $17,500 .00 from th e Manv ille Settlement and $7,583.00 from the Celotex Settlement. In his proposed am ended order, M r. Saville corrected two mistakes in its first proposed order, increasing the off-set amounts for the Celotex settlement by $7,582 .00 for a total of $15,165.00 and adding H.K. Porter Trust in the amount of $920.00. -32- Eagle Pitcher Industries Personal Injury Trust; $8,423.32 from the Combustion Engineering 524(g) Personal Injury Trust; and an unknown amount from the Haliburton/Harbison Walker Trust. 18 The Court of Special Appea ls held that Scapa did not prove joint tort-feasor status of any claimed b ankruptcy sett lement trusts, which would be its burden if seeking contribution under t he Join t Tort-f easors A ct. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 353, 988 A.2d at 1071. Moreover, the intermediate appellate court held that [t]he judgment in this case was reduced to account for three bankruptcy settlements, upon [Mr. Saville s] motion to amend the judgmen t, but the [trial] judge had no ev identiary basis upon which to g rant appellant s motion to reduce the judgment for the bankruptcy trust payments. Saville II, 190 Md. App. at 353, 988 A.2d at 1071.19 Scapa ple d in its motion for JNOV that additional § 524(g) Trust 18 Scapa specifically requested reductions from: the Celotex Asbestos Trust in the amount of $67,100.00; Eagle Pitcher Industries Personal Injury Trust for $20,000.00; Combustion Engineering 524 (g) Personal Injury Trust for $8,423.32; H.K. Porter, Inc. Asbestos Trust for $920.00; Haliburton/Harbison Walker (noting unknown settlement amount due to a redacted release f orm provided b y Mr. Saville); and the Johns Mans ville Personal Injury Settlement Trust for $17,500.00. 19 Specifically, the Court of Special Appeals noted a lack of evidence stating: Scapa claimed that [Mr. Saville] received payments fro m Eagle Picher Industries Personal Trust, the Combustion Engineering 524(g) Personal Injury Trust, and the Halliburton bankruptcy trust. Howe ver, Scapa did not introd uce evide nce of the ir distribution procedures, nor is there any evide nce on the record that [Mr. Saville] actually received the payments alleged. Saville II, 190 M d. App . at 353, 9 88 A.2 d at 107 1. -33- settlement payments ha d been m ade to M r. Saville, but the record on appeal do es not indica te if those agreements w ere presented to the trial court. Theref ore, the Court of Special A ppeals is technically correct that the trial judge did not have evidence upon which to base further reductions, however, post-verdict discovery w ould be ne cessary and a ppropriate in order to procure that evidence because once the verdicts were rendered against petitioners, the amounts of the settlement agreements became relevant in determining the apportionment of damages as to petitioners und er the Ma ryland Unifo rm Con tribution Am ong Joint T ortfeasors Act. Porter Hayden v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 45 2, 461, 713 A.2d 962, 966 (1998 ) (a case in which we remanded the issue of apportionment of damages to the trial court because it was a factua l determ ination) . B. Section 524(g) Trusts and the Joint Tort-feasors Act As noted supra, a § 524(g) Trust estab lished pursu ant to Federal Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 5 24(g), is statuto rily protected fro m suit. The refore, in ord er to obtain a utomatic off-sets to the judgment rendered against it, Scapa maintains that it cannot sue those entities for contribution and instead asks that we analogize the establishment of joint tort-feasor status through judicial determination, adjudication , by admission , or default jud gment to the establishment of a Trus t and payme nts of trust m onies to asbestos claimants. See 11 U.S.C. § 524( g)(1)(B ). The statutory prerequisites for establishing a § 524 Trust are outlined in 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(g)(2)(B)(i)(I), (ii)(I-III): the debtor must have been named in an action for damages -34- allegedly caused by asbestos, and be subject to substantial demands for payment in the future ¦ [additionally] permitting the pursuit of such claims outside the trust mechanism would threaten the p lan s attemp ts to deal equitably with current and future demands. 11 U.S.C . §§ 524 (g)(2)(B )(i)(I), (ii)(I-I II). The trust itself must also satisfy certain standards under § 524(g) in order to qu alify for the issuance of a channeling injunction directing all future claims to the trust: the trust must assume the liabilities of the debtor for current and future claims and must be funded at least in part by the securities of the debtor; the trust must either own, or be entitled to own, the majority of the voting shares of the debtor, its parent, or its subsidiary; the trust must use its assets to pay future claims and demands; and the trust must provide fo r mechan isms ensur ing its ability to value and pay present and future claimants in substantially the same mann er. In re Combustion Engineering, Inc., 391 F.3d 190, 234 n.45 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 5 24(g)(2)(B)(i)(I)-(IV), (ii)(V)). In light of the § 524(g) Trust characteristics, Scapa as serts that beca use the Tru st must assume the liabilities of the asbestos-manufacturer, that the manufacturer can only establish such a Trust after having been threatened with suit, or actually sued, and that the Trust money must be used to pay claims, that general liability under the Joint Tort-feasors Act is established by the fact of the creation of the T rust and paymen t of settle ment. W e disag ree. Under the Act, joint tort-feasors are two or m ore person s jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them. Joint Tort-feasors Act, § 3-1401(c). One purpose of the Joint -35- Tort-feasors Act is to try in one action all phases of the litigation, Bullinger, 350 Md. at 473, 713 A.2d at 972, and to pre vent doub le recovery, Hollingsworth v. Connor, 136 Md. App. 91, 139, 764 A.2d 318, 344 (2000) (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Armstrong, 326 Md. 107, 126, 604 A.2d 47, 56 (1992)). Liability arising because of joint tort-feasor status and the consequential impact of a release of such a tort-feaso r was aptly surveyed by the Court of Special Appeals in Jacobs: As the Court of Appeals recognized long ago, the Act does not specify the test of liability. Clearly, something short of an actual judgment will suffice. Swigert v. W elk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428 (1957). The fact, however, that a party has been sued or threatened with suit is not enough to establish joint tort-feasor status. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas, Inc. v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 531-32, 682 A.2d 1143 (1996). Tort-feasor status, in the absence of adjudication, generally rests on admission by the purported tort-feasor of such status. Thus, a party will be considered a joint tort-feasor when it admits joint tort-feasor status in a settle ment a greem ent, see Martinez, 300 Md. at 9495, 476 A.2d 192, or if a default judgment has been entered against a party. See Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 473-74, 713 A.2d 962 (1998) (because a default judgment is considered an ad miss ion o f liab ility, it is sufficient to establish joint tort-feasor status). One will not be considered a joint tortfeasor, however, merely because he or she enters a settlement and pays mone y. See Ga rrett, 343 Md. at 532, 682 A.2d 1143. Where the settling parties specify in the release that the settling party shall not be considered a joint tort-feasor, monies paid on account of such settlem ent will be c onsidered merely volunteer payments; a non-settling defenda nt judicially determined to be liable will not be entitled to a reduction of the damages awarded against it on accou nt of the co nsideration p aid by the settling party. See id. at 531-33; Collier v. Eagle Pitcher Indus., Inc., 86 Md. App. 38, 57, 5 85 A.2 d 256, cert. denied, 323 Md. 33, 591 A.2d 249 (19 91). -36- Jacobs, 131 Md. App. at 374-75, 749 A.2d at 191 (2000); see also H ashmi v. B ennett, 416 Md. 707, 726-27, 7 A.3d 1059, 1071 (2010) (noting that [n]ever has this Court ¦ permitted ¦ judicial determination of joint tort-feasor status, without their having been joined as original defendants or as third parties. ) (footnote om itted). Scapa has not pe rsuaded th is Court that deviation from prior cases that address the methods for establish ing joint tortfeasor status, is warranted. Thus, in accordance with our settled case law, the establishment of a § 524(g) Trust does not amount to an adjudication, nor does it suffice as an admission of liability to the claimant, nor is it analogous to a default judgment. Consequently, Scapa must rely on the language of the settlement agreements to determine whether the Trust may be treated as a joint tort-feas or for the p urposes o f an off-s et to a judgm ent. D. Bullinger: Discoverable, Relevant Releases Scapa argues that under Bullinger, it is entitled to post-verdict, pre-judgment discovery on the amounts that Mr. Saville received from any and all § 524(g) Trusts and that a subsequent reduction in the jury award must be effectuated as a matter of law regardless of the language of the settlement agreements. M r. Saville claims, however, that because the § 524 Tru st settlement ag reements individually add ress whe ther or not the ir payments to the claimant should impact a subsequent judgment won by the claimant in court against a nonbankrupt / non-settling defendant, that the on ly discoverable trust payments from Celotex, H.K. Porter and Manv ille were a lready dis closed and ac counte d. Bullinger establishes that § 524(g) Trust settlement agreements and payment amounts are discoverable and that the -37- provisions in such agre ements go vern wh ether off-se ts should be made to a verdict. In 1995, numerous plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City alleging that exposure from the products of Owens Corning Fiberglas Corporation, Porter Hayden Company ( Bullinger Petitioners ), and numerous others caused them to contract asbestosrelated mesothelioma. Upon a return of a favorable jury verdict the plaintiffs provided information to the trial court for in camera consideration regarding settlements with the Manv ille Trust and with other settling joint tort-feasors. Bullinger, 350 Md. at 458, 713 A.2d at 964. The trial court denied the Bullinger Petitioners s requests to consult the settlement information and the Court o f Special Appe als held that those amou nts were properly withheld. We disagreed. We held that the trial court erred in refusing to allow petitioners to inspect the amounts of the settlement agreements, and we vacated the judgment as to the apportionment of liability. Bullinger, 350 Md. at 459, 713 A.2d at 965. On remand, w e directed the Circuit Court fo r Baltimore City to apply the preclusive effect of ¦ [the] federal court action in Manville VI [In re Join t E. & S. Dists. Abestos Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1, 9 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996)], which would pre-date the trial court s apport ionme nt determ ination o n rema nd. Bullinger, 350 M d. at 459 , 713 A .2d at 96 5. In Manville VI, the federal district court predicted that the Maryland Court of Appea ls would exclude the Trust in determining the number and size of pro rata shares and would credit amounts settled by the Trust to defendants adjudicated joint tortfeasors who -38- have not alrea dy settled. 20 Manville VI, 929 F. Supp. at 4. In light of the substantive conclusion reached by the federal district court while interpreting Maryland law, this Court, in Bullinger, precluded the Maryland litigants and the Manville Trust from re-litigating the issue of apportionment of damages and directed the Maryland trial court to adopt the apportionment determina tion explain ed by the fed eral district cou rt. Our hold ing in Bullinger, therefore re solved treatm ent of the p rovisions of a specific T rust, which expressly require d that loc al law b e applie d to the d etermin ation of off-se ts. In Bullinger, we directed the trial court to permit post-verdict discovery of the negotiated settlements [that] may have been irrelevant in the pre-trial stage, but became relevant to the determination of apportionment of damages under the Joint Tort-feasors Act once the verdicts were rendered against petitioners. Bullinger, 350 Md. at 461, 713 A.2d at 966. Concluding that [t]he sums and certain of the conditions of the settlements ¦ are 20 In the ca se, In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Abestos Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1, 9 (E.D .N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1996) ( Manville VI ), the federal district court for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York, analyzed how the Maryland Court of Appeals would a pply Maryland set-off principles ¦ in the context of the present Settlement[,] stating: In cases tried to v erdict, the [Ma nville] Trust s hall not be counted as a joint tortfeasor in calculating the value of the statutory pro rata shares of the verdict. If the plaintiff has settled his or her claim with the [Manville] Trust at or before the time judgment is entered, the judgment against any non-settling tortfeasors shall be redu ced by the am ount of the settlement. Where there is more than one such non-settling tortfeasor, they shall share the benefit of such reduction on a pro rata basis. Manville VI, 929 F . Supp . at 9. -39- relevant an d discove rable, we specifically stated : Petitioners had a need to inspect so much of the settlement agreement as was relevant to a determination of whether, and how much, the judgments against them might be affected by (1) the way in which the agreement classified the settling defen dant, i.e., tort-feasor or non tort-feasor, (2) whether a pro tanto or pro rata release was intended, and (3) the amount paid fo r the rele ase. Bullinger, 350 Md. at 468-69, 713 A.2d at 970; see Md. Rule 2-4 02(a) (permitting discovery of any m atter, not privileg ed that is relevan t to the ac tion). Under the Act, a non-settling joint tort-feasor is entitled to a reduction on a claim against it when the plaintiff has entered into a release with a joint tort-feasor. Bullinger, 350 Md. at 469, 713 A.2d at 970. In lieu of litigation, a § 524(g) Trust may enter into a negotiated settlement agreement with an individual claimant or class of claiman ts with the intention of discharging any alleged liability for asbestos-related personal injury. Such an agreement may address the liability of the bankrupt company, in general, or in specific as relevant to poten tial litigatio n betw een the settling c laiman t and thir d parties . For instance, the Manville Trust, stipulated to the Trust s tort-feasor status, stating: The Trust shall be treated in litigation betw een Ben eficiaries of th e Trust as a le gally responsible tortfeasor under applicable law, without the introduction of further proof. See Bullinger, 350 Md. at 471, 713 A.2d at 971 ( The release between the plaintiff and the settling defendant may provide that the settling defendant, is, or is considered, a joint tort-feasor, in which case the nonsettling defenda nt is entitled to a reduction in the verdict. ) (citing Martinez v. Lopez, 300 -40- Md. 91, 94-95, 476 A.2d 19 7, 198-99 (1984)); see also Jones v. Hurst, 54 Md. App. 607, 610-11, 459 A.2 d 219, 22 1-22 (198 3) (involvin g an expr ess denial o f liability coupled with language in the release stating that the s ettling defenda nt would be consid ered a joint tor tfeasor to the same extent and effect as if judgments had been rendered against them (sic) as joint tort-feasors (sic). ). In the instant case, the substance of the settlement agreeme nts betwe en Mr. S aville and any and all § 524(g) Trusts will determine the amount of the reduction of the judgmen t.21 Acc ordingly, we rely upon our holding in Bullinger and direct that on r emand to the Circuit Court for Baltim ore City, the cou rt should: (1) p ermit discov ery for all settleme nt agreem ents between Mr. Saville and § 524(g) Trusts; (2) and reduce the judgment according to the manner explained infra, noting that denials of liability with no provisions for treatment of the Trust as a joint tort-feasor will result in no off-set for that particular Trust, just as analog ous rele ases w ould be treated u nder th e Joint T ort-fea sors A ct. 21 We make no comment about the status of the settlement payments made to M r. Saville pursuant to release agreeme nts with (adjudicated non-tort-feasor) cross-defendants: Westinghouse, Albany, and Asten because Scapa has only appealed specifically the issue of reductio n of the judgm ent to ac count f or paym ents fro m § 52 4(g) Tr usts. -41- JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEA LS AFFIR MED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WIT H DIRECTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIM ORE CITY FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID 75% BY P E T I T I O N E R A N D 2 5% B Y RESPONDENT. -42-

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